Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar vs The State Of Bombay And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 683 of 1951

Decision Date: 27 March, 1952

Coram: M. Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar

The case was titled Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar versus The State of Bombay and Others and was decided on 27 March 1952 by the Supreme Court of India. The bench that heard the matter consisted of M. Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea and N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar. The petitioner was Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar and the respondents were the State of Bombay together with other parties. The judgment was rendered on the same date, 27 March 1952, and the bench composition was again noted as Das, Sudhi Ranjan, with the chief justice being M. Patanjali Sastri, followed by Mahajan, Mukherjea, Aiyar and Chandrasekhara. The case is reported in the law reports as 1952 AIR 181 and 1952 SCR 612. Subsequent citations of the decision appear in a long series of reports, including D 1954 SC 236 (38), R 1955 SC 160 (8), R 1958 SC 163 (12, 40, 41, 42), E & D 1959 SC 65 (10), R 1961 SC 1762 (25), R 1962 SC 113 (32), R 1964 SC 1823 (4, 27, 32), RF 1965 SC 596 (11), RF 1967 SC 1145 (16), R 1972 SC 1242 (14), R 1972 SC 1446 (8, 9), D 1972 SC 1924 (6, 11, 12), R 1974 SC 1336 (8), R 1978 SC 1155 (7), R 1982 SC 710 (106). The statutory provision under consideration was Section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (the Fourth Amendment), which authorised the appropriate government, upon receiving a report from an Advisory Board that sufficient cause existed, to confirm a detention order and to continue the detention for any period it deemed fit. The petitioner had been arrested under this Act, referred to the Advisory Board, and after the Board reported that sufficient cause existed, the Government chose to confirm the detention. This confirmation was communicated to the District Magistrate by a confidential letter signed by the Assistant Secretary to the Government on behalf of the Secretary. The letter stated: “The Government is accordingly pleased to confirm the detention order against the detenu. Please inform the detenu accordingly and report compliance.” The petitioner subsequently filed a habeas-corpus petition contending that his detention was illegal because (i) the Government, when confirming the order, failed to specify the period for which the detention would continue, and (ii) the confirmation order was not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor as required by Article 166(1) of the Constitution. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri and Justices Mukherjea, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, held that the omission of a specified period of further detention did not render the confirmation unlawful. Their reasoning was based on the construction of Section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, which, while making a specification desirable, did not render the order a nullity if such a period was omitted. The Court also concluded that although the Act envisaged an executive decision for confirming detention, the failure to execute the decision in the form prescribed by Article 166(1) did not invalidate the decision, because the constitutional provisions were deemed directory rather than mandatory.

In this case the Chief Justice and the judges of the Division Bench held that, when Section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act is properly interpreted, it is not mandatory to specify the exact period for which a detention will continue, although doing so is desirable. According to the observations of Judges Mukherjea and Chandra Sekhara Aiyar, although the language of Section 11(1) suggests that the order should indicate the period during which the further detention of the detainee is to continue, the mere failure to include such a period does not render the order void nor does it justify the release of the detainee.

The Court also held, speaking for the Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri and the other judges, that the Act requires an executive decision to confirm a detention order under Section 11(1). However, the omission of the form of authentication prescribed by Article 166 of the Constitution does not make the executive decision illegal, because the provisions of that article are directory rather than mandatory.

Judges Mukherjea and Chandra Sekhara Aiyar further explained that Section 11(1) indeed contemplates a formal confirmation order and that Article 166(1) of the Constitution is applicable. They emphasized that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 must be read together. Clause (1) prescribes the manner in which an executive order or instrument is expressed, while clause (2) prescribes the manner of authentication. When both requirements are satisfied, the order is protected from challenge on the ground that it was not made or executed by the Governor. Even if clause (1) were treated as an independent provision unrelated to clause (2), it remains directory and not imperative.

Judge Mahajan expressed the view that Section 11(1) requires the Government, upon receipt of the Advisory Board’s report, to make a decision and issue an order in accordance with that decision, indicating that the detention is continued for a specified period. He held that failure to fix such a period would render the detention illegal.

The Court referred to several earlier decisions, including A.K. Gopalan v. State (1950 S.C.R. 88), Makhan Singh Tarsikha v. State of Punjab (1952 S.C.R. 368), S. Krishnan v. State of Madras (1951 S.C.R. 621), Chakar Singh v. State of Punjab (Petition No. 584 of 1951), and J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Others v. King-Emperor (1947 F.C.R. 141).

The judgment concerned original jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, arising from petition number 683 of 1951 seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The facts of the case were detailed in the judgment. Amicus curiae was presented by Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the petitioner, and the Attorney-General for India, assisted by counsel, represented the respondents. The judgment was delivered on 27 March 1952.

In this proceeding, the petitioner filed an application under article 82 of the Constitution seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and requesting his immediate release from Baroda Central Prison, where he claimed to be held in illegal detention. The factual background states that on 15 February 1951 the petitioner was taken into custody pursuant to an order dated 13 February 1951 issued by the District Magistrate of Surat. The order was made under the authority granted by the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. At the time of arrest a copy of that order was handed to the petitioner. On the same day the magistrate also served the petitioner with the grounds of detention as required by section 7 of the Act. The served grounds expressly stated that, in the public interest, further particulars could not be disclosed. The petitioner subsequently approached the Bombay High Court under article 226 of the Constitution, contending that his detention was unlawful and praying for his immediate release. In that petition he argued that the grounds provided for his detention were false, vague, and fantastical, and that the order itself had been issued in bad faith. The State responded by filing two affidavits in support of the detention order. The High Court dismissed the petition on 17 April 1951. While these proceedings were pending, the petitioner’s case was referred to the Advisory Board, which, in April 1951, produced a report concluding that there was sufficient cause to justify his detention.

The affidavit of Venilal Tribhovandas Dehejia, who was Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department, filed in answer to the present application, confirms that the Advisory Board’s report was placed before the Government and that on 13 April 1951 the Government resolved to confirm the detention order. The Government’s decision was communicated to the District Magistrate of Surat on 28 April 1951 through a confidential letter numbered B.D. II/1042-D (11) from the Home Department (Political), Bombay Castle. The letter, addressed to the District Magistrate, referred to the earlier correspondence dated 23 February 1951 and invoked section 9 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, indicating that the case of the detainee, Shri Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar, had been considered by the Advisory Board and that the Board had reported sufficient cause for his detention. The letter stated that the Government was therefore pleased to confirm the detention order, instructed that the detainee be informed accordingly, and requested a report of compliance. The letter concluded by indicating that the detainee’s case papers were being returned, and it was signed by G. K. Kharkar on behalf of the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department. The same affidavit further reveals that G. K. Kharkar, at that time, held the position of Assistant Secretary and, consequently, was authorized under rule 12 of the Rules of Business made by the Government of Bombay under article 166 of the Constitution to sign governmental orders and instruments.

Rule twelve of the Rules of Business, which had been framed by the Government of Bombay pursuant to article 166 of the Constitution, authorised certain officials to sign all orders and instruments of the Government of Bombay. In the present case the petitioner had approached this Court invoking article 32 of the Constitution, alleging that his detention was unlawful. The fundamental issue that the Court was called upon to consider was whether the petitioner had been deprived of his personal liberty in a manner that complied with the procedure established by law. The record indicated that the petitioner was said to be detained by the State in the exercise of powers conferred upon it by the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended in 1951. Accordingly, the State bore the burden of demonstrating that every step required by law had been strictly observed. A supplementary petition had also been filed in this Court in which the petitioner contended that the grounds for his detention were false, vague, lacking in particulars, and insufficient to enable him to make an effective representation against the detention order. However, that supplementary petition had not been pressed before the Court by the learned counsel appearing as amicus curiae in support of the application. At the hearing, the learned counsel confined his submissions to challenging the validity of the petitioner’s detention on two specific grounds. First, he argued that the State Government had failed to comply with the requirements of section eleven, sub-section one of the amended Act because, at the time of confirming the detention order, it had omitted to specify the period for which the detention would continue. Second, he contended that the order confirming the detention was not in the proper legal form, since it was not expressed to have been made in the name of the Governor as required by article 166, clause one of the Constitution.

Regarding the first ground of attack, the Court observed that the correctness of this contention depended upon a proper construction of section eleven, sub-section one of the Preventive Detention Act, as amended, which read: “(1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention for such period as it thinks fit”. The petitioner’s counsel argued that the sub-section contemplated a single decision containing two components: a confirmation of the detention order and a direction as to the continuation of the detention. The Court found this argument unsound, noting that if Parliament had intended both components to be merged into a single order, the language would have been expressed differently, for example, by stating that “the appropriate Government may make an order confirming the detention order and continuing the detention for such period as it thinks fit”. Instead, the grammatical construction of section eleven, sub-section one conferred two distinct powers on the appropriate Government: first, the power to confirm the detention order, and second, the power to continue the detention for such period as it thinks fit. The Court further explained that the confirmation of the detention order necessarily involved an executive decision, but, because the detainee was already in custody, the continuation of his detention followed automatically, and no additional executive decision was required to extend the period of detention.

The Court observed that once an order confirming a detention is made, the detention proceeds automatically, and consequently no further executive action is needed to keep the detention in force. From this, the Court concluded that a separate direction to continue the detention does not have to be included in the order that confirms the original detention order. The Court then addressed a suggestion that the words “such period” in the sub-section necessarily require specification of the length of time for which the detention will continue. The argument was that, had Parliament intended otherwise, the provision would have ended with the words “may continue his detention” and not have added the phrase “such period.” The Court considered a further contention that, relying on its decision in Petition No. 308 of 1951 (Makha, Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab), it is now unlawful, after the amendment of the Act, to state any period of detention in the initial detention order made under section 3, and that if no period is required at the time of confirmation under section 11(1), the government might lose track of the case and the detainee could be held indefinitely. The Court rejected the premise that two possible constructions of the provision exist, and rejected the idea that adopting the construction favoring the subject’s interests would benefit the detainee. It noted that while it is universally accepted that detention without trial is an undesirable measure and that, where preventive detention is applied, it is preferable to specify a definite period of detention if practicable, the question of whether the Act, on a proper construction, obliges such specification is separate and must be decided by looking at the actual language of the statute. The Court explained that if Parliament had intended a mandatory specification of the detention period, sub-section 11(1) would have empowered the authority to continue detention for a “period as it thinks fit to specify” rather than merely “as it thinks fit.”

The Court further observed that the concern that failure to specify a period would automatically result in an indefinite detention does not, in this context, lead to oppression, because the Act itself is of a limited duration and any detention under it must inevitably end when the Act expires. The Court then referred to the reasoning of Chief Justice Kania in A.K. Gopalan’s case, where at page 126 the Chief Justice held that the argument that section 11 was invalid because it allowed continuation of detention for “such period as the Central Government or the State Government thought fit,” potentially permitting an indefinite period, was without merit. The Chief Justice emphasized that the Act must be read as a whole, noting that the entire life of the Act was limited to one year, and therefore the contention that detention could continue for an indefinite period was unsound.

Mahajan J observed that section 11 of the Act had been challenged on the ground that it violated the Constitution by allowing preventive detention for an indefinite period. He explained that the proper way to read this provision was in the context of sub-clause (3) of section 1, which expressly states that the Act would cease to have effect on 1 April 1951. These comments were recorded when section 11 was still in its original form, before the Act was amended. The amended legislation reproduced the earlier language in section 11(1) in a substantially similar, if not verbatim, manner, as shown in the citation (1)[1950] S.C.R. 88. Consequently, Mahajan J’s reasoning was held to apply with the same force and persuasiveness to the present version of section 11(1).

In the later case of S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras, Sastri J, then a judge, addressed the same provision, now labelled section 11(1). He dismissed the objection to its validity in a few words, stating that the contention was that the discretionary power granted to the appropriate Government to continue detention “for such period as it thinks fit” effectively permitted an indefinite detention, contrary to article 29(4). Sastri J highlighted that the new Act was intended to remain in force only until 1 April 1982, and that no detention under the Act could lawfully continue beyond that date; therefore, the discretionary power could be exercised only within that overall temporal limit. From these observations, two points become clear. First, the argument that section 11(1) is invalid cannot be raised unless it is asserted that, on its true construction, the section itself permits an indefinite detention. Second, the Court did not reject this premise by insisting that the phrase “such period” necessarily requires the fixation of a definite term; rather, it held that because the Act’s life was limited, any detention authorized by the section could not extend beyond the expiry of the Act. This answer indicates that the Court recognized that, taken in isolation and properly interpreted, the section would indeed sanction an indefinite detention, but that contingency was neutralised by the limited duration of the statute itself. Mahajan J further answered the hypothetical that, had the statute been permanent, the same interpretation would have allowed an indefinite detention, thereby confirming the conditional nature of the Court’s reasoning.

In his judgment in the case of S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras, Mahajan J. observed that Parliament might have considered it unnecessary to prescribe a maximum term of detention in a law that was meant to be temporary and that would cease to exist after one year. He explained that a temporary statute automatically ends when the period for which it was enacted expires, and nothing further can be done under it after that date. Consequently, the detention of the petitioners would naturally end when the temporary statute itself came to an end. The Court agreed with this passage, stating that Parliament could have thought it unnecessary to legislate a fixed maximum period of detention for those held under such a law. The Court also noted that, in a permanent statute, Parliament would unlikely grant such a sweeping power to continue detention for an indefinite period. However, if Parliament did intend to provide such a power, the Court would not be in a position to question the legislature’s knowledge, wisdom or patriotic motives, nor to let personal dislike of the policy influence the interpretation of the language used by the legislature. The Court further pointed out that the sub-section itself contains a specified period, and that the appropriate Government may, at any time, choose to cease the detention by revoking the order under section 13, which would automatically bring the detention to an end.

The Court then considered the argument that the idea of indefinite detention is so repugnant that sub-section 11(1) should be read as requiring the period of detention to be fixed at the time the detention order is confirmed. It held that such a construction would lead to a result that could not be maintained in view of an earlier decision of this Court. The Court observed that the wording of the sub-section does not empower the appropriate Government to “continue the detention for such period as it thinks fit from time to time.” Accordingly, the power conferred by the sub-section would be exhausted after a single exercise, and it would not be possible to extend the detention beyond the period initially fixed. The Court recognized, however, that this view would be inconsistent with the ruling in Petition No 584 of 1951, Chakar Singh v. The State of Punjab, where it was held that nothing in section 11(1) prevents the appropriate Government from ordering a further continuation of detention so long as the previously fixed period has not yet expired and the person has not been released. The earlier decision therefore permits the appropriate Government to direct that detention may continue even after the expiry of the period fixed by a confirming order, provided such direction is given before the prior period ends.

The Court explained that the appropriate Government could order a detainee’s confinement to continue even after the expiry of the period fixed by the order that confirmed the detention, or by any later order, provided that such directions were issued before the expiry of the period fixed by the immediately preceding order. It then asked from where the appropriate Government derived its authority to direct a further continuation of detention after the confirming order had once specified a period of detention. The Court observed that Section 13 of the Act confers on the appropriate Government the power to revoke or amend a detention order, and that this power applied to the original detention order made under Section 3 of the Act, but not to an order made under Section 11(1) that merely confirmed a detention or fixed its period. Consequently, the authority to extend a previously fixed period of detention – an authority that, in view of the Court’s earlier decision, must be recognized as existing – had to be sourced from the words “may continue such detention for such period as it thinks fit”. From this, the Court concluded that specifying a period of detention did not destroy or limit the broad, overall power of the appropriate Government to direct the continuation of detention for as long as it deemed appropriate. The Court further questioned why a specification of a period should be considered vital if the specification is not sacrosanct and the Government may nevertheless continue detention as it sees fit. It noted that, for the detainee, detention would not become any more definite or less burdensome if the Government could keep extending detention by an indefinite number of orders until the Act itself expired in the case of a temporary statute, or until the Act was repealed in the case of a permanent statute. The Court addressed the argument that insisting on a definite period at each confirmation would compel the Government to consider the detainee’s case before issuing any further continuation order, whereas allowing no time to be specified might cause the Government to lose sight of the case and result in indefinite detention. It declined to attribute such dereliction of duty to the Government, but warned that insisting on specifying the period could induce the Government to fix the longest permissible period, ending with the expiry of the Act, and thereby lose sight of the detainee’s individual situation – a result the Court believed would not benefit the detainee. Finally, the Court reiterated that Section 13 provided ample power to the appropriate Government to act.

In this part of the judgment the Court observed that the appropriate Government possessed the authority to revoke a detention order at any time. It was expected that the Government would consider each individual case, withdraw the detention order and set the detainee free as soon as it became convinced that continued detention was no longer required. The Court noted that arguments concerning hardship might persuade a tribunal to fix a definite period of detention, but such considerations could not change the clear meaning of the statutory language. The Court emphasized that it was not called upon to decide matters of policy; rather its task was to discern the intent of the Legislature from the words used in the Act. Accordingly, after a careful construction of section 11(1), the Court held that the statute did not require a specification of the period for which detention was to continue, even though such a specification might be regarded as desirable by some. The second ground raised by counsel for the petitioner was that no valid confirmation order had ever been issued in the proper legal form and that a confidential communication from the Home Department to the District Magistrate could not be treated as an order within the meaning of section 11(1). The Attorney-General countered that section 11(1) contemplated only the making of an executive decision – namely, the decision to confirm the detention – and did not require the issuance of a formal order. He referred to section 3, which expressly mentions an order of detention, and pointed out that section 11(1) made no reference to any order of confirmation. He further noted that section 13 authorised the appropriate Government to revoke or modify a detention order, yet even that provision did not speak of a formal order of revocation or modification. Nevertheless, revocation or modification necessarily implied an executive decision. Both under section 11(1) and under section 13 the appropriate Government must think over the matter and reach a decision. Whether the decision is labelled an “order” or merely an “executive action” does not affect its legal consequences. Section 11(1) plainly requires an executive decision on whether the detention order should be confirmed or not. Once the decision to confirm is taken, the continued physical detention follows automatically as a consequence and does not demand any further executive act. Consequently, the Preventive Detention Act envisages that the only decisions required are an executive decision to confirm under section 11(1) or an executive decision to revoke or modify under section 13. The Act, however, remains silent on the precise form such a decision must take; it does not prescribe any particular format for an order or executive action.

The Court explained that the requirements of the Preventive Detention Act are fulfilled once it is shown that an executive decision has actually been taken, regardless of the form in which that decision is recorded. At this point counsel for the petitioner referred to article 166 of the Constitution and argued that every executive action of a State Government must be expressed and authenticated in the manner prescribed by that article. The Attorney-General responded that a distinction exists between the act of taking an executive decision and the formal expression of that decision. He observed that, in ordinary practice, an executive decision is recorded in office files by way of notes or endorsements made by the appropriate minister or officer.

The Attorney-General further contended that if every executive decision were required to be given a formal expression, the entire governmental machinery would come to a standstill. The Court agreed that not every executive decision needs a formal expression, especially when a superior officer simply directs a subordinate to act or refrain from acting in a particular manner. However, the Court held that when an executive decision affects an external party or must be officially notified or communicated, it should normally be expressed in the form required by article 166(1), that is, in the name of the Governor.

Subsequently, the Attorney-General argued that the omission of the formal authentication required by article 166 does not render the decision itself illegal, because the provisions of that article, like their counterpart in the Government of India Act, are merely directory and not mandatory. The Court cited the decision in J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd. and Others v. The King-Emperor, which held that such provisions are directory. In the Court’s opinion, the Attorney-General’s contention must therefore prevail.

The Court noted that it is a well-settled principle that provisions of a statute creating public duties are generally directory, whereas provisions conferring private rights are imperative. When statutory provisions relate to the performance of a public duty, declaring acts void for neglect of those provisions would cause serious inconvenience to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and would not further the legislature’s primary objective. Consequently, courts habitually treat such provisions as directory, and the neglect of them does not affect the validity of the acts performed. The considerations applied by the Federal Court in the J.K. Gas Plant case regarding section 40(1) of the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, are, in the Court’s view, equally applicable to article 166 of the Constitution. The splitting of the old provision into two clauses in article 166 does not, in the Court’s opinion, alter the meaning of the article.

The Court explained that the requirements of article 166 create an immunity for an order, meaning that the order cannot be attacked on the basis that it was not issued by the Governor. Consequently, if the State fails to fulfil the conditions laid down in article 166, it cannot invoke the immunity that the article provides. However, the Court stressed that such non-compliance does not annul the order itself. The Court observed that the Preventive Detention Act merely demands an executive decision—whether described as an order or as an executive action—to confirm a detention order issued under section 11(1). The Act does not prescribe any specific form for expressing that executive decision. Although article 166 requires every executive action to be expressed and authenticated in the manner it specifies, the Court held that an omission to follow those formalities does not render the executive action void. Accordingly, the legal procedure requires only that the appropriate Government decide whether to confirm the detention order under section 11(1). The record shows that such a decision was indeed taken by the appropriate Government. The Court therefore concluded that, in the facts of this case, there was no violation of the statutory procedure and that the petitioner's detention could not be called into question. On that basis, the Court held that the application must fail.

The Chief Justice concurred with the judgment delivered by the learned Judge Das and indicated that he had nothing further to add. The other Judge expressed his view that the application should be dismissed and took the opportunity to outline briefly his own reasoning on the matters raised. The Court noted that the petitioner's detention was challenged on two grounds. The first ground asserted that, when the appropriate Government confirmed the detention order under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, it was mandatory to specify the period for which the detention would continue, and that failure to do so would invalidate the order. The second ground contended that the confirmation order, being unsigned by the Governor as required by article 166(1) of the Constitution, was void and inoperative. To address the first ground, the Court referred to the language of section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, which reads: “In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit.” The Court also observed that section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, which governs the initial detention order, is worded differently with respect to the specification of detention periods.

The Act that authorised the initial detention order was drafted differently from the later provision. That earlier provision merely enabled the Central Government or, as the case might be, the State Government to issue an order, under the circumstances specified in the section, directing that a person be detained; it contained no reference to the length of time for which such detention could be imposed. The Court has now settled, by a prior pronouncement, that it is not required for the detaining authority to state any period of detention when it makes the original order under section 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act. Moreover, the Court declared that if the original order does specify a period, the order becomes defective and illegal because fixing a period could prejudice the detenu’s case when it is later considered by the Advisory Board, as observed in Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab, Petition No. 308 of 1951. The Advisory Board is limited to expressing an opinion solely on whether there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned; it is neither called upon nor empowered to comment on the length of detention. Once the Advisory Board reports that sufficient cause exists, the subsequent action lies entirely with the appropriate Government, which may, under section 11 (1) of the Act, “confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit.” In the Court’s view, the phrase “for such period as it thinks fit” presupposes that after receiving the Board’s report the detaining authority must decide whether to confirm the original order and, if so, determine the further period for which detention will continue. This is the appropriate stage for making such a decision because the investigation concerning the particular detenu, as contemplated by the Preventive Detention Act, is then concluded and the Government is in full possession of all relevant material. The legislature could not have intended for the matter to remain indefinite and undetermined at that point. The Court therefore regarded the difference in wording between section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act and section 3 (1) of the same Act as reflecting this purpose. The Court further held that even when the Government, in exercising its power under section 11 (1), specifies a period for which detention will continue, it does not become functus officio; the Government retains the capacity to extend the detention for an additional period later, if it deems it necessary. In this respect, the Court noted that section 13 of the Act confers very wide powers on the detaining authority to revoke or modify any detention order at any time before the originally fixed period expires, provided that any extension does not exceed the overall limit prescribed by the Act.

The Court observed that the statute confers very wide powers on the detaining authority. The authority may revoke or modify any detention order at any time it chooses. The power of modification expressly includes the power to extend the period of detention, but such an extension may be exercised only before the original period fixed in the order has expired. Moreover, any extended period must not exceed the overall limit that is co-extensive with the life or duration of the Act itself. This interpretation is consistent with the view taken by this Court in Chakar Singh v. The State of Punjab. The Court then turned to the question whether the failure to state the period of further detention while confirming a detention order under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act renders the detention illegal. The Court noted that this point is not free from doubt. However, in light of the fact that the new Preventive Detention Act is a temporary statute that was originally to remain in force only up to 1 April 1952 and has only been recently extended for a further six months, and that no detention under the Act may continue after the date of its expiry, the Court was inclined to hold that non-specification of the further period in an order made under section 11(1) does not make the order of detention a nullity.

If an order does not mention a period, the Court reasoned that the order may be taken to imply that the detention will continue up to the date of the expiration of the Act itself, at which point all detentions made under the Act would automatically cease. The appropriate Government remains at liberty to terminate the order of detention earlier, if it deems it proper, by exercising its general powers under section 13 of the Act. The Court was not persuaded by the argument that the omission of the period in the confirmation order is likely to cause serious prejudice to the interests of the detenue. While it is possible that mentioning a specific period would draw the Government’s attention to the case as the period approaches expiry and prompt a review before any further extension, section 13 makes clear that the Act contemplates review of individual cases by the appropriate Government from time to time, irrespective of whether any period is mentioned in the order of detention. It may be legitimately expected that the detaining authority will discharge the duties imposed upon it, but even if it fails to do so, there is nothing in the law that prevents it from fixing the period of detention up to the date of expiry of the Act itself, which is by no means a long period, and in that case the Court would obviously

In this case the Court observed that it would have no power to grant any relief to the person detained. While it is acknowledged that an order authorising detention for an indefinite period conflicts with the principles of democracy and the protection of personal liberty, the Court noted that the indefiniteness associated with an order under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act is mitigated by the fact that the Act itself contains a fixed maximum duration. That fixed maximum automatically imposes a time limit beyond which the detention order cannot remain in force. The Court further explained that section 11(1) of the Act does envisage that the order should specify a period for which the detention will continue and that the Government must avoid any omission in this respect. However, the Court declined to hold that a failure to mention such a period makes the order void or compels the release of the detained person.

The Court then turned to the question of whether the order was invalid because it was not expressed in the manner required by article 166 of the Constitution. Article 166 provides, in clause (1), that all executive actions of a State Government must be expressed as being taken in the name of the Governor. Clause (2) mandates that orders and other instruments made in the Governor’s name be authenticated in the manner prescribed by rules made by the Governor, and it further states that the validity of an authenticated order cannot be challenged on the ground that it was not made or executed by the Governor. Clause (3) empowers the Governor to make rules for the convenient transaction of Government business and for the allocation of such business among Ministers, except where the Constitution requires the Governor to act in his own discretion. In the present matter, the order confirming the detention was signed by Mr G.K. Kharkar, who acted as Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department. An affidavit filed by V.T. Dehejia established that Mr Kharkar was then the Assistant Secretary of the Home Department and that he had been authorised, under the rules framed pursuant to article 166(3), by the Governor of Bombay to sign orders and instruments on behalf of the Government of Bombay. The Court noted that the order was not expressed as being made in the name of the Governor, and therefore, if article 166(1) were applicable, the order failed to meet that statutory requirement. To address this difficulty, the learned Attorney-General advanced a two-fold argument. First, he contended that article 166(1) applies only in cases where the executive action must be expressed as a formal order, and that such formal expression is the situation that triggers the authentication requirement set out in clause (2).

The Attorney-General argued that article 166(1) of the Constitution applies only when an executive action must be set out in the form of a formal order, and that only such orders need to be authenticated according to clause 2 of that article. He further contended that section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act does not require a formal order at all; it would be sufficient if the authority that detained a person simply decided, by any form of executive action, that the original detention order should be confirmed. The second line of argument presented by the Attorney-General was that the provisions of clauses 1 and 2 of article 166 are directory rather than mandatory. According to this view, even if an order is not expressed or authenticated in the manner prescribed, the order would not be ineffective or invalid so long as it can be shown that it was issued by the correct authority, the authority to whom the particular business has been assigned by the rules made under clause 3 of article 166. The only consequence of such an omission, he said, would be that the order would not enjoy the immunity from challenge that clause 2 of the article provides.

In considering the first point, the Court agreed that article 166(1) is limited to situations where the executive action must be expressed as a formal order, a notification, or any other instrument. However, the Court could not accept the Attorney-General’s claim that section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act does not contemplate the issuance of a formal order. While it is true that section 11(1) does not expressly mention a confirmation order, the normal practice is that an initial detention order made under section 3 is later confirmed by passing another order. This practice is supported by section 13 of the Act, which authorises the detaining authority to revoke or modify a detention order at any time. Neither revocation nor modification can occur without an order being made to that effect, even though, like section 11(1), section 13 does not specifically refer to an order. Consequently, the Court found that the Attorney-General’s first contention could not be sustained. Regarding the second contention, the Court examined whether the requirement in article 166(1) is imperative such that non-compliance would render an executive action null and void. The Court observed that the clause does not dictate how the State’s executive action must be performed; it merely prescribes the mode of expression. While the mode of expression is generally a matter of form, whether strict compliance with that form is essential to the validity of the act depends on the legislature’s intention. The Court noted that various judicial tests have been formulated to determine whether a statutory provision is mandatory or merely directory, but it declined to discuss those tests in detail for the present case.

In this case the Court noted that a detailed discussion of the various tests that have been formulated by courts to decide whether a statutory requirement is merely directory or is obligatory with an implied nullity for non-compliance was unnecessary for the matter before it. The Court held that article 166 of the Constitution, which is intended to prescribe the procedure for regulating the business of a State Government, must be read as a single, integrated provision. Under clause (a) of article 166 the Governor is empowered to make rules that facilitate the convenient conduct of such business and that provide for the allocation of duties among the Ministers, provided that the rules do not interfere with matters in which the Governor is required to act at his own discretion. The Court explained that the conduct of business must follow these rules, and that any executive action taken in the form of an order or other instrument must be expressed as being issued in the name of the Governor, in whom the executive authority of the State is vested, and must be authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Governor’s rules. The Court stressed that clauses (1) and (2) of article 166 are to be read together; clause (1) deals with the mode of expression of an executive order or instrument, while clause (2) specifies the manner of authentication. When both requirements are satisfied, an order or instrument is insulated from challenge on the ground that it was not issued by the Governor. The Court agreed with the Attorney-General that failure to observe either clause would deprive the order of the protection it would otherwise enjoy, and the order could then be challenged in any court on the basis that it was not properly made by the Governor. In such a challenge the burden of proof would lie on the State authorities to demonstrate positively that the order was correctly made by the Governor in accordance with the rules framed under article 166. The Court found support for this view in the decision of the Federal Court in J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Company Limited and Others v. King-Emperor (1), where a comparable provision in section 49(1) of Schedule IX of the Government of India Act was held to be directory rather than mandatory. Even if clause (1) of article 166 were treated as an independent provision unrelated to clause (2) and to the purpose of the article, the Court maintained that it would still be regarded as directory and not imperative in character.

The Court explained that a statutory requirement which merely prescribes a formality for carrying out a public act must be understood as a procedural guideline rather than an essential condition of validity. In support of this view, the Court cited Maxwell’s observation that “where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or in other words as directory only.” Applying this principle to the present facts, the Court noted that the order issued under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act was presented as an order of the Government of Bombay and was signed by the officer who, according to the rules framed by the Governor under article 166 of the Constitution, possessed the necessary authority to sign such an order. Consequently, the Court held that the order could not be declared a nullity merely because it did not expressly state that it was made in the name of the Governor. As a result, both of the petitioners’ grounds of challenge failed and the petition was dismissed. Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar concurred with the order pronounced by Justice Mukherjea and stated that he had nothing further to add. Justice Mahajan then turned to the substantive content of the petitions, observing that the legality of the detention of the petitioners was contested on two separate grounds. The first ground alleged that the order of continuance made under section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended, did not specify the period for which the detention would continue. The second ground claimed that the order was not expressed “in the name of the Governor” as required by article 166(1) of the Constitution. The petitioners reported that they had been informed by the District Magistrate that the government had confirmed the detention orders, but they were not told the duration for which their detentions would persist, and no order expressed in the manner contemplated by article 166(1) had been served upon them. Acting on behalf of the petitioners, counsel argued that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act must be strictly complied with, emphasizing that section 11 required the government, at the time of confirming a detention order, to specify the period of continuance and that failure to do so vitiated the continuance order. Counsel further contended that, unless the order was expressed in the manner mandated by article 166(1) of the Constitution and served on the affected person, the order possessed no legal force. The learned Attorney-General, however, disputed both contentions. He argued that the government was not required to issue a formal order under section 11; rather, the section merely contemplated an executive action indicating the government’s intention to confirm the detention after receiving the Advisory Board’s report. He maintained that nothing in the language of section 11 obliges the government to specify a detention period, and that any omission of such a period would not render the continuation of detention illegal. Moreover, the Attorney-General submitted that the action of the government under section 11 need not be expressed in the form required by article 166(1), asserting that these provisions are directory rather than mandatory and that they had been substantially complied with.

In response to the petitioners’ claims, the counsel for the State argued that section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act did not contain any language requiring the Government to state the length of the detention. Accordingly, the omission of a specific period did not render the continuation of the detention unlawful. The counsel further maintained that the Government’s action under section 11 was not required to be expressed in the form prescribed by article 166 (1) of the Constitution. According to this view, the provisions of the Act were merely directory rather than mandatory, and the Government had substantially complied with the statutory requirements. To evaluate these submissions, the Court first set out the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. Articles 22 (4) and (5) of the Constitution read as follows: “(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless—(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention ……. (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law, providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order.” The Court then reproduced the operative sections of the Preventive Detention Act, namely sections 3, 9, 10, 11 and 13, which provide: “3. The Central Government or the State Government may—(a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to ……. it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. 9. In every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within six weeks from the date specified in subsection (2) place before an Advisory Board constituted by it under section 8 the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer, also the report made by such officer under sub-section (3) of section 3.”

“10. (1) the Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information, as it may deem necessary, from the appropriate Government or from the person concerned, and if in any particular case it considers it essential, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the appropriate Government within ten weeks from the date specified in sub-section (2) of section 9. (2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned.” The Court noted that the answer to the first question hinged upon the construction to be given to the words “such period as it thinks fit” occurring in section 11 of the Act.

Section 11 of the Act provides that when an Advisory Board reports that, in its opinion, there is sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and may continue the detention for such period as it thinks fit. Conversely, when the Advisory Board reports that, in its opinion, there is no sufficient cause for the detention, the appropriate Government must revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released immediately. Section 13, subject to the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, states that a detention order may be revoked or modified at any time, and that the revocation of a detention order does not prevent the making of a fresh detention order under section 3 against the same person.

The Court explained that the answer to the first question hinges on the construction of the words “such period as it thinks fit” occurring in section 11. These words must be given their plain meaning, regardless of the fact that they appear in a temporary statute, and must be interpreted in the same way they would be if they appeared in a permanent statute. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Makkan Singh Tarsikha v. State of Punjab, Petition No. 308 of 1951, where it held that fixing the period of detention in the initial order under section 3 would be contrary to the scheme of the Act because it would prejudice the detainee’s case before the Advisory Board. The Court emphasized that before a person is deprived of personal liberty, the procedure established by law must be strictly followed and must not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person affected.

The Court observed that the language employed in section 11 is different from that of section 3, and that this difference indicates a contrary intention. The phrase “such period as it thinks fit” means that the Government must specify and fix the period of detention. If those words were construed as suggested by the Attorney-General, it would allow the Preventive Detention Act to authorize detention without any specification of the period at any moment, subject only to the overall limit fixed for the life of the Act, and would relieve the Government of the duty to consider the duration of detention. The Court held that such a result must be avoided unless the language of the statute unequivocally points to it.

Finally, the Court noted that under the Constitution, preventive detention cannot exceed three months unless the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there is sufficient cause for a longer detention. The Constitution therefore sets a maximum limit for the initial detention and permits an extension only on the basis of the Advisory Board’s report. The Court stressed that the Constitution envisions a specified period, even if longer than three months, and rejects any notion of indefinite detention, which would be foreign to a democratic constitutional framework.

The Court observed that the Constitution itself has set the maximum limit for the initial detention and that any detention for a period longer than three months may be imposed only on the basis of a report of the Advisory Board. The expression “longer period than three months” was held not to imply an indefinite duration, as could have been the case under the unique Regulation III of 1818, but rather to denote a specified period, albeit one exceeding three months. According to the Court, the Constitution envisions an initial detention of three months which may later be extended for a further period of time; however, it excludes the notion of detention without a fixed duration, that is, a detention that has a beginning but no end. The Court stressed that any concept of an indefinite period of detention is wholly foreign to a democratic constitution such as ours. Referring to the judgment in Gopalan’s ease(1) (1) [1950] S.C.R, 88, the Court described preventive detention during peace time as an evil of necessity because it deprives a person of personal liberty without a trial and even without a personal hearing, and therefore the safeguards against unregulated executive action must be interpreted as broadly as possible for the benefit of the detained person. The words “such period” were said to imply that there must be both a beginning and an end to the detention, meaning that the detention must be for a certain duration, the length of which depends on the pleasure of the Government. Although the Government is entitled to fix the period of detention at its choice, it is bound to make a decision about that period. The Court further remarked that, had the true intention of the language been that the Government need not specify the duration of detention, the section would have been drafted differently and there would have been no need to use the phrase “for such period as it thinks fit”. The Court suggested that the intention would have been more clearly expressed if the section had read: “The appropriate Government may confirm the detention order”. It was noted that rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules was drafted on similar lines, and that the scheme of Regulation III of 1818 employed comparable language, directing the jailer to receive a person into custody and to act in conformity with the orders of the Governor-General. The Court observed that the same phraseology could have been employed in section 11. Finally, citing the decision in Chakkar Singh v. The State of Punjab (Petition No. 584 of 1951), the Court held that the power of the detaining authority under section 11 is not exhausted once it specifies the period of detention; the authority may, before the expiry of the initially fixed period, direct that the detention continue for a further period, and the Court took this view for

The Court explained that the rule was consistent with the General Clauses Act, which provides that an authority which has power to make an order or give a direction also retains the power, before it becomes functus officio, to revise, reconsider, amend or alter that order. This principle did not, the Court held, imply that the Government was relieved of the duty to specify the detention period under section 11. Rather, it was assumed that a period must be fixed initially, but the Government could alter that period if it deemed it necessary. The Court further noted that the argument that section 11 authorised detention for an indefinite period had been rejected by the late Chief Justice and also by the Court in Gopalan’s case. In that case, the learned Chief Justice observed that the contention that section 11 of the impugned Act was invalid because it permitted detention for “such period as the Central Government or the State Government thought fit”—which might suggest an indefinite period—had no substance. The Chief Justice explained that the Act must be read as a whole, and since the entire life of the Act was limited to one year, the notion of an indefinite detention was untenable. The Court’s own judgment in the same case added that the objection that section 11 allowed preventive detention for an indefinite period should be viewed in the context of sub-clause (3) of section 1, which provided that the Act would cease to have effect on 1 April 1951.

In the subsequent decision of S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras, the validity of section 11 was again examined. The majority of the Court upheld the section, while Justice Bose dissented, holding that the provision was invalid because it permitted an indefinite period of detention. Justice Patanjali Sastri, with whom the Chief Justice agreed on the validity of the section, observed that the objection could be disposed of succinctly. He explained that the discretionary power given to the appropriate Government under the sub-section to continue detention “for such period as it thinks fit” did not authorize an indefinite period contrary to article 22(4), because the new Act was to remain in force only until 1 April 1952, and no detention could continue beyond that overall limit. Thus, the discretion to extend detention was necessarily confined by the fixed expiry date of the Act.

In his observations, the Court explained that Parliament might have considered it unnecessary to prescribe a maximum term of detention in the new legislation because the statute was intended to be temporary, its existence being limited to a single year. He noted that temporary statutes ceased to have any effect once their prescribed period ended, and consequently no further action could be taken under them after expiration. Therefore, the detention of the petitioners would automatically terminate with the expiry of the statute itself. In that context, Parliament could reasonably have decided that it was wholly unnecessary to enact a provision setting a maximum period of detention for individuals held under that law. The earlier case had turned on the question of whether, while enacting the Preventive Detention Act, it was required to fix a maximum period of detention as contemplated by article 72(7) of the Constitution, and whether the absence of such a fixation rendered the statute void. That contention had been rejected. The present matter, however, raised the issue of whether the Government, when issuing an order under section 11 of the Act, was obliged to specify the length of the continued detention. The Court observed that the meaning of the phrase “such period as it thinks fit” had not been argued or decided in either of the previously cited cases. From the earlier decisions, the Court concluded that section 11 did not provide for an indefinite period of detention and therefore was not invalid on that ground, even though Justice Bose had taken a contrary view. The Court proposed that, in light of the earlier rulings, section 11 should be read as follows: “In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that, in its opinion, there is sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit, but not beyond the period of the life of the Act itself.” Accordingly, within the overall lifetime of the Act, the Government was empowered to fix any period for the detention. The expression “such period as it thinks fit” obligates the Government to determine a specific duration for each detainee, consistent with the overall limit imposed by the Act’s existence. After receiving the Advisory Board’s report, the Government must decide in each individual case whether a detainee should remain in custody for the entire remaining life of the Act or for a shorter interval. The Court emphasized that it could not be presumed that every case required detention for the maximum period, and it further held that any such governmental decision remained subject to review and could be altered before the initially fixed period expired.

The Court examined the proposition that, under section 11, the Government was not obliged to issue a formal order and could instead convey its intention by some alternative method. It found this proposition to be without merit. The argument was founded on a perceived difference in the wording of sections 3 and 11 of the Act, because section 3 expressly speaks of “making an order of detention” whereas section 11 does not contain those exact words. The Court held, however, that the disparity in language between the two sections does not lend any support to the contention. The necessity of making an order is implicit in the ordinary meaning of the words of section 11 itself. When the Government confirms a detention order that has already been passed, such confirmation can be effected only by making another order. Likewise, the provision that allows revocation of an order requires the Government to pass an order of revocation; revocation cannot be accomplished by any procedure other than the issuance of an order. Section 13 further provides for both revocation and modification of a detention order, and it is clear that any modification must be carried out by passing a fresh order, not by any other means. The absence of the phrase “make an order” in section 11 therefore carries no special significance. In the present context the term “order” is understood to mean a decision, an authoritative direction or mandate. Consequently the Government cannot be said to confirm or continue a detention without first taking a decision or issuing a direction, and such a decision or direction is equivalent to an order. The Court therefore concluded that the statutory scheme intends that, upon receipt of the Advisory Board’s report, the Government must arrive at a decision and then issue an order in accordance with that decision, thereby extending the detention for a period that the order specifies. The Attorney-General supporting the opposite view relied on two decisions of Indian High Courts. In Prahlad Krishna v. The State of Bombay the Court held that it was unnecessary for the State Government to state the length of further detention after it had confirmed the original detention order. The reasoning quoted was that “the words of the section are exactly similar in effect to the words of a contract between two parties in which one said to the other that the latter should keep a cycle lent by the former for such period as he thought fit. There would be no necessity in such a case for the person to whom the cycle was lent to say how long he would keep the cycle…If the legislature had intended that the appropriate Government should make an order after receiving a report of the Advisory Committee…”.

The Court explained that if the legislature had intended to require the Government to specify how long a detainee should be held, the wording of the provision would have been different; it would have directed the Government to “pass an order for the detention of the person concerned for such further period as it deemed fit” rather than the present wording which merely says “such period.” The Court found the analogy of a cycle-loan contract to be inappropriate for construing section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act and asserted that it could not see how the draft suggested by the High Court would better express the legislative intention than the words currently employed. The addition of the term “further” does not compel the Government to state a specific period if the original phrase “such period” does not require it. The Court recalled the decision in Ram Adhar Misra v. State, where it was held that a detention order that fails to specify a period cannot be regarded as illegal. It noted that reliance had been placed on observations of the late Chief Justice and on those made in Gopalan’s case, but those observations did not support the High Court’s conclusion, and no other independent reasoning was offered. The Court then turned to a comparable provision in Part IV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sections 106 to 110, which speak of a person being required to execute a bond for good behaviour for “such period not exceeding one year or three years as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.” It observed that a magistrate cannot demand a bond without fixing a definite period, and that in the absence of such a fixing the bond would be presumed to run for the maximum period mentioned. By analogy, the Court held that failure to fix the period for a bond renders the order ineffective, and any default by the person bound by the bond would not attract punishment. Consequently, the discretion granted to the Government by the phrase “as it thinks fit” is limited by the duty imposed by the statute. Finally, the Court addressed whether the absence of a fixed period makes the detention illegal. After careful consideration, it concluded that when the Government does not determine the length of continued detention, the effect is prejudicial to the detainees and the detention becomes illegal. The Court noted that it was quite possible that, had the Government acted on the Advisory Board’s report, it might have fixed a duration that would have expired by now.

In this case the Court observed that the Advisory Board had considered the question of detention and might have determined a fixed period for it. The Board could have set a period that had already ended, or it could have set a period that was still running. Because the exact duration was uncertain, the Court held that it was not correct to say that the petitioners were lawfully detained at the present time. The Court explained that the responsibility to prove that the detention was lawful rested on the authority that had ordered the detention, and that this burden had not been satisfied. The Court further noted that the later actions of the Government in opposing the petitions were irrelevant to this inquiry, since no order required by the statute had been issued. The Court added that, if the Government believed that detention of the petitioners should continue until 31 March 1952, it could achieve that purpose by issuing a new order of detention. Accordingly, dissenting from the majority opinion, the Court concluded that the petitioners were not being detained in accordance with the procedure established by law and that they were therefore entitled to be released. The Court directed that the petitioners be released immediately. The Court also stated that it was not required to address the second issue raised in the petitions. The petitions were therefore dismissed. The agent for the respondents was identified as P.A. Mehta.