Workers of Industry Colliery vs Management of Industry Colliery

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 133 of 1951

Decision Date: 12 December 1952

Coram: Mehr Chand Mahajan, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

The Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 12 December 1952 in the matter of Workers of the Industry Colliery, Dhanbad, as petitioners, versus Management of the Industry Colliery, as respondents. The judgment was authored by Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, who sat on the bench together with Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The case was reported in the 1953 volumes of the All India Reporter (AIR 88) and the Supreme Court Reporter (SCR 428), and it also appears in the 1959 Supreme Court reference. The dispute arose under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, specifically invoking sections 20(2)(b), 22(1)(d) and 24, which deal respectively with the termination of conciliation proceedings, the legality of a strike during such proceedings, and the role of the Chief Labour Commissioner. The Court’s headnote clarified that a conciliation proceeding cannot be deemed concluded merely when the Conciliation Officer forwards his report; it is concluded only when the report is actually received by the appropriate Government authority. Moreover, the Court held that, in the absence of an explicit delegation, the Chief Labour Commissioner does not act as an agent of the Central Government for the purpose of receiving that report. The facts before the Court showed that the petitioners, after issuing a strike notice, declined to take part in conciliation proceedings that had been initiated by the Regional Labour Commissioner. The Regional Labour Commissioner sent his report to the Chief Labour Commissioner on 22 October 1949; the report reached the Chief Labour Commissioner on 25 October, but a copy was only forwarded to the Ministry of Labour and received there on 17 November. The petitioners commenced a one-day strike on 7 November, prior to the receipt of the report by the Central Government, and the Court affirmed that the strike was therefore illegal under section 22(1)(d). The judgment emphasized that the statutory time limits prescribed in the Industrial Disputes Act must be strictly observed for the Act to function effectively.

The appeal before the Supreme Court was Civil Appeal No. 133 of 1951, taken on special leave on 1 December 1950 from a judgment dated 24 April 1950 of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad. That tribunal had affirmed the order dated 2 February 1950 of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, which had declared the one-day strike on 7 November 1949 to be illegal. On 13 October 1949, the petitioners, through the Secretary of their union, served a notice under section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act to the respondents, indicating their intention to call a strike on the expiry of 6 November 1949 in order to press sixteen specific demands. In compliance with Rule 85 of the rules made under the Act, the notice was dispatched to three authorities: the Conciliation Officer (Central) at Dhanbad, the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) at Dhanbad, and the Chief Labour Commissioner in New Delhi. The petitioners thereafter refused to engage in the conciliation process, prompting the Regional Labour Commissioner to prepare a report. That report was transmitted to the Chief Labour Commissioner on 22 October 1949, was received by the Chief Labour Commissioner on 25 October, and finally reached the Ministry of Labour on 17 November. The petitioners proceeded with the strike on 7 November, before the report’s receipt by the Central Government. The Industrial Tribunal, applying section 20(2)(b) of the Act, held that the conciliation proceeding had not concluded until the report was received by the Government on 17 November; consequently, the strike occurred while the conciliation proceedings were still pending and was illegal under section 22(1)(d). The Supreme Court, after reviewing the submissions of counsel for both sides, upheld the Tribunal’s decision, reaffirming that the statutory provisions concerning the timing of conciliation reports and the prohibition of strikes during pending conciliation are mandatory and must be strictly complied with.

Counsel for the appellants comprised S. P. Sinha, assisted by S. N. Mukherjee, while counsel for the respondent also appeared. The judgment was delivered on December 12, 1952, by Justice DAS. This appeal by special leave challenged the order dated April 24, 1950 of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad, which had affirmed the earlier order dated February 2, 1950 of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad. The earlier order had held that the one-day strike undertaken by the appellants on November 7, 1949 was illegal. The factual background leading to that determination was as follows. On October 13, 1949 the appellants, through the secretary of their union, served a notice on the respondents invoking section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The notice announced the intention to call a one-day strike on the expiry of November 6, 1949 in order to press sixteen demands set out in the notice. In accordance with rule 85 of the rules framed under the same Act, the notice was dispatched to five authorities: the Conciliation Officer (Central), Dhanbad; the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad; the Chief Labour Commissioner, Department of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi; the Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi; and the A.D.C., Dhanbad. The Regional Labour Commissioner’s office recorded receipt of the notice on October 15, 1949. Subsequently, the Regional Labour Commissioner convened conciliation proceedings at Dhanbad on October 22, 1949. On that same date the appellants sent a letter declining to take part in the conciliation, asserting that they were convinced the process would yield no result and therefore should be deemed ceased. The Regional Labour Commissioner, on the same day, issued letter No. RLC/CON 5 (Token) 7910 to the Chief Labour Commissioner, New Delhi. In that correspondence he explained that, after receiving the strike notice, he had issued a notice to the parties to commence conciliation; the employer’s representatives were prepared to discuss the demands, but the union’s representative had filed a written petition refusing participation, claiming no new material had been presented to alter his view, and indicating his reluctance to recommend referring the matter to the Industrial Tribunal. The letter concluded with a request that the Government be informed of the situation. The report accompanying the letter appears to have reached the Chief Labour Commissioner’s office on October 25, 1949. Although the Chief Labour Commissioner, in his letter dated November 17, 1949 to the Regional Labour Commissioner, stated that the contents of the report had already been communicated to the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry actually received the copy only on that same day. In the interval, on November 7, 1949, approximately seven hundred appellants went on a one-day strike in compliance with the notice that had been served. The respondents subsequently contended that …

In the present case the employers contended that the one-day work stoppage carried out on 7 November 1949 was unlawful and consequently they filed an application under section 8 (2) of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Scheme Act, 1948, before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) at Dhanbad, seeking a determination as to whether the strike was legal or illegal. By an order dated 2 February 1950 the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) held that the strike was illegal. Aggrieved by that finding, the workers exercised their right under section 8 (4) of the same Act to appeal to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad. The Tribunal affirmed the Commissioner’s view that the strike was illegal and dismissed the appeal. The workers thereafter obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, and the sole question that arose on the appeal was whether the strike was indeed illegal. Section 24 (1) of the Act declares a strike to be illegal if it is commenced or declared in contravention of section 22 or section 23. Section 22 (1) provides that “No person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike in breach of (a) contract without giving to the employer notice of strike, as hereinafter provided, within six weeks before striking; or (b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or (c) before the expiry of the date of strike specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or (d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days, after the conclusion of such proceedings.” In the present matter the workers had given notice of strike in accordance with clause (a) and the fourteen-day period prescribed by clause (b) had elapsed before the strike was actually instituted on 7 November 1949, which was the date specified in the strike notice. Consequently the only remaining issue was whether the strike occurred while any conciliation proceedings were pending, or within seven days after their conclusion. Section 20 (1) states that a conciliation proceeding is deemed to have commenced on the date on which the notice of strike required by section 22 is received by the Conciliation Officer. In this case the notice of strike was received by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), who also acted as the Conciliation Officer, on 15 October 1949; therefore, under section 20 (1), the conciliation proceedings were deemed to have begun on that date. Sub-section (2) of section 20 further provides that a conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have concluded: (a) …; (b) where no settlement is arrived at, when the report of the Conciliation Officer is received by the appropriate Government or when the report of the Board is published under section 17, as the case may be; or (c) …. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), being the Conciliation Officer in this dispute, was obliged by section 12 to conduct the conciliation proceedings in the manner prescribed and

The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) was obligated, without delay, to investigate the industrial dispute and to take any actions he considered appropriate for the purpose of persuading the parties to achieve a fair and amicable settlement. In the present matter, the Commissioner conducted conciliation proceedings on 22 October 1949, yet no settlement was reached because the appellants refused to take part, maintaining that the process would not yield any result. Consequently, under section 12(4) the Commissioner’s duty required him, as soon as practicable after concluding his investigation, to forward to the appropriate Government a comprehensive report describing the steps he had taken to ascertain the facts and circumstances of the dispute, the efforts made to secure a settlement, a full statement of those facts and circumstances, and the reasons why, in this case, a settlement could not be obtained. Section 12(6) further mandated that such a report be submitted within fourteen days from the commencement of the conciliation proceedings, or within a shorter period if the appropriate Government prescribed a different timeline. Because the conciliation proceedings were deemed to have begun on 15 October 1949, the report had to be filed no later than fourteen days after that date. In fact, the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) dispatched the report to the Chief Labour Commissioner in New Delhi on 22 October 1949, which fell well within the prescribed fourteen-day period, and he requested that the Government be informed of the situation. Under subsection 4, the report was required to be sent to the “appropriate Government,” which, as defined in section 2(a), refers to the Central Government in relation to an industrial dispute concerning a mine. Although the Commissioner did not send the report directly to the Central Government, he followed the usual administrative practice of addressing it to the Chief Labour Commissioner, New Delhi, from where it was received by the Central Government on or about 17 November 1949. According to the provisions of section 20(2)(b), the conciliation proceedings are deemed to have concluded only upon the Government’s receipt of the report. Therefore, on a preliminary basis, the strike that occurred on 7 November 1949 fell within the period while the conciliation proceedings were still pending, as held by the lower authorities. Shri N. C. Chatterjee, however, contended that, in reality, the conciliation proceedings should be considered terminated when the appellants withdrew from participation and the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) prepared his report, arguing that section 20(2)(b) creates a legal fiction that artificially extends the proceedings until the report is actually received by the Government. He maintained that the proceedings ought to be regarded as concluded at the moment the parties disengaged and the Commissioner completed his report.

The Labour Commissioner (Central) dispatched his report within fourteen days after the conciliation proceedings began. The difficulty in accepting the argument advanced by counsel lies in the differing terminology employed by the statute. Section 12(4) uses the word “send,” section 12(6) uses “submitted,” whereas section 20(2)(b) employs the word “received.” The term “received” clearly signifies the actual physical receipt of the report by the appropriate Government. To interpret the provision so that the conciliation proceedings are deemed to have concluded when the report ought, in the ordinary course of business, to have been received would create uncertainty. Section 22(1)(d) expressly provides that once the conciliation proceedings have ended, the appropriate Government is allotted a definite period of seven days to determine the subsequent steps. Accordingly, the commencement of that seven-day period must be fixed with certainty, and the statute therefore provides in section 20(2)(b) that, where no settlement is reached, the proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded only when the report is actually received by the appropriate Government. Counsel for the petitioner urged, with considerable force, that this construction could enable the Government or its officers to deliberately withhold the report, that the report might be lost in transit, or that it might be received after the deadline fixed for the strike under section 22(1). He further pointed out that the workers would be unable to know the moment of actual receipt, thereby potentially depriving them of their right to strike. He contended that the Government should not be permitted to benefit from its own wrong.

While the Court acknowledges the hardship highlighted by counsel, it is bound to presume that the public officers concerned will act fairly and properly. Moreover, the present dispute is between the employer and the employees; there is no material before the Court to justify attributing any alleged misdeeds of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) or the Chief Labour Commissioner to the respondents, the employers, who are entitled to rely on the language of the statute. The Court’s role is limited to construing the statute as it stands, and any defect in the law must be rectified by a competent authority other than this Court. Counsel also argued that, under section 12, the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) should have sent his report directly to the appropriate Government, which in this case means the Central Government, and should not have followed an alternative route.

In this case the Court observed that the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) had sent the report to the Chief Labour Commissioner. Even assuming that fact, the Court noted that the Central Government never actually received the report and therefore the conciliation proceedings had not terminated at the time the strike occurred. Counsel for the petitioner, Shri N. C. Chatterjee, further submitted that the Chief Labour Commissioner should have returned the report to the Regional Labour Commissioner because the statute required that the report not be made to him. Instead the Chief Labour Commissioner retained the report and forwarded it to the Labour Ministry. Relying on the authority in Chaturbhuj Ram Lal v. Secretary of State for India, counsel argued that the Chief Labour Commissioner must be deemed an agent of the Central Government for the purpose of receiving the report. The Court adjourned the matter so that counsel could determine whether the Central Government had delegated such authority to the Chief Labour Commissioner. Counsel was unable to discover any such delegation. The Court found it evident that the Chief Labour Commissioner could not be regarded as the Central Government for this purpose. By a notification in the Gazette of India dated 5 April 1947 the Chief Labour Commissioner was appointed as a Conciliation Officer and, in that capacity, he is required to submit his report to the Central Government. This appointment demonstrates that the Chief Labour Commissioner is a separate authority from the Central Government. Rule 85, which was cited, requires that a strike notice be served, among others, on the Chief Labour Commissioner as well as on the Department of Labour of the Government of India, further indicating that the two are distinct entities. Consequently the Court held that the Chief Labour Commissioner is merely the channel through which correspondence between the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) and the Central Government passes, and he cannot be considered an agent of the Central Government for receiving the report. The earlier ruling cited by counsel, reported in A.I.R. 1927 All 215, therefore has no application to the facts of this case. On the basis of the foregoing reasoning the Court affirmed the conclusions of the lower authorities and dismissed the appeal. In view of the peculiar circumstances the Court ordered that each party bear its own costs. Before concluding the Court drew the attention of the concerned authorities to the slack and unbusinesslike manner in which the matter was handled in the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner. The Act requires that the Conciliation Officer

The judgment explained that the governing Act required the Conciliation Officer to submit his report within fourteen days from the beginning of the conciliation proceedings, and that the conciliation proceedings were deemed to have concluded only when the appropriate Government received that report. In practice, the conciliation process actually ended either when the parties reached a settlement before the Conciliation Officer or when it became clear that no settlement could be achieved. Nevertheless, the Act created a legal fiction by extending the existence of the conciliation proceedings until the report was actually received by the appropriate Government. Once the report was in the hands of that Government, the Act granted the Government seven days to consider any further action that might be required under the statute. During those seven days the Act expressly prohibited any strike, but after the expiry of that period the employees were free to resort to collective action, including a strike. Consequently, the date on which a strike could lawfully be commenced had to be carefully chosen and clearly specified in the strike notice that the employees were required to give under section 22 (1) of the Act. The judgment observed that even a brief reading of the Act showed that timing was a critical element of the legislation and that strict compliance with the relevant procedural time-limits was necessary for the Act to function smoothly.

In the present matter, the Conciliation Officer had submitted his report on 22 October 1949, which fell well within the fourteen-day period prescribed by section 12 (6) of the Act. The report was transmitted through the ordinary official channel and was received in the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner in New Delhi on 25 October 1949. However, the report was not forwarded to the Ministry of Labour, also located in New Delhi, until approximately 17 November 1949. Because of this delay, the employees had no way of knowing when the Central Government—the appropriate Government in this case—had actually received the report, nor when the subsequent seven-day consideration period had ended. Believing, and it was thought, that the administrative process had been carried out regularly and promptly, the employees proceeded to strike on 7 November 1949, as they had previously announced in their notice.

The court later discovered that the report had not, in fact, been received by the Central Government. Accordingly, under the literal terms of the law, the strike that began on 7 November 1949 had to be held illegal. The employees were therefore liable to face the legal consequences of an illegal strike, including the possible loss of benefits to which they might otherwise have been entitled. The judgment emphasized that this hardship was imposed upon the employees through no fault of their own but resulted from the apparent callous indifference, utter inefficiency, and slackness that had characterized the functioning of the Chief Labour Commissioner’s office. The judgment concluded by expressing a hope that public officials, in discharging their duties in the future, would exhibit a greater sense of responsibility than was demonstrated in the circumstances of this case.

The Court observed that public officers, when performing their duties in the future, must exhibit a considerably higher degree of responsibility than the conduct they displayed in the matter presently before this Tribunal. In light of this observation, the Court concluded that the appeal presented by the petitioners could not be sustained and therefore ordered the dismissal of the appeal. The record further indicates that the appointed representative for the appellants was identified as Gobind Saran Singh in the proceedings. Similarly, the individual designated as the representative for the respondent was recorded as P. K. Chatterjee in these proceedings. The Court emphasized that such an improvement in responsibility is essential to uphold the integrity of administrative functions and to prevent recurrence of the procedural shortcomings highlighted in this case. Accordingly, the judgment serves as a directive that future actions by officials should be guided by diligence, promptness, and a sincere commitment to lawful procedures. The identification of the parties’ representatives ensures that the procedural record accurately reflects the individuals who acted on behalf of the appellants and the respondent during the hearing. Such clarity in the official record contributes to the transparency and accountability of the judicial process.