Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji vs Patel Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 99 of 1951

Decision Date: 7 March 1952

Coram: B.K. Mukherjea, Saiyid Fazal Ali, Vivian Bose

In the matter titled Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji versus Patel Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 7 March 1952. The judgment was authored by Justice B. K. Mukherjea, and the bench comprised Justices B. K. Mukherjea, Saiyid Fazal Ali, and Vivian Bose. The petitioner was Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji and the respondent was Patel Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai together with other parties. The case was reported as 1952 AIR 143 and 1952 SCR 513, and it has been cited in several later decisions. The dispute arose under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act V of 1908, which governs suits concerning religious trusts. The specific issue before the Court was whether a declaration that a temple and its possessions constituted a public trust of a religious and charitable nature was legally proper, given that the plaintiff’s allegations of breach of trust had not been established and no order directing the administration of the trust had been sought.

The Court observed that a suit instituted under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is of a special character. Such a suit presupposes the existence of a public trust that is either religious or charitable, and it may proceed only when there is a proven breach of that trust or when the Court’s direction is required for proper administration of the trust. Furthermore, the plaintiff must pray for relief that is specifically enumerated in the provision. In the present case, both the District Judge and the High Court had found that the defendant was not guilty of misconduct or breach of trust, and they had dismissed the suit. Nevertheless, the High Court had also made a declaration that the temple and its properties were held in public trust. The Supreme Court held that because the allegations of breach of trust were unfounded and no request for a direction on the administration of the trust had been made, the essential basis of a suit under section 92 was absent. Consequently, the plaintiffs had no cause of action, and the High Court’s declaration regarding the existence of a public trust was merely an obiter dictum. The Court therefore ordered that such a declaration be deleted from the decree that dismissed the suit.

On 7 March 1952 the judgment was delivered by Mukherjea J. The appeal was filed on behalf of the defendant and stemmed from a suit brought under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. The suit had originally been commenced by nine plaintiffs in the court of the District Judge of Kaira at Nadiad. During the long course of the litigation, which began in 1928, all of the original plaintiffs but one had died; the sole surviving plaintiff now appeared as the sole respondent in the appeal.

The plaintiffs contended that a man named Kuberdas, who was a religious teacher and the head of a cult known as Kaivalya or Karunasagar Panth, had received money and lands from his followers. The doctrine of the Panth held that the realization of the Infinite could be achieved only through a Guru or spiritual preceptor. Using the received funds, Kuberdas constructed a temple at Sarsa. By a will he appointed his principal disciple Narayandas to succeed him on the Gadi. Narayandas subsequently built a larger temple, in which he installed an image of Kuberdas together with images of two staff bearers placed on either side. After Narayandas, the positions of Mahant were successively filled by Baldevdas, Bhagwandas and Pragdasji, the latter being the defendant in the suit, each appointment having been made by a will executed by the preceding Mahant.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had acted contrary to the established customs of the institution. They claimed that he was guilty of incontinence, mismanagement and the improper alienation of trust properties. On the basis of these allegations they prayed for four orders: first, that the properties listed in the schedule to the plaint and other properties under the defendant’s management be declared religious and charitable trust properties of the Kaivalya or Karunasagar Panth; second, that the defendant be removed from the Gadi and possession of the properties and that a suitable successor be appointed; third, that the defendant be required to render accounts for the period of his management; and fourth, that a scheme be framed for the proper management of the institution.

The defendant, in his written statement, denied all of the material allegations contained in the plaint. He argued, inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable because no public trust of a religious and charitable character existed with respect to the properties in question, which he claimed were his private properties.

The District Judge framed several issues for determination. Two of these were tried as preliminary questions: (1) whether the temple and the properties in dispute were public charitable properties, and (2) if they were not, whether the court possessed jurisdiction to try the suit. By his judgment dated 18 July 1935, the District Judge decided that the properties were not public charitable properties and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, he dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs subsequently appealed the decision to the High Court.

In the appeal before the High Court of Bombay, the judges held that the ownership of the properties alleged in the suit was limited by an obligation to maintain the institution for purposes that could be described only as public charitable purposes. Because of this restriction, they concluded that the suit fell within the scope of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. Consequently, the High Court set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered that the case be sent back to that court for a hearing on its merits. The High Court rendered this judgment on 24 January 1938. Dissatisfied with that order, the defendant applied for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee, but the application was denied. The defendant then filed a petition before the Privy Council seeking special leave to appeal. The Privy Council also refused leave, stating that the matter was still at an interlocutory stage, although it expressly noted that the refusal was without prejudice to a fresh petition after all issues had been finally determined. The matter returned to the trial court, where, after considering the evidence presented by both parties, the District Judge found that the plaintiffs had not proved any misconduct or breach of trust. In light of that finding, the judge dismissed the suit, while maintaining the declaration previously issued by the High Court that the temple and the properties in the defendant’s possession were public, religious and charitable in nature. The plaintiffs appealed this dismissal to the High Court of Bombay, and by a judgment dated 14 July 1947 the High Court affirmed the District Judge’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The defendant now approached this Court relying on a certificate issued by the High Court; although the formal basis is an appeal against the final decree of 14 July 1947, the real issue challenged is the propriety of the order of remand dated 24 January 1938, by which the High Court had reversed the trial judge’s dismissal and sent the case back for further trial on the view that the disputed properties belonged to a public religious and charitable trust. Counsel for the appellant argued that, on the question of whether a public trust existed over the properties, the trial judge’s view was correct and that the High Court’s decision resulted from a misapprehension of the evidence. Both sides’ evidence was fully reviewed, but, given the view that this Court intends to adopt, it was considered unnecessary to record a finding on whether the properties in dispute do

In this case the Court observed that it was unnecessary to decide whether the properties in dispute belonged to a public charitable trust. The Court held that, after both the lower courts had reached the same conclusion on the merits, it was beyond the authority of a suit brought under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code to grant the plaintiffs a mere declaration of the trust character of the property and to incorporate such a declaration into the decree, even though the suit itself had been dismissed. The Court explained that a suit filed under section 92 is of a special nature and presupposes the existence of a public trust having a religious or charitable purpose. Such a suit may proceed only on the allegation that the trust has been breached or that the court must issue directions for the proper administration of the trust, and it must seek one of the specific reliefs enumerated in that provision. The Court stressed that the suit must satisfy these conditions in order to be compatible with the requirements of section 92.

The Court then referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Abdur Rahim v. Barkat Ali (1) and noted that a suit for a declaration that certain property belongs to a religious trust may be entertained under general law, but it falls outside the scope of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. Applying this principle to the present matter, the Court observed that the prayers pleaded in the plaint were unquestionably within the ambit of section 92 and that the suit had been instituted on the basis that the defendant, who was alleged to be a trustee of a public trust, had committed a breach of trust. The defendant denied both the existence of the trust and any misconduct or breach of trust on his part. While such denial did not automatically remove the court’s jurisdiction, the Court found that, on the evidence produced by both parties, the allegations of breach of trust were unsupported and that the plaintiffs had not shown that any court-issued direction was necessary for the proper administration of the trust. Consequently, the essential foundation of a suit under section 92 was lacking, and the plaintiffs possessed no cause of action for the suit they had brought.

Under these circumstances, the Court held that the High Court’s finding regarding the existence of a public trust was wholly irrelevant, since it was unrelated to the actual grounds on which the case had been decided. Accordingly, that finding could not be incorporated into the decree or final order as a declaratory relief in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court also addressed the argument advanced by counsel for the respondents, which contended that, even though the plaintiffs had failed to prove the other allegations in the plaint, they had succeeded in establishing that the properties were held in a public charitable trust—a fact the defendant had denied. In light of this argument, the Court noted that there was no justification for the lower court to award any relief to the plaintiffs beyond what was proper under section 92, because a declaration that the properties constitute trust property does not fall within any of the specific reliefs provided for in that section.

In this case the Court explained that a suit brought under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code permitted only those reliefs that were specifically listed in the various clauses of that section. Consequently, a request for a declaration that the lands involved were trust property did not fall within any of the permissible categories of relief. The Court noted that where the defendant denied the existence of a trust, a declaration affirming the trust’s existence could be furnished as an ancillary relief only if the plaintiff succeeded on the principal claim authorized by the section. However, because the plaintiff’s case failed on the ground that there was no cause of action, the Court held that there was no authority to grant a declaratory relief under section 92. The finding that a public trust existed, under those circumstances, was described as merely an obiter dictum and could not form the operative part of the final judgment. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the decision of the High Court ought to remain in force, but that the decree and the concluding portion of the judgment rendered by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court should be amended to order a dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit without any declaration concerning the nature of the properties. The Court therefore allowed the appeal in part and modified the final decree accordingly. The order for costs previously made by the lower courts was left untouched, and each side was directed to bear its own costs in the appeal. The appeal was thus allowed, and the agents representing the parties were recorded as Ganpat Rai for the appellants and K.J. Kale for the respondents.