Visweshwar Rao vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 27/05/1952

Coram: Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan, Mukherjee, Das, Chandrashekhar Aiyar

In the matter of Visweshwar Rao versus the State of Madhya Pradesh and others, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 27 May 1952. The case was heard by a bench comprising Justice Gupta, A.C.; Justice Beg, M.; Justice Hameedullah Chandrachud; and Justice Y.V. The reported citation is 1975 AIR 1083. The dispute centered on the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1 of 1951, which was enacted to abolish various proprietary estates and tenures. Several issues were raised, including whether the compensation provided under the Act was adequate, whether the court possessed jurisdiction to examine the Act’s validity, the scope of the right of eminent domain, the necessity of a provision for payment of compensation and a public purpose, the constitutional spirit, alleged delegation of legislative powers, accusations of fraud upon the Constitution, procedural aspects of the Bill’s passage, the conclusiveness of the Speaker’s certificate attesting that the Bill had been passed, the effect of any omission from the record, the requirement of reserving the law for the President’s assent, the necessity of the Governor’s signature, and the meanings of “law,” “legislature,” and “public purpose.” Additional questions concerned the compulsory acquisition of malguzari villages and the status of property set aside as a ruler’s private property under a covenant of merger, all examined in the context of the Constitution of India and the First Amendment Act of 1951, particularly Articles 31, 31-A, 31-B, 362 and 363.

The Full Court, consisting of Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri and Justices Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, held that the Madhya Pradesh Act was valid in its entirety. Relying on Articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B, the Court concluded that it lacked authority to entertain objections based on alleged inadequacy of compensation. The Court found no improper delegation of legislative powers and determined that the compensation provisions did not constitute a fraud on the Constitution. The Court further ruled that the Speaker’s certificate, which accompanied the Bill when it was presented to the President for assent and affirmed that the Bill had been passed by the House, constituted conclusive proof of passage. The absence of a recorded vote on the motion, required under rule 20(1) of the Rules of Procedure, was deemed insufficient to invalidate the Act. Justice Patanjali Sastri noted that any failure to formally move the motion before the House, if it occurred, was merely a procedural irregularity, given that the overwhelming majority of the 1,021 members present supported the motion and no dissent was expressed. The Court also held that, although Article 31(3) mentions a “law” being reserved for the President’s consideration, the Constitution does not require a Governor’s assent before a Bill passed by the Legislative Assembly is submitted to the President; the President can fulfil both functions under Article 200 and the relevant provisions of Article 31 simultaneously.

In the Court’s analysis, it was observed that the provisions of Article 31(3) and Article 31(4) could be applied simultaneously; the President was not required to give assent on two separate occasions, once to convert the Bill into law under Article 200 and again to make that law operative under Article 31(2). The term “Legislature” in Article 31(4) was interpreted to refer to the House or Houses of the Legislature and not to the Governor. The Court further held that although malguzari villages were excluded from the definition of “estate” in Article 31-A, Article 31-B—being an independent provision rather than merely illustrative of Article 31-A—validated the Act even for those villages, and because Article 31(4) was not limited to “estates,” its provisions protected the entire law. Moreover, Article 362 was found not to forbid the acquisition of property that had been designated as private property of a Ruler by a covenant of merger. The Court also noted, with reference to the opinions of Justices Mahajan and Das, that the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate disputes arising from a covenant of merger was excluded by Article 363.

The petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking enforcement of fundamental rights, specifically the right to property under Article 31(1). The petitions listed were numbered 166, 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 257, 268, 280 to 285, 287 to 289, 317, 318 and 487 of 1951. Counsel for the petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951 was assisted by another lawyer, while counsel for the petitioner in Petition No. 317 of 1951 was also represented by a senior advocate with assistance. Separate counsel represented the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 280-285, 257 and 287-289 of 1951. Additional petitioners were represented by counsel in Petition No. 26 of 1951 and Petition No. 318 of 1951, and another petitioner in Petition No. 487 of 1951. Counsel for the respondent, the State of Madhya Pradesh, included the Advocate-General and an assisting counsel. The judgment of the Chief Justice, printed on pages 893-916 of the reported volume, covered these cases as well. Justices Mahajan, Mukherjee, Das and Chandra Sekhara Aiyar delivered separate judgments. Justice Mahajan authored the judgment for Petition No. 166 of 1951, which was brought by Shri Visweshwar Rao, a zamindar and proprietor of the Ahiri zamindari estate as defined in Section 2(3) of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, II of 1917, located in Sironcha tehsil, Chanda district, Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner sought a writ or direction restraining the State from disturbing his possession of the estate and of eighty malguzari villages in Garchiroli tehsil, asserting that he and his ancestors had enjoyed full proprietary rights over these properties for many generations. The petition noted that the application was filed on the 5th

On 30 April 1950 the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly passed the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act. The President of India gave his assent to the Act on 22 January 1951 and it was subsequently published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on 26 January 1951 as Act I of 1951. By a notification issued in a gazette extraordinary on 27 January 1951 the Madhya Pradesh Government fixed 31 March 1951 as the date on which the estates would vest under section three of the Act. Consequently the petitioner stood to lose his estate and associated lands on the specified vesting date of 31 March 1951. On 9 March 1951, that is before the vesting date, he filed the present application before this Court seeking writs that would restrain the Government from taking possession of his property. He alleged that the Madhya Pradesh Act I of 1951 was unconstitutional, void, and infringed his fundamental rights in several respects. To appreciate the grounds on which the Act’s validity is being questioned, it is necessary to set out the relevant statutory provisions and the factual background that prompted the legislation. Madhya Pradesh is a composite State formed from the Central Provinces, Berar and several merged territories. An agreement of merger signed on 15 December 1947 between the rulers of certain Indian States and the Dominion of India transferred territories that were previously under the Indian States Agency to the Dominion. The actual integration of those territories took place on 1 January 1948 and the States were merged into Madhya Pradesh on 1 August 1949. At the time of the impugned Act there were one hundred six estates within Madhya Pradesh that were defined in section two three of Act I of 1951 and were held by zamindars. Most of the land was owned by malguzars of mahals who held the status of “Malkan cabza”. The prevailing land system in Madhya Pradesh was malguzari, except in certain areas where the ryotwari system operated, and the malguzar functioned as an intermediary between the State and the tiller. Land was also held under various subordinate tenures such as absolute occupancy, occupancy, ryot, thikedar, mafidar, and ilaqadar arrangements. The assessment of land revenue in Madhya Pradesh was last made under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act II of 1917, and estate holders paid revenue on the lands comprising their estates at a concessionary rate known as “tekoli”. In 1939 an ad-hoc increase in the amount of tekoli was effected by the Central Provinces Revision of Land Revenue Estates Act I of 1939. On 3 September 1946 the Central Provinces and Berar Legislative Assembly passed a resolution calling for the elimination of intermediaries between the State and the peasant. Following that resolution, several statutes were enacted with the objective of achieving this result, the Act under review being the last of those statutes.

In the year 1947 the Central Provinces enacted the Land Revenue Estates Act, numbered XXV of 1947. According to the material placed before the Court, the revenue assessment known as tekoli on the estates was increased in certain areas from thirty to fifty percent of the full jama, while in other areas the rate was raised from forty to sixty percent of the full jama. In that same year the legislature also passed the Central Provinces Land Revenue Revision Mahals Act, numbered XXVI of 1947. It is alleged that the land assessment on malguzari villages was lifted to seventy-five percent, an increase from the earlier range of forty-five to fifty percent of the assessed malguzari assets. The increase was effected without any settlement having been undertaken.

Subsequently, in 1948 the Central Provinces and Berar promulgated the Revocation of Exemptions Act, numbered XXXVII of 1948. That statute removed the exemption previously enjoyed by certain persons from the liability to pay land revenue, thereby rendering them liable for payment. It is urged that the effect of this legislation was to cause a substantial reduction in the net income of the proprietors.

On 11 October 1949 the Bill that is now the subject of the present petition was introduced in the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Within four days, on 15 October 1949, the Bill was referred to a Select Committee for detailed examination. The Select Committee completed its work and reported its findings on 9 March 1950. The report was formally published on 17 March 1950 and the Assembly took the report into consideration on 29 March 1950.

On 30 March 1950 the opposition moved that the Bill be circulated for further consideration. The motion for circulation was rejected on 3 April 1950. Thereafter the Bill was debated clause by clause, and the individual clauses were passed between 3 April and 5 April 1950. On 5 April 1950 the member who was in charge of the Bill moved the following amendment: “Speaker Sir, I now move that the Central Provinces & Berar Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Bill, 1949 (No 64 of 1949) as considered by the House be passed into law.” The Speaker recorded the motion and repeated its wording.

During the third-reading stage a number of speeches were delivered. The opposition was a very small minority, and the speeches were largely laudatory, with each member praising the Bill as a significant reform of the land system in Madhya Pradesh. No motion seeking delay was tabled, and in effect there was no substantive opposition to the passage of the Bill. Some members expressed the view that the Act did not go far enough, while others suggested that the compensation provisions should have been more generous; however, none advocated rejecting the Bill in its present form. The official report of the proceedings on 5 April 1950 does not contain a note stating that the motion to pass the Bill into law was carried. The absence of such a note in the legislative record has been used to argue that the Bill was

In this case the Court observed that the record showed the Bill had not been formally recorded as having been passed into law because the legislative proceeding notes omitted the statement of passage. The printed proceedings of the session were dated 21 June 1950 and were later signed by the Speaker on 1 October 1950. By contrast, the original Bill that was laid before the President for assent bore a printed date of 29 April 1950 and carried the Speaker’s certificate dated 10 May 1950, which declared that the Bill had been duly passed by the legislature on 5 April 1950. The Court noted that the Speaker’s certificate was signed well before he affixed his signature to the printed proceedings. The Act, as the Court reiterated, obtained the President’s assent on 22 January 1951 and was subsequently published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on 26 January 1951 as Madhya Pradesh Act I of 1951. Following the enactment, several petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Act were filed in the High Court of Nagpur; that Court dismissed all of those petitions on 9 April 1951 while the present petition and a few others were pending before this Court. The Court reproduced the preamble of the Act, which read: “An Act to provide for the acquisition of the rights of proprietors in estates, mahals, alienated villages and alienated lands in Madhya Pradesh and to make provision for other matters connected therewith.” The Court held that the legislation fell squarely within entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and therefore the Madhya Pradesh Legislature possessed undisputed competence to enact it. The Act was organized into eleven chapters and three schedules. Chapter II, which deals with the vesting of proprietary rights in the State, sets out the consequences of such vesting. Section 3 of the Act states: “Save as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from a date to be specified by a notification by the State Government in this behalf, all proprietary rights in an estate, mahal, alienated village or alienated land, as the case may be, in the area specified in the notification vesting in a proprietor of such estate, mahal, alienated village, alienated land, or in a person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor, shall pass from such proprietor or such other person to and vest in the State for the purposes of the State free of all encumbrances ….” Section 4 further provides that after the publication of the notification under Section 3, all rights, title and interest that vest in the proprietor—or any person having an interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor—in the specified area, including cultivable or barren land, grassland, scrub jungle, forest, trees, fisheries, wells, tanks, ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, village sites, hats, bazaars and melas, as well as all sub-soil interests such as rights in mines and minerals whether being worked or not, shall cease and vest in the State free of all encumbrances. However, the provision also preserves the proprietor’s right to retain possession of his homestead, home-farm land, and, in the Central Provinces, any land that was brought under cultivation after the agricultural year 1948-49 but before the date of vesting.

In the present case the Court examined the provisions concerning lands that were cultivated after the agricultural year 1948-49 but before the date of vesting. It was held that the proprietor was entitled to recover any sums that became due to him before the vesting date by virtue of his proprietary rights. All open enclosures that were used for agricultural or domestic purposes, all buildings, places of worship, wells situated therein and trees standing on those lands or on house sites continued to remain in the possession of the proprietor. The State Government was required to settle those holdings with the proprietor on such terms and conditions that it might determine. Likewise certain private wells, trees, tanks and groves were to remain in the possession of the proprietor or of any other person who had an interest in them. Chapter III of the Act dealt with the assessment of compensation. Section 8 provided that the State Government must pay compensation to the proprietor in accordance with the rules contained in Schedule I. In addition to the amount determined under that schedule the Government was obligated to compensate for any expenditure incurred on the construction of a tank or well that was used for agricultural purposes and that subsequently vested in the State Government. Further, the State Government had to pay compensation for lands that lay within the limits of a municipality or a cantonment, and that payment was to be made according to the rules set out in Schedule II. The compensation for the divestment of proprietary rights became due from the date of vesting and, as mandated, it would attract interest at the rate of two and a half per cent per annum from the date of vesting until the date of payment. Section 9 stipulated the modes by which the compensation prescribed in section 8 could be paid. According to the rules, payment could be made in cash in full or in annual instalments not exceeding thirty years, or by way of bonds, either negotiable or non-negotiable, carrying interest at the rate specified in sub-section 4 of section 8 and having a guaranteed face value maturing within a period not exceeding thirty years. The remaining sections of the chapter dealt with interim payments, the appointment of compensation officers and the procedure for determining compensation. Schedule I specified that, in the Central Provinces and in Berar, the amount of compensation would be ten times the net income as determined by the rules in the schedule. In merged territories the compensation was payable on a sliding scale ranging from two times to ten times the net income. Schedule II set out a measure of compensation on a scale varying from five to fifteen times the assessment of the land as specified in the schedule. Section 2 of Schedule I outlined the calculation of gross income by adding the income received by a proprietor from the aggregate rents of tenants recorded in the jamabandi for the previous agricultural year, together with other sources of income such as siwai

The judgment explained that the schedule defined “income” to include earnings from a variety of sources such as jalkar, bankar, phalkar, markets, fairs, grazing and village forests, and that this income was to be calculated at twice the amount recorded in the current settlement of 1923. It further stated that “consent money” on transfer of tenancy lands was to be measured by taking the average of transactions recorded in the village papers for the ten years preceding the agricultural year in which the vesting date occurred. The schedule also set out the method for determining the gross income of a mahal, as well as the gross income of an alienated village or alienated land, each to be assessed separately. In addition, the schedule prescribed a method for ascertaining gross income in the case of mines and forests.

The Court noted that the schedule prescribed that net income should be arrived at by deducting certain items from gross income. The deductions enumerated were the assessed land revenue, sums payable during the preceding agricultural year on account of cesses and local rates, the average of income tax paid on income derived from large forests during the thirty agricultural years preceding the year in which the relevant date fell, and a cost of management calculated as a percentage ranging from eight to fifteen per cent of the gross annual income for incomes that varied between rupees two thousand and rupees fifteen thousand. The schedule further provided that, notwithstanding any provision in sub-rule (2), the net income could not, in any case, be reduced to less than five per cent of the gross income.

Chapter IV, the judgment observed, dealt with incidental matters concerning the determination of the debts of proprietors, and its provisions were analogous to those found in the Debt-Consolidation or Relief of Indebtedness Act. Chapter V set out the procedure for determining the actual amount of compensation payable and the manner of its payment. Chapter VI applied to that part of Madhya Pradesh defined in the Act as the Central Provinces, and it provided that a proprietor who had been dispossessed of his estate would retain malik-makbuza rights in his home-farm lands. The chapter also conferred malik-makbuza rights on absolute occupancy tenants and on occupancy tenants. It made provisions for the reservation of grazing lands and for the collection of land revenue.

Similar provisions were contained in Chapter VII, which dealt with the management and tenures of land in the merged territories. Chapter VIII addressed the management and tenures of lands in Berar. The schedule made a separate provision for determining compensation payable to lessees of mines and minerals under section 218 of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act and section 44 of the Berar Land Revenue Code, operating on the presumption that all mines and minerals belonged to the State and that proprietary rights in them could be granted by the State to any person. Where a right to minerals had been assigned, the schedule laid down the procedure for its acquisition and the consequences arising from such acquisition.

Finally, the Act provided for the grant of a rehabilitation amount to ex-propriated proprietors, the range of which was specified in Schedule III.

The final chapter of the Act contains provisions that are classified as miscellaneous, among which is the authority to formulate rules. The principal objective of the Act is to place the actual cultivators of the soil in direct relationship with the State by removing any intermediary land-holders. In effect, the legislation seeks to transform the existing malguzari system into a ryotwari land framework. Additionally, the Act provides that gram panchayats shall assume responsibility for the administration of common lands that have been released from the control of private owners, and it envisions the creation of self-government institutions at the village level. Regarding the compensation provisions, the Act does not offer a precise monetary equivalent for the property that is taken; consequently, the compensation may not be fully adequate, but the provisions cannot be described as illusory. The Act represents a clear advancement over the Bihar Act because it retains rent arrears in the possession of the proprietors and does not artificially diminish the net income by any contrivance. Moreover, the Act stipulates that the net income of a proprietor must never fall below five percent of the gross income. As a result, every case obliges the State to pay some amount of compensation to the proprietor, and the compensation never becomes a negative figure, zero, or a mere nominal amount. In other respects, the compensation rules follow the pattern common to all zamindari legislation, namely the inflation of expenditure and the deflation of actual income. For example, the siwai income derived from jal-kar, bankar and similar sources, as well as from village forests, is calculated at twice the amount recorded in the settlement of 1923. The Act, which was enacted in 1951, uses the 1923 settlement figures even though those figures are considerably lower than the actual income that proprietors earned from the same sources in 1951. Likewise, the income from consent money is determined by taking the average income for the ten years preceding the date of vesting, rather than by using the actual income realized in the most recent agricultural year. The expenditure side is also inflated: for large forests, the average income tax paid over a thirty-year agricultural period is taken into account, even though an agricultural income tax did not exist for most of that period and was introduced only recently. The cost of management is fixed at a flat rate ranging from eight to fifteen percent. Consequently, there can be no doubt that the principles laid down for the determination of compensation are neither equitable nor do they ensure payment of just compensation to the expropriated proprietor. The petitioner contends that, under the formula provided in the Act, a compensation amount of twenty-five lakh rupees—calculated on the basis of the value of the property taken—has been reduced to a sum of sixty-five thousand rupees, which is to be paid in thirty unspecified instalments.

The Court observed that the compensation figure of sixty-five thousand rupees was purely nominal and illusory. The amount of sixty-five thousand rupees was computed by first determining the gross income from rents, which amounted to fifty-five thousand rupees, and then adding the alleged Siwai income of eighty-thousand-fifty rupees. According to the petitioner's affidavit, the actual Siwai income realized by the petitioner was four-lakh-sixty-five thousand rupees, but the statutory formula used a much lower figure, resulting in a total gross income of one-lakh-thirty-five thousand rupees. Deductions permitted under the Act were then subtracted: revenue deductions of forty-five thousand rupees, income-tax calculated on the average of thirty years amounting to sixty-six thousand-six hundred rupees, and a cost of management charge of twenty-one thousand rupees. These deductions summed to one-lakh-thirty-two thousand-six hundred rupees, leaving a net income of only two thousand-four hundred rupees. Multiplying the net income by ten gave twenty-four thousand rupees; however, the Act required that net income not fall below five per cent of gross income, which worked out to six thousand-five hundred rupees. Consequently, the compensation payable was fixed at sixty-five thousand rupees, even though the petitioner’s yearly income was approximately five-lakh-sixty-five thousand rupees and the market value of his property stood at twenty-five lakh rupees. The primary objection raised by the counsel for the petitioner concerned the validity of the Act itself, arguing that the Bill had never been duly passed into law. The objection was based on the omission from the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly proceedings dated 5 April 1950 of any statement indicating that the Speaker had presented the Bill to the House and that it had been passed. The counsel referred to Rules 20, 22, 34 and 115 of the procedural rules framed under the Government of India Act, 1935, which prescribe that a matter requiring Assembly decision must be presented by the Speaker as a question on a member’s motion, that the Speaker reads the motion for consideration, that votes may be taken by voice or division at the member’s request, that the result of a division is announced by the Speaker and is final, and that a full report of the proceedings must be prepared, printed, and signed by the Speaker to constitute the authentic record.

The counsel further argued that the authentic report of the Assembly’s proceedings was conclusive proof that the Bill had not been put to the Assembly as a question and therefore had not been voted upon, meaning it could not be said to have been passed by the legislature. It was submitted that even if there had been no open opposition to the Bill’s passage, the possibility remained that, had the Bill been formally presented to the Assembly, it might have been rejected. This line of reasoning sought to demonstrate that the procedural deficiencies identified in the official record undermined the legislative authority of the Act, rendering the compensation calculation based on that Act fundamentally flawed.

In this case the Court observed that the official record of the Assembly’s proceedings bore the Speaker’s signature dated 1 October 1950, whereas the certificate stating that the Bill had been passed was entered by the Speaker on the original Bill when it was presented to the President for assent on 31 May 1950. The Court held that the Speaker’s certificate is decisive evidence that the Bill had been duly passed by the legislature, citing the authority in Craies’ Statute Law, fourth edition, page 36. The Court noted that an apparent omission in the printed proceedings failed to indicate that the motion had been introduced and approved by the House; the Speaker, in signing the report six months after the event, apparently did not notice this discrepancy. Nonetheless, the Court found no doubt that the Assembly, on 5 April 1950, had expressed a clear intention to pass the Bill and that no member present opposed its passage. The motion before the House was expressly phrased as “the Bill be passed,” and the Court reasoned that the Speaker could not have appended a certificate of passage if the Bill had not actually been passed. Consequently, there were no grounds to question the correctness of the Speaker’s certificate, and the contention that the Bill had not become law was rejected. The Court then turned to the argument that constitutional provisions articles 31-A and 31-B did not apply because the Bill had never become law through the constitutional process and that such provisions applied only to legislation that had attained the status of an Act. The Court explained that the Legislature of Madhya Pradesh consists of the Governor and the Legislative Assembly. It was contended that even if the Assembly had passed the Bill, the Governor’s assent was absent because the Bill was transmitted directly to the President, and that without the Governor’s assent the Bill could not become law despite the President’s subsequent assent. Reference was made to sub-clause (3) of article 31, which mentions “law” being reserved for the President’s consideration, not merely a “Bill.” The Court found this argument unconvincing in light of article 200, which empowers the Governor either to assent to a Bill or to reserve it for the President’s consideration. In the present case the Governor exercised the latter option, thereby placing the Bill before the President, who either could assent or withhold assent. Since the President gave his assent, the Court held that the Bill must be regarded as having become law. The Court observed that the constitutional scheme does not envisage a scenario where the Governor first assents to the Bill, thereby making it a law, and subsequently reserves it for the President; rather, the Governor’s reservation is a preliminary step, after which the President’s assent finalises the law. The counsel for the petitioner subsequently argued that the President could…

The Court examined the submission that the President could not discharge his functions under Article 200 together with those under Article 31(3) and Article 31(4) with respect to the same Bill at one time. The submission proposed a two-step procedure: first, the Governor would either assent to the Bill or reserve it for the President’s consideration under Article 200; if the Governor reserved it, the President would then give his assent, thereby making the Bill a law. After that, the Governor would again have to reserve the now-lawful Bill for the President’s consideration under Article 31(3) so that it could become an effective law despite the restrictions of Article 31(2). The argument continued that only after this second reservation and a further assent by the President could it be said that the President had verified that the law did not breach Article 31(2). The submission asserted that without this “double procedure” the President could not be said to have satisfied the constitutional requirement that the law be examined for conformity with Article 31(2).

The Court found this argument to be without merit. It held that requiring the President to assent to the same Bill twice would be a pointless formality. The Court explained that the Constitution did not prevent the President from performing both sets of duties—those assigned by Article 200 and those by Articles 31(3) and 31(4)—simultaneously. The President was free to consider the Bill once, decide whether it should be passed into law, and at the same time assess whether it complied with the conditions of Article 31(2). The Court further noted that once the President gave his assent, Articles 31-A and 31-B applied, thereby removing any rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution for persons affected by the law. The Court endorsed the view expressed by the learned Attorney-General that the document to be sent to the President was the Bill as passed by the Legislature, not the Bill after the Governor’s assent. The Court quoted the provision: “If any Bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2).” In interpreting this clause, the Court clarified that the term “Legislature” referred to the House or Houses of the Legislature and expressly excluded the Governor. It observed that the word “Legislature” carried different meanings in different constitutional articles; in some it included the Governor, while in many others it denoted only the elected Houses.

Article 31(4) was explained to mean that when a Bill that violates clause (2) of Article 31 is passed by the House or Houses of the Legislature, and that Bill is then reserved for the President’s consideration and receives his assent, the Bill becomes law and cannot be challenged on the ground of the violation. After stating this rule, the petitioner argued that the duty to pay compensation was inherent in the legislative power contained in entry 36 of List II and that the Act was unconstitutional because it allowed the acquisition of zamindaris without any compensation, rendering the compensation provisions illusory. The Court rejected this argument, relying on the reasoning set out in the earlier judgment in the Bihar case. It further held that the compensation stipulated in the impugned Act could not be described as illusory; rather, it was merely grossly inadequate and did not correspond to the market value of the property taken. Nonetheless, the adequacy of the compensation could not be examined by the Court because Article 31(4) barred any judicial review of that question. The Court noted that the Bill in question was pending at the moment the Constitution came into force, it had been reserved for the President’s consideration, and the President had given his assent. Consequently, all the conditions required for the operation of Article 31(4) were satisfied.

In addition to the bar created by Article 31(4), the Court identified two further obstacles arising from Articles 31-A and 31-B, which were introduced by constitutional amendments. These articles also prevented the petitioner from seeking a review of the amount of compensation. The petitioner’s claim that the Act lacked a public purpose was likewise dismissed, again on the basis of the reasoning applied in the Bihar case. The Court explained that the purpose of the Act was to create a direct link between the tillers of the soil and the Government, to eliminate intermediaries, and to promote the welfare of society as a whole. The Act also intended to give “malik maqbuza” status to occupancy tenants, to improve their conditions, and to place the management of village affairs and cultivation in a democratic village body. The Court observed that it was too late to argue that such reforms did not serve the general public interest. The petitioner’s further contention, raised by Mr Somayya, that the Act was a constitutional fraud because it was enacted under entry 42 of List III to permit acquisition without payment of compensation, was also rejected following the Bihar case analysis. The Court clarified that the Act never allowed compensation to amount to nothing; in every case some compensation was payable, and in most cases the amount was not inadequate. Mr Somayya had argued that a compensation payment of Rs 65,000 for property valued at twenty-five lakh rupees was purely illusory. The Court held that the petitioner’s valuation could not be taken as the definitive market value.

The Court observed that the value of the property cannot be assessed at its full market price, and it further held that it is incorrect to say that a statute which mandates the payment of a sum of Rs 65,000 fails to provide any compensation at all. The Court explained that the amount and the schedule of instalments for such payment must be determined by the rules made under the relevant legislation, and that if those rules are framed in a manner that constitutes an abuse of the rule-making power, they may be challenged on that ground. The contention that the Act is defective because it delegates essential legislative authority to the executive was rejected, with reference to the reasoning set out in the Bihar case. A further argument was raised that the constitutional amendments embodied in articles 31-A and 31-B could not prejudice the petitioner’s guaranteed rights under Part III of the Constitution with respect to the eighty malguzari villages, because those villages, referred to as mahals, did not fall within the definition of “estate” contained in article 31-A. The Court quoted the definition given in sub-clause (2)(a), which states: “The expression ‘estate’ shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant.” The Court then referred to Section 2(3) of the C.P. Land Revenue Act of 1917 (Act II), which defines “estate” as “an estate as declared by the State Government.” Although the learned Advocate-General conceded that the villages were not encompassed by that definition, he argued that they could be regarded as “estate” within the meaning of article 31-A, because mahals in the Central Provinces serve as the local equivalents of the term, even though they have not been formally declared as such by the Act. The Court found no material on record to support this contention. Moreover, the Court noted that even if the eighty mahals are held not to be “estate” and therefore fall outside the reach of article 31-A, the petitioner’s case does not gain any advantage, since the obstacles created by articles 31-B and 31(4) remain effective irrespective of the non-application of article 31-A. The petitioner further argued that article 31-B is merely illustrative of the rule set out in article 31-A and should be disregarded if article 31-A has no operation. Finally, the Court referred to the Privy Council decision in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, which examined the construction of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 2 of the Defence of India Act. The Court reproduced the material portion of that section, noting that “(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, make such rules as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.”

In discussing the language of subsection (2) of section 2 of the Defence of India Act, the Court quoted the earlier authority that the subsection reads: “(1) L.R. 72 J.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the rules may provide for, or may empower any authority to make orders providing for, all or any of the following matters, namely ….” The Court then explained that the purpose of subsection (2) is merely illustrative. It observed that the power to make rules is granted by subsection (1), and that the phrase “the rules” in the opening sentence of subsection (2) refers to the rules authorised and made under subsection (1). Moreover, the Court stressed that the provisions of subsection (2) do not limit the broader power given in subsection (1), a point underscored by the words “without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)”. The Court subsequently reproduced the text of Article 31-B, which states: “Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void … on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.” Relying on the similarity of the opening words of Article 31-B with those of subsection (2) of the Defence of India Act, counsel for the petitioner argued that Article 31-B was merely illustrative of Article 31-A and therefore should be limited in the same way as Article 31-A, which applies only to estates as defined therein. The Court, however, held that the observations in the earlier Sibnath Banerjee case do not support that contention; in fact, they contradict it. The Court explained that Article 31-B expressly validates certain Acts listed in the Ninth Schedule despite the provisions of Article 31-A and is not merely illustrative of Article 31-A but operates independently. Consequently, the Act under challenge, concerning the acquisition of the eighty malguzari villages, cannot be attacked on the basis that it violates Article 31-(2) of the Constitution or any other provision of Part III. The Court further noted that the applicability of Article 31-(4) is not confined to estates and that its provisions uphold the law in its entirety. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed, and the Court made no order as to costs. The petition was identified as Petition No. 317 of 1951. Counsel for the petitioner had also relied on the observations of Chief Justice Holmes in Communications Assns. v. Douds, quoting that “the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil…”. The Court recorded this citation but proceeded to reject its application to the present constitutional construction.

In arguing before the Court, counsel referred to a passage that described legal principles as “mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil.” The passage further asserted that the true significance of such principles is not merely formal but must be understood by examining their origin and development rather than by a simple dictionary definition. Counsel claimed that if the Constitution of India were interpreted in accordance with this view, then, notwithstanding the explicit language of article 31(2), a broader intention could be discerned that obliges the State to pay full compensation whenever property is compulsorily acquired.

Counsel further argued that the right to compensation is implied in entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and that article 31(2) does not create the right but only protects an existing one. In attempting to support this contention, counsel quoted the observations of Mr. Das but achieved no persuasive effect. The Court noted that the dictum of Holmes C.J. concerning “mathematical formulas” has no relevance to the construction of a Constitution that expressly obliges the payment of compensation for compulsory acquisition, especially after an amendment that expressly removed that right from persons affected by the impugned Act.

Another point raised by counsel was that “nationalisation” of land constitutes a distinct head of legislation and that “acquisition in general” does not fall within the scope of entry 36 of List II. Counsel sought to substantiate this claim by citing a passage from Stephen’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume III, page S41. However, when read in full, the passage actually undermines the argument, stating that under powers of compulsory acquisition a number of properties have been nationalised in England and other jurisdictions.

The final allegation advanced was that the legislation under scrutiny was not enacted bona-fide because, in 1946, the legislature passed a resolution to abolish zamindaris and subsequently enacted statutes designed to defeat the constitutional guarantee of compensation through various devices. According to counsel, the first step in this alleged scheme was an increase in land revenue aimed at reducing the zamindars’ gross income, followed by the enactment of additional Acts mentioned earlier in the judgment with the same purpose.

The Court found this argument to be without merit. It held that the Government possessed the competence, within its sovereign powers, to raise land revenue, withdraw any revenue exemptions previously granted, and pass other similar statutes. No evidence was presented to show that these enactments were fraudulently intended to circumvent the constitutional provision on compensation. Moreover, most of the statutes in question were enacted before the Constitution came into force. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. The Court made no order as to costs.

The Court noted that the petition was already disposed of by the decision in Petition No. 166 of 1951, except for one remaining issue. The properties in dispute had been acquired under the statute while they were situated in a princely State that later merged with Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner argued that, according to the covenant of merger, those lands were declared his private property and were therefore protected by the guarantee in article 362 of the Constitution. He contended that the impugned Act was invalid because it violated that guarantee. The Court reproduced the text of article 362, which states: “In the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (1) of article 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State.” The Court also observed that article 333 removes the jurisdiction of courts over disputes arising out of treaties, agreements, covenants, engagements, sanads and similar instruments. While it is true that the covenant of merger transformed the petitioner’s holdings into private property distinct from State property, the Court held that the petitioner was in no better position than any other owner of private land. Article 362 does not forbid the acquisition of property that has been declared private under a merger covenant, nor does it guarantee the perpetual existence of such property. The guarantee in article 362 is limited to ensuring that the personal properties of a ruler, once designated as private, will not be claimed by the State. The Court found that this limited guarantee had been fully respected by the statute, which treated the lands as private and proceeded on that assumption. Moreover, because article 363 contains comprehensive language on the matter, the Court concluded that the issue was not justiciable. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed without any order as to costs.

The Court then turned to the other petitions listed, namely Petitions Nos. 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 257, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288 and 289 of 1951, a total of fifteen petitions. In each of these proceedings counsel appeared on behalf of the petitioners. Seven of the petitions were filed by zamindars from Madhya Pradesh who owned estates. The petitioner in Petition No. 246 also possessed certain malguzari villages, while the petitioner in Petition No. 237 was a malguzar of eighteen villages but did not own an estate. Petitions Nos. 280 to 285 and 257 concerned territories that had been merged with Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner in Petition No. 282 had been the ruler of the former State of Jashpur, and his petition related to his private properties. The petitioners in Petitions Nos. 283, 284 and 257 were Ilakadars, whereas those in Petitions Nos. 280 and 285 were mafidars. Finally, the petitioner in Petition No. 281 was a Thikedar, that is, a revenue farmer of three villages. All of these petitions were addressed and the Court’s conclusions were incorporated in the overall dismissal of the matters presented.

Mr. Swami repeated the claim originally made by Mr. Somayya that the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act had not been properly enacted by the legislature. The Court referred to the reasons set out in Petition No. 166 of 1951 and concluded that the claim lacked any merit. Mr. Swami also reiterated a contention raised by Mr. Bindra that the legislation was not passed in good faith. The Court examined the grounds articulated in Petition No. a17 and found that this submission could not be accepted. In addition, Mr. Swami advanced a vigorous argument that the Act had effectively turned the Government into a “super-zamindar,” that it served no public purpose, that it introduced no alteration to the existing order, that it accomplished nothing new, that tenants remained in the same position, that the malikan-cabza were already existent, that tenants could acquire such status merely by occupancy under the existing statutes, and that they already possessed the authority to transfer their holdings. The Court held that this line of reasoning was fundamentally flawed. It restated that the true object of the Act was to reform the land-tenure system of the State by creating a direct relationship between the actual cultivators of the land and the Government. Consequently, the petitions relying on the above arguments were dismissed, and no order as to costs was made. Petition No. 318 of 1951 was also dismissed; the counsel appearing for that petition merely adopted the arguments presented in the earlier petitions, and, for the reasons already explained, the Court dismissed it without awarding costs. Petition No. 487 of 1951 was similarly dismissed; the counsel for that petition raised the same points as in the other petitions, and the Court found the petition failed, again making no order as to costs.

Justice Mukherjee expressed concurrence with the Chief Justice that all of the pending petitions should be dismissed. The Court then turned to the legislative background of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (referred to as Act I of 1951). The Act received the President’s assent on 22 January 1951, and a notification was subsequently published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on 27 January 1951, fixing 31 March 1951 as the date on which all proprietary rights would vest in the State pursuant to section 3 of the Act. Following the enactment, a series of applications were filed under article 226 of the Constitution in the Madhya Pradesh High Court by, or on behalf of, various individuals described as Zamindars, Malguzars, or proprietors of “alienated villages.” These applications sought writs directing the State to refrain from operating under the Act and challenged the Act’s validity on numerous grounds. Eleven of these applications were heard by a Full Bench of the High Court consisting of Chief Justice B.P. Sinha, Justice Mangalmurthi, and Justice Mudholkar, and on 9 April 1951 the Full Bench dismissed the applications. The High Court certified, under article 132(1), that the matters raised involved a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. No appeal appears to have been filed, apparently because the present applications under article 226 were already pending before this Court.

In the course of the litigation, it was noted that the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh had also enacted legislation to abolish zamindari tenures, and that those statutes had been challenged by the proprietors who were affected. The Allahabad High Court upheld the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Act, whereas the Patna High Court declared the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, to be unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution. In response to these developments, the Constituent Assembly enacted the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, by which sections 4 and 5 inserted two new articles, article 31-A and article 31-B, into the Constitution. A new Ninth Schedule was also added, listing thirteen Acts and Regulations, including the Madhya Pradesh Act, 1951. The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the First Amendment, and consequently every court is required to give effect to the two new articles, which now form substantive parts of the Constitution. Article 31-A applies retrospectively to the date of the Constitution, while article 31-B takes effect from the dates of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule. The present group of petitions was filed under article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the Madhya Pradesh Act and seeking writs, directions and orders to restrain the State of Madhya Pradesh from implementing that Act and from disturbing the petitioners’ title to, and possession of, their estates, villages or properties. Counsel for the various petitioners accepted that, because of the constitutional amendments, the impugned Act was removed from the operation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, and therefore any attack on the Act would have to be based on other constitutional provisions. Counsel for the petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951 (Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh) raised several grounds of challenge: first, that the Bill had not been passed by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature; second, that the procedure prescribed in article 31(3) had not been complied with; third, that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature lacked competence to enact the Act because the acquisition sought was not for a public purpose and because the Act provided no legal provision for compensation; fourth, that the Act amounted to a fraud on the Constitution; fifth, that the Act was unenforceable because it provided for compensation in instalments without specifying the instalment amounts; and sixth, that the Act delegated essential legislative functions to the executive government and, insofar as it sought to acquire the Malguzari villages or Mahals, was not protected by article 31-A.

The petitioners additionally asserted that the Act had in effect transferred legislative functions to the executive Government, and they further maintained that the sections of the Act which attempted to acquire the Malguzari villages or Mahals were not covered by the protection afforded under article 31-A. Counsel representing the other petitioners accepted these contentions and, in several respects, reinforced the arguments originally advanced by Mr B Somayya. Regarding the first ground of objection, identified as point (a), the Court found it necessary to trace the legislative history of the Bill before it entered the Statute Book. There was no dispute about the accuracy of the chronological details supplied by the petitioners’ counsel. The Bill was formally introduced in the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly on 11 October 1949. Four days later, on 15 October 1949, the Bill was referred to a Select Committee for detailed examination. The Select Committee completed its work and issued its Report on 9 March 1950, and this Report was subsequently presented to the Assembly on 29 March 1950. Between the date of presentation and 5 April 1950, the Assembly debated the Bill in the light of the Committee’s findings; during that interval, the amendments suggested by the Select Committee were moved and disposed of. The Official Proceedings of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly dated 5 April 1950 indicate that after the final amendment had been considered and accepted, the Honourable Minister for Education, Sri P.S. Deshmukh, moved that the Bill be passed into law and delivered a brief address urging the members to give their final approval. Following this, the Speaker read out the motion. Subsequently, eleven members rose to speak; each offered congratulations to the Government and to those members who had been actively involved in advancing this significant measure of land reform and relief for cultivated soil. No member proposed any substantive amendment at that stage, and the tone of the speeches suggested that the House was inclined to accept the Bill. However, the Official Report does not record that the Speaker subsequently put the motion to a formal vote or declared the motion carried. The record merely shows that the Assembly proceeded to discuss another piece of legislation, namely the Madhya Pradesh State Aid to Industries (Amendment) Bill, 1950. The version of the Bill as it emerged from the Assembly was printed on 29 April 1950. On 5 May 1950 the Speaker signed a copy of the printed Bill, certified that it had been passed by the House, and forwarded it to the Governor. The Governor, by endorsing that copy, reserved the Bill for the President’s assent. The President, on 22 January 1951, signified his assent by affixing his signature at the foot of the same printed copy. The learned Advocate-General produced the original printed Act bearing the signatures of the Speaker, the Governor and the President. It further appears that the Official Report of the proceedings of 5 April 1950 was printed in June 1950 and, on 1 October 1950, the Speaker signed that report along with the proceedings of many other Assembly meetings.

It is to be noted that the Speaker merely affixed his signature to the printed proceedings without expressly stating whether the Bill in question had been passed. The objection raised by counsel for the petitioners is based on the Rules of Procedure that were framed by the Assembly under section 84 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and that remained in force until new rules were made under article 208 of the Constitution. The petitioners do not dispute that the requirement of the old rule twenty-two – which mandated that after a motion was made the Speaker should read the motion for the consideration of the Assembly – was complied with. Their contention, however, is that the provisions of old rule twenty (1) were not observed. That rule provided that “A matter requiring the decision of the Assembly shall be decided by means of a question put by the Speaker on a motion made by a member.” The petitioners argue that the question of whether the Bill should be passed into law was never put to the Assembly in accordance with rule twenty, and that even if it had been put, the outcome of the voting – whether by voice or by division – was never announced by the Speaker as required by old rule thirty-four. Because a presumption of regularity attaches to all official business, the burden of proof lies on the petitioners to allege and demonstrate that the procedure prescribed by the rules was not followed. No affidavit has been produced by any person who was present at the Assembly meeting held on 5 April 1950 to describe what actually transpired on that day. The petitioners rely solely on the fact that the Official Report of the proceedings contains no mention of the question being put to the Assembly or of the Bill being carried. The Official Proceedings were prepared and confirmed in accordance with old rule one-one-five, which states: “(1) The Secretary shall cause to be prepared a full report of the proceedings of the Assembly at each of its meetings and publish it as soon as practicable. (2) One impression of this printed report shall be submitted to the Speaker for his confirmation and signature and, when signed, shall constitute the authentic record of the proceedings of the Assembly.” The petitioners argue that this authentic record discharges the initial onus placed upon them and therefore it must be held that the Bill never actually became law. The Court is not prepared to accept this contention as sound. It has already been observed that the original printed Act produced before the Court clearly shows that on 5 May 1950 the Speaker certified that the Bill had been passed by the Assembly. It is further pointed out that old rule seven, under which the Speaker certified that the Bill had been passed, did not give any finality or conclusiveness to the Speaker’s certificate that the Bill had been

In this case, the Court noted that a certification issued under the former rule 87 could not override the authenticity of the record that had been confirmed and signed by the Speaker pursuant to the former rule 115. The Court regarded that view as an incorrect way to address the issue. The essential question, the Court held, was whether the Bill had in fact been properly passed in accordance with the applicable rules. The Speaker’s certification was dated within a month after 5 April 1950, whereas the confirmation of the proceedings was signed on 1 October 1950. The Court observed that the Speaker’s memory would necessarily have been fresher on 5 May 1950, the date on which the certification of the Bill’s passage was made, than on 1 October 1950, when he signed a collection of reports of the proceedings. Consequently, the Court reasoned that, as a factual matter, greater reliance should be placed on the Speaker’s certification of the Bill than on the later confirmation of the proceedings. The Court further observed that the failure to mention that the question had been formally put and carried by the Assembly was likely an accidental slip or omission. Moreover, the speeches delivered by the eleven speakers indicated that at that stage there was no opposition to the Bill, and therefore moving the question at the end of the third reading would have been at most a formality. The Court referred to May’s Parliamentary Practice (14th edition, p. 544) to support the proposition that the Speaker’s declaration determines the result. In British parliamentary practice, the Court noted, the Speaker’s authentication is regarded as conclusive, citing Crates on Statute Law (4th edition, p. 36). The petitioners, the Court observed, relied heavily on the Official Report of the Proceedings. The Court reminded that Article 208 of the Constitution preserved the old rules until new rules were promulgated. The new rules came into force on 8 September 1950, and the new rule 148 did not replicate sub-rule (2) of the former rule 115. After the new rules became operative, the Speaker was no longer required to confirm the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the alleged confirmation of the proceedings by the Speaker on 1 October 1950 could not be given any legal effect, and the argument based on authentication under the now-defunct rule 115(2) must lose its force. The Court further held that any procedural irregularity, if it existed, was expressly remedied by Article 212. The Court was not persuaded by the petitioners’ attempt to distinguish between a procedural irregularity and an omission of a procedural step, characterising such an omission as merely another form of procedural irregularity. In the Court’s judgment, this ground of attack on the validity of the Act was not well founded and had to be rejected.

In this matter, the Court observed that the contention challenging the validity of the Act on the ground of procedural irregularity was not well-founded and therefore had to be rejected. The contention relied upon Article 31(3) of the Constitution, which provides: “(3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.” The Court noted the emphatic use of the terms “law” and “Legislature of a State” and explained that the provision envisions a law created by the Legislature of a State. Reference was then made to Article 168, which stipulates that each State shall have a Legislature consisting of the Governor and, in the case of Madhya Pradesh, a single House, namely the Legislative Assembly. The petitioners argued that Article 31(3) requires a “law” to be first reserved for the President’s consideration, and that a Bill which is merely reserved by the Governor without the Governor’s own assent remains a Bill and has not yet become a law. Consequently, they submitted that after a Bill is passed by the State Assembly, the Governor must first give assent to transform the Bill into a law, and only thereafter may that law be reserved for the President’s consideration; they further asserted that because this sequence was not followed, the conditions of Article 31(3) were not satisfied and the Act could not have any legal effect. The Court rejected this line of reasoning. It explained that the assumption that a Bill can become a law only by the Governor’s assent is inaccurate. The Constitution sets out the procedure to be followed after a Bill has been passed by the State Assembly in Article 200. Under that article the Governor has three options: (i) he may declare his assent, whereby the Bill immediately becomes a law; (ii) he may withhold assent, causing the Bill to fail unless the special procedure in the proviso is invoked; or (iii) he may reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration, in which case the President acts in accordance with Article 201. Article 201 provides that the President may either assent to the Bill, thereby making it a law, or withhold assent, causing it to fail unless the proviso’s procedure is followed. Hence, the Court clarified that a Bill passed by a State Assembly can become law either by the Governor’s assent or, if the Governor reserves it, by the President’s assent. This analysis demonstrated that the petitioners’ contention that a second reservation was required after the President’s assent was untenable, and that the statutory requirements of Article 31(3) had, in fact, been satisfied.

When a Bill receives the President’s assent, counsel for the petitioners argue that the instrument, having become a law, must once again be reserved for the President’s consideration in order to acquire effect. The Court describes this position as a puzzling conclusion that it would adopt only if compelled to do so. It notes that Article 200 of the Constitution does not provide for a second reservation by the Governor, and that the plain meaning of Article 31(3) does not support the contention. The entire argument hinges on the term “law”. The Court does not accept that the word “law” in Article 31(a) necessarily refers to a provision that had already attained the status of law before the President’s assent. If that were the intended meaning, the clause would have been phrased in the alternative form “unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, receives his assent”. The expression “has received his assent” unmistakably points to a completed fact, and the clause, when read in its entirety, does not grammatically exclude a provision that ultimately becomes law by virtue of the President’s assent. The question of whether the requirements of Article 31(3) are satisfied, the Court explains, arises only at the moment when the State attempts to acquire a person’s property under a statute and the affected individual denies that the asserted statute has any operative effect. At that juncture the Court must inquire whether the instrument in question is “a law which, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent”. The Court therefore interprets the word “law” in this sense, meaning the instrument that, at the time of the dispute, purports to be or is claimed to be a law. The language of Article 31(4) likewise supports this interpretation. Consequently, in the Court’s judgment, a proper reading of Article 31(3) does not obligate the Governor first to give assent to a Bill passed by the Assembly, thereby converting it into law, and then to reserve that law for the President’s consideration. The Court reiterates that Article 200 does not contemplate a second reservation, which would have been required only if the Governor, instead of assenting, had initially reserved the Bill for the President. In the Court’s opinion, the second objection raised by the petitioners lacks any substantive foundation and must therefore be overruled. Regarding points (c), (d), (e) and (f), similar objections were extensively formulated and argued by counsel in the Bihar appeals, and the petitioners’ counsel in the present proceedings have adopted the same line of reasoning. In brief, the argument is that although the impugned Act cannot be challenged on the ground that it violates the provisions of Articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B by taking away or abridging any fundamental right, it may nevertheless be contested on other bases, such as lack of legislative competence of the Madhya Pradesh Legislature or inconsistency with other constitutional provisions.

In this case the Court observed that even if the impugned Act could not be attacked on the basis that it removed, abridged, or was inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the petitioners were still entitled to challenge it on other grounds. The petitioners could therefore attempt to demonstrate that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature lacked the authority to enact the law or that the law violated some other constitutional provision. Counsel for the petitioners, identified as Mr. N. S. Bindra and Mr. Swami, sought to strengthen these contentions by referring to additional passages from textbooks and reported decisions. The Court noted that the provisions of the challenged Act had already been examined and summarized by Justice Mahajan in the judgment that had just been delivered, and therefore it was unnecessary to repeat that analysis. Likewise, the Court found it unnecessary to set out in detail the various arguments premised on the alleged legislative incompetence of the Madhya Pradesh Legislature, which were based on the language of the legislative topics in entry 36 of List II and entry 42 of List III, nor to elaborate on the claim that the Act constituted a fraud on the Constitution or that it impermissibly delegated essential legislative power to the executive Government. The Court merely indicated that, for the reasons expressed in its earlier judgment in the Bihar appeals, these lines of objection were rejected. The Court further observed that, if anything, the presence of a public purpose was more evident in the Madhya Pradesh Act than it had been in the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Moreover, the compensation scheme provided in the Madhya Pradesh Act was more generous than that in the Bihar Act, because clause 4(2) of Schedule I stipulated that the net income could in no case be reduced to less than five per cent of the gross income. Consequently, the Act could not be questioned on the ground of an absence of public purpose or inadequate compensation, as had been concluded in the earlier Bihar judgment. The Court also addressed the argument that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature had enacted a series of statutes—namely the C.P. Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act, 1947; the C.P. Revision of Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939; the C.P. Revision of Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1947; the Revocations of Exemptions Act, 1948; and finally the impugned Act—purporting to demonstrate a systematic scheme to expropriate zamindars and thereby constitute a fraud on the Constitution. The Court declined to accept this reasoning, holding that the sequence of legislation could have been conceived and enacted over time in good faith. While acknowledging that section 9 of the Act did not expressly specify the commencement date of the instalments or the amount of each instalment, the Court affirmed that the provision clearly envisaged that such details were to be worked out by rules framed under section 91 of the Act.

The Court observed that the procedures for determining instalment amounts were to be worked out by rules to be made under section 91 of the Act. It further noted that section 10 obliges the State Government to order payment of an interim compensation equal to one-tenth of the estimated total compensation where the full amount is not paid within six months after the date on which the property vests in the State. The Court found no improper delegation of legislative power in these provisions and therefore dismissed all the objections raised on that ground. It then addressed the final ground of attack, identified as point (g), which argued that the eighty Malguzari Mahals belonging to the petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951 were not estates, and consequently the impugned Act, insofar as it sought to acquire those Mahals, could not be protected by article 31-A. The Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh admitted that the Mahals did not qualify as estates under the definition in the C.P. Land Revenue Act, but contended that article 31-A employed the term “estate” in a broader sense. The Court observed that, irrespective of that contention, the impugned Act was expressly protected by article 31-B. Accordingly it held that it was unnecessary to analyse the meaning of “estate” in article 31-A, because the argument based on article 31-B was well founded and should prevail. The Court then considered submissions made by counsel who pointed to the phrase “without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of article 31-A” appearing at the beginning of article 31-B and urged that the interpretation given by the Judicial Committee in Shibnath Banerjee’s case should be applied. The Court rejected that line of reasoning, stating that the principles laid down by the Judicial Committee could not be applied to the interpretation of article 31-B, which is neither illustrative of nor dependent on article 31-A. It explained that the reference to article 31-A was intended solely to prevent any argument that article 31-B narrowed the scope of the general provisions of article 31-A. Finally, the Court recorded a question raised by counsel for the Ruler of Khairagarh, the petitioner in Petition No. 268 of 1951. The Ruler had entered into a covenant of merger on 15 December 1947, whereby the properties in dispute were identified as the personal property of the Ruler, distinct from State property. The Court noted that article 362 requires that, when Parliament or a State Legislature exercises its law-making power or when the Union or a State exercises its executive power, due regard must be given to any guarantee or assurance contained in such a covenant or agreement, as referred to in clause (1) of article 291, with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State.

The Court observed that the legislation being challenged was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the constitutional provisions previously discussed. The Court explained that several responses could be given to this challenge. First, it held that the guarantee or assurance mentioned in the Constitution required the Government to give due regard only to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler in his capacity as a Ruler. That guarantee did not extend to the Ruler’s personal property, which is a distinct concept from personal rights. Secondly, the Court noted that the constitutional article did not create a binding legal duty; it merely provided an assurance. Accordingly, the covenant entered into by the Ruler merely acknowledged that the Ruler was the owner of certain specific properties. The Court clarified that recognizing the Ruler as the owner of those properties did not mean that the State could never acquire those properties. The fact that the State sought to acquire the Ruler’s personal properties on the condition of paying compensation demonstrated that the Ruler’s title was being respected in the same manner as the titles of other private landowners. Finally, the Court pointed out that Article 363 barred the Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute arising out of the covenant. For these reasons, and also for the reasons stated in the Court’s earlier judgment in the Bihar appeals, the Court concluded that the petitions filed against the Act had to be dismissed.

Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar then remarked that he had nothing further to add and that he concurred with the orders issued by the Chief Justice and the other judges. The petitions were therefore dismissed. The Court’s record listed the agents appearing for the petitioners as follows: Petition No. 166 of 1951 – M.S.K. Sastri; Petition No. a317 of 1951 – R.S. Narula; Petitions Nos. 228, 237, 245, 246 and 280 to 285 of 1951 – M.S.K. Bastri; Petitions Nos. 230, 257 and 287 to 289 of 1951 – Rajinder Narain; Petition No. 268 of 1951 – S.P. Varma; Petition No. 318 of 1951 – Ganpat Rai; Petition No. 487 of 1951 – Naunit Lal. The agent appointed for the Respondent, the State of Madhya Pradesh, in all the petitions was P. A. Mehta.