Thakur Pratap Singh vs Shri Krishna Gupta And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 294 of 1955

Decision Date: 2 December 1952

Coram: BOSE J.

In this matter the Court noted that the petitioner, Thakur Pratap Singh, had been a candidate for the office of President of the Municipal Committee of Damoh, while the respondents, seven in number, were also candidates. The nominations were submitted on forms that the Municipal Committee had supplied, but it later emerged that these forms were the older versions that had not been updated. Under the previous rules the forms required a candidate to state his caste; however, a rule change dated 23-July-1949 mandated that the candidate instead state his occupation. Only the first respondent was aware of this amendment and, accordingly, struck out the word “caste” on the printed form, inserted the word “occupation,” and entered his occupation as required. All other candidates, including the petitioner, completed the forms as they were printed and entered their caste rather than their occupation. The first respondent objected before the Supervising Officer, contending that the nominations of the other candidates were invalid and that his own nomination was the sole valid one. The Supervising Officer overruled the objection, the election was held, the petitioner obtained the highest number of votes, and he was declared elected. The first respondent then filed an election petition, which was the subject of the present appeal.

The Court recorded that the election petition had been dismissed by the Election Tribunal on the ground that the defect in the nomination forms was not substantial and could be cured. The Nagpur High Court, however, reversed that decision on revision, holding that any failure to comply with any provision of the nomination rules was fatal and required the nomination paper to be rejected. The appeal was filed as Civil Appeal No. 294 of 1955 by special leave from the High Court’s order dated 7 September 1955 in Civil Revision No. 833 of 1954. Counsel for the appellant and counsel for respondent No 1 were permitted to appear.

The Court examined the statutory framework, specifically the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act (II) of 1962, sections 9(1)(iii)(c) and 23, and considered whether the rule requiring the occupation of the candidate to be stated in the nomination form was mandatory or directory. Relying on the principle that not every rule carries the same weight, the Court held that the occupation requirement was directory in character. The Court emphasized that the failure to comply with a directory rule did not affect the substantive merits of the election, as provided by section 23 of the Act, and therefore the election could not be set aside on that ground. The Court distinguished the earlier decision in Rattan Anmol Singh v. Atma Ram ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 481) and reiterated that courts should not be guided solely by technicalities but should look at the substance of the case. While some procedural rules are vital, others are merely directory and may be overlooked if there is substantial compliance with the rules as a whole and no prejudice results. In the absence of a clear statutory distinction, the Court said it is the duty of the court to draw that line using common-sense reasoning, referring also to Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Income-Tax Officer, Lahore ([1940] L.R. 67 I.A. 464). Justice Bose delivered the judgment, concluding that the petitioner’s election stood.

In this case the nomination forms that were used were old forms that had not been updated. Under the earlier rules the candidate had to state his caste, but a rule dated 23-7-1949 replaced the caste entry with a requirement to state the candidate’s occupation. The first respondent was the only candidate who kept himself informed of that change. He crossed out the word “caste” on the printed form, wrote the word “occupation” in its place and entered his occupation as the new rule demanded, rather than stating his caste. All of the other candidates, including the appellant, completed the forms as they existed and entered their caste instead of their occupation. The first respondent then lodged an objection before the Supervising Officer, contending that the nomination papers of all the other candidates were invalid and that his own paper was the only one that complied with the law, and therefore he should be declared elected. The Supervising Officer rejected the objection and the election was allowed to proceed. The appellant received the largest number of votes and was declared the elected President. Dissatisfied, the first respondent filed an election petition, which gave rise to the present appeal. The trial court held that the defect in the other nomination papers was not material and could be cured, and consequently it dismissed the petition. On revision, the High Court set aside that decision. The High Court judges relied on the decision of this Court in Rattan Anmol Singh v. Atma Ram (1) and held that any failure to comply with any provision of the various rules was fatal, requiring the rejection of the nomination paper. The Court expressed disagreement with that approach, admonishing a tendency to over-emphasise technicalities. It emphasized that substance must prevail over mere form, that some rules are essential and cannot be breached, while others are merely directory and may be overlooked if there is substantial compliance and no prejudice, and that the judiciary must, using common-sense discrimination, differentiate between the two classes of rules when the legislature has not drawn a clear distinction.

The Court further noted that this principle had been articulated by Viscount Maugham in Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Income-Tax Officer, Lahore (2) and quoted by the High Court judges: “It is a well settled general rule that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially.” (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 481. (2) [1940] L.R. 07 I.A. 464, 476. The Court observed that the High Court judges had treated the direction concerning the entry of occupation as mandatory, a view the Court considered erroneous. The matter, the Court explained, was governed by section 18 of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act (II) of 1922, which empowers the State Government to make rules under the Act regulating the conduct of municipal elections.

The Act contains a provision concerning the mode of election of presidents and section 175(1) provides that “all rules for which provision is made in this Act shall be made by the State Government and shall be consistent with this Act.” One of the provisions of the Act that directly concerns the present dispute is set out in section 23, which states that “Anything done or any proceeding taken under this Act shall not be questioned on account of any defect or irregularity not affecting the merits of the case.” Consequently, every rule made under the Act must be interpreted in conformity with that clause. Rule 9(1)(i) requires each candidate to deliver to the Supervising Officer a nomination paper completed in the prescribed form and signed by the candidate himself as assenting to the nomination and by two duly qualified electors as proposer and seconder. The amended nomination form obliges the candidate to furnish, among other details, his name, his father’s name, his age, his address and his occupation. Rule 9(1)(iii) further directs that the Supervising Officer shall examine the nomination papers, shall decide any objections that may be raised to any nomination, and may, either on such objection or on his own motion and after such summary enquiry as he thinks necessary, refuse any nomination on any of the specified grounds, including a failure to comply with any provision of clause (i). The contention advanced was that the word “may” in this provision should be read as having the force of “shall” because clause (a) of the rule provides that the candidate is ineligible for election under section 14 or section 15 of the Act. It was argued that once a candidate’s ineligibility under those sections is established, the Supervising Officer has no discretion but to refuse the nomination, and that the same compulsory meaning of “may” should apply when clause (c) is invoked. The Court held that it was unnecessary to examine whether that argument would be correct in the absence of section 23, because the rules cannot extend beyond the Act and must be read subject to its provisions. Reading rule 9(1)(iii)(c) in the light of section 23, the Court examined whether the omission of a candidate’s occupation on the nomination form could be said to affect “the merits of the case.” The Court found that such an omission does not affect the merits. For example, if a man has no occupation, whether the form records the word “nil,” strikes out the word “occupation,” places a line through it, or leaves the space blank makes no material difference. Similarly, if a man who does have an occupation either does not disclose it or misstates it, the merit of the nomination is unchanged, particularly because a candidate’s occupation is not a qualification for the office of President. The Court therefore concluded that this part of the rule is merely directory and does not constitute grounds for refusing a nomination.

The Court observed that the nomination form functioned only as a directory and formed part of the description of the candidate; it did not touch the substantive issue provided that the paper contained enough material to enable the candidate to be identified beyond doubt. It was further noted that a reason was advanced for requiring the candidate’s occupation to be stated, namely that section 15(k) of the Act disqualified any person who “holds any office of profit” under the Committee. However, the Court explained that merely disclosing the occupation would not necessarily reveal the existence of such an office because the occupation need be expressed only in general terms such as “service” or “agriculture” and does not have to be detailed. Moreover, the Court pointed out that section 15 also enumerates other grounds of disqualification which are not required to be shown in the nomination form. The Court then referred to an earlier decision involving a case where the law demanded the satisfaction of a particular official at a particular time regarding the identity of an illiterate candidate. In that case, the Court held that the satisfaction of the named official was the substantive requirement and that the satisfaction of another person could not substitute for it, nor could the requirement be dispensed with altogether. The earlier law also required that the official’s satisfaction be endorsed on the nomination paper, a step the Court described as a formal requirement. Quoting from page 488, the Court explained: “If the Returning Officer had omitted the attestation because of some slip on his part and it could be proved that he was satisfied at the proper time, the matter might be different because the element of his satisfaction at the proper time, which is of the substance, would be there, and the omission formally to record the satisfaction could probably, in a case like that, be regarded as an unsubstantial technicality.” The Court further observed that although several English cases had been cited, it would be futile to examine them because the matter turned on the terms of section 23 of the Indian Act, and foreign decisions dealing with other statutes could not provide assistance. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeal succeeded, ordered the appeal to be allowed with costs in both the High Court and the present proceeding, set aside the order of the High Court, and restored the order of the Civil Judge.