State Of Madras vs V.G. Row.Union Of India and State

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 31 March, 1952

Coram: M. Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar

In the matter titled State of Madras versus V.G. Row, Union of India and State, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the thirty-first day of March, 1952. The opinion was authored by Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, who sat as Chief Justice, and the bench was composed of Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B. K. Mukherjea and Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar. The petitioner before the Court was the State of Madras, while the respondent was V.G. Row, acting in his individual capacity and also representing the Union of India and the State. Intervenors were also listed, including the Travancore authorities, who sought to participate in the proceedings. The judgment was recorded on the same date, 31 March 1952, and the case citation appears in the All India Reporter at volume 1952, page 196, and in the Supreme Court Reporter at volume 1952, page 597. A comprehensive citator record lists numerous subsequent references to this decision across the decades, such as RF 1954 SC 92, RF 1954 SC 229, RF 1956 SC 479, R 1956 SC 559, E&R 1957 SC 896, E 1958 SC 578, F 1958 SC 731, F 1959 SC 300, and many others extending through the early 1980s, indicating the continued relevance of the judgment in Indian jurisprudence.

The legal issue centered on the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, as amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act of 1950, specifically sections 15 (2) (b) and 16. These provisions empowered the State to declare any association unlawful by issuing a notification in the Official Gazette, without providing for a judicial inquiry or for service of the notification on the association or its office-bearers. The Court examined the validity of this legislative scheme, considering whether it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the constitutional right to form associations guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (c) and Article 19 (4) of the Constitution of India. The headnote of the judgment explained that section 15 (2) (b), as amended, defined an “unlawful association” as one that the State had declared unlawful on the ground specified in the notification, namely that the association either constituted a danger to public peace, interfered or intended to interfere with the maintenance of public order, or interfered or intended to interfere with the administration of the law. Section 16 of the Act was also referenced as part of the legislative framework under scrutiny.

The amendment to the Act required that any notification issued under section 15(2)(b) must first state the specific ground on which it is made and must include any other particulars that may affect the necessity of the notification. It must also set a reasonable time limit within which any office-bearer, member of the association, or any other interested person may make a representation to the State Government concerning the notification. Under section 16A, after the expiry of the period fixed in the notification for making a representation, the Government was obligated to refer the matter to an Advisory Board. The Board was then to consider the representation and, if it found that there was no sufficient cause for the notification, to direct the cancellation of that notification. The Court observed that the statute contained no provision ensuring that the notification would be properly communicated to the association, its members, or its office-bearers.

The parties conceded that the test prescribed by section 15(2)(b), as amended, remained a subjective test, just as it had been under section 16 before the amendment. Accordingly, the existence or non-existence of the factual grounds for the notification was not a matter that could be adjudicated by the courts. The core issue, therefore, was whether section 15(2)(b) was unconstitutional and void. The Court held, for the reasons explained later, that section 15(2)(b) imposed restrictions on the fundamental right to form associations guaranteed by article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Those restrictions were not reasonable within the meaning of article 19(4) and were consequently unconstitutional and void.

The Court explained that the constitutional right to form associations or unions under article 19(1)(c) enjoys a broad and varied scope. Any curtailment of that right can provoke significant reactions in religious, political, and economic fields. Therefore, vesting the executive Government with the power to restrict this right without requiring that the factual and legal grounds for such restriction be subjected to a judicial inquiry is a serious infirmity that must be weighed when assessing the reasonableness of the restriction. The absence of any mechanism for adequate communication of the Government’s notification—such as personal service or service by affixing the notice to the association, its members, or its office-bearers—was also identified as a serious defect.

The Court further noted that the formula allowing the Government, or its officers, to rely on a subjective satisfaction of an Advisory Board to review the materials on which the Government seeks to override a basic freedom could be regarded as reasonable only in exceptional circumstances and within the narrowest limits. In evaluating whether a law restricting a fundamental right is reasonable, the Court stressed that both the substantive and procedural aspects of the impugned provision must be examined. The test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, must be applied to each individual statute that is challenged, and no single abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be imposed as a universal rule for all cases.

The Court observed that, when deciding whether a restriction on a fundamental right was reasonable, it must consider several elements. These elements included the character of the right claimed to be infringed, the purpose behind the restriction, the seriousness and immediacy of the problem that the restriction aimed to address, the degree to which the restriction was disproportionate to that problem, and the circumstances prevailing at the time the restriction was imposed. All of these factors were to be taken into account when forming the judicial judgment.

In examining these factors and reaching a view of what was reasonable in the particular case, the Court noted that the judges’ own social philosophy and value system inevitably influenced their assessment. The Court further explained that the extent to which judges could interfere with the legislature’s judgment depended on their sense of responsibility, self-restraint, and the understanding that the Constitution was designed for all citizens, not merely for those who shared the judges’ personal viewpoints. The Court also emphasized that the elected representatives, by enacting the restriction, had already judged the measure to be reasonable.

The Court referred to the earlier authorities of A.K. Gopalan v. The State ([1950] S.C.R. 88) and Dr Khare v. The State of Punjab ([1950] S.C.R. 519) as distinguished precedents.

The parties appearing before the Court were as follows: M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, was assisted by S. Govind Swaminathan and R. Ganapathi Iyer, representing the appellant, the State of Madras. C. R. Pattabhi Raman appeared for the respondent. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, together with G. N. Joshi, represented the Union of India. T. N. Subrahmanya Iyer, Advocate-General for Travancore-Cochin, with M. R. Krishna Pillai, appeared for the State of Travancore-Cochin.

The judgment was delivered on 31 March 1952 by Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri. The appeal arose from a decision of the Madras High Court, which had declared section 15(2)(b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, to be unconstitutional and void. The High Court also set aside Government Order No. 1517, dated 10 March 1950, by which the State Government had declared the People’s Education Society an unlawful association.

The respondent, who served as the general secretary of the Society registered under the Societies’ Registration Act, 1860, had filed a petition on 10 April 1950 under article 226 of the Constitution. The petition challenged the impugned Act and the March 10 order, claiming they infringed the respondent’s fundamental right under article 19(1)(c) to form associations or unions, and sought appropriate relief. The Madras High Court, sitting as a full bench of three judges—Chief Justice Raja-Mannar, Justice Satyanarayana Rao and Justice Viswanatha Sastri—allowed the petition on 14 September 1950 and granted a certificate of fitness for appeal under article 132. The State of Madras subsequently filed the present appeal.

The Government Order under scrutiny began with the following declaration: “WHEREAS in the opinion of the State Government, the Association known as the People’s Education Society, Madras, has for its object interference with the administration of the law and the maintenance of …”

In the order the Governor of Madras, acting under the authority granted by Section sixteen of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, declared the People's Education Society to be an unlawful association as defined by that statute. The declaration was based on the Government’s view that the Society’s purpose was to interfere with the administration of law and order and that it posed a danger to public peace. No personal copy of this order was delivered to the respondent or to any other officer of the Society; instead, the order was placed in the official Gazette in accordance with the requirements of the impugned Act.

The respondent’s affidavit set out the Society’s stated objectives as follows: (a) to encourage, promote, diffuse and popularise useful knowledge in all sciences, especially social science; (b) to encourage, promote, diffuse and popularise political education among the people; (c) to encourage, promote and popularise the study and understanding of all social and political problems and to bring about social and political reforms; and (d) to promote, encourage and popularise art, literature and drama. In contrast, a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State by the Deputy Secretary of the Public Department asserted that, according to information obtained by the Government, the Society was actively assisting the Communist Party in Madras—a party that had been declared unlawful in August 1949—by using its funds through its Secretary to carry out propaganda for that Party. The counter-affidavit further claimed that the Society’s declared objectives were merely a disguise for its actual activities.

The Madras Amendment Act numbered XI of 1950 received assent on 12 August 1950, while the petition challenging the order was still pending and was scheduled for argument on 21 August 1950. Consequently, the Court had to resolve the questions raised in the petition by applying the law as it stood after the amendment. To understand the matters in dispute, the relevant provisions of the legislation, as they existed before the amendment, were examined. Those provisions read: “Section fifteen, paragraph one, defines ‘association’ as any combination or body of persons, whether or not it is known by a distinctive name; and paragraph two defines ‘unlawful association’ as an association (a) which encourages or aids persons to commit acts of violence or intimidation, or whose members habitually commit such acts, or (b) which has been declared to be unlawful by the Provincial Government under the powers herein conferred. Section sixteen provides that if the Provincial Government is of the opinion that any association interferes with, or has for its object interference with, the administration of law or the maintenance of law and order, or that it constitutes a danger to public peace, the Provincial Government may by notification in the official Gazette declare such association to be unlawful.” The amendment replaced clause (b) of subsection two of section fifteen with new language stating that an association may be declared unlawful by the State Government by Gazette notification on the specified ground that the association (i) constitutes a danger to public peace, (ii) has interfered or intends to interfere with the maintenance of public order, or (iii) has interfered or intends to interfere with the administration of law.

In the amended statute the sub-clause (b) of section 15(2) was replaced by the following wording: “constitutes a danger to the public peace, or (ii) has interfered or interferes with the maintenance of public order or has such interference for its object, or (iii) has interfered or interferes with the administration of the law, or has such interference for its object.” For the earlier provision numbered section 16, the legislature substituted sections 16 and 16A with new text. Section 16(1) now provides that a notification issued under clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 15 in respect of any association shall: (a) specify the ground on which it is issued, the reasons for its issuance, and such other particulars, if any, as may have a bearing on the necessity thereof; and (b) fix a reasonable period within which any office-bearer, member of the association, or any other interested person may make a representation to the State Government concerning the notification. Sub-section (2) of section 16 adds that nothing in sub-section (1) shall compel the State Government to disclose any facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose. Under the newly inserted section 16A, after the expiry of the period fixed in the notification for making representations, the State Government is required to place before an Advisory Board, constituted by it, a copy of the notification together with any representations received before the expiry. The Board is to consider the materials placed before it, and may call for further information it deems necessary from the State Government, from any office-bearer or member of the concerned association, or from any other person. After such consideration the Board must submit its report to the Government. If the Board finds that there is no sufficient cause for the issuance of the notification against the association, the Government is obligated to cancel the notification. The amendment left section 17 untouched; that provision continues to prescribe penalties of imprisonment, fine, or both for membership or management of an unlawful association, for taking part in meetings of such association, and for making, receiving or soliciting contributions for its purposes. Section 17A, which gives the Government power to notify and take possession of places used for the purposes of an unlawful association, was amended by adding sub-clauses 2(a) and 2(b). These sub-clauses provide a remedy when such power is exercised by way of an application, within thirty days of the Gazette notification, to the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court or to the District Judge, depending on whether the place notified is situated in the Presidency Town or outside it, for a declaration that the place has not been used for the purposes of any unlawful association. If such a declaration is made, the Government must cancel the notification relating to that place. Section 17B empowers the officer taking possession of a notified place to forfeit movable property found there if, in his opinion, such property is, or may be, used for the purposes of an unlawful association.

In the amended Act, Section 17B authorised the officer who took possession of a notified place to forfeit any movable property found there if, in his opinion, such property was, or might be, used for the purposes of an unlawful association, after following the prescribed procedure. Section 17E similarly authorised the Government to forfeit the funds of an unlawful association if, after an enquiry that it deemed appropriate, it was satisfied that those funds were being used or intended to be used for the purposes of an unlawful association; the statute also prescribed the procedure to be followed in such cases. Section 17F barred the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of proceedings taken under Sections 17A to 17E, except as expressly provided. Section 6 of the amending Act provided that notifications which had already been issued and not cancelled before the amendment were to be treated as if they had been issued under the amended Section 15(2)(b), and it required that a supplementary notification be issued in accordance with the amended Section 16(1)(a) and (b). Thereafter, the procedure laid down in the new Section 16-A was to be applied. It was under this provision that the validity of a notification dated 10 March 1950, issued under the old Section 16, had to be examined in light of the amended Act when the petition was heard by the High Court on 21 August 1950. The old Section 16 had expressly given the Provincial Government power to declare an association unlawful if, in its opinion, certain specified grounds existed. Those grounds were now incorporated in the amended Section 15(2)(b), and the reference to the Government’s “opinion” was omitted. This raised a question before the Court as to whether the grounds listed in the amended Section 15(2)(b) were justiciable issues. If the factual existence of those grounds could be examined by a court, the restrictions on the right of association would not be subject to any exception, but the Government would then appear to have no use for Section 15(2)(b). The Attorney-General, on behalf of the Government, argued vigorously that because the grounds were placed in a definition clause, the declaration by the Government itself became the test of unlawfulness, making the words “in its opinion” unnecessary and even inappropriate. He further contended that the omission of those words did not imply that the grounds on which a declaration was to be based had become more justiciable than they were under the old Section 16, especially since the Government’s or its officers’ “opinion” or “satisfaction” remained the decisive factor in notifying a place under Section 17A(1) and in forfeiting movables under Section 17B(1) or funds under Section 17E(1). The requirement of an inquiry before an Advisory Board into the existence or non-existence of such grounds, and the power to cancel the notification if the Board found insufficient cause, was also cited to support the same conclusion.

In this case the Court noted that the argument advanced by the Government – that the provision allowing a notification to be issued even when the Advisory Board found no sufficient cause to declare an association unlawful led to the same result – possessed persuasive force, and the respondent did not contest this position. Consequently the Court was able to accept that the test prescribed by section 15(2)(b) of the Act, just as the earlier section 16 had operated, was a subjective test, and that the actual factual existence or non-existence of the grounds for declaring an association unlawful was not a matter that could be examined by the courts. On that basis the Court turned to the question of whether the amended provision, section 15(2)(b), fell within the constitutionally permissible limits on the legislative restriction of the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(c). The permissible limits are set out in clause (4) of the same article, which provides that nothing in sub-clause (c) shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes, or prevents the State from imposing, reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order or morality on the exercise of the right conferred by that sub-clause. It was not disputed that the restrictions under review were asserted to be in the interests of public order; the remaining issue, therefore, was whether those restrictions satisfied the requirement of being reasonable within the meaning of article 19(4). Before addressing that issue, the Court felt it necessary to point out a point that is sometimes overlooked: the Constitution expressly empowers the judiciary to review legislation for its conformity with the Constitution, a provision that differs from the American system where the Supreme Court derives extensive review powers from the broadly interpreted “due process” clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, when the courts of this country are called upon to perform this important and not facile task, they are not acting out of a crusading desire to challenge legislative authority, but are merely fulfilling a duty unmistakably imposed upon them by the Constitution. This duty is especially acute with respect to the fundamental rights, over which this Court has been assigned the role of a vigilant sentinel. While the Court naturally accords great respect to legislative judgment, it cannot abandon its own responsibility to make a final determination on the constitutionality of an impugned statute. The Court made these observations because some commentators had suggested that the courts of the newly independent nation were seeking confrontation with the legislature. The High Court, by a unanimous decision, had held that the restrictions imposed by section 15(2)(b) were not reasonable for three principal reasons: first, the notification was inadequately published; second, the Act failed to prescribe a time-limit within which the Government must forward the papers to the Advisory Board or within which the Board must render its report, and it provided no safeguards against the Government enforcing penalties during that interim period; and third, the aggrieved person was denied the right to appear before the Advisory Board either in person or through counsel to make a proper representation of his case.

The Court noted that the Act denied the aggrieved person the right to appear either in person or through counsel before the Advisory Board to present his representation. One of the learned Judges, Satyanarayana Rao, further observed that the impugned Act violated article 14 of the Constitution because it lacked a reasonable basis for distinguishing between the two categories of unlawful associations enumerated in sections 15(2)(a) and 15(2)(b). The remaining learned Judges did not accept this view. Viswanatha Sastri, another Judge, held that the provisions authorising forfeiture of property under the Act were void, reasoning that they bore no reasonable connection to the maintenance of public order. The other two Judges offered no opinion on that point. While the Court concurred with the learned Judges that section 15(2)(b) is unconstitutional and void, it expressed the view that the decision could rest on a broader and more fundamental ground. The Court referred to the precedent set in Dr. Khare’s case, where the scope of judicial review under clause (5) of article 19 was defined. Four of the five Judges in that case, the fifth leaving the question open, held that both substantive and procedural aspects of a restrictive law must be examined for reasonableness. The Court explained that this test of reasonableness requires the Court to consider not only the duration and extent of the restriction but also the circumstances of its authorisation and the manner in which it is imposed.

The Court stressed that the reasonableness test must be applied to each statute individually and that no single abstract standard can be imposed on all cases. It listed the relevant factors: the nature of the right alleged to be infringed, the purpose underlying the restriction, the urgency and magnitude of the evil the restriction seeks to remedy, the disproportionality of the measure, and the prevailing conditions at the time. The Court observed that in evaluating these elusive factors, judges inevitably bring their own social philosophy and value system to bear, and that their interference with legislative judgment must be guided by a sense of responsibility, self-restraint, and the awareness that the Constitution is meant for all citizens, not merely for those who share the judges’ viewpoints. The Court further noted that elected representatives, when imposing restrictions, have considered them reasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that all these considerations must be given due weight when judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by section 15(2)(b) on the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(c).

In the present matter, the Court concluded that section 15 (2) (b) could not be sustained as falling within the limits of authorized restrictions on the right guaranteed by article 19 (1) (c). The Court observed that the right to form associations or unions possesses a very wide and varied scope, and that any curtailment of that right is likely to provoke significant reactions in both religious, political and economic spheres. Consequently, assigning to the executive government the authority to impose restrictions on such a fundamental right without permitting the factual and legal grounds for such imposition to be examined in a proper judicial inquiry was regarded as a serious factor that must be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of the restrictions embodied in section 15 (2) (b). The Court further emphasized that a mere summary review, which would inevitably be largely one-sided, conducted by an Advisory Board— even when the Board’s verdict is binding on the executive—cannot serve as a substitute for a full judicial examination. The Court described the formula whereby the Government or its officers are required only to satisfy themselves subjectively, with an Advisory Board merely reviewing the material on which the Government seeks to override a basic freedom, as a scheme that may be regarded as reasonable only in extremely exceptional circumstances and within the narrowest possible limits. Such a scheme, the Court held, cannot receive judicial approval as a general pattern of reasonable restrictions on fundamental rights. The Court then turned to the special context of preventive detention. It noted that, in Gopalan’s case(1), the Court had upheld deprivation of personal liberty on the ground that the Constitution itself authorises legislation providing for preventive detention, and therefore the question of reasonableness could not arise under article 21. The Court quoted Kania C.J. at page 121, referring to Lord Finlay’s observation in Rex v. Halliday(2): “the court was the least appropriate tribunal to investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based.” The Attorney-General relied heavily on the decision in Dr Khare’s case(3), where the subjective satisfaction of the Government regarding the necessity of externment, coupled with a reference of the matter to an Advisory Board whose opinion was not binding, had been held by a majority to constitute a “reasonable” procedure for restricting the right to move freely guaranteed by article 19 (1) (b). The Attorney-General argued that the reasoning in that case applied a fortiori to the present appeal, because the impugned Act made the Advisory Board’s report binding on the Government. The Court rejected that submission. It explained that Dr Khare’s case was distinguishable on several essential points. Firstly, externment of individuals, like preventive detention, is fundamentally precautionary and based on suspicion. In fact, section 4 (1) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, which was the subject of consideration in Dr Khare’s case(3), authorised such measures on a basis of anticipatory danger rather than on the factual grounds that underlie section 15 (2) (b). Consequently, the Court could not accept the argument that the same reasoning could be extended to a provision that permits the Government to declare an association unlawful on the basis of facts that are not anticipatory or suspicious in nature.

Both preventive detention and externment are authorised for the same purpose and on the same ground, namely the necessity of preventing a person from acting in any manner that is prejudicial to public safety or to the maintenance of public order. Both measures also share an element of emergency, requiring that prompt steps be taken to forestall an apprehended danger to public tranquillity. Accordingly, authority must be vested in the Government and its officers so that they can take appropriate action on their own responsibility. These characteristics, however, are absent from the grounds on which the Government is empowered, under section 15(2)(b), to declare associations unlawful. The grounds for such a declaration are factual in nature and are not anticipatory nor based on suspicion. An association may be declared unlawful because it “constitutes” a danger, because it “has interfered or interferes” with the maintenance of public order, or because it has such interference as part of its object. The factual existence of these grounds can be objectively determined by the court, just as the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 15 can be. In the latter case, the Attorney-General admitted that the Government must establish as a fact that the association it alleges to be unlawful “encouraged” or “aided” persons to commit acts of violence, and similar conduct. The Court found no merit in the Government’s claim that, by merely declaring an association unlawful, it could shut out judicial enquiry into the underlying facts under clause (b). The Court was unable to discover any reasonableness in that claim.

The East Punjab Public Safety Act was a temporary enactment that was intended to remain in force for only one year, and any order made under it was to expire with the termination of the Act. A restriction that may be regarded as reasonable when imposed under such a temporary statute does not automatically become reasonable when imposed under the impugned Act, which is a permanent measure. A declaration made under the permanent Act would continue indefinitely until the Government decided to cancel it. While the Advisory Board procedure in the impugned Act provides a better safeguard than the procedure under the East Punjab Act, where the Board’s report is not binding on the Government, the impugned Act suffers from a more serious defect: it lacks any provision for adequate communication of the Government’s notification under section 15(2)(b) to the association, its members, or its office-bearers. The statute requires the Government to fix a reasonable period in the notification for an aggrieved person to make a representation, but it does not prescribe personal service on any office-bearer or member, nor service by affixing the notice at the association’s office, if any. Nor does it provide any other mode of proclamation of the notification at the place where the association carries on its activities, leaving a gap in the manner by which the notice is communicated.

In this case, the Court observed that publishing a declaration of an association’s unlawfulness in the official Gazette, whose reach is limited, might not effectively inform the members of that association. Consequently, if the period fixed for making representations expired before the members became aware of the declaration, their sole chance to present their case would be lost. The Court emphasized that the impact of such a notification on the members is severe because, after the declaration, the mere fact of their membership becomes an offence punishable under section 17. While some counsel at the bar argued about whether a lack of knowledge of the notification could serve as a defence in prosecutions under that provision, the Court said it was unnecessary to decide that issue. Rather, the Court held that the very risk of prosecution that arises when an association is declared unlawful, together with the penal consequences, is enough to make the restriction unreasonable if the law fails to provide adequate means of communicating the declaration to the association, its members, or its office-bearers. By contrast, an externment order is placed on a different footing because the statute requires personal service or another adequate method of notifying the individual concerned, thereby guaranteeing that the person has an opportunity to put forward his defence. For all of these reasons, the Court found that the decision in Dr Khare’s case (1) is distinguishable and cannot be applied to the present matter as the Attorney General suggested. The Court further reiterated an earlier observation that a precedent dealing with the validity of restrictions on one of the rights guaranteed by article 19(1) does not carry much weight for deciding the validity of restrictions on a different right, even though the constitutional test of reasonableness is the same, because each determination depends on the cumulative facts and circumstances of the specific case. After giving the matter its most careful consideration, the Court concluded, in agreement with the High Court judges, that, taking into account the special features previously noted, section 15(2)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, exceeds the authorized limits of restriction under clause 4 of article 19, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs. The appeal was dismissed. Representative for the appellant. Representative for the respondent. Representative for the Union of India and the State of Travancore-Cochin. (1) [1950] S.C.R. 519.