Vishwamitra Press Karyalaya vs The Workers Of Vishwamitra Press

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 65 of 1952

Decision Date: 2 December 1952

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Mehr Chand Mahajan

In this case the Supreme Court recorded that the matter involved Vishwamitra Press Karyalaya of Kanpur as the petitioner and the workers of the same press, represented by the Kanpur Samachar Patra Karamchari Union, as the respondents. The judgment was delivered on 2 December 1952 by a bench consisting of Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Mehr Chand Mahajan and Sudhi Ranjan. The citation of the decision appeared as 1953 AIR 41 and 1953 SCR 272. The dispute concerned the alleged victimisation of certain employees under the pretext of retrenchment, which gave rise to an industrial dispute that the State Government referred to an Industrial Tribunal by a notification dated 24 April 1951. Under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Tribunal was required to make its award within a prescribed period that originally expired on 9 June 1951. On that same day the Government issued a further notification extending the deadline to 30 June 1951. The 30th of June happened to be a public holiday and the following day, 1 July, was a Sunday. Despite these circumstances the Industrial Tribunal rendered its award on 2 July 1951 and pronounced it in open court on that day. The Uttar Pradesh Government, however, considered the award to have been made after the expiry of the statutory period and therefore invalid.

The Court noted that the time prescribed for making an award under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, had indeed lapsed on 9 June 1951, but that the Government’s extension to 30 June 1951 was valid. It further held that because 30 June 1951 was a public holiday and 1 July 1951 was a Sunday, the Tribunal’s pronouncement of the award on the next working day, 2 July 1951, did not breach the statutory time limit. The Court clarified that an Industrial Tribunal to which a dispute is referred under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, qualifies as a “court” within the meaning of section 10 of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904. Consequently, the award pronounced on 2 July 1951 was deemed valid and could not be set aside on the ground that it was not issued within the original period. The judgment further affirmed that the award dated 17 November 1951, originally made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Calcutta with certain modifications, remained operative. The appeal, filed as Civil Appeal No. 65 of 1952, was thus dismissed, confirming the legitimacy of the Tribunal’s award despite the intervening holidays.

On 18 July 1951 a notification was issued extending the time for the award up to 3 July 1951. The appellant subsequently filed a challenge to the award before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, seeking reversal of the Tribunal’s decision. The Labour Appellate Tribunal rejected all of the appellant’s contentions, concluding that the award should remain in force and refusing to set it aside. The appellant then applied for special leave, which this Court granted on 21 December 1951, limiting the grant to three specific grounds. The first ground stated that the Government lacked authority to extend the time for making the award after the original deadline had passed, rendering any later award illegal, ultra vires, inoperative and void. The second ground contended that the State Government had already extended the time for making the award to 30 June 1951, so any award made after that date was void. The third ground argued that the further extension issued on 21 July 1951, after the previous extension had already expired, was ultra vires and could not convert a void award into a valid one. The industrial dispute between the appellant and the respondents had been referred by the Uttar Pradesh Government to the Industrial Tribunal under the powers granted by sections three and four of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Exercising its authority under section three(d) of that Act, the Government issued an order prescribing the procedure for adjudicating disputes referred to the Tribunals. Paragraph sixteen of the order required the Tribunal or adjudicator to hear the dispute and deliver a decision within forty days, excluding holidays observed by courts subordinate to the High Court, measured from the date of reference. The same paragraph further allowed the State Government to extend that period from time to time, and required the Tribunal to supply copies of the decision to the parties and any other persons or bodies directed in writing. Paragraph nine of the order specified that the decision had to be in writing, pronounced in open court, dated and signed by the member or members of the Tribunal at the time of pronouncement. It was not disputed that, according to paragraph sixteen, the original forty-day period expired on 9 June 1951 and that the Uttar Pradesh Government validly extended this period until 30 June 1951. However, the appellant argued that the Tribunal should have rendered its award on 30 June 1951 and not on 2 July 1951 as it actually did. The appellant further contended that the exclusion of holidays provision in paragraph sixteen applied only when the period was extended by a specified number of days, not when a fixed calendar date was prescribed. Accordingly, the appellant maintained that the Tribunal’s award dated 2 July 1951 was beyond the permissible time and therefore invalid.

In this case the appellant argued that because the Uttar Pradesh Government had extended the prescribed period only up to 30 June 1951, the Industrial Tribunal should have rendered its award no later than that date. The award was, however, delivered on 2 July 1951, and the appellant claimed that the award was therefore beyond the deadline and invalid. The court noted that this argument would have succeeded except for the operation of section 10 of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904. Section 10 provides that when any act or proceeding is required to be done on a particular day or within a prescribed period, and the court or office is closed on that day or on the last day of the period, the act is deemed to have been done in time if it is performed on the next day on which the court or office is open. The Industrial Court was closed on 30 June 1951 because the day was declared a public holiday, and it was also closed on 1 July 1951, which was a Sunday. Consequently, the next day on which the court was open was 2 July 1951, and the award pronounced on that day was therefore within the time prescribed by law. In the court’s view, the award was prima facie timely and could not be struck down on the ground of delay.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the term “court” in section 10 should be confined to courts belonging to the civil hierarchy of the State, and that an Industrial Court did not fall within that category. The court rejected this submission. It observed that the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, together with the General Order dated 15 March 1951 issued by the State Government under section 3(d) of that Act, expressly required that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal be pronounced in open court. Accordingly, the Industrial Tribunal was indeed a “court” within the meaning of section 10 of the General Clauses Act. Because the Tribunal was closed on both 30 June and 1 July 1951, the decision could validly be rendered on the next open day, namely 2 July 1951. The court therefore concluded that the award pronounced on that date was valid, binding on the parties, and that the appeal was dismissed with costs.

In this case the Court observed that the industrial tribunal resumed its sittings on the day following its reopening, namely on 2 July 1951, and that it pronounced its award on that date. Having examined the statutory time limits applicable to the issuance of such an award, the Court concluded that the judgment rendered on 2 July 1951 fell well within the period prescribed by law and therefore possessed both legality and binding effect upon the parties to the dispute. The Court further held that this determination settled all remaining questions raised in the present appeal, rendering any further consideration unnecessary. Consequently the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed in its entirety and that the costs of the proceedings be awarded against the appellant. Accordingly, the formal order recorded that the appeal was dismissed and that the appellant was required to pay the costs of the suit. The record also noted the representatives appearing for the parties, indicating that the appellant was represented by an agent identified as B. P. Maheshwari, while the respondents and the intervener were represented by an agent named C. P. Lal.