Dhiyan Singh And Anr. vs Jugal Kishore And Anr.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 22 February, 1952

Coram: Vivian Bose

The matter before the Court was styled Dhiyan Singh and another versus Jugal Kishore and another and was decided on the twenty-second day of February, 1952. The judgment was authored by Justice Vivian Bose, who also sat as the sole member of the bench. The dispute concerned two branches of a family that traced their common ancestry to an individual named Megh Raj Singh. The genealogical relationships were set out as follows: Megh Raj Singh had two sons, Jawahar Singh and Madan Singh. From Jawahar Singh descended Shanker Lal, who died in 1884, and his brother Brijlal, who died in 1890. Shanker Lal was survived by a daughter named Musammat Mohan Dei, who died in October 1929. Musammat Mohan Dei was married to Narain Das, who died on 21 May 1940, and she herself died in October 1929. Their offspring included Shri Kishan Das, who died in March 1929, and another son, Mahabir Prasad, who died in 1921. The surviving descendants of this line were the plaintiffs, identified as Dhiyan Singh and Jai Bhagwan Singh, and the defendants, identified as Ghas Ram and Onkar Prasad, together with Jugal Kishore and Amar Nath who were also mentioned as parties. The Court’s narrative recorded that the plaintiffs alleged that the property in dispute formed part of Shanker Lal’s estate and that, at all material times, the two branches of the family had remained separate. According to the plaintiffs, upon Shanker Lal’s death in 1884, his daughter Musammat Mohan Dei, who was the grandmother of the defendants, succeeded to a limited portion of his estate. The plaintiffs further contended that the reversionary interest in that portion opened upon Musammat Mohan Dei’s death in October 1929 and that they, as the next reversioners, were entitled to the property because Musammat Mohan Dei’s son, Shri Kishan Das, had predeceased her.

The defendants conceded that Shanker Lal was distinct from the other branch of the family and they divided the property that their grandmother Musammat Mohan Dei had possessed into two categories. They asserted that the first category comprised property which, in their view, she had purchased or acquired under mortgages in her own right. The second category, they claimed, consisted of property that had belonged exclusively to her father and to which she succeeded merely as his daughter. The dispute that arose after Shanker Lal’s death involved the son of Brijlal—who was the grandfather of the plaintiffs—and Musammat Mohan Dei, the defendants’ grandmother. Brijlal claimed the entire estate on the basis of survivorship, alleging that Shanker Lal died in a state of joint ownership with him and that all the properties were part of a joint family estate. This contention was referred to arbitration and an award was subsequently delivered. Under the terms of the award, Musammat Mohan Dei was assigned the suit properties as an absolute owner, while the remainder of the disputed estate was awarded to Brijlal. Following the award dated 21 December 1884, a division of the property was effected in accordance with the award. From that date until the filing of the suit on 26 March 1941, each branch of the family possessed and dealt with the properties allotted to it as absolute owners without interruption. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were bound by the arbitration award and, in any event, were estopped from asserting contrary rights. The lower court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, but the High Court reversed that decision in favour of the plaintiffs, prompting the defendants to file this appeal. The primary issue presented for determination concerned the nature and effect of the arbitration award, specifically whether it conferred an absolute estate upon Musammat Mohan Dei or merely a limited estate, a point on which the defendants maintained that they were correct.

The Court observed that the defendants contended the award conferred upon Musammat Mohan Dei an absolute estate, whereas the plaintiff asserted that she had been granted only a limited estate. The Court held that the defendants were correct in this regard. The matter before the Court centered on a straightforward question of construction of the award, which is annexed as Exhibit A-1. The operative clause of the award states: “Having regard to the specifications given above, Brij Lal, the first party, and Musammat Mohan Devi, the deceased’s female issue, the second party, have been held entitled to shares worth Rs 28,500 and Rs 42,482-10-0 respectively in the said properties; and accordingly two lots have been made and the first lot is allotted to the first party and the second lot to the second party; and henceforth the parties shall have no claim or liability against each other; and each party has become permanent owner (malik mustaqil) of his or her share; and each party should enter into proprietary possession and occupation of his or her respective share.” The Court’s emphasis on this passage is indicated by underlining. It found no ambiguity in the language, particularly because the term “malik mustaqil” was employed. The Court referred to the authorities in Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal and Other ((1950) S.C.R. 766 at 778) and Bishunath Prasad Singh v. Chandika Prasad Kumari ((1933) 60 I.A. 56 at 61 & 62) to support its interpretation. While counsel argued that the award should be read as a whole and pointed to earlier passages that might suggest a different intention, the Court examined those passages. The first earlier passage found that the properties Musammat Mohan Dei claimed as her own actually belonged to Shankar Lal, who had purchased some and acquired others through mortgages in her name but was merely a benamidar without title. The second passage noted that some of the disputed properties were ancestral while the remainder were self-acquired, and the arbitrator could not determine whether ancestral funds had been used. The third passage reflected the arbitrator’s view of Hindu law, stating that “the brother should be the owner of the joint ancestral property and the daughter who has a male issue should be owner of the self-acquired property.” The fourth passage declared that, although the second party had inherited no property from her husband, any share she obtained would be settled in Amroha, become her father’s haveli’s abode, remain as it had been, and thereafter devolve upon her son, who would become the malik (owner), with his descendants succeeding thereafter. The Court concluded that none of these earlier passages qualified or altered the operative portion of the award. Consequently, it could not agree with the High Court judges who had held that they did. In the Court’s view, the arbitrator was confused both as to the facts and as to the applicable law; nevertheless, the clear and unqualified language of the award, free from any disqualifying context, must be given its ordinary meaning.

The Court observed that the arbitrator’s understanding of the law was erroneous, yet the language employed by the arbitrator was, in the Court’s view, clear and unqualified. In the absence of any express qualification, the Court held that the words must be given their ordinary meaning. The Court noted that some earlier decisions had interpreted the term “malik” and, in one instance, the phrase “malik mustaqil” as indicating a limited estate because of surrounding qualifying circumstances. However, the Court found it unnecessary to analyse those precedents because the present enquiry was confined to the documents before it. Even if it were conceded that ordinary words can be qualified by other expressions or circumstances within the same document, the Court was of the opinion that the passages and circumstances relied upon in this case did not qualify the strong, clear and unambiguous language used in the award. The Court further commented that counsel for the plaintiff-respondents had to search diligently through other passages to derive a meaning and had to make several assumptions that were not apparent on the face of the award concerning what the arbitrator might have thought or intended. Accordingly, the Court declined to qualify clear and unambiguous language by invoking speculative or lubricious phrases that could be twisted to support either interpretation by resorting to conjectural factual assumptions.

The Court then turned to the other grounds on which the award had been challenged. It was argued that the arbitrator had exceeded his reference by granting Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute interest. It was also contended that, even if Brijlal were bound by the award, his son Kishan Lal—who did not claim through his father but possessed an independent title as reversioner to Shanker Lal—would not be bound, and that, consequently, the plaintiffs themselves would not be bound if Kishan Lal were not. The Court held that it need not examine these arguments because the decision did not depend on the binding nature of the award. Even assuming the award to be invalid, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ claim was wholly defeated by the plea of estoppel. The Court explained that, for an estoppel to arise, three elements must be satisfied: first, a representation of an existing fact rather than a mere promise of a future act; second, reliance by the other party on that representation; and third, detrimental action taken by the relying party as a result of that reliance. The Court indicated that it would address these elements in stages, beginning with whether any estoppel could be said to exist against Brijlal. It noted that it was undisputed that Brijlal had asserted a serious claim to the property in 1884, contending that he was a joint owner with Shanker Lal and, upon Shanker Lal’s death, would be entitled to the entire estate, while Mst. Mohan Dei possessed only a limited right.

It was argued that the question of whether the plaintiff might have found it difficult, or even impossible, to establish his claim was irrelevant to the point at hand. The record shows that the plaintiff pressed his claim with seriousness and insisted that he was entitled to pursue the arbitrator on the basis that he possessed an immediate right to a portion of the estate. Conversely, the defendant, Mst. Mohan Dei, opposed the plaintiff’s assertion and maintained that she was entitled to separate and exclusive possession, and in any event that she possessed an absolute right to a part of the property. Subsequent evidence revealed that Brijlal did not have a valid claim and that any hope of him succeeding as a reversioner was remote. Mst. Mohan Dei had a son, Shri Kishan Das, who stood as the next presumptive reversioner. Since the boy was considerably younger than Brijlal, Brijlal’s chances of succeeding were slim. In fact, the boy outlived Brijlal by almost forty years: Brijlal died in 1889 or 1890, while the son survived until March 1929. Had the son lived only another eight or nine months, he would have succeeded and the plaintiffs would have had no claim at all. The dispute, which was vigorously pursued by both sides, was eventually referred to arbitration.

The Court noted that the validity of the arbitral award was not the decisive issue. Questions as to whether the award fell within the scope of the reference or whether it possessed any inherent binding character were deemed immaterial. Even assuming the award to be wholly invalid, the parties were free to decide that, irrespective of the arbitrator’s correctness, the award was fair and sensible and that further litigation would only waste time and money. Accordingly, they could accept the award and divide the estate in accordance with its findings, a settlement that would bind the immediate parties even if it did not bind third parties. By his conduct, Brijlal induced Mst. Mohan Dei to rely on the representation that acceptance of the award would be final. Acting on that belief, she altered her position to her detriment by accepting the award and relinquishing a substantial portion of the estate, while Brijlal obtained a substantial advantage that he would not otherwise have been entitled to and retained for the remainder of his life, never attempting to retract his decision. The Court concluded that this conduct gave rise to an estoppel against Brijlal. The Court further observed that the present facts were closely analogous to those in the Privy Council decision in Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal ((1919) 45 I.A. 118), where a similar estoppel was held to arise despite the presence of a voluntary compromise.

In the earlier case, the claimant who sought adoption asserted that he possessed no right to the estate in question. The dispute was brought before the courts and eventually resulted in a compromise whereby, according to the terms of the settlement, the property was divided between the two rival claimants. The parties implemented the agreement and lived under its effects for a period of twenty years. When succession later opened, the other party to the compromise, who at that time had stepped into the position of the reversioner, asserted a claim to the remainder of the estate that had originally been assigned to the limited owner, and he pursued that claim against the personal heirs of the woman who had originally received the award. The Judicial Committee rejected this later claim on the ground of estoppel. It held that although the plaintiff in that suit presented himself in a different capacity—as a reversioner—he had nevertheless been a party to the original compromise, had acted upon it, and had induced the opposite side to alter her position to her detriment; consequently, he was estopped from thereafter asserting a contrary right. The Court observed that the existence of a voluntary compromise in the earlier case does not create a material distinction from the present circumstances, in which an arbitrator’s decision was imposed. The Court emphasized that the present proceedings are not based upon the formal footing of the award itself but upon the conduct of the parties in accepting that award, conduct that they need not have undertaken had the present contentions been correct. It further noted that while a question of title is, in one sense, a question of law, estoppel cannot arise on a pure question of law; it must be grounded in factual circumstances. When Brijlal’s conduct is examined, it is found that he made an assertion that he admitted and recognised facts that, in law, would give Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute interest in the lands awarded to her. Because of that admission and recognition, Mst. Mohan Dei was induced to relinquish roughly one-third of the property, a portion to which Brijlal, on a true estimate of the facts now known, had no right. There can be no doubt that she acted to her detriment, and there can be no doubt, either, that she was induced to do so on the faith placed in Brijlal’s statements and conduct, which led her to believe that he accepted all the implications of the award. Accordingly, the Court is clear that Brijlal would have been estopped. The nature of the dispute, as described in the award, shows that there was considerable doubt and substantial disagreement about the true state of affairs. Even if the arbitrator was wholly wrong and even if he lacked the authority to decide as he did, both sides were free to accept the decision, and by accepting it they recognised the existence of facts that, in law, would give the other party an absolute estate in the properties they had agreed to divide between themselves and indeed did divide. In the Court’s view, this acceptance constituted a representation of an existing fact or set of facts, thereby giving rise to mutual estoppel between the parties.

In the judgment the Court observed that each party who had represented an existing fact or a set of facts would be estopped against the other, and that Brijlal, in particular, would have been estopped from denying facts that would give Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute interest in the suit property. The Court then turned to the position of Brijlal’s son, Kishan Lal. It noted that Brijlal had died in either 1889 or 1890, and at that time Mst. Mohan Dei’s son, Shri Kishan Das, was alive and was the next presumptive reversioner. Consequently, Brijlal’s sons possessed no greater right to that portion of the estate that had been assigned to Brijlal than Brijlal himself had possessed. Nevertheless, they took possession of the property and claimed it through their father; they did not assert an independent title in their own names, and, as the record showed, they owned no other title at that date. Because they stepped into Brijlal’s shoes, the Court held that the estoppel which would have attached to Brijlal also descended to his sons, even if Brijlal had claimed the property solely for himself, which he had not. Moreover, Brijlal had acted in the capacity of karta or manager on behalf of the joint family, strengthening the application of the estoppel to his heirs.

The Court further identified an independent estoppel that operated against Kishan Lal personally. It pointed out that Kishan Lal had no right to the portion of the estate in question when his father died, except for the rights conferred by the award. Yet he nevertheless entered upon possession together with his brother, treated the property as their own, derived benefit from it, partitioned the estate between themselves and sold portions to third parties. Kishan Lal was aware of the award; he knew that mutation had been effected in accordance with the award and that Brijlal had taken possession under it, while the balance of the property had been retained by Mst. Mohan Dei. By retaining the property and continuing to deal with it on the basis of the award, Kishan Lal indicated his acceptance of the award. Through his acts and conduct, he represented, as his father had, the existence of facts that would, in law, give Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute estate. He also permitted Mst. Mohan Dei to deal with the estate as her own, and she, relying on the award, claimed absolute rights in the portion assigned to her, dealt with it and, on 4 April 1929, gifted it to her grandsons, the contesting defendants. Mutation was effected and Kishan Lal raised no objection. The Court therefore concluded that Brijlal had retained possession of property to which he was not entitled for a period of five or six years from 1884 until his death in 1889 or 1890, and that he had induced Mst. Mohan Dei to part with it by representing that she held an absolute title to the remainder. After Brijlal’s death, Kishan Lal and his brother enjoyed the benefit of that possession from 1889 or 1890 onward, continuing the situation described in the earlier parts of the judgment.

In this case, the Court observed that Kishan Lal continued to enjoy the benefits of the estate from the time he assumed possession in 1889 or 1890 until October 1929, when Mst Mohan Dei died, a period of roughly forty years. During those years, Kishan Lal’s conduct led Mst Mohan Dei to believe that he, too, recognized her absolute title to the estate. The Court found no doubt that Kishan Lal was estopped from asserting any contrary claim for the reasons previously explained. Had he challenged the award and reopened the dispute, Mst Mohan Dei would immediately have exercised her rights and, for the ensuing forty years, would have derived the benefit of the property from which she had been excluded only because she relied on the award in accordance with Brijlal’s representation that he also accepted it. The Court noted that Kishan Lal’s inaction over those years was undertaken with full knowledge of the relevant facts, as demonstrated by the deposition of D W 2, Dhiyan Singh, whose testimony remains uncontradicted. Dhiyan Singh affirmed that Kishan Lal “always accepted this award and acted upon it.” Although, on cross-examination, the witness qualified his statement by indicating that Kishan Lal had at some point objected to the award, the witness could not specify whether that objection occurred before or after Mst Mohan Dei’s death. The documents on record show that any objection was made after her death, and therefore the main portion of the uncontradicted testimony, which could have been contested, must be accepted. In March 1929, the son of Mst Mohan Dei, Shri Kishan Das, died, after which Kishan Lal became the next presumptive reversioner. When, in October 1929, the reversion technically vested in him—though the estoppel prevented the vesting—the Court considered whether the estoppel continued to bind him after the reversion opened. The Court held that it did. It referred to the Judicial Committee decision in Kanhai Lal v. Brijlal (1918) 45 I.A. 118, which is clear that a reversioner who has consented is estopped, even though other reversioners who are not parties to the consent are not bound. This principle is undisputed where a limited owner alienates property without legal necessity, as illustrated in Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb (1927) 54 I.A. 396 at 403, where the court said that the party benefiting from the transaction was precluded from questioning any part of it. The Court applied the same reasoning to the present case. The respondents argued, relying on Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (1919) 46 I.A. 72 and Mt Binda Kuer v. Lalitha Prasad, that even if Kishan Lal had taken possession in 1889 or 1890 based on a title derived from his father, that would not have barred him from asserting his rights in a different capacity when the succession opened. The Court, however, found that argument unpersuasive and affirmed that the estoppel continued to bind Kishan Lal.

When the succession opened out, the parties placed particular reliance on page 308 of the later decision. The Court, however, considered that decision to be distinguishable from the present facts. In the cited case, the reversion did not vest until 1916. Earlier, in 1868, the next presumptive reversioners had entered into a compromise whereby the grandfather of Jairam, a party to that case, obtained a greater share of the goods than he would have been entitled to under ordinary law. Absent the compromise, that grandfather would have received only one anna and twelve gundas, but because of the compromise he obtained two annas and four gundas. The actual taking of possession under the compromise was deferred until the death of Anandi Kuer, who died in 1885. At the time of her death, Jairam became entitled to his grandfather’s share because both his father and grandfather were deceased, and he consequently enjoyed the benefit of the transaction.

The Court observed that the additional benefit Jairam derived from the compromise was limited to a twelve-gunda share, since he already possessed an absolute and indefeasible right to one anna and twelve gundas in his own name, a title that did not arise from the compromise. Later, Jairam lost one anna and four gundas to a creditor named Munniram. From the remaining portion of the two annas and four gundas, he sold thirteen gundas to the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs 500. On the basis of the facts, the Court found it impossible to conclude that the thirteen gundas purchased by the plaintiffs were taken from the extra twelve gundas obtained through the compromise, rather than from the one anna and twelve gundas to which Jairam held a sound and independent title. Moreover, unless the thirteen gundas could be positively linked to the twelve gundas, it could not be said that the plaintiffs derived any benefit from the compromise.

The Judicial Committee added that even if such a link could be established, it did not follow that the plaintiffs had admitted that fact, nor that they would automatically receive a benefit under the compromise. The plaintiffs retained the right to challenge the position and to argue that they could prove the contrary. The Committee quoted, “Unless the plaintiff’s individual conduct makes it unjust that they should have a place among Bajrangi Lal’s reversioners, their legal rights should have effect.” The Court also referenced the case of Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (1919) 46 I.A. 72, noting that the decision there turned on a similar point, as seen on page 87.

The Court then distinguished the present matter, stating that it was very different. When Kishan Lal took possession of his father’s property, he did so by virtue of the award and possessed no other title, and for forty years he continued to derive benefit from that possession.

In this case the Court observed that Kishan Lal, having taken possession of his father’s property solely by virtue of the award and having enjoyed its benefit for forty years, was barred by the principle of estoppel from asserting any claim to the property even if he attempted to do so in a different capacity as a reversioner after the succession had been opened out. The Court further noted that it had been conceded that, should the estoppel operating against Kishan Lal have continued beyond October 1929, the plaintiff, whose claim was pursued through Kishan Lal, would likewise be subject to the same estoppel. Accordingly, the Court held that the present appeal succeeded. It therefore set aside the decree of the High Court and restored the decree of the first Court, which had dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. The Court further ordered that the costs of both the present proceedings and those incurred in the High Court be borne by the plaintiffs, who also acted as respondents in this appeal. The appeal was therefore allowed.