Godavari Parulekar vs State Of Bombay And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petition No. 399 of 1952

Decision Date: 5 December 1952

Coram: M. Patanjali Sastri, B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan

In the matter titled Godavari Parulekar versus State of Bombay and others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the fifth day of December, 1952. The opinion was authored by Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, and the Bench consisted of Chief Justice M. Patanjali Sastri together with Justices B. K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan. The case is reported in the 1953 volume of the All India Reporter at page 52 and also in the 1953 Supreme Court Reports at page 210. The dispute arose under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act of 1952, specifically concerning the operation of section 11-A. The primary question was whether the provision of section 11-A, which created a new classification of detentions, violated the equality guarantee of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or the procedural safeguard of Article 22(7)(b). The issue also involved the interpretation of the phrase “unless a shorter period is specified in the order” as used in subsection (2) of section 11-A. Section 11-A limited the maximum period of detention following a confirmed order under section 11 to twelve months from the date of detention, but subsection (2) further divided detentions into those confirmed before 30 September 1952 and those confirmed thereafter, prescribing that in the former category, unless a shorter period was specified, detention would continue until either 1 April 1953 or twelve months from the date of detention, whichever expired later.

The Court held that the classification introduced by section 11-A did not offend Article 14 or Article 22(7)(b) because the distinction between detentions confirmed before and after 30 September 1952 was a reasonable classification and did not amount to prohibited discrimination. The Court emphasized that the provision did not discriminate between individuals whose detentions were confirmed before that date merely because, as a consequence of the amendment, some persons might be detained for a longer duration while others for a shorter one. The Court cited the earlier decision of Shamrao Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana and others, reported in the 1952 Supreme Court Reports at page 683, as supporting authority. In addition, the Court found that a detention order dated 16 October 1951, which omitted any specification of a detention period, could not be said to contain “a shorter period specified in the order” within the meaning of subsection (2) of section 11-A, even though the detention would, in the absence of the amendment, have expired on either 31 March 1952 or 30 September 1952. The original jurisdiction arose from Petition No. 399 of 1952, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the petitioner, Godavari Parulekar, who appeared in person. The State of Bombay was represented by the Attorney-General for India, M. C. Setalvad, assisted by counsel. The judgment was delivered by Justice Vivian Bose, who noted that the petition fell within the scope of Article 32.

The petitioner was taken into custody on 16 October 1951 under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 as amended in 1951. Although her actual period of detention extended beyond that date, the earlier periods of detention were based on different orders and were not material to the issue before the Court. The present detention arose from an order issued by the District Magistrate of Thana, which simply directed that the petitioner be detained, without fixing any definite term of detention. A confirmation of that order was issued on 4 January 1952, and that confirming order likewise failed to specify any period of detention. The petitioner contended that because the order contained no expressed term, her detention should have terminated on 31 March 1952 under the amendment of 1951, or on 30 September 1952 under Act XXXIV of 1952, which introduced a further amendment. The State of Bombay responded that the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 had been amended by Act LXI of 1952, and that the effect of that amendment was to extend the petitioner's detention until 31 March 1953 by operation of the newly added section 11-A. The petitioner argued that the new Act could not apply where the detention order was silent as to its duration, and therefore section 11-A should not lengthen her detention. She relied on the wording of section 11-A(2), which states: “... every detention order which has been confirmed under section 11 before the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act 1952, shall, unless a shorter priod is specified in the order, continue to remain in force until the Ist day of April, 1953...” The petitioner admitted that no shorter period was specified in her order, but asserted that because her detention would have expired on either 31 March 1952 or 30 September 1952, one of those dates must now be read into the order. She claimed that, if so read, the order would contain a shorter period, and consequently section 11-A(2) would not operate to extend her detention.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s submission. It held that the provision of section 11-A(2) is clear: unless a shorter period is expressly specified in the detention order, the provision applies and extends the detention until 1 April 1953. The Court emphasized that it could not read into the statutory language the implication that “or must be deemed to have been specified by reason of the expiry of the earlier Act.” Accordingly, the Court affirmed that section 11-A(2) validly extended the petitioner’s detention to 1 April 1953. The petitioner’s subsequent argument invoked Articles 14 and 22(i)(b) of the Constitution. She pointed out that Section 3(1)(a) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 classifies permissible grounds for detention into three categories, and that Article 22(7)(b) empowers Parliament to prescribe the maximum period for which any person may be detained “in any class or classes of cases.” The petitioner argued that this constitutional provision permits only a single maximum period for each class, and that providing different maxima for persons within the same class would violate both Article 22(7)(b) and the equality guarantee of Article 14 as interpreted by this Court.

The petitioner argued that the Constitution permits only one maximum period of detention for each class of cases, and that providing different maximum periods for persons who are equal within the same class violated both article 22(7)(b) and article 14 as interpreted by this Court’s earlier decisions. She then contended that section 11-A, which had been added by the second amending Act of 1952 (Act LXI of 1952), created precisely such a prohibited distinction and was therefore beyond the legislative authority. She explained her reasoning in detail. First, she quoted subsection (1) of section 11-A, which prescribed that the maximum period for any person to be detained under a detention order confirmed pursuant to section 11 would be twelve months from the date of detention. Next, she pointed out that subsection (2) qualified that rule by separating detentions into two categories: (a) those whose detention order had been confirmed before 30 September 1952, and (b) those whose confirmation occurred after that date. The provision further stated that, for the first category, if the order did not specify a shorter period, the detention would continue either until 1 April 1953 or for twelve months from the date of detention, whichever ended later. The petitioner said that this created a new classification that divided detentions into those made before the Act and those made after it. She maintained that this classification was ultra vires for two reasons. First, it introduced a discriminatory split within the class to which she belonged under section 3 of the Act. Second, it produced discrimination even within the newly created subclass formed by the second amending Act of 1952. Regarding the first argument, she relied on the ratio decidendi in Shamrao v. Parulekar (1952) SCR 683 at 691-693, where the Court had upheld a division of detentions into those already examined by an Advisory Board and those not yet examined. Although the present dividing line was a fixed date rather than a procedural stage, she argued that the same principle applied and that the classification was unreasonable. She then traced the legislative history. The principal Preventive Detention Act of 1950 had been extended to 1 October 1952 by section 2 of the first amending Act (Act XXXIV of 1952). Section 3 of that amendment prolonged the life of all detentions that were in force on 14 March 1952, provided they had been confirmed before that date, until the principal Act ceased to operate, which at that time meant 1 October 1952. The second amending Act of 1952 later extended the life of the principal Act to 31 December 1954. Consequently, if section 11-A had not been inserted, all detentions existing at that time would have been extended automatically until the new expiry date of 31 December 1954. Instead, section 11-A altered that outcome by fixing 1 April 1953 as the latest release date for those older detentions. The petitioner asserted that this alteration conferred a benefit on the detainees and could not be considered unreasonable. She concluded her submission by turning to subsection (3) of section 11-A, which she indicated would be examined further.

Section 11-A was intended to achieve the purpose that had been identified earlier. Nevertheless, the petitioner challenged the provision by alleging discrimination. She argued that even if one accepts the newly created classification of detentions as those made before 30 September 1952 and those made after that date, section 11-A still discriminates against persons within her own category, namely those whose detentions were made and confirmed before 30 September 1952. To illustrate her point, she referred to her own detention. She noted that, assuming section 11-A is valid, her detention would continue only until 1 April 1953, which would amount to a period of seventeen and a half months beginning on 16 October 1951 and ending on 1 April 1953. She contrasted this with the situation of a person detained after her, for example on 30 September 1952, who would also be ordered to be released on 1 April 1953, thereby serving only six months in detention. The Court observed that this difference does not constitute discrimination within the meaning of article 14. The Court explained that a maximum period of detention may be fixed either by specifying a fixed term such as twelve months or by setting an outer limit, and that it is inevitable that the actual length of detention will vary from case to case. Those who are detained later are inevitably detained for a shorter period. The Government is not required to detain every individual for the same length of time; it retains discretion. Moreover, the competent Government retains the power to revoke or modify a detention order at any earlier date. The Court referred to the principle articulated in Shamrao V. Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana & Others (1), where the decision was against the detainee. The petitioner sought to have her application reopened on its merits, again contending that the grounds of detention were vague. She relied on Shamrao V. Parulekar v. The State of Bombay (2), where another detainee had been released by a different Bench of this Court in circumstances that she described as very similar. The Court could not permit this approach because the petitioner’s petition had already been rejected on its merits and she had been permitted to raise only constitutional issues. It was further noted that the fact relied upon in the other petition had not been brought to the Court’s notice at that time. Consequently, the application was dismissed. The respondent’s agent was G H Rajadhyaksha.