Workers Of The Industry Colliery vs Management Of The Industry Colliery

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 12 December, 1952

Coram: Mehr Chand Mahajan, Das

The case was styled Workers of the Industry Colliery versus Management of the Industry Colliery and was decided on 12 December 1952 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, who also formed the bench that heard the matter, and Justice Das contributed to the opinion. This proceeding was an appeal by special leave against a decision dated 24 April 1950 rendered by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad. The Tribunal’s decision upheld an earlier order dated 2 February 1950 issued by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, which had declared a one-day strike organised by the appellant on 7 November 1949 to be illegal. The Court set out the relevant factual background before addressing the legal issue raised on appeal.

On 13 October 1949 the appellants, acting through the Secretary of their Union, served a notice of intended strike on the respondents in accordance with section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The notice proposed a one-day strike to commence on the expiry of 6 November 1949 and listed sixteen demands that the union sought to have satisfied. Pursuant to rule 85 of the rules framed under the same Act, copies of the notice were dispatched to five authorities: the Conciliation Officer (Central), Dhanbad; the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad; the Chief Labour Commissioner, Department of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi; the Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi; and the Additional District Commissioner, Dhanbad. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) received the notice at its Dhanbad office on 15 October 1949 and subsequently convened conciliation proceedings on 22 October 1949. The appellants, by a letter dated the same day, declined to participate in those proceedings, contending that the process would be futile and should therefore be deemed terminated. On that day the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) sent a letter, identified as No. RLC/CON 5 (Token) 7910, to the Chief Labour Commissioner in New Delhi. In the letter he explained that after receipt of the strike notice he had issued a notice of conciliation to the parties, that the employer’s representatives were prepared to discuss the demands, but that the union’s representative had filed a written petition refusing participation and had asserted that no new material warranted a recommendation to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. The Commissioner concluded the correspondence by requesting that the Government be informed of the situation. This report reached the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner on 25 October 1949. Although the Chief Labour Commissioner’s letter of 17 November 1949 to the Regional Labour Commissioner stated that the contents of the report had already been communicated to the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry actually received a copy of the report only on that same day.

On 7 July 1949, approximately seven hundred workers who were appellants observed a one-day strike in accordance with a previously issued strike notice. The respondents asserted that this strike was unlawful and consequently filed an application under section 8(2) of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Scheme Act, 1948, before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) at Dhanbad, seeking a determination of the strike’s legality. By an order dated 2 February 1950, that Commissioner concluded that the strike was illegal. Dissatisfied with this finding, the appellants exercised the right provided in section 8(4) of the same Act to appeal to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad; the Tribunal affirmed the Commissioner’s view that the strike was illegal and dismissed the appellants’ appeal. Following that dismissal, the appellants successfully obtained special leave to present the matter before this Court.

The sole issue presented for consideration on this appeal is whether the strike in question was illegal under the provisions of the governing legislation. Section 24(1) of the Act declares a strike illegal when it is commenced or declared in breach of either section 22 or section 23. Section 22(1) stipulates that no employee in a public utility service may strike without complying with several contractual requirements: (a) giving the employer a notice of strike at least six weeks before the strike; (b) ensuring that at least fourteen days have elapsed after the notice is given; (c) striking only after the date specified in the notice; and (d) refraining from striking while any conciliation proceedings are pending and for seven days after such proceedings conclude. In the present case, the strike notice satisfied clause (a) and the requisite fourteen-day period under clause (b) had passed, and the strike was carried out after the November 6, 1949 date specified in the notice. Consequently, the remaining question was whether the strike occurred during the pendency of conciliation proceedings or within the prohibited seven-day post-conclusion period. Section 20(1) provides that a conciliation proceeding is deemed to have begun on the date the notice of strike is received by the Conciliation Officer. The notice was received by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), who acted as the Conciliation Officer, on 15 October 1949, thereby commencing the conciliation process on that date. Section 20(2) explains that a conciliation proceeding is considered concluded either when a settlement is reached, when the Conciliation Officer’s report is received by the appropriate Government, or when the Board’s report is published under section 17, as applicable. The determination of when the proceeding actually concluded, based on those provisions, became the focal point for deciding the legality of the strike.

The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), acting as the Conciliation Officer in this industrial dispute, was statutorily obliged under section 12 to conduct conciliation proceedings in the manner prescribed by law. Section 12 further required the Commissioner, without undue delay, to investigate the dispute and to undertake any measures he deemed appropriate to encourage the parties to reach a fair and amicable settlement. In accordance with these duties, the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) convened conciliation proceedings on 22 October 1949, but the appellants refused to participate, asserting that they believed the process would yield no result. Because the appellants withdrew from the proceedings, the provisions of section 12(4) imposed upon the Commissioner the obligation to, as soon as practicable after the investigation closed, forward to the appropriate Government a comprehensive report. That report had to set out the steps taken to ascertain the facts and circumstances of the dispute, describe the efforts made to obtain a settlement. It also required a full statement of the facts and the reasons why a settlement could not be achieved. Sub-section (6) of the same section stipulated that the report must be submitted within fourteen days of the commencement of the conciliation proceedings, or within any shorter period that the appropriate Government might specify. The conciliation proceedings were deemed to have begun on 15 October 1949, when the strike notice was received, so the fourteen-day deadline fell on 29 October 1949. In practice, the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) transmitted his report to the Chief Labour Commissioner in New Delhi on 22 October 1949, thereby complying with the statutory time limit. The report was dispatched with a request that the Government be informed of the situation, and under the definition in section 2(a) the “appropriate Government” for a mine-related industrial dispute referred to the Central Government. Rather than sending the report directly to the Central Government, the Commissioner followed the usual administrative routine and addressed it to the Chief Labour Commissioner, whose office subsequently conveyed it to the Government. The Central Government did not receive the report until approximately 17 November 1949, and according to section 20(2)(b) the conciliation proceedings are deemed to have concluded only upon actual receipt of the report by the appropriate Government. Consequently, on its face, the strike that occurred on 7 November 1949 fell within the period during which the conciliation proceedings were considered to be pending by the lower authorities. The appellant’s counsel, however, contended that the conciliation proceedings should be regarded as terminated when the appellants withdrew and when the Commissioner sent his report within the prescribed fourteen-day window. He argued that section 20(2)(b) created a legal fiction that artificially extended the proceedings beyond the point at which the Commissioner had fulfilled his statutory reporting duty.

The Court examined the contention advanced by Shri N C Chatterjee that the conciliation proceedings ought to be considered terminated when the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) dispatched his report within fourteen days of the commencement of the conciliation process. The difficulty with accepting that position lies in the statutory language: section 12(4) employs the word “send,” section 12(6) uses “submitted,” while section 20(2)(b) expressly refers to the report being “received.” The term “received” unmistakably denotes the actual receipt of the report by the appropriate Government. To deem the proceedings concluded at the point when the report should ordinarily have been received would introduce uncertainty, because section 22(1)(d) clearly provides the appropriate Government with a definite seven-day period after the conclusion of the conciliation proceedings to decide on further action. Consequently, it is essential to fix the commencement of the seven-day period so that the expiry of that period is certain. For this reason, section 20(2)(b) stipulates that the proceedings shall be deemed concluded, where no settlement is reached, when the report is actually received by the appropriate Government. Shri N C Chatterjee fervently argues, with some force, that on such a construction the Government or its officers might deliberately withhold the report, that the report could be lost in transit, or that it might be received after the date fixed for the strike in the notice issued under section 22(1). He further points out that the workers would be unable to know the actual receipt date, thereby potentially depriving them of their right to strike, and asserts that the Government cannot benefit from its own wrong. While the Court acknowledges the considerable hardship highlighted by Shri N C Chatterjee, it must presume that the public officers concerned will act fairly and properly. Moreover, the present dispute is between employers and employees; there is no material before the Court to attribute any alleged misdeeds of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) or the Chief Labour Commissioner to the respondents, the employers, who are entitled to rely on the language of the statute. The Court can only interpret the enactment as it stands, and any defect in the law is a matter for a competent authority other than this Court to remedy. Shri N C Chatterjee also urges that, under section 12, the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) should have sent his report directly to the appropriate Government, which in this case means the Central Government, rather than forwarding it to the Chief Labour Commissioner.

In the submissions made, it was contended that the report prepared by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) should have been sent directly to the appropriate Government, which in the present case meant the Central Government, and that it should not have been transmitted to the Chief Labour Commissioner. Even if that premise were accepted, the fact remained that the Central Government never received the report and consequently the conciliation proceedings could not be said to have terminated at the time the strike occurred. The argument was further advanced that, under the applicable law, the Chief Labour Commissioner was obligated to return the report to the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) because the report was not meant to be addressed to him. Instead, the Chief Labour Commissioner retained the report and forwarded it to the Labour Ministry. Relying upon the decision in Chaturbhuj Ram Lal v. Secretary of State for India, it was urged that the Chief Labour Commissioner should be deemed an agent of the Central Government for the purpose of receiving the report. The matter was adjourned so that the counsel could investigate whether any delegation of authority from the Central Government to the Chief Labour Commissioner existed. No such delegation was found. It was therefore clear that the Chief Labour Commissioner could not be regarded as the Central Government for that purpose. By a notification published in the Gazette of India on 5 April 1947, the Chief Labour Commissioner had been appointed as a Conciliation Officer, and in that capacity his duty was to submit his report to the Central Government. This appointment demonstrated that the Chief Labour Commissioner constituted an authority separate from the Central Government. Moreover, Rule 85, which was cited, required that a strike notice be sent both to the Chief Labour Commissioner and to the Department of Labour of the Government of India, a requirement that further indicated the two bodies were distinct entities. Accordingly, the Chief Labour Commissioner functioned merely as a channel through which correspondence between the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) and the Central Government was conveyed, and he could not be treated as an agent of the Central Government for receiving the report. Hence, the ruling relied upon by the counsel could not be applied to the facts of this case.

The Court concluded that, for the reasons set out above, the findings of the lower authorities on this point were correct and that the appeal had to be dismissed. In view of the special circumstances of the case, the Court decided that no order as to costs should be made and that each party should bear its own costs. Finally, the Court drew the attention of the concerned authorities to the slack and unbusiness-like manner in which the matter had been handled in the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner.

In this case the Court explained that the Act required the Conciliation Officer to forward his report within fourteen days of the start of the conciliation proceedings, and that upon receipt of the report by the appropriate Government the proceedings were to be considered concluded. While in reality the conciliation process ended either when a settlement was reached before the Officer or when it became clear that no settlement could be achieved, the statutory scheme created a legal fiction that extended the proceedings until the report was actually received by the appropriate Government. The Act further prescribed that the appropriate Government was allotted seven days to decide what further action, if any, should be taken under the Act. During those seven days the Act prohibited any strike; after the expiry of that period the employees were permitted to engage in collective action such as a strike. Consequently, the date on which a strike could be lawfully launched had to be carefully chosen and clearly stated in the notice of strike required by section 22(1) of the Act. A simple reading of the Act therefore showed that strict adherence to time limits was essential for the statute to function properly.

The Court noted that, in the present matter, the Conciliation Officer submitted his report on 22 October 1949, which was well within the fourteen-day period mandated by section 12(6) of the Act. The report was transmitted through the normal official channel and was received in the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner in New Delhi on 25 October 1949. However, the report was not forwarded to the Ministry of Labour, also located in New Delhi, until approximately 17 November 1949. Because of this delay, the employees could not know when the Central Government—the appropriate Government in this case—actually received the report or when the seven-day period following receipt would have ended. Believing, and it was reasonable for them to believe, that the official process had been carried out promptly, the employees proceeded with a strike on 7 November 1949, as they had previously announced. It later emerged that the Central Government had not yet received the report, and therefore, according to the literal provisions of the Act, the strike was unlawful. The Court held that the employees were consequently liable for the consequences of an illegal strike, including possible loss of benefits to which they might otherwise have been entitled. The Court observed that this hardship was imposed on the employees through no fault of their own but resulted from the apparent callous indifference, inefficiency and slackness in the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner, a conduct that could not be too strongly condemned. It is to be

The Court expressed that it hoped public officers, when carrying out their official duties in the future, would display a markedly greater sense of responsibility than the conduct they had exhibited in the matter presently before the Court. It emphasized the expectation that future actions by such officers should be guided by heightened diligence and accountability, reflecting a standard of conduct superior to that observed in the case under consideration. Accordingly, the Court concluded its deliberations by ordering the dismissal of the appeal that had been brought before it.