Brahma Prakash Sharma And Others vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 1951

Decision Date: 8 May 1953

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, M. Patanjali Sastri, Ghulam Hasan

In the matter titled Brahma Prakash Sharma and others versus the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the eighth of May, 1953. The case was reported under the citation 1954 AIR 10 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reports at 1954 SCR 1169. The bench hearing the petition consisted of Justice B.K. Mukherjea, Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, and Justice Ghulam Hasan. The petitioners were identified as Brahma Prakash Sharma and several other individuals, while the respondent was the State of Uttar Pradesh.

The judgment recorded the composition of the bench in several ways, noting “Bench: Mukherjea, B.K.” and later reiterating the members as “Mukherjea, B.K.; Bhagwati; Natwaral H. Sastri; M. Patanjali (Chief Justice); Das; Sudhi Ranjan Hasan; Ghulam.” The case has been referenced in numerous legal publications, including the 1954 Supreme Court case series (C 1954 SC 743), the 1959 and 1962 reports, and several subsequent citations up to the early 1990s. The operative statutory provision discussed was section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, which deals with the reflection on the condition and character of judicial officers when such reflection amounts to contempt of court.

The headnote of the judgment emphasized the purpose of contempt proceedings. It explained that the objective is not to shield judges personally from criticism but to protect the public interest, which would be jeopardised if the authority of the court were diminished and public confidence in the administration of justice were eroded. Accordingly, when the court itself is the target of attack, the summary power to initiate contempt proceedings must be exercised with great caution and only where the matter is clear and beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court outlined two principal considerations in contempt cases involving statements about judges. First, it must be examined whether the comment on the conduct or character of the judge falls within the bounds of fair and reasonable criticism. Second, the Court must determine whether the statement constitutes mere libel or defamation, or whether it rises to the level of contempt of court. The Court held that a purely defamatory remark that does not intend to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law does not warrant contempt proceedings.

When assessing whether a defamatory utterance aimed at a judge is likely to undermine public confidence in the judge’s competence or integrity, or to distract the court from its duties, the surrounding facts and circumstances become relevant. The degree of publicity given to the statement and the context in which it was made are also material factors. The Court stressed that the assessment cannot rely solely on the language of the statement; the entire surrounding situation must be considered. The judgment concluded this portion of the opinion by noting that the Executive Committee of a District Bar Association had received several complaints concerning the manner in which the Judicial Magistrate and the Revenue Officer of the district disposed of cases and treated litigants and lawyers.

The Court explained that the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association had adopted a resolution concerning the manner in which the Judicial Magistrate and the Revenue Officer of the district disposed of cases and treated litigants and lawyers. The resolution declared that, in the Committee’s considered opinion, the two officers were thoroughly incompetent in law, failed to inspire confidence in their judicial work, were prone to stating incorrect facts when passing orders, and were overbearing and discourteous to both the litigant public and lawyers. The Committee also attached a list of various specific complaints against the officers. This resolution was adopted in a closed-session meeting, was typed by the President of the Association himself, and was sent confidentially to the District Magistrate, the Commissioner of the Division, and the Chief Secretary and Premier of the State. Consequently, the District Magistrate petitioned the Allahabad High Court for contempt proceedings against the six appellants who had passed the resolution. The High Court found the appellants guilty of contempt but accepted their apology; nevertheless, it ordered them to bear the costs of the respondent State. On further appeal, the Court held that, after considering all surrounding circumstances, any contempt, if it existed, was merely technical in nature and that, once the appellants had filed affidavits before the High Court, the contempt proceedings should have been terminated. The appeal before the Supreme Court was Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 1951, granted special leave on 2 April 1951 from the judgment dated 5 May 1950 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 34 of 1949. Counsel for the appellants included the Attorney-General for India and senior counsel, while counsel for the respondent State was also listed. The judgment was delivered on 8 May 1953 by Justice Mukherjee. The Supreme Court noted that the appeal challenged the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, which had held the six members of the Executive Committee guilty of contempt, accepted their apology, yet required them to pay the State’s costs. The contempt proceedings arose from resolutions passed on 20 April 1949, copies of which were forwarded to the District Magistrate and other officials by a covering letter signed by the first appellant in his capacity as President of the Bar Association. To understand the arguments raised, the Court found it necessary to state the relevant facts: the resolutions concerned the conduct of two judicial officers who were then serving at Muzaffarnagar, one being a Judicial Magistrate and the other a Revenue Officer.

In this case the two officers involved were Kanhaya Lal Mehra, who was serving as a Judicial Magistrate, and Lalta Prasad, who was a Revenue Officer. It was alleged that the first appellant, who acted as President of the District Bar Association, had received a large number of complaints concerning the manner in which these officers disposed of cases in their courts and the way they treated lawyers and members of the public. The Executive Committee of the Bar Association examined the complaints, concluded that they were genuine and well-founded, and accordingly convened a meeting on 20 April 1949. At that meeting the Committee adopted several resolutions. The first resolution began with a statement that the members of the Association, having had ample opportunity to observe the judicial work of Sri Kanhaya Lal, Judicial Magistrate, and Shri Lalta Prasad, Revenue Officer, now held the considered opinion that both officers were thoroughly incompetent in law, failed to inspire confidence in their judicial work, tended to state incorrect facts when passing orders, and were overbearing and discourteous to both the litigant public and the lawyers. The resolution further noted that, in addition to these common defects, each officer possessed additional specific defects, which were then enumerated under separate headings. The next resolution directed that copies of the resolution be sent to the Honourable Premier, the Chief Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Government, the Commissioner and the District Magistrate for appropriate action. Another resolution requested that the District Magistrate and the Collector be asked to meet a deputation consisting of five members of the Association at an early date, the names of those five members being listed in the resolution. It is undisputed that the meeting of the Executive Committee was held in camera, with no non-members permitted to attend, that the resolutions were typed by the President himself, and that the proceedings were not entered in the Association’s Minute Book. The following day, on 21 April 1949, the President transmitted a copy of the resolutions together with a covering letter marked “confidential” to the District Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar. Identical copies of the resolutions were also dispatched to the Divisional Commissioner, the Chief Secretary and the Premier of Uttar Pradesh. It is not contested that the District Magistrate was the immediate superior of the two officers concerned, while the Commissioner, the Chief Secretary and the Premier occupied higher positions in the official hierarchy. One paragraph of the covering letter stated that complaints against the two officers had been increasing and that the matter had now reached a stage where it had to be formally addressed. The letter asserted that the resolution was well-considered, unanimous, and represented the consensus of opinion of all practitioners on both the criminal and revenue sides. The post-script of the letter requested that the District Magistrate, if convenient, fix an early date for a meeting with the deputation of five members as specified in the third resolution.

On 27 April 1949 the Divisional Commissioner sent a letter to appellant No 1 acknowledging receipt of the copy of the resolutions and asking the addressee to provide specific details of cases tried by the officers named in the resolutions to support the allegations contained therein. The very next day, without waiting for the requested information, the Commissioner wrote to the Chief Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Government suggesting that the matter should be brought before the High Court because, in his view, it was not uncommon for influential members of the Bar to obtain such resolutions from their associations in order to exert extra-judicial pressure on judicial officers and to make them susceptible to questionable wishes. On 10 May 1949 a deputation of five members visited the District Magistrate and discussed the entire situation with him, and the Magistrate informed the deputation that the details of the complaints required by the Commissioner should be furnished as soon as possible. The appellant No 1 complied with this direction and on 20 June 1949 sent the District Magistrate a list of specific instances, the accuracy of which was attested by several senior lawyers who had actually handled those cases. Subsequently, on 20 July 1949 the District Magistrate, through the Divisional Commissioner, addressed a letter to the Registrar of the Allahabad High Court requesting that the Court be drawn to the resolutions passed on 20 April 1949 and to other remarks made by members of the Committee, and he suggested that appropriate action might be taken against them under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1926. On 16 November 1949 the High Court ordered that notices be issued to eight members of the Committee, requiring them to show cause why they should not be proceeded against for contempt of court in respect of certain passages of the resolution set out in the notice. In response to those notices the opposite parties appeared before the Court and filed affidavits, and a bench of three judges delivered a judgment on 5 May 1950 concluding that, except for two individuals who were not members of the Executive Committee at the relevant date, the remaining six persons were guilty of contempt of court. The Court held that the opposite parties were not motivated by personal or improper motives and accepted their statement that their purpose was to improve the administration of justice, yet it observed that the language employed in the resolution was little removed from personal abuse and, irrespective of motive, was likely to bring the Magistrate into contempt and diminish his authority. The judgment concluded by stating, “We think that the opposite parties acted under a misapprehension as to the position, but”.

They have expressed their regrets and have tendered an unqualified apology. In view of those circumstances, the Court accepted the apology but ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the Government Advocate, which were assessed at three hundred rupees.

The propriety of that judgment was challenged before this Court on appeal. The High Court judges had held that the allegations made against the judicial officers fell within the category of contempt that is committed by “scandalising the court.” Relying on the pronouncement of Lord Russell in Reg. v. Gray (1), they observed that this class of contempt carries an important qualification. They stated that judges and courts are open to criticism, and that when a reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against a judicial act on the ground that it is contrary to law or the public good, no court may treat such expression as contempt of court.

According to the learned judges, the complaint lodged by the appellants went beyond the limits of fair and legitimate criticism. Consequently, the members of the Bar Association could not claim any privilege higher than that enjoyed by ordinary citizens. The High Court further held that no distinction could be drawn merely because the charges against the judicial officers were presented in a representation to authorities who were the official superiors of those officers and under whose administrative control the officers acted.

The Attorney-General, appearing in support of the appeal, characterised the approach adopted by the High Court as wholly erroneous. He argued that an act or publication intended to lower the authority or dignity of a judge does not, by itself, constitute contempt of court. The proper test, he said, is whether the allegations are of such a character or are made in circumstances that would tend to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or the due administration of law, as expressed in the citation (1) [1900] 2 Q.B 36.

The Attorney-General relied on certain pronouncements of the Judicial Committee, which had definitively held that an imputation affecting the character or conduct of a judge, even if it could give rise to a libel action, would not automatically amount to contempt of court. He placed great emphasis on the fact that the resolutions passed and the representations made by the appellants were not intended to expose the alleged shortcomings of the officers to the public; rather, their sole object was to have the genuine grievances of lawyers and litigants addressed by the authorities competent to remedy them. According to him, such conduct could not be calculated to interfere with the due administration of law and therefore could not be regarded as contempt of court.

The issues raised are undeniably important and require careful examination.

There was no dispute that the power of superior courts to summon a person summarily on the ground of contempt existed primarily to prevent any interference with the due course of justice and to preserve the authority of law as it is administered in the courts. The Court reiterated what had often been stated by various judges, namely that the purpose of contempt proceedings was not to shield individual judges from personal attacks or imputations that they might endure as private persons. Rather, the purpose was to protect the public, whose interests would be seriously affected if the conduct of any party were to diminish the authority of the court and weaken the confidence that people place in the administration of justice. The Court observed that there are countless ways in which attempts may be made to hinder or obstruct the proper administration of justice in the courts. One particular form of such interference arises when an act or a publication “amounts to scandalising the court itself,” an expression that has been familiar to English lawyers since the days of Lord Hardwick(1). The Court explained that scandalising the court may take many shapes, but in essence it constitutes an attack on individual judges or on the court as an institution, with or without reference to specific cases, and involves casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions on the character or ability of the judges. The Court noted that such conduct is punished as contempt because it tends to create distrust in the public mind and to erode the confidence of the people in the courts, confidence that is essential for litigants to protect their rights and liberties. The Court further referred to early decisions of English courts in which jurisdiction was assumed to commit persons to prison for publishing scandalous material concerning the court itself. In 1899, Lord Morris, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in MacLeod v. St. Aubin(2), observed that “committals for contempt by scandalising the court itself have become obsolete in this country. Courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them.” Lord Morris added that the power to summarily commit for contempt was considered necessary for the proper administration of justice, but it was not to be employed for the vind

In the case reported at C 549 (1900) 2 Q B 36, the trial judge warned the newspaper press that, while reporting the proceedings of the court, it was improper for them to give publicity to indecent matters that were revealed during the trial. Despite this warning, the defendant published an article in the Birmingham Daily Argus under the heading “An advocate of Decency” in which Justice Darling was abused in scurrilous language. The trial of Wells had already concluded, but the Assizes were still in session. The Court held that the publication clearly amounted to contempt of court and that the attack was calculated to interfere directly with the proper administration of justice. Lord Russell, in his judgment, cautioned that the summary jurisdiction to commit a person for contempt when the court itself is attacked must be exercised with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt. He explained that if the case does not meet the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, the court should leave the matter to the Attorney-General to proceed by criminal information.

Lord Atkin, delivering the Privy Council judgment in Devi Prashad v King Emperor (1943), observed that cases of contempt consisting of scandalising the court are fortunately rare and must be treated with great discretion. He emphasized that proceedings of this kind should be used sparingly and always with reference to the administration of justice, adding that if a judge is defamed in a manner that does not affect the administration of justice, the ordinary remedies for defamation remain available to the judge. From these authorities, the Court identified two primary considerations when exercising summary powers for contempt by “scandalising” the court. First, criticism of a judge’s conduct or character in relation to the performance of judicial duties does not constitute contempt if it is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism that every citizen possesses with respect to public acts done in the seat of justice. Lord Atkin described the path of criticism as a public way, noting that members of the public may err in their criticism provided they do not impute motives, act with malice, or attempt to impair the administration of justice, and that such honest criticism is immune. Second, when remarks are disparaging in character and derogatory to the dignity of a judge, the Court must carefully distinguish between libel on the judge and conduct that truly amounts to contempt of court.

The Court noted that the mere fact that a statement is defamatory of a judge does not, by itself, make the statement contempt of court. It highlighted that the difference between libel and contempt had been explained by a Committee of the Privy Council, a matter to which the Secretary of State made a reference in 1892 (2). To illustrate the point, the Court referred to an incident that occurred in the Bahama Islands where a private individual wrote a letter that was printed in a colonial newspaper. In that letter the writer attacked the Chief Justice of the Colony using language that was described as extremely ill-chosen, sarcastic and pungent. The writer implied, in a veiled manner, that the Chief Justice was incompetent, shirked his duties and even suggested that it would be a providential occurrence if the judge were to die. The matter was examined by a strong Board consisting of eleven members. The Board reported that, although the letter could have given rise to libel proceedings, it was not, in the circumstances, calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or with the proper administration of law, and therefore it did not amount to contempt of court. The Court further indicated that the same principle was reiterated by Lord Atkin in the case of Devi Prashad v. King-Emperor (') which had been mentioned earlier. This principle was subsequently followed and approved by the High Court of Australia in King v. Nicholls (1) and has been accepted as sound by this Court in Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] A.C. 322 at p. 335 (2); in the matter of a special reference from the Bahama Islands [1893] A.C. 138 (3); in 70 I.A. 216 (4); and in 12 Commonwealth Law Reports 280 in the Court of Reddy v. The State of Madras (1).

The Court explained that, consequently, a defamatory attack on a judge may be treated as libel insofar as the judge’s personal reputation is concerned, and the judge may, if he wishes, bring a proper action against the author of the libel. However, where the publication of a disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by the court, such a statement can be punished summarily as contempt. The Court distinguished between a wrong done to the judge personally and a wrong done to the public. An injury to the public arises when the statement tends to create apprehension in the minds of people about the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge, or deters present or prospective litigants from placing full reliance on the court’s administration of justice, or when it is likely to cause embarrassment to the judge in the performance of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove an actual interference with the administration of justice; it is sufficient that the statement is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law (2). In view of these principles, the Court stated that it would now proceed to examine the facts of the present case.

In the present case, the Court observed that members of a Bar Association do not enjoy any special or higher status than ordinary citizens when contempt matters are considered. The Court further held that the manner in which a disparaging statement is expressed is not decisive; however, it was important to note that, even if the statement was derogatory to the dignity of the judicial officers, it received very little publicity and the appellants had actually taken great care to keep it from public knowledge.

The representation containing the statement was addressed only to four specified individuals who were the official superiors of the officers concerned. The High Court found as a matter of fact that the appellants, as recorded in the citation (1) (1952] S. C. R. 452 and (2) Mr. Mookerjea J. in In re Motilal Ghosh and Others, I.L.R. 45 Cal. 269 at 283, acted bona-fide and had no intention to interfere with the administration of justice, although they might have been under a mistaken understanding of the precise legal position. No copies of the resolution were sent to the officers themselves, and this circumstance was relevant to determining whether the appellants’ conduct fell within the scope of contempt law.

The first issue for consideration was whether the allegations made against the two judicial officers exceeded the bounds of fair and legitimate criticism. At the meeting, three resolutions were passed; the second and third were merely formal and required no further examination. The offending statement was located in the first resolution, which was divided into two parts. The first part contained general allegations against both officers, while the second part listed specific complaints under separate headings for each officer.

Regarding Judge Kanhaya Lal, the allegations were that he failed to record evidence properly in cases tried by him, that in all criminal matters transferred to his court he did not allow accused persons who were already on bail sufficient time to furnish fresh sureties, resulting in their imprisonment, and that he was not accommodating to lawyers. Concerning the other officer, a serious allegation was that he illegally heard two cases simultaneously, personally recording evidence in one case while allowing the Court Reader to record evidence in the other. Additional claims stated that he was short-tempered and frequently threatened lawyers with contempt proceedings. The Court noted that some of these complaints were not serious, and that no judge, unless unduly hypersensitive, would feel aggrieved by them.

In this case the Court observed that the allegation that the Revenue Officer simultaneously heard two cases and permitted the Court Reader to take evidence on his behalf was a serious accusation, representing a clear illegality which, if proved, should be reported to the District Magistrate who serves as the administrative head of such officers. Regarding the first part of the resolution, the Court noted that the complaints were expressed in vague terms, stating that the officers failed to state facts accurately when issuing orders and behaved discourteously toward members of the public; the Court held that these statements did not rise to the level of scandalising the court and that similar grievances are commonly voiced about many subordinate courts. The Court further explained that if the appellants possessed a genuine grievance, their expressions had not exceeded the permissible bounds of criticism. The only portion of the resolution that could invite a prima facie objection, the Court said, was the passage describing the officers as thoroughly incompetent in law and as judges whose work failed to inspire confidence. The Court considered these remarks sweeping and difficult to justify. Assuming, for argument’s sake, that this portion was defamatory, the Court examined whether such a statement constituted contempt of court. To determine contempt, the Court explained that it must be shown that the statement was calculated to interfere with the proper administration of justice, meaning that it could create apprehension in the minds of litigants regarding the officers’ ability to handle cases or could embarrass the officers in performing their duties. The Court rejected the respondent’s counsel’s contention that the test should be confined solely to the language of the resolution, emphasizing that surrounding facts and circumstances may also be examined, except insofar as they merely mitigate or aggravate the alleged offence. The Court found that a content offence had been committed and that the usual defences of justification or privilege were unavailable to a defendant in contempt proceedings. While the Court acknowledged that the technical question of publication, as understood in libel actions, is not determinative in contempt matters, it stressed that, except for cases of obvious contempt, the relevance of a defamatory statement against a judge depends on whether it undermines public confidence in the judge’s capacity or integrity, or diverts the court from performing its duties without hesitation. Consequently, the Court held that the surrounding facts, the context in which the statements were made, and the extent of publicity given to them must be considered. The Court concurred with the respondent’s counsel that the matter had indeed been discussed among members of the Bar and possibly among the officers who had received copies of the resolutions, establishing that some form of publication had occurred as required under libel law. However, the Court warned that in contempt proceedings such publication is not alone decisive; what matters is the nature and breadth of the publication and whether it is likely to exert a harmful effect on public or judicial perception, thereby interfering with the administration of justice. After reviewing the material before it, the Court concluded that it was difficult to determine that the appellants’ representation was calculated to produce such a detrimental effect, noting that any remote possibility could not be taken into account. The Court thus expressed a clear opinion that, if any contempt existed, it was merely of a technical character, and that following the filing of affidavits on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, the proceedings should be considered in that light.

It was observed that the subject matter of the dispute had been openly examined in the present proceedings by members of the Bar, and that it possibly had also been the topic of conversation among the officials who had received copies of the resolutions in question. The Court acknowledged that a publication had indeed occurred, as the law of libel requires a publication for a cause of action, but it emphasized that such a fact alone does not settle the issue in contempt proceedings. The Court explained that the decisive factor is the character and the reach of the publication and whether the publication was likely to cause a harmful impact on public opinion or on the confidence of the judiciary, thereby potentially interfering with the proper administration of justice. After reviewing the material placed before it, the Court found it difficult to conclude that the manner in which the appellants made their representation was intended to produce such a harmful effect. While the Court did not entirely exclude the remote possibility that some adverse impact might have arisen, it refused to give any weight to that possibility. Accordingly, the Court expressed a clear view that, if any contempt existed, it was of a merely technical nature, and that once affidavits had been filed on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, the proceedings against them ought to have been discontinued. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and ordered that no costs be awarded to either party, either in this Court or in the court below. The appeal was therefore allowed. The agents acting for the appellants and the respondents were recorded as S. S. Shukla and C. P. Lal respectively.