Veerappa Pillai vs Raman and Raman Ltd. And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1951

Decision Date: 17 March 1952

Coram: N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, M. Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea

In the matter titled Veerappa Pillai versus Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 17 March 1952. The opinion was authored by Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar and the bench was composed of Justices N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, M. Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, and B. K. Mukherjea. The petitioner in the proceeding was Veerappa Pillai and the respondents were Raman and Raman Ltd. together with other parties. The judgment is reported in the 1952 volume of the All India Reporter at page 192 and in the Supreme Court Reporter at page 583. Several citator references to the case appear in later reports, including citations in the 1954, 1955, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1969 and 1970 Supreme Court law reports. The case primarily concerned the application of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as they relate to the grant of permits for operating motor buses. The petitioner sought to quash an order of the Regional Transport Authority and the Central Road Traffic Board that granted permanent permits to a rival claimant, and also asked the High Court to direct the authorities to issue permits to him. The legal issue before the Court involved the maintainability and jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with orders of subordinate tribunals under Article 226, and whether the grant of a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act depended upon ownership of the bus or rested within the discretionary power of the transport authorities.

The Court noted that writs under Article 226 are intended to be issued only in circumstances of grave injustice where a subordinate body either acts beyond its jurisdiction, exceeds the limits of its authority, violates principles of natural justice, refuses to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it, or commits an error that is evident on the face of the record. While such jurisdiction is extensive, the Court emphasized that it does not convert the High Court into an appellate tribunal that re-examines the merits of the decisions of the lower authority. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, provides a detailed and complete scheme for the regulation of bus permits, specifying the relevant factors to be considered, and laying down procedures for appeals and revisions to higher authorities. Under this scheme, the issuance or refusal of a permit is a matter of administrative discretion vested in the transport authorities and is not a statutory right of any applicant. In the present dispute, two rival claimants each asserted that they had purchased five buses from a third party and therefore claimed the right to operate them on a particular route. The Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, after obtaining a report from the Regional Transport Officer and after considering several material circumstances, restored the permanent permits previously granted to one of the claimants. The other claimant then approached the Madras High Court under Article 226, seeking a writ of certiorari to set aside the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, the Central Road Traffic Board, and the State of Madras, and also requested a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to issue five permanent permits to him. The Court held that the High Court's interference was erroneous because the issue of a bus permit under the Motor Vehicles Act does not depend solely on the ownership of the bus but also on other considerations that the Board had duly examined, and that the direction to grant permits to the other party exceeded the High Court's jurisdiction.

In this case the High Court had set aside the order issued by the Central Traffic Board, holding that the petitioner’s title to five buses had been established and consequently directing the Regional Traffic Authority to grant permanent permits for those five buses. The Court further held that, under the Motor Vehicles Act, the issue of a bus permit was not conditioned solely on ownership of the vehicle but also depended on a range of other considerations, and that the Central Traffic Board, having examined all relevant circumstances, was entitled to grant permits to one of the claimants. Accordingly, the High Court was said to have acted erroneously in interfering with the Board’s order on an application under Article 226, and its direction to the Regional Transport Authority to issue permits to the opposite party was deemed to be beyond the scope of its powers and jurisdiction. The judgment explained that the Motor Vehicles Act creates new rights and liabilities and provides a detailed procedural framework for their regulation; it emphasized that no person is entitled to a permit as a matter of right even if all prescribed conditions are satisfied, because the grant of a permit lies entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities, which must take into account a variety of circumstances. The judgment therefore set out the civil appellate jurisdiction for Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1951, noting that the appeal was filed by special leave from the judgment and order dated 13 April 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rajamannar C.J. and Somasundaram J.) in C.M.P. No. 122/15 of 1950. Counsel for the appellant and respondents were identified, and the order was dated 17 March 1952, with Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar delivering the judgment. The appeal arose from special leave to appeal granted on 1 May 1951, challenging the High Court’s order dated 13 April 1951 which had set aside certain proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, and the Central Traffic Board, Madras, dated 19 January 1950 and 3 March 1950 respectively, as well as an order of the State of Madras dated 7 November 1950 that directed the issue of permits to Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., who had been petitioners before the High Court, for the five buses for which a joint application had originally been filed by them together with T.D. Balasubramania Pillai. The present appellant, G. Veerappa Pillai, had been the fourth respondent in the High Court, while the present first respondents, Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., had been the petitioners before that Court; the present respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 corresponded to respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the High Court proceedings, and the dispute centered on the competing claims to the five permanent permits for the buses identified by numbers M.D.O. 81, M.D.O. 230, M.D.O. 6, M.D.O. 7 and M.D.O. 759 on the Kumbakonam-Karaikal route.

In this case the appellant, G Veerappa Pillai, was in dispute with Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., both of whom operated bus services in the Tanjore District. The contention concerned five permanent permits identified as M.D.O. 81, M.D.O. 230, M.D.O. 6, M.D.O. 7 and M.D.O. 759, which authorized operation on the route between Kumbakonam and Karaikal. Although the litigation involved many stages and tactics by both parties, the Court limited its discussion to the points that directly affect the present appeal. Originally the five permits, classed as “C” permits, were held in the name of T.D. Balasubramania Pillai. He had agreed to sell the five buses to Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., and a joint application for the transfer of both ownership of the buses and the associated permits was filed by the seller and the purchasers on 10 March 1944. Two days after that filing, on 12 March 1944, the appellant, proprietor of the Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, submitted an application for temporary permits to operate two of his own vehicles on the same Kumbakonam-Karaikal route, arguing that the vehicles belonging to the two existing agencies were largely out of service. In fact, out of the five buses that Balasubramania Pillai had sold, only two were then functioning while the remaining three were undergoing repairs. Consequently, the permanent permits attached to the five buses were suspended by an order of the Secretary dated 28 March 1944. During that same month the appellant was granted temporary permits for the vehicles numbered M.D.O. 920, M.D.O. 894, M.D.O. 918, M.S.C. 7632 and M.S.C. 7482. Subsequently Balasubramania Pillai withdrew from the joint application, claiming that it had been obtained through fraud. The Secretary of the Road Traffic Board therefore refused to register the transfer of ownership on 19 March 1944, a decision that was reaffirmed by the Board on 29 May 1944. Nevertheless, on 10 April 1944 Balasubramania Pillai and the appellant made another joint application, this time seeking to transfer both the buses and their original permits to the appellant, who on that same day agreed to purchase the vehicles. The Secretary approved this later application. Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. then appealed to the Central Road Traffic Board, which on 16 August 1944 upheld the appellant’s temporary permits for his buses but set aside the proposed registration of the original buses and the transfer of the corresponding permits. The appellant subsequently applied for a review of the Board’s order dated 16 August 1944, and the Central Road Traffic Board, on 27 November 1944, permitted only the transfer of ownership of the buses, refusing to allow a transfer of the permits.

In this case the Court recorded that the Board had allowed only the transfer of ownership of the five buses and had refused to transfer the associated permits. Subsequently, Veerappa Pillai instituted legal proceedings before the Subordinate Judge at Kumbakonam on 3 October 1944, seeking to recover possession of the original five vehicles from Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. on the basis that he had purchased the buses from Balasubramania Pillai. The Subordinate Judge appointed Veerappa Pillai as receiver on 17 March 1945, and the contested buses were handed over to him on 26 April 1945. He immediately carried out repairs on two of the vehicles, identified as M.D.O. 6 and M.D.O. 7, and placed them on the route using the temporary permits that were already in his possession. The suit was decided in his favour on 2 May 1946. After obtaining the judgment, he also repaired the remaining three buses—M.D.O. 759, M.D.O. 230 and M.D.O. 81—and commenced their operation on the same route under the same temporary permits. Veerappa Pillai’s receivership was terminated on 18 September 1946. Relying on the decree of the Sub-Court, he applied for a permanent transfer of the permits. On 22 July 1946 the Central Road Traffic Board forwarded his petition to the Regional Transport Authority, indicating that it had no objection to issuing regular permits to Veerappa Pillai for the disputed buses or to effecting a transfer of those permits into his name, provided that valid permits already existed. However, this position was later altered. On 2 September 1946 the Regional Transport Officer ordered that temporary permits be issued for the buses for the period from 3 September 1946 to 31 October 1946, on the condition that the grant of such permits would not prejudice the rights of either party in the ongoing dispute. Both Veerappa Pillai and Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. then made representations to the Government, but the Government chose not to intervene. Consequently, on 30 June 1947 the Regional Transport Authority issued an order stating that, because the matter was pending before the High Court, the issue would remain deferred until the High Court rendered its decision, and that the temporary permits would continue to be in force. A subsequent petition filed by Veerappa Pillai with the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, was dismissed, yet a later appeal to the Government of Madras resulted in a favorable order dated 29 March 1949. That order read in part: “Shri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, Tanjore district, have been permitted by the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to run their buses M.D.O. 6, 7, 81, 230 and 750 on the Kumbakonam-Karaikal route on temporary permits from 1944 pending the High Court’s decision on the question of permanent ownership of the buses. The Government considers it undesirable to keep these buses operating on temporary permits for an extended and indefinite period. Further, Shri Sathi Vilas Bus Service have obtained the Sub-Court, Kumbakonam, decision in their favour concerning the permanent ownership of the buses.”

In the order referenced, the Regional Transport Authority at Tanjore was instructed to issue permanent permits for the buses of Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, to replace the temporary permits that had previously been granted. Acting on that Government order, permanent permits were formally granted to Veerappa Pillai on 18 April 1949. After learning of this issuance, the firm of Raman and Raman Ltd. submitted a petition to the Government of Madras seeking clarification of the order. In the petition they requested that the permanent permits be expressly conditioned upon the outcome of the pending High Court case concerning the title to the five disputed buses, and that if the High Court were to decide in their favour, the five permanent permits should be withdrawn from Veerappa Pillai and transferred to Raman and Raman Ltd. The Minister of Transport, who considered the petition, responded that this intention was also his own. The High Court subsequently set aside the Sub-Court’s decree on 2 September 1949, holding that the title to the five buses belonged to Raman and Raman Ltd. rather than to Veerappa Pillai. Following that judgment, on 19 September 1949 the firm filed an application with the Government demanding that the five permits issued to Veerappa Pillai be cancelled and that the same permits be granted to them. The Government declined to intervene, stating that the Regional Transport Authority was the proper authority to act, as reflected in an order dated 16 November 1949. In a further application to the Regional Transport Authority dated 28 November 1949, Raman and Raman Ltd. asked that the permits be withdrawn. Meanwhile, on 14 October 1949, Veerappa Pillai applied for renewal of his permanent permits for his own buses numbered M.D.O. 1357, 20, 1366, 1110, 1077, M.D.O. 1368 and M.S.C. 7632, which had replaced the disputed buses because those had become unroadworthy. Under section 58, sub-clause (2) of the Act, such a renewal was treated as a fresh application for new permits. Accordingly, a notification was issued on 22 October 1949 inviting objections to the renewal, with the hearing scheduled for 30 November 1949. No objections were received, and the Secretary renewed the permits for a period of two years beginning 1 January 1950, an order dated 3 January 1950. The Regional Transport Authority, which had been considering the application of Raman and Raman Ltd. dated 28 November 1949, finally resolved on 19 January 1950 that the permanent permits granted to Veerappa Pillai should be cancelled, that the route be declared vacant with respect to the five buses, and that fresh applications be invited and decided on their merits. The order further provided that, in the meantime, temporary permits would be issued to Sri G. Veerappa Pillai for two buses and to Raman and Raman for three buses on the same route, that the permanent permits would be cancelled with immediate effect, and that Raman and Raman should put in the buses as

After the Regional Transport Authority issued its order, it directed that Sri Veerappa Pillai should receive temporary permits “so as not to dislocate public traffic,” while the permanent permits were to be cancelled and the route declared vacant for fresh applications. Both Sri Veerappa Pillai and the firm of Raman and Raman Ltd. were dissatisfied with this order and each filed an appeal before the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras. The Board dismissed the appeal of Raman and Raman Ltd. and, by an order dated 3 March 1950, restored the permanent permits that had been granted to Sri Veerappa Pillai. Dissatisfied with the Board’s decision, Raman and Raman Ltd. approached the Government, which refused to intervene, issuing a Government Order on 7 November 1950 that declined to interfere. Consequently, on 4 December 1950 Raman and Raman Ltd. instituted a Civil Miscellaneous Petition (No. 12215 of 1950) under article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court, seeking a writ of certiorari to set aside the orders and proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority (dated 19 January 1950), the Central Road Traffic Board (dated 3 March 1950), and the State of Madras (dated 7 November 1950). The petition also requested a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate direction directing the first respondent to transfer, issue, or grant the five pucca permits for the Kumbakonam-to-Karaikkal route to the petitioner, Raman and Raman Ltd. The High Court’s decree on this petition formed the basis of the order that is now under challenge in the present appeal.

The High Court observed that, at every stage preceding its decree, the parties, the transport authorities charged with issuing permits, and the Government acted on the premise that the right to transfer a permit depended upon the title to the vehicles concerned. Accordingly, it held that Sri Veerappa Pillai had obtained both temporary and permanent permits solely in his capacity as a transferee and not as an individual right-holder. As the learned Chief Justice explained, “the conduct of the parties, the attitude of the transport authorities including the Government are all explicable only on the assumption that the rights of parties were consequent on the ownership of the five vehicles in question.” He further noted that the fourth respondent, having enjoyed the benefit of the temporary and permanent permits as a transferee from Balasubramania Pillai, could not now be allowed to claim, after the Court’s decision that rejected his claim and upheld the petitioner’s claim, that the applicant should not enjoy the fruits of his success. The Court also pointed out that the procedures prescribed by the Motor Vehicles Act and the requisite rules for granting fresh permits had not been observed, and that the Regional Transport Authority had been apprised of the High Court’s decision well before the renewal application was permitted. In the Chief Justice’s view, the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was unsatisfactory because it rested on a fine distinction between “withdrawal” and “cancellation” of permits, a distinction that effectively deprived Raman and Raman Ltd. of the benefits of the decree they had obtained after considerable expenditure of time and money.

It was observed that a review of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act did not support the proposition that the grant of a permit for a bus classified as a “stage carriage” depended necessarily on the ownership of that vehicle. The Act required only that the applicant be in possession of the bus and that the vehicle meet the statutory or rule-based criteria. Consequently, the Court held that ownership was not a condition precedent for the issuance of a permit and that any party or authority that maintained a contrary view was operating under a misconception. Nevertheless, that misconception could be explained, though not justified, by the assumption that the question of ownership might have a material impact on determining which party possessed a preferential claim to the permits. The Court recognized that ownership could be one of several factors to be considered, and it appeared that this perception was the reason the question of granting permanent permits had been repeatedly deferred until the Government’s order dated 29 March, issued on petitions filed by both contestants. The Court noted that, had the factual situation remained unchanged until that Government order, an argument in favor of Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. could have been advanced, especially if they eventually succeeded before the High Court on the title to the five buses. However, the Government order altered the landscape. The order directed that the issuance of permanent permits should not rest solely on the Sub-Court’s decision in favor of Veerappa Pillai; it also invoked a policy consideration that it was undesirable to allow the buses to operate on temporary permits for an indeterminate period. The Court also recalled that the High Court, by its judgment of 2 September 1949, had set aside the Subordinate Judge’s decree and had dismissed Veerappa Pillai’s suit for possession of the buses on the basis of his title. The Court observed that if the law required ownership-based possession as the decisive factor for permit issuance, and if no other circumstances could be taken into account when the question of permanent permits arose again, it would have been straightforward to conclude that Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. enjoyed at least a preferential claim. The Court found that this was not the case because the statutory provisions contain no language linking permit issuance to ownership. Moreover, additional circumstances that bore materially on the entitlement to the permits had arisen since the original joint application, and these were taken into account by the transport authorities and the Government.

In this case, the Court noted that the original joint application, together with the circumstances existing at the time of that application, had been considered by both the transport authorities and the Government. The Regional Transport Authority issued an order on 19 January 1950 that attempted to achieve a prompt and equitable settlement between the parties by adopting what may be described as a middle-ground approach. The specific provisions of that order had been set out earlier in the judgment. Before the appeals of the two parties were finally disposed of, the Central Traffic Board is recorded to have requested a report from the Regional Transport Officer. That report brought to the Board’s attention that all five buses involved had been replaced with new vehicles and that, as a consequence of the replacement, the registration certificates for the original buses had been cancelled. After the period during which Balasubramania Pillai had operated the service, it was Veerappa Pillai who continued to run the buses on the same route for almost five years and who also succeeded in obtaining the privilege of permanent permits. On 3 March 1950 the Central Traffic Board issued an order restoring those permanent permits to Veerappa Pillai. The Board based its decision on two observations: first, that Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. had requested the withdrawal of the permits rather than their cancellation; and second, that Veerappa Pillai had not been given an opportunity to show cause why his permits should be cancelled, and furthermore the statutory procedure for cancellation had not been observed. Subsequently, the Government was approached by Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. under section 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government therefore had before it a petition seeking the withdrawal of the permanent permits that had been issued to Veerappa Pillai and also seeking the transfer or grant of five pucca permits corresponding to the five buses. The Government responded by staying the appellate order of the Central Road Traffic Board while the revision petition was being considered, and it also asked for a report from the subordinate transport authorities. The report highlighted two material facts: first, that Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. had not lodged any objections to the renewal of the permits that Veerappa Pillai was seeking; and second, that they possessed no authorisation from the French authorities to operate any buses on the portion of the route that lay within French territory. The report further observed that there was no existing joint application that could support a request for transfer, and that the original permits in the name of Bala Subramanian had ceased to exist on 31 December 1944. In addition, the Government had before it two petitions dated 8 March 1950 and 25 October 1950 from Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., and two petitions dated 29 March 1950 and 8 June 1950 from Veerappa Pillai. After considering all of these materials, the Government declined to interfere with the decision of the Central Road Traffic Board. The appellant contended that, in view of these circumstances, the High Court exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution had no authority to interfere with the orders of the transport authorities. The Court observed that it was unnecessary to address that contention at this stage.

The appeal required the Court to determine the precise scope and reach of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The question was whether the writs the High Court may issue must be limited to those enumerated in Article 226—habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari—and thus subject to all statutory limitations and restrictions. Alternatively, the issue was whether the High Court could, whenever the interests of justice demanded, issue any suitable directions, orders or writs untrammeled by any conditions. The Court observed that this is a broad and somewhat difficult problem, but it did not need to be resolved in the present appeal. Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Setalvad, advanced two narrower arguments that he considered sufficient for his purpose. First, he contended that even if the High Court enjoys a wide jurisdiction under Article 226, it cannot exercise that power in a manner that transforms it into an appellate court. He further argued that such a court should not pass judgment over every administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal or authority in the State. Second, he argued that the Motor Vehicles Act together with the rules made under it forms a self-contained code. He further maintained that any rights and liabilities created by that statute must be enforced within the statute’s own framework. He also submitted that, in any event, the High Court could not replace the view or discretion of the specified authorities with its own, even if the authorities’ decision were erroneous or unsound. The writs listed in Article 226 are clearly intended to be used in grave situations where subordinate tribunals, bodies, or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, exceed their jurisdiction, or breach natural-justice principles. They may also be invoked when such officers refuse to exercise a vested jurisdiction or when an error apparent on the face of the record exists, and such misconduct results in manifest injustice. While the Court recognized that the jurisdiction may be extensive, it concluded that it is not so expansive as to allow the High Court to become a Court of Appeal. It also held that the High Court should not re-examine the correctness of the impugned decision and then decide the proper view or order to be made. Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Daphtary, did not contest this position. He argued that the authorities and the Government had consistently proceeded on a particular basis in dealing with the parties’ rights. He further maintained that they could not later abandon that basis and adopt an entirely new conception of the parties’ rights. According to him, permitting such a change would cause manifest injustice to his client, and this formed the basis of his objection.

The Court observed that the Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and sets out a detailed procedure for regulating them. It held that a permit is not a matter of right even when an applicant satisfies every condition laid down in the Act; the grant of a permit is wholly discretionary and must be based on the various circumstances that the transport authorities consider relevant. Under section 42 the Regional Transport Authority and the Provincial Transport Authority are invested with this discretionary power, and they function as administrative bodies performing quasi-judicial duties in connection with the issuance of permits. The Court explained that rule 8 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules designates the Regional Transport Authority as the Road Traffic Board and the Provincial Transport Authority as the Central Road Traffic Board, both of which are constituted by the Provincial Government. Section 47 enumerates the factors that must be taken into account when a stage-carriage permit is either granted or refused. By virtue of rule 134 A the Secretary of the Road Traffic Board is authorised to exercise certain functions concerning the grant or refusal of such permits, and rule 136 provides for an appeal from the Secretary’s order to the Board. In a similar manner, rule 148(1) authorises the Secretary to the Central Board to delegate powers, with an appeal from that Secretary’s order lying to the Central Board. An appeal from an original order of the Road Traffic Board proceeds to the Central Board, and an appeal from the original orders of the Central Board proceeds to the Government, as prescribed by rules 147 and 148. The Court noted that the amendment introduced by the Madras Act XX of 1948, which appears as section 64 A in the Act, confers a revisionary power on the Provincial Government. In addition, section 43 A authorises the Provincial Government to issue general orders and directions to the Provincial Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority on any matter relating to road transport, and the respective authority must implement those orders and directions. Accordingly, the Court recognised a clear hierarchy of administrative bodies established to regulate motor-vehicle transport, providing a complete scheme that identifies the matters to be considered, the channels for appeal, and the avenues for revision. The Court emphasized that the statute itself contains the remedies for redress of grievances or correction of errors, and that those statutory remedies are the proper means of obtaining relief. Since the issuance or denial of permits is a discretionary act and not a legal entitlement, the Court concluded that the appropriate course is to respect the discretion exercised by the transport authorities within the framework set out by the Act.

The Court was of the opinion that this matter did not warrant interference with the discretion exercised by the Transport Authorities, because they had taken into account all the facts and the surrounding circumstances. It observed that the High Court, instead of limiting itself to merely setting aside the proceedings, went further by issuing a directive to the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore. The directive required the authority to grant the petitioner permits for the five buses that had originally been the subject of a joint application filed by the petitioner and Balasubramania Pillai. The High Court further ordered that, in the event any of those buses were condemned, the petitioner would be permitted to provide substitute vehicles within a time frame that might be prescribed by the authorities. The Court found that such a directive exceeded the jurisdiction and the powers of the High Court. Consequently, on the basis of the reasons set out above, the appeal was allowed and the order of the High Court was set aside. The Court directed that each party should bear its own costs for all stages of these proceedings. The appeal was therefore allowed. The record shows that the appellant was represented by an agent named S. Subrahmanyarn, while respondent No. 1 was represented by an agent identified as M.S.K. Sastri, and respondent No. 4 was represented by an agent identified as P.A. Mehta.