In re THE EDITOR, PRINTER ANDPUBLISHER OF "THE TIMES OF INDIA" vs ARABINDA BOSE AND ANOTHER

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 160 of 1952

Decision Date: 12 December 1952

Coram: Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

In the matter styled In re The Editor, Printer and Publisher of “The Times of India” versus Arabinda Bose and Another, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 12 December 1952. The judgment was authored by Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan and the bench was composed of Justices Mehr Chand Mahajan, B. K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The case is reported in 1953 AIR 75 and 1953 S.C.R. 215, and is also cited in RF 1971 SC 221 (15). The proceedings arose under the Contempt of Court Act, concerned with an article that alleged that the judges of the Supreme Court acted on improper motives and therefore amounted to gross contempt.

The Court recorded that the Supreme Court ordinarily refrains from issuing contempt rules except in cases of grave seriousness, and it does not view public criticism as undue sensitivity. However, the Court emphasized that when criticism threatens serious mischief to the administration of justice, the matter must not be ignored and must be examined with calm equanimity. The controversy centred on a leading article published in “The Times of India” on 30 October 1952, which commented on the Supreme Court’s decision in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose and Another ([1953] S.C.R. 1). The article asserted that the dual system in the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts was regarded in the higher legal circles of Delhi as obsolete and anomalous, and it noted that the Supreme Court’s rules for the enrolment of advocates contained a provisional statement that the judges were considering a proposal to abolish the dual system. The article further contended that to achieve any purpose, whether dubious or laudable, by distorting the law was hardly edifying, and it pronounced that politics and policy should have no place in the pure realm of law, urging the courts to serve the Constitution by discarding extraneous considerations and observing a “divine detachment”.

In its contempt proceedings, the Court held that an article merely preaching divine detachment to the courts would not be objectionable. However, by attributing improper motives to the judges, the article crossed the boundary of fair and bona-fide criticism and was found to have a clear tendency to impair the dignity and prestige of the Court. The Court described this as a gross contempt of court. It explained that if the public were led to believe that the highest judges acted on extraneous considerations, the confidence of the entire community in the administration of justice would be seriously undermined, and no greater mischief could be imagined. The Court noted that, in view of the unconditional apology tendered by the editor, printer and publisher, together with their undertaking to give wide publicity to their regret, the contempt proceedings were ultimately dropped. The judgment also referenced the earlier decision in Andrew Paul v. Attorney-General of Trinidad (A.I.R. 1936).

In the original jurisdiction matter numbered Petition 160 of 1952, the Court entertained contempt of Court proceedings that had been instituted against the editor, printer and publisher of the daily newspaper “The Times of India,” which is circulated in Bombay and New Delhi. The contempt proceedings arose from a leading article that the newspaper printed on 30 October 1952 under the heading “A Disturbing Decision.” The article was identified by the Court as having been published in a manner that allegedly impugned the dignity of the Supreme Court. Counsel for the Attorney-General for India, namely M C Setalvad, appeared together with P A Mehta in the capacity of amicus curiae. On the other side, N C Chatterjee, assisted by Nur-ud-Din Ahmad and A E Dutt, represented the respondents who were the editor, printer and publisher. The matter was heard on 12 December 1952, and the order was delivered by Justice Mahajan.

The Court set out the substance of the contested article. The article asserted that, in an unusually indirect and unfortunate manner, the Supreme Court—by a majority decision—had effectively ended the long-standing dual system that operated in the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts. According to the article, the Supreme Court’s decision conferred upon advocates of the Supreme Court the right to practise before any High Court, thereby rendering the existing rules that required advocates appearing on the original side of a High Court case to be instructed by attorneys inapplicable. The article went on to claim that in the higher legal circles of New Delhi and elsewhere the dual system was regarded as obsolete and anomalous. It cited a note at the head of the Supreme Court’s rules on enrolment of advocates and agents, which indicated that those rules were subject to revision and that the judges were considering a proposal to abolish the dual system. The article urged that the system be abolished “by all means if the system has outgrown its usefulness and is found incongruous in the new setting of a democratic Constitution,” while warning that achieving any purpose by “straining the law” was not edifying. It further declared that politics and policy have no place in the pure sphere of law, and that courts would better serve the country and the Constitution by discarding extraneous considerations and by observing an uncompromising, divine detachment, which it described as the glory of law and the guarantee of justice.

The Court observed that no objection could have been taken to an article that simply preached such a principle of divine detachment to the courts. However, the Court found that the article went beyond fair and bona-fide criticism by attributing improper motives to the judges. By doing so, the article transgressed the permissible limits of criticism and showed a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court concluded that the article constituted a gross contempt of court. The Court emphasized that if the public were led to believe that the judges of the highest court in the land act on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, the confidence of the whole community in the administration of justice would be seriously undermined, and no greater mischief could be imagined.

The Court explained that the imagined danger to public confidence in the administration of justice was the reason why a contempt rule had been issued against the respondents. It expressed satisfaction that the editor, the printer and the publisher of the newspaper, through the affidavits they filed in these proceedings, had openly admitted that the article in question went beyond the boundaries of legitimate criticism. In those affidavits they acknowledged that certain words and expressions could be interpreted as casting a reflective shadow on the Court and therefore amounted to contempt, and they stated that such language had unintentionally entered the article. The Court noted that the three persons had shown sincere remorse, had offered an unreserved and unqualified apology for this first lapse, and had promised to make their regret widely known. The Court observed that it is not customary for this Court to issue contempt rules except in cases that are gravely serious, and that it is not overly sensitive to public criticism. Nevertheless, when there is a real danger of serious mischief affecting the administration of justice, the Court held that such criticism cannot be ignored or treated with placid indifference. In reaching this conclusion, the Court aligned itself with the opinion expressed by the Privy Council in Andre Paul v. Attorney-General of Trinidad, where the Council held that criticism is a public right, that erroneous opinions are permitted, provided the public refrains from attributing improper motives to those administering justice and acts without malice or intent to impair the judicial process. Justice, according to that judgment, is not a secluded virtue and must endure the scrutiny and even outspoken comments of ordinary persons. Having considered the unconditional apology tendered by the respondents and the undertaking that they would give wide publicity to their regret, the Court decided to discontinue any further proceedings. Accordingly, it accepted the apology, discharged the contempt rule without imposing any order as to costs, and recorded that the rule was discharged. The agent for the contemners was identified as Rajinder Narain. (1) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 141.