Surajpal Singh And Others vs The State

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 1950

Decision Date: 20 December 1951

Coram: Saiyid Fazal Ali, Vivian Bose

In the matter titled Surajpal Singh and Others versus The State, the judgment was delivered on 20 December 1951 by the Supreme Court of India. The citation for this decision appears as 1952 AIR 52 and 1952 SCR 193, and it has been referenced in several subsequent reports, including R 1953 SC 459 (10), R 1954 SC 645 (2), R 1955 SC 585 (4), R 1955 SC 807 (5), F 1956 SC 217 (2,34), R 1956 SC 425 (5), R 1956 SC 643 (39), R 1957 SC 216 (12), R 1957 SC 589 (16), RF 1961 SC 715 (7), RF 1962 SC 439 (8), RF 1963 SC 200 (17), F 1972 SC 116 (22), R 1973 SC 2622 (7), F 1974 SC 606 (6). The bench for this case comprised Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali, Justice Vivian Bose, and Justice (the record lists the name as Fazal Ali, Saiyid) in the capacity of the Supreme Court. The petitioner was Surajpal Singh together with other respondents, while the respondent was the State. The case arose under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Act V of 1898, dealing with an appeal against acquittal and the scope of judicial interference. The headnote of the decision explained that, although a high court possessed full authority to review the evidence that formed the basis of an acquittal under section 417, the presumption of innocence attached to the accused is reinforced by a trial-court acquittal. Consequently, a high-court finding that overturns the trial-court’s judgment could be entertained only for reasons that are both substantial and compelling.

The criminal appellate jurisdiction for this appeal lay under Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 1950, which reached the Supreme Court by way of special leave from a judgment and order dated 8 May 1947 delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, in which Judges Sankar Saran and Akbar Hussain presided over Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 1946. Counsel for the appellant was Mr. S. P. Sinha, assisted by G. C. Mathur, while counsel for the respondent was Mr. K. B. Asthana. The Supreme Court, through Justice Fazl Ali, noted that the appeal challenged a High Court decision that had set aside the finding of the Sessions Judge of Aligarh and had imposed convictions. The appellants had originally been tried before the Sessions Judge on charges under section 302 read with section 149, section 148, sections 325 and 326 read with section 149, and section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, and the Sessions Judge had acquitted them of all charges. The State Government appealed this acquittal, and the Allahabad High Court reversed the Sessions Judge’s order, convicting the appellants and directing transportation for life under section 302 read with section 149, five years’ rigorous imprisonment under sections 325 and 326 read with section 149, and two years’ rigorous imprisonment under section 147, all sentences to run concurrently. Following the High Court’s judgment, the appellants applied to the Privy Council for special leave, which was granted on 28 October 1947. The prosecution’s case, as summarized before the Supreme Court, involved the circumstances surrounding a plot of land known as the “teesa” field in Nagaria Patti Chaharum, village Shahgarh, Aligarh district, which had been the subject of an earlier ejectment suit filed in 1944 by landlords Mst. Bhagwati Kuer, Ratan Singh, and co-sharers. The High Court’s reversal of the acquittal and the subsequent convictions formed the factual and legal backdrop for the Supreme Court’s examination of the principles governing appeals under section 417, particularly the extent to which a higher court may interfere with a trial-court acquittal.

The land involved in the dispute was identified as plot number 518 located in Nagaria Patti Chaharum, village Shahgarh, in the district of Aligarh. The plot covered approximately thirty bighas and was locally known as the “teesa” field. This field constituted “sir” land belonging to several landlords, among them Mst. Bhagwati Kuer and Ratan Singh, and it had previously been let out to various tenants. In the year 1944 Mst. Bhagwati Kuer, Ratan Singh and their co-sharers instituted a suit seeking the ejectment of those tenants, and the court decreed in favour of the landlords. On 7 June 1945 possession of the plot was formally handed over by the Amin to Surajpal Singh, the first appellant, who acted in the capacity of mukhtar-i-Am for Mst. Bhagwati Kuer. Surajpal Singh contended that he accepted possession on behalf of all the co-sharers; however, certain statements made by Ratan Singh during his testimony did not support that claim. Irrespective of that contention, on 17 June 1945 Ratan Singh reported to the police that he had dispatched his labourers to irrigate the “teesa” field. While the labourers were engaged in irrigation, Surajpal Singh together with some other individuals intervened, attempted to halt the irrigation work and caused damage to the ploughs owned by Ratan Singh.

On the following morning, 18 June 1945, at about 7 a.m., the incident that forms the subject of the present trial occurred. According to the prosecution’s version, Ratan Singh’s labourers were working in the field under the supervision of a man named Behari Singh when the appellants arrived accompanied by a large number of persons armed with guns, spears and lathis. Certain members of the appellants’ group entered the field, cut the nose-strings of the bullocks, verbally abused the labourers and physically assaulted them, causing most of the labourers to flee. At that point Deva Sukh, who had been providing water to the labourers, protested against the assault and was himself beaten with lathis. Subsequently Behari Singh, aided by ten to fifteen other men, confronted the appellants and a fight ensued between the two parties. During the melee a young accused named Rajendra Singh discharged his gun twice into the air. Thereafter Surajpal Singh seized the firearm and fired two shots, one of which struck Nawab Mewati, who died instantaneously, and the other struck Behari Singh, who succumbed to his injuries later the same day. In addition, three other persons identified as Zorawar, Rajpal and Lakhan sustained gunshot injuries.

Later that day Surajpal Singh, together with the three other appellants, reached the site, placed Nawab Mewati’s dead body on a cart and disposed of it in a river. The body was recovered from the river on 20 June 1945. Following the investigation, twenty-five persons, including the appellants, were indicted and sent to trial. After the evidence was fully heard, the Sessions Judge delivered his judgment on 20 February 1946. He held that the “teesa” field was in possession of Surajpal Singh, that the men of Behari Singh and Ratan Singh acted as aggressors seeking to take forcible possession of the field, that when their attempt was resisted they attacked the party of the appellants, and that the individual who discharged the gun did so in self-defence.

The Sessions Judge held that the accused had not fired the gun with the intention of killing Behari Singh and Nawab Mewati, and that the prosecution’s evidence was so unsatisfactory that it was unsafe to secure a conviction on that basis. Regarding the charge of concealing evidence of murder by removing Nawab’s dead body, the Judge expressed the view that a conviction on this charge required proof that the murder itself had been committed, because the accused was alleged to have caused the disappearance of evidence of that offence. Since the murder charge could not be proved in the present case, the accused could not be convicted of causing the disappearance of evidence relating to it. The Judge further observed that, because the evidence was unreliable, the charge under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court delivered its judgment on 8 May 1947, allowing the appeal of the State Government. In brief, the High Court concluded that Ratan Singh possessed as much right to the field as Bhagwati Kuer, that both parties were endeavouring to obtain exclusive possession of the field, and that both were prepared for any contingency to enforce their respective rights; consequently, the question of possession was deemed wholly immaterial and the appellants could not successfully plead a right of private defence. A review of the two judgments shows that the Sessions Judge had carefully examined every material aspect of the case and recorded his opinion on each point, whereas the learned High Court judges reversed his decision without overturning the substantial reasons he had provided in support of his conclusion. The contrast between the two courts is especially noticeable in their handling of the prosecution evidence. The Sessions Judge had taken each witness’s testimony, assessed credibility, and discussed the minutest details of the evidence. In contrast, the High Court’s comment on the prosecution evidence was limited to a general observation, quoting an earlier case that police often find it difficult to obtain independent testimony in such matters because villagers present at the incident tend to be biased toward one of the disputing parties, making reliable evidence hard to secure. The High Court acknowledged that this difficulty, common in riot cases, also applied here, but nevertheless noted that, as in the earlier case, there were four witnesses—Deo Sukh, Rori Singh, Ram Singh, and Ratan Singh—who could be described as independent.

In the judgment the Court observed that the four witnesses identified by the High Court largely supported the prosecution’s case, and that their testimony was, on the whole, worthy of credence and sufficient to justify the conviction of the respondents. Because the High Court had treated the evidence only in summary form, the Court had to examine the material presented at trial with particular care. In doing so it found that the four witnesses whose statements had been accepted by the High Court were precisely those against whom the Sessions Judge had levelled serious criticism. The Court noted that Ratan Singh was not an eye-witness and could therefore be excluded from consideration. Regarding the remaining witnesses, the Court expressed a general agreement with the view of the Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge had argued that the manner in which Deva Sukh was introduced into the evidence and the circumstances surrounding his testimony gave strong reasons to reject the prosecution’s version. The Court reiterated that the prosecution’s claim that Deva Sukh had suffered injuries during the alleged incident was held to be false, and that his alleged injuries had been fabricated to create evidence of private defence to support the charge that the appellants’ party had caused injuries to the accused.

The Court then turned to the injuries sustained by members of the accused’s side. It recorded that at least four persons on that side had been injured: Mahindarpal had received no fewer than sixteen injuries and had remained in a serious condition for some time; Karan Singh had suffered twelve injuries, one of which was grievous; Hari Singh had sustained seven injuries, including a grievous wound; and Nikka Singh had also been injured, a fact noted by the investigating sub-inspector. The prosecution’s evidence stated that many of the accused were armed with lathis and had used them, making it unlikely that none of them would have sustained injuries caused by lathis. In contrast, the four injured persons belonging to Ratan Singh’s party—namely Rajpal Singh, Lakhan Singh, Behari Singh and Zorawar Singh—were found to have only gunshot wounds. The Court identified a crucial question as to the timing of the gunfire: whether the gun was discharged in self-defence after the accused’s party had been assaulted with lathis, or whether it was used before any such assault. The prosecution witnesses admitted that the gun was first fired twice in the air and thereafter actual firing occurred. This sequence supported the defence narrative that the gunfire was a response in self-defence when Ratan Singh’s men attacked members of the accused’s party. The Sessions Judge, however, expressed the view that the prosecution had introduced the story of Deva Sukh being assaulted with a lathi at the outset in order to portray the appellants’ party as the aggressors.

The prosecution alleged that Behari Singh and his men had used lathis to defend themselves. To resolve the conflicting versions of the parties and to ascertain the true facts, the Sessions Judge examined in great detail whether any reliable evidence existed that Deva Sukh had sustained any injury during the incident. The Court observed that a substantial collection of circumstances supported the conclusion reached by the Sessions Judge. It noted that the first information report did not mention Deva Sukh by name, nor did it refer to any injuries attributed to him. The Judge pointed out that a considerable lapse of time occurred between the occurrence and the lodging of that report, making the omission of what appeared to be the most important incident and the name of the principal witness especially surprising. Furthermore, the dying declarations of Behari Singh, recorded by Dr Shankar Deo, and of Lakhan Singh contained no reference to Deva Sukh or to any injuries he might have suffered. The Judge also highlighted that the prosecution’s witnesses—Chokha, Prempal, Cheta and Gangola Singh—who were examined by the investigating officer on 18 June, made no mention of Deva Sukh. The investigating sub-inspector first learned of Deva Sukh’s alleged injuries and his presence at the scene on 19 June 1945. When questioned, Deva Sukh explained that he had not appeared before the police earlier because he was frightened, had hidden in his house for about two days, and had instructed his relatives not to inform the police of his whereabouts. He also stated that after returning home he did not disclose the events to his relatives. The Court held that such matters might have been overlooked if convincing proof of his injuries existed; however, the evidence before the Court was extremely unsatisfactory and raised serious doubts as to whether Deva Sukh had incurred any injury at all. Dr Shankar Deo, who examined Deva Sukh, was a retired Sub-Assistant Surgeon practising in Kauiraganj, close to the village of Shahgarh. He admitted having known Ratan Singh since childhood, when he had been taught at Ratan Singh’s house by a teacher employed by Ratan Singh’s uncle. Dr Deo testified that Deva Sukh had two bruises on the back of the middle part of his left forearm, one of which was serious because the left ulna was fractured. He further stated that he charged Deva Sukh fees for the examination, that Deva Sukh was brought to him three days after the other injured persons, and that when the latter group arrived none informed him of an additional injured person; Deva Sukh was subsequently brought by a servant of Ratan Singh.

According to the testimony, when a second group of persons arrived at the doctor, none of them informed him that an additional injured individual needed examination, and the doctor learned that Deva Sukh had been brought to him by a servant of Ratan Singh. The court noted several unsatisfactory aspects in the doctor’s evidence on unrelated matters, which it deemed unnecessary to detail. More striking was the observation that, despite the existence of a District Board Hospital at Jalali located about four miles from Kauirganj, Deva Sukh did not obtain an injury certificate from the physician in charge of that hospital. Deva Sukh claimed that he had visited the hospital to have his injuries treated, but the record contained no evidence to confirm that claim. The court held that these facts, together with other facts relied upon by the Sessions Judge, supported the theory that the prosecution’s case depended on fabricated evidence, thereby casting doubt on the entire prosecution case.

The court further examined the background of the land-ejection dispute. The record showed that Surajpal Singh had taken an active interest in the suit and had admittedly spent money on it. Ratan Singh alleged that he had also given money to Surajpal Singh for the expenses, but the court found this allegation improbable because the two men had been on bad terms. It was admitted that Surajpal Singh was the person to whom the Amin had transferred possession of the land. Nevertheless, despite this fact, men employed by Ratan Singh commenced operations on the land, ignoring Bhagwati Kuer, an act for which Ratan Singh had no right even if the land were jointly owned. The court observed that if Behari Singh and other men sent by Ratan Singh were attempting to take exclusive possession by starting work on the land, Surajpal Singh had a legitimate right to protest. Moreover, if Surajpal’s men were assaulted first, as the evidence strongly indicated, he was entitled to defend himself under the right of private defence. The court found it clear that Ratan Singh had made extensive preparations through Behari Singh. It also accepted that a number of persons armed with lathis, including outsiders such as Nawab Mewati, described as a well-known fighter, Zorawar, and others, were present at the scene on Ratan Singh’s behalf.

Regarding the two additional witnesses, Rori Singh and Pransukh, referenced by the High Court, the court observed that the High Court appeared to have overlooked the Sessions Judge’s comments on their testimony, some of which were particularly compelling. The court was struck by the fact that these witnesses were not independent, were not listed in the first information report as witnesses to the incident, and were only examined by the sub-inspector on 20 June and 21 June 1945. After reviewing both judgments, the court concluded that there was no reason to deny the Sessions Judge’s opinion on these witnesses the weight that ordinarily should be accorded to such an assessment.

In this case, the Court observed that the opinion of the Sessions Judge should be given the same weight as that of the trial court. It is well-established that, in an appeal filed under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court possesses full authority to examine the evidence on which the acquittal was based. However, it is equally well-settled that the presumption of innocence attached to an accused is reinforced by the trial-court acquittal, and that the findings of the trial court— which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their testimony— may be overturned only for reasons that are very substantial and compelling. After considering the material, the Court was inclined to hold that the Sessions Judge had adopted a reasonable view of the facts, and that there were no good reasons to disturb that view. The assessors who assisted at trial were unanimous in holding that the accused were not guilty. Although twenty-five persons were tried on identical evidence, the State Government chose to prefer an appeal against only five of them, arguing solely that the acquittal was against the weight of the evidence on record. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences of the appellants, and acquitted them of all charges. The appeal was allowed. The appellant was represented by counsel P.K. Chatterjee and the respondent by counsel I.N. Shroff for P.K. Bose.