Abdul Gani and Ors. vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 3 March, 1952

Coram: Chief Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Mahajan, J.

The Court recorded that the matter concerned the appeals of Abdul Gani and others against the State of Madhya Pradesh, filed on 3 March 1952 before the Supreme Court of India. The bench was headed by Chief Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar and the opinion was authored by Justice Mahajan. The appellants had invoked Article 134 of the Constitution, challenging a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur dated 5 February 1951, which had set aside their earlier acquittal on charges of rioting and murder and had instead convicted them of the same offences.

The factual background, as narrated by the Court, explained that Wazir Ali had held the post of Jambardar Malguzar of mauza Dhadi, a village in the tehsil of Arvi, district Wardha, Madhya Pradesh. Upon his death, his widow Wazdi Begum succeeded him in that office. After her death in 1947, the malguzari right of the village passed to her nine sons, namely Hasan Ali (P. W. 22), Rashid Ahmad (P. W. 23), Asadali, Bashir Ahmad, Nazir Ahmad, Ashraf Ali, Hafiz Ali, Aman Ali and Shiraz Ahmad. The Court noted that the last three of these brothers – Hafiz Ali, Aman Ali and Shiraz Ahmad – were murdered on 25 July 1949, two of them at the house where Hafiz Ali was residing and Aman Ali at his own residence.

The prosecution’s version, according to the judgment, stated that the villagers of Dhadi bore a deep resentment toward the malguzars because certain grazing dues and rents remained unpaid by the latter. The malguzars had also failed to meet a government demand for land revenue, prompting the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Arvi to issue an order on 16 July 1949 directing the sale of the malguzari rights of mauza Dhadi on account of this default. The record further indicated that on 34 July 1949 the station-house officer at Ashti, named Dongar Singh, visited the village to investigate a complaint lodged by Hafiz Ali, alleging that several villagers had forcibly removed timber from a forest belonging to the malguzars and had turned the wood into charcoal. During that investigation, Dongar Singh apprehended a number of persons, including some of the accused, but released them on bail on the morning of 25 July, with accused Bhimrao Kadu standing as surety for a few of the released individuals.

The Court observed that the magistrate’s order to sell the village could be executed only after the rainy season. In an attempt to forestall the sale and to satisfy the government’s revenue demand, Hafiz Ali, Aman Ali and Bashir Ahmad convened a meeting and resolved to recover the arrears of rent and grazing dues owed by the villagers. Accordingly, on the morning of 25 July they made a public proclamation demanding payment, signalling the demand by beating a drum throughout the village. This public proclamation provoked the anger of the villagers, who also met among themselves and resolved to resist the demand. The judgment further reported that a gathering of villagers took place on that morning at the house of Govinda Gaikwad (identified as accused 22), where it was decided that the demand should be opposed and, if necessary, the malguzars should be dealt with severely. The narrative concluded by noting that Hafiz Ali and Aman Ali, having become aware of this villagers’ meeting, subsequently held their own consultations and proceeded to the house of Bashir Ahmad to devise a response to the situation that had arisen.

Being informed of the villagers’ meeting, the accused held private consultations among themselves and assembled at the residence of Bashir Ahmad to devise a response to the situation that had arisen. They prepared a written report intended for the police. Aman Ali, together with Jilani, who was a servant of Hafiz Ali, were assigned to personally deliver the report to Ashti. After leaving Jilani and Shiraz Ahmad at Bashir Ahmad’s house, Aman Ali returned to his own home to dress and then proceeded to the police station. Meanwhile, Hafiz Ali also departed from Bashir Ahmad’s house; on his way he encountered a group of the accused gathered at the house of Abdul Gani (accused six). Members of the mob attacked Hafiz Ali with sticks, striking him once. He fled into his house and shut the door, but the mob surrounded the dwelling, removed the small door, and forced their way in. While Hafiz Ali stood near the doorway, Bhimrao Kadu (accused five) struck him with a spear, after which all the accused entered the house and beat Hafiz Ali with swords, spears, sticks and stones, inflicting grievous injuries. They then abandoned him in that condition and proceeded to Aman Ali’s house, where they broke in and assaulted him with swords, spears and lathis, causing his death. Hearing the commotion, Shiraz Ahmad and Jilani arrived at Hafiz Ali’s house; while they were present, the crowd returned to the house after completing the assault on Aman Ali. Hafiz Ali was again attacked and killed. A search was made for Shiraz Ahmad, who had hidden on the loft; he was pulled down and murdered. The bodies of Hafiz Ali and Shiraz Ahmad were dragged out of the house, the former being left outside the door and the latter near a well. The accused then turned their attention to Jilani, seized him, and took him outside the house, where they tied him to a wooden post. Sheshrao Patode (accused nineteen) is reported to have taken a sword from the hand of Abdul Gani (accused six) and cut his nose and upper lip. The accused also broke open a box belonging to Hafiz Ali, taking cash amounting to six hundred rupees in ten-rupee notes and other documents. All of these events occurred between half past twelve in the afternoon and two o’clock in the afternoon on 25 July.

At seven forty-five in the evening on the same day, the first information report concerning the murder of Aman Ali and the wounding of Hafiz Ali was recorded at the Ashti police station. The report was dictated by Ikrar Ullah, who was the son-in-law of Hafiz Ali and who had managed to escape from Hafiz Ali’s house after the initial attack. Ashti lies six miles from Dhadi. Ikrar Ullah also informed Rashid Ahmad, another brother of Hafiz Ali who resides in Ashti, about the incident. In pursuance of this report, Sub-Inspector Dongar Singh and Circle Inspector Kanetkar, who had arrived from Arvi, proceeded to Ashti and began their investigation, reaching the village at approximately two o’clock in the morning.

In this case, Sub-inspector Dongar Singh and Circle Inspector Kanetkar, who had been transferred from Arvi, travelled to Ashti after receiving the report and began their investigation at approximately two o’clock in the morning. As a result of their inquiries, the police lodged four separate charge-sheets against the accused before Shri R.K. Pandey, Magistrate First Class of Wardha. In total, thirty-two persons were charged with rioting while armed with deadly weapons and with the murders of Hafiz Ali, Shiraz Ahmad and Aman Ali; several of the accused were also charged with the offences of dacoity and causing grievous hurt. All of these offences were triable by a jury. The Magistrate, by an order dated 19-10-1949, committed all of the accused to trial before the Court of Session, holding that the offences alleged in the four charge-sheets had arisen out of the same series of events and therefore could be tried together. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of not guilty against accused Sheshrao Patode on the charge under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, and also acquitted accused Shankar Mahar, Govinda Gaikwad, Gondu Mussalman, Sampat Gawari and Gulab Lande on the charges under Sections 326 and 109. A unanimous verdict of not guilty was likewise delivered by the jury for accused Walayut, Pundalik Chore, Shamrao Wankhede, Maroti Gawande, Ramarao Wankhede, Dinya, Gond, Puniya Gond, Bhurya Gond, Sheshrao Patode, Bhimrao Gawande and Govinda Gaikwad on the charges under Section 395, which related to the cutting of Jilani’s nose and the breaking open of Hafiz Ali’s box to remove cash notes worth Rs 600 and other papers. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the jury’s findings and acquitted all of the accused on these charges. Regarding the charges of rioting and murder, the Sessions Judge accepted the majority view of the assessors, found all of the accused not guilty and accordingly acquitted them. In the concluding part of his judgment, the Judge observed that out of eleven eyewitnesses, five had withdrawn the statements they had given in the committing Court. Those five were Jilani, Mahadeo, Sitaram, Radhi and Hayatbi. He particularly noted that Jilani and Hayatbi had no motive to recant because they were personally affected by the offences—Jilani had suffered a cut to his nose and Hayatbi had lost her husband at the hands of the accused. The Judge stated that while their later statements might have been influenced by relatives of the deceased or by pressure from the police, even if that were not the case, it would not be safe to rely on their testimony, although the law permits reliance on such witnesses if they are otherwise trustworthy.

In this case, the Court observed that the testimony of Shakir and Ikrar could not be relied upon because both witnesses were deemed untrustworthy and had been proven to be perjurers. The Court noted that Ikrar had even warned the committing Court in an attempt to justify his false statement, while Shakir had made highly inconsistent statements. Evidence presented by the Circle Inspector demonstrated that Ikrar had taken an active interest throughout the investigation, further undermining his credibility. Consequently, the Court held that reliance on the testimony of these two witnesses was impossible. The Court further examined the credibility of Gulzarali, identified as PW 9, who was described as a petty servant of the malguzars of Dhadi, three of whom had been murdered; because of his position, his testimony could not be considered disinterested. The Court also found that Hasan Ali, the brother of the deceased, offered a story that was markedly unnatural, and the Court expressed no belief that he had actually witnessed the assault on Hafiz Ali as he claimed. Regarding Ibrahim, the Court observed that the police had failed to examine him for twenty-one days after the incident, and his testimony had also been proved to be perjurious. The statement of Biyabi was deemed unconvincing, and her testimony before this Court was seriously impaired by a written and signed report taken from her during the investigation. The Court commented that the investigation had not been impartial; the police appeared to have acted at Ikrar’s direction from the outset, failing to record material statements and to execute seizures properly. Many of the alleged seizures were unauthorised and illegal. In view of these circumstances, the Court concluded that the prosecution case presented in this Court could not be relied upon. While the Court acknowledged that it was possible some of the accused might have participated in the offences, it was impossible to identify, with any certainty, which individuals were guilty based on the prosecution’s evidence. The Court regretted that some guilty persons might escape punishment for the brutal daylight murders, but it held that convicting any of the accused on the existing prosecution evidence would be a pure gamble. The State Government had appealed the acquittal of the accused to the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur. The High Court had found that reliable evidence was provided by five witnesses—Biyabi (PW 1), Jilani (PW 3), and Ikrar Ullah (PW 25) concerning the murders of Hafiz Ali and Shiraz Ahmad, and Mt. Hayatbi (PW 6) and Radhi (PW 4) concerning the murder of Aman Ali. The High Court had relied on the statements of Hayatbi and Radhi made in the committal Court, and on Jilani’s statement made in that Court, preferring them over their later statements in the Court of Session, which were considered suborned and influenced by the accused. The High Court had agreed with the Sessions Judge that the evidence of the other witnesses was not reliable.

In its assessment, the Court found that the testimony of the remaining witnesses could not be trusted. Regarding the charge of dacoity, the Court held that there was no misdirection of the jury and that the jurors were free to accept or reject the evidence of Biyabi; consequently the jury’s decision to disbelieve Biyabi could not be characterised as perverse. For that reason the verdict of not guilty on the dacoity charge against the accused was upheld. With respect to the allegation that the nose of Jilani had been cut, the Court likewise upheld the jury’s verdict, stating that it could not be said that the jurors acted perversely by not relying on Jilani’s identification of the persons concerned. Turning to the offences of rioting with deadly weapons and murder, the Court set aside the acquittals in the two appeals and pronounced convictions as follows: Walayat was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code for two counts and under Section 148; Pundalik Gulab Chore was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for two counts and under Section 148; Bhimrao Kadu was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for two counts and under Section 148; Abdul Gani was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for three counts and under Section 148; Pundalik Bajirao was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for two counts and under Section 147; Ramrao Wankhede was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for three counts and under Section 148; Dinya Gond was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for two counts and under Section 148; Shankar Mahar was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for three counts and under Section 148; Sheshrao Patode was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for three counts and under Section 148; Bhimrao Gawande was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for three counts and under Section 148; Govinda Gaikwad was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for three counts and under Section 148; Gendu was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for three counts and under Section 147; Gulab Chore was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for two counts and under Section 148; Bahman was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for two counts and under Section 147; Sampat Manya Gawari was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for two counts and under Section 147; Baburao Chore was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for two counts and under Section 147; and Gulab Lande was convicted under Sections 302 and 149 for two counts and under Section 147.

The Court ordered that those convicted under Section 148 would serve rigorous imprisonment for two years and those convicted under Section 147 would serve rigorous imprisonment for one year. For the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 149, the Court sentenced Bhimrao Kadu, Abdul Gani and Sheshrao Patode to death, while the remaining convicted persons received transportation for life for each count of conviction. The imprisonment terms imposed under Sections 147 and 148 were directed to run concurrently with the life sentences. The acquittals of the other individuals challenged by the police were left undisturbed and those persons were ordered to be released. Counsel for the appellants argued strongly that there were no substantial or compelling reasons to overturn the trial court’s acquittals and convert them into convictions on appeal. They contended that the presumption of innocence had been reinforced by the trial court’s findings, which had the advantage of directly observing the witnesses and hearing their evidence, and that the High Court erred in interfering with that decision on a mere balance of probabilities and conjecture.

It was alleged that the entire prosecution narrative was fabricated. The allegation stated that Ikrar, when he made the first information report at 7:45 p.m. on the 25th, did so after consulting some of the brothers of the deceased and attempted to implicate every person with whom they bore enmity. It was further alleged that the police recorded only a very brief report and did not fully examine Ikrar about the incidents he claimed to have witnessed. When the police party set out from Ashti for Dhadi shortly thereafter, they reportedly encountered two kotwars (village watchmen) who were on their way to the police station to file a report. The sub-inspector and the circle inspector were said to have failed in their duty to record the statements of these independent persons, statements that could have provided the police with an accurate account of the three murders. The police allegedly also met two of the accused, Walyat and Chotu, both bearing injuries and also proceeding to the police station to report, but the police again failed to record their statements. Upon reaching Dhadi, where they remained for five to six hours, the police were said not to have taken any steps to record the statements of any eye-witnesses. In view of these alleged omissions by the police, it was suggested that a case had been concocted against the accused, who were hostile to Ikrar and his associates, in consultation with him and the brothers of the deceased. It was further alleged that after deliberations, at 8 a.m., following the preparation of the inquest reports and the dispatch of the dead bodies for post-mortem examination and of the injured to the hospital, Ikrar drafted a report (Ex P-1), obtained the signature of Mt Biyabi, and handed it to the police, naming all the accused persons he wished to avenge against, and that subsequent evidence was prepared to fit that version. Additional submissions argued that, from the statements of Biyabi, Ikrar and Jilani, it was clear that Biyabi was not present in the house at the time of her husband’s murder but was either at Ashti or at Asadali’s house and was brought by the police to Hafiz Ali’s house on the morning of the 26th, rendering her not an eye-witness. Even if she had been present, material discrepancies in her various statements made her an unreliable witness, and it was deemed unsafe to convict the appellants on her evidence. Regarding Ikrar, it was contended that he was a liar, that no reliance could be placed on his statement, and that, in fact, he was not in the house at all and never witnessed the occurrence; had he left the house of Hafiz Ali as he claimed, he should have reached the police station by four o’clock at the latest, and that

The Court recorded that the reason for the delay in filing the police report was that the informant had been consulting two brothers of Hafiz Ali, namely Bashir and Rashid, with the intention of preparing a report that would implicate persons who were hostile to the malguzars. It was suggested that, on this basis, the murders were most probably committed by some of the servants of the malguzars who were not on good terms with their employers. The testimony of Ikrar was attacked on several grounds. First, the statement he gave before the committing magistrate differed in material respects from the statement he later gave before the Sessions Court. Second, the Court observed that Ikrar appeared to modify his narrative in order to accommodate the prosecution’s case and that he attributed all of his omissions to the police or to the magistrate. Regarding Jilani, whose nose had been cut, the Court found him wholly unreliable. Jilani had initially identified Sheshrao Patode as the individual who had cut his nose, but in the Sessions Court he altered his account, acknowledging that a person named Sheshrao had cut his nose while denying that Sheshrao Patode was that person. The Court noted that a witness who can change such a crucial portion of his testimony and who seems ready to lie on a matter of grave importance cannot be trusted on any point. The reliability of Hayatbi and Radhi was also questioned. Both witnesses had fully withdrawn the statements they had given before the committing magistrate, and the Court found no satisfactory reason to prefer their earlier statements over the later ones recorded in the Sessions Court. Finally, the defence counsel argued that an inference should be drawn against the prosecution because two very important witnesses – Bashir, the brother of the deceased persons, and Subhan, a nine-year-old son of Hafiz Ali – had not been examined. The defence further asserted that it had been prejudiced by the prosecution’s failure to produce copies of the police “roznamcha” entries, the police having claimed that those entries were lost.

After a careful consideration of all the contentions raised by counsel, the Court expressed its opinion that, although the prosecution witnesses admitted by the High Court had not disclosed the whole truth and their evidence did not enable an absolutely certain reconstruction of the events of the afternoon of 25-July-1949, it could not accept the proposition that the prosecution’s case was a complete fabrication. The Court held that the murders of the three individuals and the cutting of the fourth person’s nose could not be said to have occurred without the disturbance of the riot that took place that afternoon, in which at least some of the accused were participants. The Court acknowledged that, given the present state of the record, the narrative presented by the eye-witnesses required careful scrutiny, but it refrained from concluding that the entire prosecution case was untenable.

In evaluating the evidence, the Court emphasized that every allegation must be carefully examined and, unless it can be established with reasonable certainty that a particular individual participated in the riot, the benefit of doubt must be accorded to that person. The Court found that the learned Sessions Judge erred in concluding that the prosecution evidence was incapable of revealing, with any degree of certainty, which of the accused had taken part in the offence and that any conviction would therefore be a mere gamble. Rather than attempting to separate truth from falsehood and to distinguish reliable material from unreliable material, the Sessions Judge adopted an easy course, declared the evidence contradictory, and consequently held that the entire case was untrue. The Court, however, held that for some of the accused the material on record was sufficiently convincing to sustain a conviction, and there were no adequate reasons to justify their acquittal. Conversely, for other accused the Court observed that the High Court had apparently transformed acquittals into convictions in error. Before addressing each appellant’s individual case, the Court considered it necessary to examine the merits of several points raised on their behalf and referred to earlier in the judgment.

The Court rejected the argument that Mount Biyabi was absent from Hafiz Ali’s house at the time of the incident. It noted that, in the normal course of events, a wife is presumed to reside with her husband unless evidence shows she had departed. All prosecution witnesses unanimously testified that she was present. No evidence was produced to demonstrate that she lived at Ashti or at Asadali’s house. Although vague suggestions were made during cross-examination that she might have accompanied the police party or been at Asadali’s house, she firmly denied those suggestions. The counsel for the appellants relied on the deposition of PW-14, Biyabi, who stated that “Tukya Gawari had also hit my husband over the mouth with an axe at the time when he was being assaulted by the accused as a result of which his teeth had fallen down and uprooted.” The doctor, PW-23, responded that he did not find any injury indicating that the teeth had freshly fallen. The Court observed that the counsel’s argument stemmed from an incorrect translation of the witness’s statement; none of the parties alleged that Hafiz Ali’s teeth had actually fallen out and been uprooted. The inquest report merely noted that the teeth became visible because the lip had been cut. Accordingly, the statement does not demonstrate that Biyabi was not an eyewitness to the occurrence, even though her description of the injury may not be entirely precise.

The Court observed that the witness Biyabi gave a description of the incident that was not necessarily precise with respect to the injury. In paragraph 19 of her statement she said that the sari identified as Article A-12 was her own garment and that she had wrapped this sari around her husband. She further stated that one burkha and two dupattas belonging to her were also stained with blood, and that some of her child’s garments had likewise been stained, although those child’s garments were not produced before the Court. In paragraph 56 she added that the two dupattas marked as Articles C-38 and C-39 had been hanging on a rope inside the house and that they had become stained with the blood of the deceased, Shiraz Ahmad, during the assault. She also mentioned that the burkha was hanging on the same line, and that the clothes she was in the process of putting on had become smeared with blood. According to her, she had shown these blood-stained garments to the police, but the police had not seized them. She also asserted that she had pointed out the blood marks on her own clothing to the investigating officers.

The Sub-Inspector Dondgar Singh, in paragraph 74 of his deposition, testified that he did not confiscate any of the clothing that Biyabi claimed to have been wearing at the time of the incident. He explained that had the garments been stained with blood, he would have taken them into custody, and he would also have seized the clothing of her son, Subhan, if those too had been stained. Counsel argued that if Biyabi had indeed been present at the scene, it would have been unlikely for her clothing and her son’s clothing to be free of blood, and therefore her claim that both sets of clothes were blood-stained was considered false in light of the Sub-Inspector’s testimony. The Court rejected this inference as unsupported. It found no reason to disbelieve the Sub-Inspector’s statement that neither the woman’s nor the child’s garments were blood-stained. The Court noted that Biyabi may have been standing at some distance from the location where her husband received spear blows and where Shiraz Ahmad was killed; consequently, the absence of blood on her clothing or on her son’s clothing was not surprising. The Court suggested that, perhaps in order to counter the defence’s contention that she was not present, Biyabi may have exaggerated her description by asserting that her own and her son’s garments were stained. The Court also examined the testimony recorded in paragraph 69, where Biyabi described the spear blow delivered by Bhimrao Kadu as striking Hafiz Ali on the stomach, while she could not specify the exact part of the stomach. She further clarified that she had distinguished the blow from a chest wound and that she had not previously told the police that the blow had landed on the chest. The Court held that this portion of her testimony did not, by itself, establish that she was absent from the scene.

In the testimony of the witness, she first declared that the spear blow delivered by Bhimrao Kadu had struck Hafiz Ali on the chest. Later, however, during her deposition she stated, “The spear blow given by Bhimrao Kadu fell on the chest. I had not stated that Bhimrao Kadu speared Hafiz Ali on the chest. I had not stated that the spear blow given by Bhimrao Kadu hit my husband on the chest.” This later statement conflicted with the earlier declaration made before the committing magistrate and in the police statement, where she asserted that the blow had hit the chest. Counsel for the prosecution heavily emphasized this inconsistency and argued that if Biyabi had indeed been present at the incident, she could not truthfully assert that the blow landed on the chest when, according to the medical evidence, it had not. The counsel further contended that Biyabi altered her statement before the Sessions Judge in order to bring it into conformity with the doctor’s post-mortem report. The Court found that this criticism carried little weight because the inquest report itself recorded a wound on the chest rather than on the stomach. The blow in question was located on the upper portion of the abdomen, a region close to the chest, and both the lady and the police, upon examining the body at the inquest, regarded the injury as being on a part of the chest. In contrast, the post-mortem doctor described the injury precisely as an abdominal wound. From this type of discrepancy it was therefore difficult to infer that the error in the witness’s statement arose from her absence at the scene. The Court then turned to the prosecution’s decision not to call two potential witnesses, Subhan and Bashir. The Court held that this omission was not of serious consequence. It invoked the observations of Lord Porter in Malak Khan v Emperor, who remarked that, although it is generally important to call all Crown witnesses, there is no absolute duty for the prosecution to present every person who can speak to matters the Crown wishes to prove. The decision to call witnesses rests with the prosecution’s discretion, and while a Court will note the absence of expected testimony, it must assess the entire evidence in the light of the persuasiveness of the material that was produced. Applying this principle, the Court noted that Subhan, a nine-year-old boy, could scarcely have offered valuable testimony, and Bashir was not an eye-witness to the episode but only a witness to certain events that occurred before the riot. Consequently, the lack of their production did not materially prejudice the defence or illuminate the facts of the murders.

The Court held that the two persons suggested as witnesses could not have materially assisted the defence nor shed significant light on the actual incidents and the murders. It was submitted that the first information report was a sketchy document deliberately left incomplete to create room for fabrication and that it should not be relied upon. The Court examined this claim and found that the High Court had not used the first information report as substantive evidence; rather, it had been employed merely to corroborate the statements of the eyewitnesses. Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that the report’s lack of completeness rendered it unusable, stating that there was no justification for ignoring it altogether. The Court also dismissed the allegation that Biyabi had been tutored between two a.m. and eight a.m. on the morning of the twenty-sixth and that Ikrar had prepared a report for her which she had blindly signed. After a careful reading of Biyabi’s statement, the Court expressed no hesitation in concluding that, despite various contradictions and discrepancies, her narration of the essential events of the twenty-fifth was substantially true. The Court further observed that a conviction could safely be based on her testimony, particularly regarding the accused to whom she attributed a significant role, because she had neither contradicted nor altered her statement in any material way, and independent corroboration existed for her account. The Court noted that the loss of the police diary, referred to as the ‘roznamcha’, had not materially affected the outcome, since the diary had been supplied to the defence and was used by them to challenge the prosecution’s evidence.

Regarding the evidence of Ikrar, the Court agreed that much of the criticism raised by counsel was justified and that reliance on his testimony should be limited to those portions that could be stated with certainty as true. Concerning Jilani, the Court concluded that the High Court was not justified in placing any reliance on his statement, which contained falsehoods in several vital particulars, and therefore Jilani’s evidence was to be ignored altogether. With respect to Hayatbi and Radhi, the Court observed that they had completely altered their statements in the Sessions Court; consequently, it would be imprudent to convert their earlier acquittals into convictions solely on the basis of the statements they made before the committing Magistrate without additional supporting evidence. After addressing these matters, the Court proceeded to examine the case against each individual appellant. After a thorough assessment of the evidence presented against the appellants, the Court concluded that the appeal was allowed in respect of the following persons, who were thereby acquitted: Pundalik Bajirao Mahar (accused 11), Gendu (accused 23), Gulab Chore (accused 24), Sampat Manya Gawari (accused 29), Baburao Chore (accused 30) and Gulab Lande (accused 32). The Court’s decision on the remaining appellants was left for further determination.

The Court expressly indicated that the accused identified as Lande, who was designated as accused number thirty-two in the record, was to be granted an acquittal. In other words, the appellate authority set aside any finding of guilt against Lande and ordered that he be released from the liability arising from the proceedings. By contrast, with respect to every other accused person whose names appeared in the appeal, the Court held that the arguments and evidence presented did not satisfy the threshold required to overturn the earlier judgment. Consequently, the appellate relief sought on behalf of those remaining appellants was denied. The Court therefore concluded that the appeal, insofar as it pertained to all persons other than Lande, failed to establish any error or miscarriage of justice sufficient to merit reversal. As a result, the appeal was dismissed in respect of the rest of the accused, and the original determinations against them were left undisturbed. This final order thus effected an acquittal solely for Lande (accused thirty-two) while rejecting and dismissing the appeal for all other respondents.