The State Government, Madhya Pradesh vs Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 19 November 1952

Coram: Mahajan J., Hemeon J., Hidayatullah J.

The appeal, granted by special leave, challenged the order of acquittal issued by the Nagpur High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 121, 122 and 123 of 1950, which had been filed by the three respondents. Respondent 1, Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey, was a practising advocate of the Nagpur High Court; respondent 2, Kisanrao, was related to Limsey through a marriage between their cousins; and respondent 3, Shaligram, was described as a friend and client of Limsey. All three were tried for the murder of Dattu Patel and were charged as follows: that on or about the eighth day of October 1949 at Nagpur they had intentionally caused the death of Dattu Patel, thereby committing an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Session. The Sessions Judge convicted them, sentencing Limsey to death and sentencing Kisanrao and Shaligram to transportation for life. Each of them appealed the conviction to the Nagpur High Court, which subsequently acquitted them. The State later moved for an enhancement of the sentences imposed on Kisanrao and Shaligram, but that petition was dismissed. The deceased, Dattu Patel, was a resident of Taroda in Wardha district, but at the time of the incident he was staying in the residence of Virendra Malviya, a private witness numbered 27, located at Ganjapeth, Nagpur. It was alleged that Dattu Patel was a friend of Limsey who visited him intermittently to seek advice on domestic problems, that Dattu and a few others habitually smoked ganja and drank liquor at Limsey’s house, and that, prior to the incident, the relationship between Dattu and Limsey had become severely strained. Dattu purportedly complained to Virendra Malviya that Limsey had appropriated thousands of rupees belonging to him and that Limsey associated with thieves, receiving stolen goods and sharing the proceeds. Limsey, in turn, alleged that Dattu had defamed him and threatened that unless Dattu ceased his alleged defamatory campaign, Limsey might resort to killing him. On 8-10-1949 Limsey sent a letter to Dattu requesting an immediate meeting, the letter stating, “You should see me today at once. Intimate time.” Dattu did not reply, but it is alleged that he left Malviya’s house at three p.m., travelled by bicycle, and reached Limsey’s house at about five p.m., where he entered a sitting-room on the third floor and did not emerge. It is further alleged that Kisanrao and Shaligram were present in Limsey’s office on the second floor, and that at approximately eight p.m. a fifteen-year-old servant named Ganpat, employed in Limsey’s kitchen, heard a cry of “Oh, father, I am dead” from the upstairs room and went to investigate.

According to the testimony, a young man named Ganpat, who was employed in Limsey’s kitchen, heard a cry from the upstairs room that said, “Oh, father, I am dead.” He went up to investigate and found the door of the upper room closed. Through a crack in the door he saw Dattu lying on his back on the floor. The witness described that the accused Kishan Rao was holding Dattu by his hair, the accused Shaligram was holding his legs, and Limsey was standing over him with a sword raised as if to strike. Some neighbours who heard the cry came to make inquiries, but they were sent away by Limsey’s mother, who told them that nothing had happened. On 12-10-1948 a search of the third storey of Limsey’s house uncovered a freshly constructed brick-and-cement tomb that emitted a foul smell. The tomb was opened and the body recovered was identified as that of Dattu. Limsey was not present in the house at that time; he later surrendered to the police in Benaras on the 16th of October. Kishan Rao was arrested on the 14th, and he guided the police to a well where parts of the deceased’s bicycle were found. On the same day, the third accused, Shaligram, was also arrested and he produced additional bicycle parts.

When summoned to present his defence, Limsey asserted that he was not in the house and claimed ignorance of how Dattu Patel died or how his body came to be buried there. He described the incident as a possibly accidental death that was deliberately concealed by another person during his absence. Kishan Rao, the second accused, echoed Limsey’s alibi and added that Dattu had arrived at Limsey’s house that evening in the company of Virendra, a witness, Gadi Patel, Jaikisan and Dilawar while Limsey was away. He alleged that Dattu had been smoking ganja and drinking liquor, suddenly died, and that his body was left in the loft. Kishan Rao further stated that Gadi Patel, Ganpat and others had found Dattu drinking and dying of heart failure; he claimed to have scolded them and asserted that they deliberately disposed of the body, insisting on his own innocence. Shaligram, the third accused, denied any involvement, maintaining that he did not know how Dattu died or why his body was buried, and accused Ganpat of falsely charging him because Ganpat believed Shaligram knew what he had done with the bicycle parts. In support of his alibi, Limsey submitted a detailed statement that he left Nagpur on the afternoon of 8 October for Amaravati before Dattu arrived at his house and did not return to Nagpur until after his surrender at Benaras on the 16th. The alibi was not accepted by the lower courts and was not seriously pressed before the present Court.

In this matter, the Court observed that the alibi pleaded by the accused Limsey was not accepted by either of the lower courts and was not seriously pursued before the present tribunal; consequently the plea had to be deemed untrue. The record contained evidence that, up to the evening of 11 October and prior to the issuance of a search warrant on 12 October, Limsey remained in his house where the dead body of Dattu Patel had been concealed. Because there was no evidence indicating that Limsey had left his residence, the Court applied the ordinary presumption that he was staying at his usual dwelling on 8 October. Limsey had, by means of a written invitation, called upon Dattu Patel to meet him on that date, and the Court found it highly unlikely that any person or persons could have undertaken the act of entombing a corpse on the third storey of his house in his absence and without his permission. Further confirmation of Limsey’s presence was provided by an application he filed with the court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Nagpur, dated 11-10-1949, in which he stated: “I appear for the respondent in Revenue Appeal No. 601/33-7 of 1948-49, ‘Doma v. Eknath’, fixed for 11 October 1949. I am not well since the last four days. I therefore request your Honour to adjourn the hearing of the appeal to some other date and oblige.” The statements contained in this letter were regarded as intrinsic evidence that Limsey continued to be at his house, the place where Dattu Patel’s body was entombed, until at least 11 October 1949. Accordingly, the Court was inclined to hold that the High Court had erred in concluding that the prosecution had failed to prove Limsey’s presence at his Nagpur residence on 8 October. Nevertheless, the Court noted that this error did not materially affect the High Court’s ultimate determination. The acquittal of the respondents by the High Court was principally based on the finding that the prosecution had not established that Dattu Patel had been murdered, and that, in the absence of legal proof of a criminal act, no criminal liability could be imposed. Justice Hemeon, author of the principal judgment, expressed his conclusion as follows: there was nothing to indicate the cause of Dattu’s death; while the absence of violence might appear improbable, there was no proof of any violent act, and the viscera had not been sent for chemical examination. He further noted that Dattu could have died from fright, heart failure or poisoning; Shri G. P. Shrivastava had observed that death from alcohol poisoning or internally administered ganja was not impossible; and Dr. De Costa had stated that, although ganja smoking alone was unlikely to cause death, the autopsy report did not allow a definitive conclusion as to whether death resulted from alcoholism combined with ganja smoking. In summary, the Court found that the material on record did not demonstrate positively that Dattu Patel’s death was anything other than a natural occurrence or that it resulted from violence.

The Court observed that it could not be positively established that Dattu either died a natural death or that his death resulted from violence. People react in different ways to such situations, and the record, though scant, showed that no arrangements had been made beforehand to place the corpse in the loft of Limsey’s house. The decision to entomb the body appears to have been taken only after Dattu’s death, and a similar pattern was noted regarding the scheme to dismantle the bicycle and hide its parts at various locations. In a separate judgment, Justice Hidayatullah, who concurred with the opinion of the Acting Chief Justice, expressed his view that the case failed because the autopsy report was inconclusive. He stated that it was irrelevant whether the inconclusiveness resulted from putrefaction or any other cause, noting that the police had not ordered a further examination. The Court emphasized that it could not speculate about the cause of death and, on the basis of the material before it, could not hold that Dattu’s death was caused by violence. Consequently, the Court held that once a conclusion of violence could not be drawn, the acquittal of the accused necessarily followed.

The appeal before this Court was lodged by way of special leave. Article 134 of the Constitution allows an appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order, or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court when the High Court, on appeal, reverses an acquittal and imposes a death sentence. The same article does not provide for an appeal when a High Court, on appeal, reverses a conviction and orders an acquittal. In other words, there is no constitutional provision that mirrors Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, rendering such an acquittal order final, subject only to the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred by Article 136. The Court referred to the decision in Pritam Singh v. The State, which held that the admission of special leave does not give the appellant a free licence to contest every factual finding or raise every issue that might have been raised in the lower courts. Only those points that could have been raised at the preliminary stage when leave was sought may be raised at the final hearing. The Court warned against adopting different standards at different stages of the same case and stressed that the exercise of this extraordinary jurisdiction in criminal matters is justified only where exceptional or special circumstances exist or where a substantial and grave injustice has been committed.

In an order of acquittal, the presumption of innocence attached to the accused is reinforced, and the Court observed that exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction merely to correct factual or legal errors of the High Court would not be justified. Interference with an acquittal would be warranted only in exceptional situations where the High Court acted perversely, behaved improperly, or had been misled by fraud. Consequently, the Court identified the need to determine whether the present case fell within that narrow category. The State Government challenged the High Court’s judgment on the ground that it was perverse. After hearing the learned Advocate General of the State, the Court could not accept that allegation. The Court stated that, although it might have been inclined to reach a different conclusion if it were hearing the appeal at the High Court stage, it could not positively declare the High Court’s conclusion to be perverse or improper, nor could it say that, based on the facts found, the only possible conclusion was that the crime had been committed by the accused. Therefore, the Court held that the appeal must fail. The Court also noted, after a brief examination of the material, that there was no direct evidence linking the respondents to the murder of Dattu Patel, nor any evidence establishing their participation in the alleged offence.

The learned Advocate General for the State submitted that the High Court should have inferred from the circumstantial evidence that Dattu’s death resulted from foul play rather than natural causes. He argued that Dattu’s body could not have been concealed in Limsey’s house without Dattu’s consent, and therefore Limsey must have been responsible. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for such an extraordinary act, the Advocate General contended that the concealment was intended to destroy evidence of a criminal act. He further asserted that if Dattu had died of natural causes, Limsey’s conduct would have been markedly different; he would have informed Dattu’s mother and wife of the tragedy, arranged a proper cremation, and would not have destroyed the body, which could have served as evidence of his innocence. The Advocate General also highlighted Limsey’s flight from Nagpur on the eleventh day as conduct inconsistent with innocence. Finally, he maintained that Limsey possessed a motive to eliminate Dattu because of strained relations, had the opportunity to carry out the act, and that his post-crime behaviour created an irresistible presumption of guilt, thereby justifying a finding that the murder charge was proved against him. The Court acknowledged that these contentions possessed considerable force, but concluded that it could not find the High Court’s findings to be necessarily erroneous.

The Court observed that the High Court had erred in concluding that the circumstantial evidence did not altogether contradict the accused’s innocence and that it failed to create an irresistible presumption that Limsey murdered Dattu. The Court found it implausible that Limsey would have sent a letter on 8 October inviting Dattu to his residence with the purpose of killing him, noting the absence of any proof of a pre-arranged plan to that effect. It was further noted that, had the earlier estrangement between the two men still been persisting, Dattu would not have readily accepted the invitation to go to Limsey’s house. Because the testimony of Ganpat had been disbelieved, the Court held that there was no evidence of any act or conduct by Kisanrao or Shaligram that would indicate their participation in the incident. In these circumstances the Court stated that a finding of guilt could not be arrived at by reliance on conjecture. The Court allowed that several alternative explanations were possible: Dattu and Limsey might have had a quarrel while drinking and smoking together and, in the heat of the moment, Limsey could have struck Dattu causing his death; alternatively Limsey might have administered poison to Dattu because Dattu was obstinate and would not cease his defamatory statements; or Dattu might simply have suffered a fatal heart failure. The Court emphasized that all of these possibilities remained open and that, without any material pointing to a definite conclusion, they were merely speculative. Consequently, the Court could not say that the High Court had acted improperly in holding that there was no evidence establishing that Dattu was murdered. The Court acknowledged that the most compelling point raised by the learned Advocate-General was the presence of a newly built tomb on the loft of Limsey’s house where Dattu’s body had been placed. Although the construction of a tomb on the third floor of Limsey’s house was described as bordering on irrationality and generated a strong suspicion against him, the Court held that this conduct alone did not conclusively prove that Limsey had murdered Dattu. The Court further observed that the High Court had been faced with a person whose mental state was so distorted that he failed to appreciate that such conduct would inevitably backfire and serve as the strongest evidence against his innocence. The Court therefore could not exclude the possibility that Limsey might have acted in a similar manner if he had sought to conceal a death that occurred naturally in his house for his own reasons. It was not difficult to envisage that Dattu could have died a sudden natural death and, in a moment of panic and confusion, Limsey might have decided to hide the death by entombing the body in his own house. No circumstances were found that would preclude the theory that Dattu might have died from alcoholic poisoning or heart failure while sitting with Limsey and drinking heavily.

Limsey, having been shocked by the events, could plausibly have decided to hide the body in the way he did so that the circumstances of the death – namely that it occurred while he was present, consuming liquor and smoking ganja – would remain concealed. His motive, according to the Court’s observation, was to protect his reputation because his dwelling had become known as a haunt of drinkers and a place where ganja was smoked. It was also not entirely clear that the earlier strained relationship between Dattu and Limsey continued up to October 1949. In August 1949 Dattu had taken steps toward reconciliation, and it was possible that those steps succeeded. An informal letter dated 8 October, written by Limsey to Dattu, invited Dattu to visit his house, and Dattu’s reply to that invitation indicated that, at that time, the two men appeared to be on amicable terms. Consequently, the Court found that there was no strong motive for Limsey to murder Dattu. While the presence of Dattu’s tomb inside Limsey’s house inevitably raised a strong suspicion against Limsey, the Court held that the High Court, after considering all the surrounding facts, was not incorrect in refusing to treat that suspicion as conclusive proof of Limsey’s guilt. Regarding the other two respondents, the Court observed that there was absolutely no evidence linking them to Dattu’s death. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the case did not warrant interference with the High Court’s acquittal order under Article 136 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the acquittal order was upheld.