The District Board, Tanjore... vs M.K. Noor Mohamed Rowther And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 10 December, 1951

Coram: Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Mahajan

The District Board of Tanjore filed an appeal that was recorded on 10 December 1951. The case involved the District Board of Tanjore as the appellant and M K Noor Mohamed Rowther together with others as the respondents. The judgment was delivered by Justice Mahajan, with Chandrasekhara Aiyar presiding on the bench.

The factual background began with a lease dated 1 August 1945, commonly referred to as a ‘muchilika’, under which the respondent obtained possession of the land that forms the subject of the suit for a term of three years, paying the fixed rent specified in that instrument. That lease terminated on 30 June 1948. Before the lease period expired, the respondent instituted Summary Suit No 87 of 1948 in the revenue court, seeking a patta (title deed) for the disputed land on the ground that he had acquired permanent rights of occupancy against the landholder. The respondent alleged that the leasehold land had not been surrendered to the landholder at the end of the lease term.

While the summary suit was still pending, the plaintiff-appellant filed a civil suit on 4 August 1948 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore. The suit, from which the present appeal arises, sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the appellant’s possession of the land. The appellant claimed that after the lease expired he had taken possession of the property, that part of the land had already been brought under cultivation, and that the respondent-defendant was threatening to forcibly take possession of the property despite having no legal right to do so.

In the written statement, the respondent contended that, notwithstanding the clause in the muchilika requiring the lessee to surrender possession by 30 June 1948, he was entitled to remain in possession and to manage the land with a permanent right of occupancy. He argued that his claim to a permanent right of occupancy was founded upon Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908. The respondent further asserted that the land in question was an “estate” within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Act, as amended by Act 18 of 1936, and therefore fell within the scope of Section 6.

The court framed several issues for determination. The first issue was phrased: “Whether the suit lands are ryoti lands in a whole inam village, and whether the first defendant has acquired occupancy rights thereon.” By agreement of the parties, it was decided that the question of whether the suit land qualified as an estate under the Madras Estates Land Act should be tried as a preliminary issue.

The Subordinate Judge concluded that the suit land did not constitute an estate as defined in Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The appellant challenged this finding by filing a petition for revision before the High Court. The High Court reversed the lower court’s view, holding that the suit land did indeed constitute an estate within the meaning of the Act. This reversal formed the basis for the High Court’s subsequent order directing the return of the plaint with instructions that it be presented to the court having proper jurisdiction to hear the matter.

The High Court ordered that the plaint be sent back with instructions that it be filed before the court that possessed the appropriate jurisdiction to hear the matter. Subsequently, an application was filed seeking to amend that order and requesting that the suit be sent back to the Subordinate Judge for the trial of the remaining part of issue 1 together with issues 2 through 5. By an order dated 28-7-1950, issued on the basis of that application, the High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit in its entirety. Nevertheless, the High Court, by a later order dated 13-9-1950, granted a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution permitting an appeal to the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of Section 3, sub-clause 2, which defines “estate”, reads as follows: “(2) ‘Estate’ means— … (d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognized by the British Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees. Explanation 1: Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes.” The question that the Court had to decide was whether the grant in the present case to the predecessor in interest of the appellant covered an entire inam village, and, if the grant did not encompass the whole village, whether the grant was expressed as being of a named village such that any portion excluded from it had previously been granted on service or other tenure or reserved for communal purposes as contemplated by Explanation 1. In other words, the grant must either consist of the whole area of a village or must be expressed in terms that amount to a grant of a named village as a whole, even though in fact it may not contain the entire village area. For a grant to fall within the definition in the latter situation, three conditions had to be satisfied: (a) the wording of the grant must expressly, and not merely by implication, indicate that it is a grant of a particular village by name rather than a grant of a defined specific parcel only; (b) the area that was excluded must already have been granted for service or another form of tenure; and (c) the excluded area must have been reserved for communal purposes. The learned counsel for the respondent, Mr Somayya, conceded that the burden of proving that certain lands constitute an “estate” rested on the party making that claim. In the Court’s opinion, based on the materials that existed in the record, that burden had not been discharged satisfactorily. The sole evidence offered in support of the respondent’s contention comprised two isolated entries—Exhibits B-1 and A-2—from the inam register that had been prepared in the year 1870.

In the year 1870 the register entries demonstrated that the grant made to the predecessor in interest of the Chatram, who is the appellant, did not encompass the entire area of the village lands. The respondent argued that the grant was expressly made in the name of the village Kunanjeri and that the portion of land omitted from the grant had previously been conveyed in an inam to another individual on service or another form of tenure; consequently, the respondent maintained that the grant satisfied the definition of “estate” as interpreted in Explanation 1. Exhibit B-1 was presented as an extract from the register of inams covering the whole village of Kunanjeri. In column 2 of this extract the heading reads “General class to which the inam belongs” and the entry recorded is “Personal. Now Dharmadayam”. Column 3, which is intended to list the survey numbers and the names of the fields included in the grant, contains the entry “‘Ayacut’. Deduct ‘poramboke’ minor inams”. No specific survey numbers are shown in this column, although the revenue records do describe the land by survey numbers. The fourth and fifth columns, which describe the extent of the grant, indicate that the grant consisted of the total village area minus approximately sixty-three acres, although this statement does not fully correspond with the comments found in column 21. Columns 6 and 7, which would normally record the cess paid by the ryot to the inamdar or the average assessment of comparable government land, are blank; a few figures appear in column 7 showing calculations of an amount that was fixed as quit-rent in place of an earlier kind of rent, but these figures do not relate to the purpose of the column. Column 8, dealing with the description of the inam, specifies that the grant was for the personal benefit of the holder, that the tenure was hereditary, and that the proposed quit-rent was Rs 1,733-10-10. Column 11, headed “By whom granted and in what year”, records the entry “By Pratapa Simha Raja 1790”. Column 12 states that the grant was made under a ‘Paravangi’ bearing the seal of Sri Pratapa Simha Raja dated 1790. Column 13 identifies the original grantee as Gudalur Venkatachala Mudali. Column 14 notes that when the register was prepared under Regulation 31 of 1802, the registered holder was Mukthambalpuram Annachatram. Columns 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20 were left empty because they were not relevant to the history of this particular grant. Column 18 contains the appellant’s name and indicates the relationship of the present holder to the original grantee or to any subsequent registered grantee. Finally, column 21, which is reserved for the Deputy Collector’s opinion and recommendation, includes the recital: “This is a whole ‘Nel Izara’ or grain rented village. It is, supported by a”.

In this case the record shows that a Paravangi was issued by Pratapa Simha Raja in the year that corresponds to 1790 according to the Tissian maya Alaf calendar, which is equivalent to the Sadarana era of AD 1790. A copy of this Paravangi is attached to the register. The Paravangi indicates that the village was rented to Gudalur Venkatachala Mudali on the condition that a grain rent of four thousand kalams of paddy, exclusive of any sundry charges, be paid. The area of the village as stated in the Paravangi is forty-zero twelve (40-12) units. Of this total, the portion allotted to Venkatachala Mudali is thirty-nine-zero seventeen (39-17) units. The particulars of the land are listed as follows: Poramboke five V, Paticat punja two V ten M, Wet thirty-two V seven M, and Yerayeli thirty-nine-zero seventeen, which is now registered as a minor inam measuring zero-15. The total of these measurements amounts to forty-six-zero twelve (46-12) units. The grain rent of four thousand kalams was fixed upon a measurement of thirty-three V two M, inclusive of the Yerayeli portion. Consequently, the ayacut amounts to forty-zero twelve, from which poramboke five-zero, punja two-ten, and the remainder wet thirty-three-two are deducted. The record further states that the village was purchased by Saraboji Maharaja for the Mukthambalpuram Annachatram from Sarangapani Ayyangar, who appears to have acquired it from Venkatachala Mudali, in the year 1811 for the sum of seven thousand eight hundred fifty rupees. A deed of sale on plain paper is produced as a copy, and the village has remained under the enjoyment of the chatram since that time. The register also contains details on the method of calculating the jodi, or quit rent, showing that the quit rent for the chatram’s holding was fixed at one thousand seven hundred thirty-three rupees ten annas ten paise, while the quit rent for the holding of Vijayathammal, the owner of the Yerayeli inam, was fixed at thirty-six rupees five annas two paise. A later entry dated 1947 records that this quit rent was redeemed upon payment of a specified sum of money. From the various entries it can be legitimately inferred that out of the total village area of forty-zero twelve units, the land allotted to Mudali comprised thirty-nine-zero seventeen units and the portion described as Yerayeli comprised zero-15 units. Two blocks of land, one major and one minor, were held by different persons under separate grants. It also appears that before these separate grants, the whole village had been rented by the Raja to Mudali for a grain rent of four thousand kalams. The boundaries of the village as given include both of these areas. The document does not contain any express statement that the village of Kunanjeri was granted to Mudali as an inam; rather, when the entire village was given on lease, it was described in clear terms as a rental. In the column that records the extent of the grant, the grant is not described as the village per se but the area granted is specified. Furthermore, it is not clear from the document whether the area described as Yerayeli was granted prior to the major grant of 1790, was contemporaneous with the same Paravangi, or was a subsequent grant. Exhibit A-2 is another entry from the same inam register relating to the area described as Yerayeli.

In the entry that dealt with the area called Yerayeli, the register recorded that the grant was a personal one in column two. Column three listed the survey number associated with the granted area. Columns four and five gave the size of the land expressed in acres. Column six was left empty, whereas column seven indicated the amount fixed as quit rent. Column eight recorded that the grant was intended for the personal benefit of the holder. Column nine showed the proposed jodi amount as rupees thirty-six rupees five annas two paise. Column ten stated that the grant was hereditary. Column eleven, headed “By whom granted and in what year,” contained no entry at all. Column twelve remarked that the grant was made under the paravangi of 1790. The name of the original grantee, which should have appeared in column thirteen, was also omitted. In column fourteen it was entered that one Chinna Appumuppan had been registered as the holder pursuant to Regulation 31 of 1802. Column sixteen named the present holder as Vijayathammal, who was then twenty years old. Columns seventeen and twenty were left vacant. Column eighteen, titled “Relation to original grantee or subsequent registered holders,” contained the description “Grandson’s widow to the party in the fourteenth column.” Column twenty-one directed reference to the register entry shown in Exhibit B-1.

The document, however, did not allow any conclusion as to whether the Yerayeli grant preceded, coincided with, or followed the grant to Mudali. Because both grants referred to the paravangi of 1790, it was possible that they originated from the same instrument, yet the order of their creation could not be established. Subsequently, on 16-December-1870, both grants received confirmation from the Inam Commissioner. Title deed number 2156 confirmed the principal grant to the Chatram, imposing a combined quit rent of rupees one thousand seven hundred ninety-eight. Title deed number 2157 confirmed the Yerayeli grant in favour of the heirs of Vijayathammal. Consequently, the village comprised two distinct parcels of land, each held under a separate grant by different individuals and each acknowledged by separate title deeds issued by the British administration.

From this limited material it was impossible to determine that the first grant covered the entire village or that it was expressly described as a particular village, nor could it be shown that the excluded area had already been granted for service or any other tenure. The trial judge and the judges of the High Court had concluded that the inam grant of Kunanjeri village reflected in title deed number 2156 pertained to a named village because column twenty-one listed the boundaries of the whole village and described it as a grain-rented village. In the present view, that inference was not supported by the wording in column twenty-one, which related to the lease that had been granted prior to the grant, and not to the grant itself.

In the record, the lease that had been given to Mudali before the grant was described as covering the whole area of the village, and its boundaries were specifically stated. When the grant itself was considered, entry 21 clearly indicated that the grant comprised thirty-nine acres and seventeen perches out of a total area of forty acres and twelve perches. From this statement, the more reasonable conclusion is that the grant was expressed in terms of measured area rather than by naming a village. Even when a grant concerns a particular portion of a village, the village’s name is required; however, such a requirement is not satisfied by the wording found in Explanation 1 to Section 3(2)(d) of the Act. That explanation expressly mandates that a grant must be of a village by name, and if the grant, expressed in those terms, is later found not to include the entire village because some portion has been excluded, the grant will still be deemed to be of an estate provided the excluded portion had already been granted for service or other tenure or set aside for communal purposes.

From the entries shown in Exhibits B-1 and A-2, no inference can be drawn that the situation falls within the main provision of Clause (d), because the grant did not encompass the whole village; a certain area was admittedly left out. It is difficult to assert with certainty, although it is possible, that the grant to Mudali and the Yerayeli grant originated from the same “paravangi”, but even if that were the case, they would constitute two distinct grants written on the same document, with the contracting parties being two different individuals. Neither of these grants can be regarded as a grant of an entire village. On the limited material before the Court, it is not possible to establish that service grants were involved. The phrase “other tenure” in the explanation should ordinarily be read ejusdem generis with service tenure, because service tenures are usually resumable; when such tenures are resumable, the reversionary right remains with the grantee, and therefore, even if resumable tenures are excluded from the grant, the grant may, in substance, be deemed to cover the whole village. The same reasoning applies to lands reserved for communal purposes.

In the earlier decision of Janakirama Sastri v. Jagani Gopalam, it was observed that the expression “any inam village” in Section 3(2)(d) means “a whole village granted in inam and not anything less than a village, however big a part it may be of that village.” In the Court’s opinion, that interpretation represents the true construction of Clause 3(2)(d), and the accompanying explanation carries a similar meaning. The explanation clarifies that, notwithstanding the exclusion of certain lands in which the grantee retains a reversionary interest, the transaction still constitutes a grant of a whole village provided the grant is expressed as such.

From the material placed on record and discussed earlier, the only conclusion that can be confidently drawn is that two separate blocks of land were granted, each to a different individual. Whether these grants were made at the same time or at different times cannot be determined with certainty. The evidence does not sufficiently disclose either the precise nature of the Yerayeli grant or the exact date on which it was made. Nonetheless, it appears evident that the Yerayeli grant was not a resumable tenancy; instead, it was hereditary and bore the same character as the grant that had been made to Mudali.

The learned judges were influenced by the observation that the village boundaries were recorded in the register and that, for the purpose of fixing the ‘jodi’, the income from the entire village had been taken into account. They also noted that the village had later been permitted to be redeemed upon payment of twenty years’ quit rent. The recitals in column twenty-one seem to draw an inference from these facts, but, in my opinion, that inference is not justified. While it is true that in the absence of direct and authentic proof concerning the nature of the original grant, a report contained in the inam register must be given weight, such reliance is subject to the condition that the entries in the register are accurately made, carefully written, and present a complete picture of the grant’s history, showing how it originated and the terms on which it was expressed. In this respect, Exhibit A-2 fails to provide either the name of the grantor or of the grantee. Likewise, the entries shown in Exhibit B-1 are incomplete and inaccurate; they do not state how the original grant was expressed or the specific terms on which it was made.

For the reasons set out above, I am of the view that it has not been satisfactorily established that the grant represented by title deed number 2156 covered an entire village, nor that it was expressed in terms of a named village with the area excluded falling within the category described in the explanation to Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. Consequently, the definition of “estate” contained in that provision does not apply to the facts of this case. Under Section 6(2) of the Act, the defendant therefore was not entitled to a permanent right of occupancy in the suit land.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the decision of the High Court is set aside, and the order of the trial Court is restored, with costs awarded throughout. While I concur with the conclusion that the appeal should be allowed and costs awarded, I will briefly set out my own reasons. The factual background has already been fully detailed in the judgment rendered by my learned brother, Mahajan J., and need not be repeated. The remaining question is whether the village of Kunanjeri in the Tanjore District of Madras State constitutes an “estate” within the meaning given to that term in the Madras Estates Land Act (No 1) of 1908.

In this case the Court examined whether the village of Kunanjeri in the Tanjore District qualified as an “estate” within the meaning of the expression contained in the Madras Estates Land Act, No 1 of 1908. To resolve that issue the Court first looked at the definition of “estate” that appears in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Act together with explanation 1 to clause (d) of the same section. The provision reads as follows: “Section 3(2) ‘Estate’ means— (d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees— Explanation (1). Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or have been reserved for communal purposes.” Explanation (1) had been inserted by the Madras Amendment Act 2 of 1945.

The Court then provided a brief historical background to explain why that explanation was introduced. Originally clause (d) could be interpreted to mean that if the grant did not comprise the whole inam village— for example because portions of the village had been carved out earlier or because the grantor had made reservations— then the portion granted would not be an “estate”. This construction had been adopted by two-bench decisions of the Madras High Court, namely Ademma v. Satyadhyana, AIR 1943 Mad 187 and Suri Reddi v. Agnihotrudu, AIR 1943 Mad 764. The Legislature considered that view unsatisfactory because, in practice, such villages were treated as estates and the cultivating tenants were regarded as having acquired permanent tenancy rights. Consequently, the explanation was added by Madras Act 2 of 1945 and was given retrospective effect from the date on which the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act 18 of 1936 came into force.

Turning to the facts of the present dispute, the Court noted that the original grant document was not produced and the title deeds issued at the time of the inam settlement were unavailable. Therefore the Court was compelled to rely solely on the entries recorded in the Inam Register prepared around the year 1870. The register consisted of two parts identified as Exhibit B-1 and Exhibit A-2, and the parties were required to build their respective cases upon the information contained in those exhibits. In Exhibit B-1 the Court observed that the area of the village, as recorded under the “paravangi”, was shown as 40 varahas 12 muddus. Of this total, 39 varahas 17 muddus were indicated as the land allotted to Venkatachala Mudali, who was listed in column 13 as the original grantee. Additionally, 0 varahas 15 muddus were described as belonging to Yerayeli, which was registered as a minor inam. The Court also noted that further details appeared in the register regarding the nature of the grant, but those details were to be considered in the subsequent discussion.

The notes entered by the Deputy Collector in column twenty-one recorded his opinion that the village had been held by Venkatachala Mudali on a grain-rent basis. The original grant to Venkatachala Mudali was a personal grant, which he later conveyed to Sarangapani Ayyangar, who subsequently sold it to the Maharaja of Tanjore for the Mukthambalpuram Annachatram. Consequently, at the time of the settlement the village was classified as a ‘dharmadhayam’ village, indicating its status as a religiously dedicated settlement under the prevailing land tenure system.

The minor Yerayeli inam appears to have been granted to Chinna Appu Moopan as a personal grant under the paravangi dated 1790, as shown in exhibit A-2. The respondents argue that this minor inam might have been created under a different paravangi of the same year. However, the register entry in column twenty-one of exhibit A-2 reads ‘vide remarks in the register of the whole village of Kunanjeri to be confirmed under Rule 5, Clause 3’. This reference, together with the citation to the 1790 paravangi in column twelve, suggests a single paravangi covering both grants. The entry in column twenty-one of exhibit B-1, which relates to the larger inam, states ‘copy of the paravangi is attached to this Register’, reinforcing the impression of a common paravangi. Because definitive documentary evidence is lacking, the Court must rely on inferences and probabilities rather than firm proof.

Even assuming that a portion of land classified as ‘poramboke’ had been reserved for communal use, the grant would still constitute an estate. The register also records that the poramboke area of fifty-seven acres and sixty-six cents was included in the thirty-nine varas and seventeen metres allotted to Venkatachala Mudali. The phrase ‘deduct poramboke’ appears to have been inserted by revenue officials for assessment calculation purposes, not to indicate that the entire village was granted.

The register also records a small parcel of five acres and forty cents granted under the same instrument to Chinna Appu Moopan. If this inference is correct, and because the respondents have not provided satisfactory reasons to reject it, the first respondent bears the burden of proving that the original grant was an estate. He has consequently failed to meet that evidentiary burden, thereby leaving the claim of an estate unsubstantiated and unsupported by the record. The Court does not rely on the wording that the register mentions ‘inams in the whole village of Kunanjeri’, as the preposition ‘in’ suggests only a limited inclusion. Nor does the Court feel compelled to interpret the words ‘or other tenure’ in the explanation to clause (d) of sub-section two of section three ejusdem generis with ‘service’. The language of the provision is sufficiently broad to encompass grants made as personal inams, without limiting interpretation to service tenures alone.

The Court observed that the phrase “to include lands granted as personal inams” indicated that the statutory provision was intended to cover lands that were allotted as personal inams. The Court found it more likely that, under a single paravangi, two separate grants had been made to two different individuals. The larger grant comprised an area measured as 39V. 17M and included the poramboke, and it had been made in favour of Venkatachala Mudali. The smaller grant measured 0V. 15M and had been made in favour of Chinna Appu Moopan. Both of these grants were characterised as personal grants at the time they were created. Accordingly, the Court concluded that no grant had been made of an entire inam village, nor of a specifically named village, and that the smaller portions had been carved out of any such village before any grant on the basis of service or other tenure could take effect. The portion that remained untouched continued to be recognised and administered as a distinct revenue unit with its own name. Consequently, the Court held that the first respondent had failed to meet the burden of proof required to demonstrate that Kunanjeri qualified as an “estate” within the meaning of the Act.