Akhlakali Hayatalli vs The State Of Bombay

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 1953

Decision Date: 9 December 1953

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B.K. Mukherjea

In the matter titled Akhlakali Hayatalli versus The State of Bombay, the decision was rendered on the ninth day of December, 1953 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, who sat in the bench together with Justice B. K. Mukherjea. The petitioner in the proceedings was Akhlakali Hayatalli and the respondent was the State of Bombay. The judgment bears the citation 1954 AIR 173 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reports at page 435. Subsequent citations to this decision include references in the Reporters of the Supreme Court dated 1957 at page 373, the sixth volume, and in 1962 at page 605, the fourteenth volume. The case involved the application of section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the five-year code as amended, and the discussion centered on the proper approach that a High Court must adopt when dealing with a reference under that provision. The headnote articulated that the High Court is empowered to interfere with a jury verdict only when the verdict is perverse, meaning it is unreasonable, manifestly wrong, or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Where the facts and circumstances are such that a reasonable body of men could legitimately reach either of two conclusions, neither the Sessions Judge nor the High Court may replace the jury’s verdict with their own. The headnote emphasized that the jury alone serves as the judge of fact and that the accused is entitled to the benefit of the jury’s determination. Even if the Sessions Judge or the High Court, exercising independent judgment, might have arrived at a different conclusion, they lack the authority to initiate a reference or, after a reference has been made, to substitute their own verdict for that of the jury, provided that the jury’s verdict could have been reached by a reasonable group of men based on the evidence. The decision also cited Ramanugrah Singh v. Emperor (AIR 1946 PC 151) as precedent.

The judgment concerned Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 1953, filed by special leave against the order dated the sixteenth of June, 1952 issued by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Jury Reference No. 58 of 1952. Counsel for the appellant was H. J. Umrigar, while counsel for the respondent was Porus A. Mehta. The Court’s opinion was delivered by Justice Bhagwati. The appeal arose from a judgment of the Bombay High Court that had accepted a reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge of Greater Bombay under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That reference resulted in the conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and the imposition of a sentence of four years of rigorous imprisonment. According to the prosecution’s case, on the evening of the twenty-fifth of August, 1951, at approximately ten-thirty or eleven o’clock at night, the complainant, identified as Abdul Satar, was proceeding towards Dhobi Galli via Bibijan Street. As he reached the junction where Chakla Street intersected with Bibijan Street, the events that formed the basis of the charge began, as further detailed in the subsequent portion of the record.

The incident began when the appellant approached Abdul Satar at the junction of Chakla Street and Bibijan Street on the night of 25 August 1951. The appellant first tried to strike Abdul Satar on his right shoulder, but Abdul Satar seized the appellant’s hand and held it. The appellant then released his hand, moved in front of Abdul Satar and thrust a knife, causing two stab wounds—one at the level of the ninth and tenth ribs on the left side and another on the left shoulder. After inflicting the injuries, the appellant fled the scene and was chased by a group of locals who gathered nearby. Babu Adam saw the appellant at the corner of Chakla Street and Masjid Bunder Road, joined the pursuing crowd, and continued the chase. Sub-Inspector Chawan entered the crowd that was pursuing the appellant along Dhobi Street, and the combined pursuit ended when the appellant was seized at the intersection of Dhobi Street and Nagdevi Street. The apprehended appellant was taken to the police station, and shortly thereafter the police escorted him back to the spot of the attack to record a panchnama at 1:05 a.m. on 26 August 1951. Following the on-site recording, the appellant and the police officers returned to the police station, where at 1:30 a.m., within half an hour, a second panchnama was drawn concerning the appellant’s clothing. The second panchnama noted blood stains on the right armpit, on the front of the shirt, on the right thigh, on the right-side collar and on the back of the shirt.

The appellant’s defence asserted that he was a fruit-broker who, after collecting his dues from Crawford Market at about 11 p.m., had arrived at the corner of Dhobi Street and heard cries of “chor, chor.” He claimed that he likewise shouted “chor, chor,” ran after the fleeing individual, reached the junction of Nagdevi Cross Street, and then fell, after which the fleeing person plunged into a gutter. According to the appellant, three or four members of the public following the fleeing person fell on him after he fell, and when he rose, two or three individuals seized him and said he was the attacker. Sub-Inspector Chawan was among those who claimed to have seized the appellant, and although there was an initial suspicion that he might be an accomplice, a person identified him as a police officer, leading to his release. The appellant was placed in a police pilot car that arrived, transported to the police station, and subsequently brought back to the scene of the offence where another panchnama was drawn. He was then returned to the police station, made to sit in the charge room, and, feeling overheated, removed his shirt and set it aside. During this interval, a police constable approached him, struck him on the nose, and asked, “Do you think this is your father’s residence that you removed your shirt?” The blow caused the appellant to bleed from his nose, resulting in blood staining his shirt and trousers, after which the constable ordered him to put the clothing back on and escorted him to his officer. The officer, identified as D. I. Kakatkar, examined the appellant’s attire, after which the panchas were summoned and a panchnama was recorded noting the bloodstains on the shirt and trousers.

During the interrogation a police constable questioned the appellant about having removed his shirt at his father’s residence, and at that moment the appellant began bleeding from his nose, causing his shirt and trousers to become stained with blood. The same constable then instructed the appellant to replace his clothing, after which the appellant was escorted to his superior officer. The officer, identified as D. I. Kakatkar, examined the appellant’s attire and observed the bloodstains. Consequently, the panchas were summoned and a panchnama was prepared, explicitly noting the presence of blood on both the shirt and the trousers.

The appellant was subsequently tried before an Additional Sessions Judge accompanied by a common jury. The prosecution presented the testimony of the complainant, Abdul Satar, as well as that of Babu Adam and Sub-Inspector Chawan. Evidence also included an identification parade conducted at the hospital designated 6-93 S.P. India/59, where Abdul Satar, having been taken from the scene of the offence, positively identified the appellant as the person who had assaulted him. In addition, a panchnama witness testified, confirming that the panchnama recorded the blood-stained shirt and trousers of the appellant.

After hearing all the evidence, the Additional Sessions Judge delivered a summary charge to the jury that was described as very fair. No party challenged the charge before the High Court or before the present Court on the ground that it contained any misdirection or omission that might have prejudiced the jury’s deliberations. The jury, after deliberating, was unable to reach a unanimous decision and returned a verdict of not guilty, with a majority of six jurors to three. The Additional Sessions Judge, however, refused to accept the majority verdict. He expressed disagreement with the verdict and concluded that, for the sake of justice, it was necessary to refer the matter to the High Court. Accordingly, by an order dated 22 April 1952, he referred the case to the High Court under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

It is noteworthy that, before the enactment of the Bombay Act VI of 1952, sections 305 and 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code applied to the Court of Sessions for Greater Bombay. The objects of the Bill that later became that Act intended to create a mechanism for handling situations where a Sessions Judge disagreed with a unanimous jury verdict, permitting a reference to the High Court under section 307 even when the verdict was unanimous. However, the amendment effected by the Bombay Act VI of 1952 removed the power of the Sessions Judge of Greater Bombay to discharge the jury and order a retrial before another jury, even in cases of a majority verdict. Consequently, even a narrow majority such as five to four, which had previously been considered an effective verdict, now required the case to be referred to the High Court under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The record showed that a reasonable person could draw no conclusion other than that the appellant was the assailant of Abdul Satar. Accordingly, the High Court convicted the appellant of the offence under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and imposed the sentence recorded in the judgment. The appellant obtained special leave to appeal from this Court on 4 February 1953, and the present appeal was filed on that basis. The defence highlighted several circumstances that emerged from the prosecution witnesses’ evidence. The prosecution openly acknowledged that it had been unable to prove any motive for the appellant’s alleged conduct. Abdul Satar had never, before testifying in the Sessions Court, indicated that he had spoken with the appellant about the reasons for the injuries inflicted upon him. Only in the Sessions Court did Abdul Satar claim that he had asked the appellant why he was stabbing him, and that the appellant replied that he was acting on the instruction of a friend. Abdul Satar further alleged that he was on hostile terms with one Sulaiman and that the appellant had acted at Sulaiman’s behest. The defence described this narrative as a post-hoc invention intended solely to provide a motive for the alleged offence, and urged that if Abdul Satar could fabricate such a story, his identification of the appellant could not be trusted.

The weapon alleged to have been used in the offence was never recovered from the appellant’s person, nor was it discovered by police during a search of the scene or its vicinity. Neither Babu Adam nor Sub-Inspector Chawan gave evidence that they had seen a knife in the appellant’s hands. The only testimony concerning the presence of a knife came from Mohamed Safi, a witness initially dropped by the prosecution, later examined by the defence, and ultimately treated as a hostile witness even by the defence. Mohamed Safi asserted that he saw a knife in the appellant’s hands. Consequently, if Babu Adam’s evidence were accepted, Mohamed Safi would be lying; if Mohamed Safi’s evidence were accepted, Babu Adam would be lying. The defence correctly pointed out this conflict of evidence. The identification parade was also contested as improper, on the allegation that many ward boys had been mixed with the appellant during the parade. No questions concerning this issue were raised during the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, and the Additional Sessions Judge told the jury that, in the absence of such cross-examination, little reliance could be placed on the criticism of the identification parade.

It was observed, in passing, that even the High Court had recorded its view that the identification parade had not been conducted to the standard that the Court normally expects in such cases. The High Court further remarked that the only consequence of this shortcoming was to place the jurors on guard with regard to the testimony of Abdul Satar and that they ought not to rely upon that testimony unless it was supported by additional evidence. The record also showed that the blood stains that later appeared on the appellant’s shirt and trousers were not noticed at the time the first statements were taken by either Babu Adam or Sub-Inspector Chawan. These stains were first observed only when a second panchnama was prepared at approximately one-thirty in the morning on 26 August 1951, after the appellant had been brought back to the police station from the scene of the alleged offence. The second panchnama recorded the presence of the blood stains on the appellant’s clothing. The prosecution put forward the existence of these stains as corroborative support for Abdul Satar’s statement that the appellant had inflicted injuries upon him. By contrast, the defence advanced a narrative that a police constable had struck the appellant on the nose, causing a nose bleed that resulted in the blood stains on the shirt and trousers. The defence sought to discredit this version by arguing that it was improbable for a constable to have acted in such a manner within the confines of the police station precincts.

The prosecution’s theory could possibly account for the blood stains found in the right-arm pit, on the front of the shirt and on the trousers, but it struggled to explain the stains that were located on the back of the shirt. The defence, however, maintained that the blood on the back of the shirt was readily explained by its own version of events, and it relied on this circumstance to argue that its narrative was more probable. These factual circumstances were presented to the jury when they deliberated on the question of the appellant’s criminal liability. The Court’s task was to consider whether the verdict reached by a majority of six to three was one that no reasonable group of men could have arrived at based on the evidence presented. The appropriate method of approach to references made under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code had been set out by the Privy Council in Ramanugrah Singh v. Emperor. In that case the Privy Council resolved the then-existing conflict of authorities in India and accepted the principle that a High Court would interfere with a jury’s verdict only if it found the verdict to be “perverse in the sense of being unreasonable”, “manifestly wrong” or “against the weight of evidence”. The observations of the Privy Council on the principle underlying section 307 were quoted, noting that under sub-section (1) two conditions must be satisfied to justify a reference: first, that the judge must disagree with the jury’s verdict.

The Court observed that the first condition for referring a jury verdict—namely, the judge’s disagreement with that verdict—requires no further comment because it forms the very basis of any reference. The second condition, that the judge must be “clearly of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case,” was described as crucial, and the Court held that this phrasing provides the key to interpreting the statutory provision. The legislature, the Court noted, was aware that introducing trial by jury in the provincial courts would be experimental and might give rise to miscarriages of justice due to jurors’ ignorance and inexperience, as illustrated by the case reported in (1946) A.I.R. 1946 P. C. 151, where erroneous verdicts were returned. The Court stated that the section was intended to guard against such dangers, not to enable the Sessions Judge or the High Court to deprive jurors—who are acting within their lawful powers—of the right to determine the facts as conferred upon them by the Code.

The Court explained that where the jury has reached a conclusion on the evidence that a reasonable body of men could also reach, it is not necessary for the ends of justice that the Sessions Judge refer the case to the High Court merely because the judge himself might have reached a different factual conclusion. The judge must go beyond his personal view and be of the opinion that the jury’s verdict is one which no reasonable body of men could have arrived at on the evidence. The High Court’s powers in dealing with such a reference are set out in sub-section (3); the Court may exercise any power it could exercise on an appeal, including the power to call fresh evidence under section 428. Accordingly, the High Court must consider the whole case, give due weight to the opinions of both the Sessions Judge and the jury, and then decide whether to acquit or convict the accused.

In the Court’s opinion, the paramount consideration for the High Court is whether the ends of justice require that the jury’s verdict be set aside. Generally, if the evidence can properly support either a guilty or a not-guilty verdict as viewed by the trial court, and the jury adopts one view while the judge thinks the opposite view should have been taken, the jury’s view must prevail because the jury is the judge of fact. In such circumstances a reference is not justified, and only by accepting the jury’s view can the High Court give it proper weight. Conversely, if the High Court concludes that, on the evidence, no reasonable body of men could have reached the jury’s conclusion, then the reference is justified and the ends of justice demand that the jury’s verdict be disregarded.

The Court affirmed that this approach constitutes the correct method for handling references under section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It further noted that when the facts and circumstances of a case are such that a reasonable body of men could arrive at either conclusion, neither the Sessions Judge nor the High Court may substitute their own verdict for that of the jury, who remains the sole judge of fact.

When the facts and circumstances of a case are such that a reasonable body of men could arrive at either conclusion, it is not within the competence of the Sessions Judge or the High Court to substitute their own verdict for the verdict rendered by the jury. The jury are the exclusive judges of fact, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of the jury’s determination. Even if the Sessions Judge or the High Court, exercising their own judgment, might have reached a different conclusion, they are not authorised to make a reference nor may the High Court accept such a reference and replace the jury’s verdict, provided that the jury’s verdict could have been reached by a reasonable body of men on the evidence and the surrounding circumstances.

Having regard to the foregoing position, the Court was of the opinion that, on the facts and circumstances of the case before it, there were sufficient materials before the jury to enable it to reach either conclusion on the criminality of the appellant. Six of the nine jurors concluded that the appellant was not guilty of the offence with which he was charged, while the remaining three jurors arrived at the opposite conclusion. In the circumstances of the case it was impossible to characterize either of the jury’s conclusions as perverse, unreasonable, manifestly wrong, or contrary to the weight of the evidence. The majority verdict, which found the appellant not guilty, was a verdict that a reasonable body of men could have reached on the evidence on record, and therefore the reference was not competent.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed. The judgment of the High Court on the reference was set aside, and the majority verdict of the jury was affirmed. The appellant was thereby pronounced not guilty of the offence with which he had been charged, and was acquitted, discharged, and released. The agent for the respondent was identified as G. H. Rajadhyaktha.