Sukhdev Singh vs Maharaja Bahadur Of Gidhaur

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1950

Decision Date: 2 May, 1951

Coram: Saiyid Fazal Ali, B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar

Sukhdev Singh versus Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur was decided by the Supreme Court of India on the 2nd May 1951. The judgment was authored by Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali and was delivered by a bench consisting of Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali, Justice B.K. Mukherjea and Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar. The petitioner in the case was Sukhdev Singh and the respondent was the Maharaja Bahadur of Gidhaur. The official citation of the decision is reported in 1951 AIR 288 and 1951 SCR 534.

The headnote of the judgment dealt with the law relating to ghatwali tenures, particularly the distinction between government ghatwalis and zemindary ghatwalis, the rights of a zemindar over sub-soil minerals and the evidentiary value of District Gazetteers. The Court observed that, although there have been several instances where a government ghatwali was incorporated into the zemindary of another person, the absence of clear evidence about the true nature of a ghatwali required the Court to infer its character from the fact that the tenure was included in a zemindary and that the land revenue (jama) was assessed upon it. Such inclusion, the Court held, favoured the party who claimed that the tenure depended upon the zemindary. The Court further noted that merely showing that a ghatwali was under the jurisdiction of the Collector did not alter its character; a ghatwali that was originally a zemindary ghatwali could not be transformed into a government ghatwali solely because it was described as being under the Collector. In the absence of proof that a zemindar had relinquished his rights, the Court presumed that the zemindar retained ownership of the underground mineral rights created by his tenancies. The Court also explained that a statement appearing in a District Gazetteer was not conclusive, but it was an official document prepared with care by experienced officials who had consulted official records, and therefore it carried evidentiary weight.

The substantive judgment concerned a civil appeal filed under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The appeal was numbered 29 of 1950 and was filed against the judgment and decree dated 10 October 1945 rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Patna, which itself affirmed a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr dated 28 February 1942 in Suit No. 10 of 1941. Counsel for the appellants consisted of a senior advocate assisted by a junior, while counsel for the respondent was similarly assisted. The judgment was delivered on 2 May 1951 by Justice Fazal Ali.

In the factual background, the Court explained that the appeal arose from a title suit initiated by the plaintiff-respondent, who was the Maharaja of Gidhaur. The Maharaja had succeeded in both the Subordinate Judge’s decision and the High Court’s decision, establishing himself as the proprietor of an impartible estate known as Gidhaur Raj situated in the Monghyr district. The ancestors of the first-named defendant originally possessed a four-annas share in a ghatwali tenure identified as Mahal Dumri Nisf Katauna, bearing the record number 325. By means of a private partition, those ancestors were subsequently allotted the mouza of Dumri together with its forty-seven tolas, the details of which were set out in Schedule I of the plaint. Following this allocation, a mortgage decree was obtained, and the execution of that decree formed the next step in the proceedings.

The Maharaja of Gidhaur obtained a mortgage deed that had been executed by a person named Chethru Rai against the ancestors of the first-party defendants. The interest created by that deed was subsequently purchased by the Maharaja in the name of one of his employees. The employee took physical possession of the mortgaged property on 19 April 1904. Earlier, on 13 August 1903, the ancestors of the first-party defendants had filed an application before the executing court seeking to set aside that sale. The executing court dismissed the application, and the defendants appealed the dismissal. Both the High Court and the Privy Council upheld the lower court’s decision and dismissed the appeal. After the civil dispute, further controversies arose in the criminal courts. The second-party defendants, claiming to be lessees of the first-party defendants, obtained a mining licence in 1937 from the sub-divisional officer of Jamui. Anticipating a breach of the peace, the District Magistrate initiated proceedings under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The proceedings concluded with a judgment that was favourable to both the first- and second-party defendants and adverse to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff contended that, empowered by the favourable order under section 144, the defendants commenced mining operations in the tolas identified in Schedule II of the plaint and extracted a substantial quantity of mica, which compelled him to bring the present suit. In the suit, after restating the relevant facts, the plaintiff prayed for a declaration establishing his sub-soil rights over the entire Mahal Dumri, and for the recovery of possession of the mortgage lands situated in the tolas listed in Schedule XI of the plaint. He additionally sought mesne profits and a permanent injunction to restrain the first- and second-party defendants from extracting mica or any other underground minerals from the lands described in Schedule II. The plaintiff summarized the basis of his claims in paragraph 12 of the plaint, stating: “That the plaintiff submits that he being the 16 annas proprietor of Dumri Nisf Katauna has got an indefeasible right and title to all the underground minerals including mica situate within the said talukas. The plaintiff further submits that all the titles and interest in the said 4 annas mokrari shares of the ancestors of the defendant 1st party having been acquired by plaintiff’s ancestor by auction purchase in 1903, the defendant 1st party have no sort of right and interests in the mica and other underground minerals nor the defendant 2nd party have derived any lawful right under leases alleged to have been granted in their favour by defendant 1st party, the plaintiff in law is entitled to get a declaration of his title and possession with respect to all the underground right including mica ……” The suit was contested by defendants numbered 1 to 11, representing the first-party defendants; however, the trial judge observed that the true defendant was Defendant No 1, who was the father of the appellant. This defendant asserted that the four-annas interest in village Dumri was a ghatwali tenure granted to his ancestors by the Muhammadan rulers to guard the hill passes in the taluka, a grant later confirmed by Captain Browne of the East India Company, and that the mineral and sub-soil rights vested in him by that tenure were not affected by the plaintiff’s auction purchase in 1903.

Defendant No 1 asserted that the one-anna interest in the village of Dumri originated from a ghatwali tenure that the ancestors of the first-party defendants received from the Muhammadan rulers for the purpose of guarding the hill passes in the taluka, and that this grant was later confirmed by Captain Browne, who acted as a representative of the East India Company. He further contended that the mineral and subsoil rights vested exclusively in him as the holder of that ghatwali tenure, and therefore the plaintiff’s purchase at auction in 1903 could not confer any right because the property in dispute was a Government ghatwali tenure that was inalienable, rendering the auction-purchase invalid. In addition, Defendant No 1 claimed that he and his ancestors had exercised possession over the mines and minerals for more than twelve years prior to the filing of the suit, invoking their ghatwali right and doing so with the knowledge of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s ancestors, which, according to him, gave rise to an indefeasible right by adverse possession to the mines and minerals, particularly those described in Schedule II of the plaint. The Subordinate Judge decreed in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the contested tenure was a zamindary ghatwali tenure that was not inalienable, that the plaintiff had remained in possession of the property from the time of his 1903 purchase until the order of the District Magistrate issued in 1938, and that as the proprietor of the Mahal the plaintiff was entitled to the mineral and subsoil rights, while only the surface right passed to him under the mortgage-sale. On appeal, the High Court substantially affirmed the findings of the Subordinate Judge, but modified them by observing that, although it agreed that the subsoil rights stayed with the proprietor, even if Defendant No 1 were assumed to have possessed those subsoil rights, they had transferred at the 1903 mortgage-sale, and consequently the plaintiff was, in any event, the true owner of the subsoil. Regarding the defence of adverse possession, the High Court held that there was no clear evidence that any mine had been worked on behalf of the lessees of Defendant No 1; at most, the evidence showed isolated acts of possession during recent years, likely commencing around 1935, and therefore the claim of adverse possession could not be sustained. The appellant raised two principal points on this appeal: first, that the lower courts erred in concluding that the ghatwali tenure held by the first-party defendants was a zamindary ghatwali rather than a Government ghatwali, and that, if correctly classified as a Government ghatwali, the property would be inalienable and no title could have passed to the plaintiff; and second, that, irrespective of that question, the plaintiff’s suit was barred by limitation under Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act.

The Court noted that the first ground raised by the appellant, concerning the limitation under article 144 of the Limitation Act, was not free of difficulty, and that resolving it required a careful construction of several historic documents; consequently the parties were heard at length, even though the lower courts had simultaneously held that the tenure in dispute was not a government ghatwali. Before addressing the substantive dispute between the parties, the Court found it necessary to explain the meanings of the terms “ghatwal” and “ghatwali tenure.” For this purpose the Court referred to a passage from the Patna High Court decision in Rani Sonabati Kumari v. Raja Kirtyanand Singh, where the concept of ghatwali tenures was discussed in detail. The passage explained that a ghatwal literally means a guard of mountain passes, and that the Mughal authorities used the expression “ghatwali tenure” to describe lands allotted at a low rent or without rent for the purpose of guarding passes and protecting nearby villages from attacks by law-less hill tribes. Such tenures were largely situated on the western frontier of Bengal, especially in areas identified as Kharagdiha, Gidhaur, Birbhum, Kharagpur, Bhagalpur, and the Santal Parganas. The Court observed that the rank of ghatwals and the conditions of their tenure varied from place to place. In some instances the ghatwals were owners of extensive estates, some resembling semi-military colonies. The passage further stated that certain ghatwalis were created directly by the ruling power, while others were established by landlords or zamindars to protect their zamindari estates and tenants, enabling them to maintain a small armed force to fulfil obligations owed to the sovereign. At times, owners of large ghatwali estates subdivided and re-granted portions to other tenants, who, in addition to paying modest rents, were required to render quasi-police and military services and to furnish a specified number of armed men for the government or the zamindar, as the case required. From this exposition the Court derived that a government ghatwali is a tenure created by the sovereign for a person obliged to provide ghatwali services to the state, whereas a zamindary ghatwali is a tenure created by a zamindar for services owed to that zamindar. The Court observed that the appellant’s insistence on characterising the tenancy as a government ghatwali stemmed from the well-settled rule that a government ghatwali is inalienable, while a zamindary ghatwali may be alienated with the zamindar’s consent and, where local custom allows, even without such consent. The Court also indicated that case law on zamindary ghatwalis suggested that, over time, the need for the zamindar’s explicit consent has become less significant, especially where alienation occurs without any objection from the zamindar.

It was observed that, with the passage of time, the consent of the zamindar had become a matter of little importance, and the law generally presumed consent when an alienation was carried out without any objection from the zamindar. The extent of the power to alienate was illustrated by a decision of the Privy Council in Kali Prasad v. Ananda Rai, where the Council held that once it was established that the ghatwal possessed the power of alienation, that power formed an integral part of his right and interest in the ghatwali. The Council further emphasized that there was no evidence to limit such alienation to the ghatwal’s own lifetime or to any similar restriction.

To ascertain the true nature of a ghatwali tenure, the court usually needed to examine the original grant by which the tenure had been created. In the present matter, the appellant relied upon Exhibit C (1), which was a ghatwali sanad dated 1776 and issued to the appellant’s ancestors. The sanad began with a notice addressed to the Chaudhuris, kanungoes, zamindars and mutasaddis of the mauza of Dumri Ghat in the pargana of Gidhaur, Sarkar Monghyr, situated in the province of Bihar. It declared that the perquisites of ghatwari in all the rahdaris of the aforesaid mauza had been granted to Kunji Singh, Jangal Singh, Ragho Singh and Manorath Singh, who were identified as the ghatwars of that mauza. The grant was said to be made in accordance with long-standing custom and was to take effect from the commencement of the year 1184 Fasli. The document expressed the desire that the named ghatwars should be allowed to enjoy the perquisites of ghatwari in all the rahdaris according to the old custom. It further imposed a duty on the ghatwars to be ever ready to discharge the duties of their post and to guard the ghats and chaukis of their area by making rounds day and night. The sanad warned that if any murder, mischief, theft, highway robbery or sudden night attack occurred in their area, the ghatwars would be held liable and would be dismissed from their post. The instrument concluded by stating that it was to be treated as peremptory and that all parties should act in accordance with its terms. It was dated the fifth Ziqada of the eighteenth year of the August reign, corresponding to 1184 Fasli.

This sanad had been issued by Captain Browne, who had been deputed by the East India Company to restore order in a tract known as Jungle Terai, a vast waste and hilly country lying to the south of Bhagalpur and west of the Rajamahal Hills. A bench of the Patna High Court, while deciding the case of Fulbati Kumari v. Maheshwari Prasad, interpreted this document. As noted by Justice Dawson Miller, C.J., the sanad was not a grant of land but rather an authority conferred upon the persons named to collect ghatwali fees or tolls from those using the roads and passes that the ghatwals were tasked to protect. When the present sanad was compared with other ghatwali sanads granted by Captain Browne, notable differences emerged, indicating that the mere fact of Captain Browne’s involvement could not alone determine the character of the tenure, since his role often included confirming and recognising older titles.

The Court observed that when the present document is compared with those found discussed in reported cases, the contrast becomes very marked. In several other documents, for example the document that was the subject of the decision of the Privy Council in Narayan Singh v. Niranjan Chakravarti (1) and also considered by the Patna High Court in Rani Songbati Kumari v. Raja Kirtyanand Singh (2), the grant related to a very extensive area of land and the language of the grant indicated that the services were to be rendered directly to the ruling power. The Court therefore held that the mere fact that the present sanad was issued by Captain Browne could not be decisive of the nature of the tenure, because it appeared to be part of his duties to confirm and recognise old titles. As Dawson Miller C.J. had pointed out, the sanad must be read together with the record of certain proceedings before the Dewani Adalat of Ramgarh, which show that a tenancy of eight annas in mauza Dumri was granted by the zamindar of Gidhaur to two persons, one of whom was the ghatwal mentioned in Captain Browne’s sanad, and that this grant had the sanction of Captain Browne. The Court noted that a document of 1708, which formed the proceeding of the original court and was before the learned judges who decided Fulbati’s case (3), has not been produced; however, a judgment dated 18th March 1799 of the appellate court in the same proceeding is before us. That judgment states that the ghatwals had for three generations possessed half of village Dumri, but in the year 1187 fasli (1780 A.D.) the zamindar of Gidhaur attempted to increase the rent, and the ghatwals refused to accept a new patta or kabuliyat at the higher rate. Subsequently the lower court ordered the zamindar to grant a patta, the zamindar failed to comply and forcibly dispossessed the ghatwals, who then prayed that the zamindar be ordered to grant them a patta and receive the kabuliyat at the old rent. The appellate court, to which the zamindar had appealed, upheld the decree of the first court ordering the patta to be granted. This record demonstrates firstly that the ghatwali tenure over half of Dumri existed for generations prior to 1780, therefore predating Captain Browne’s sanad, and secondly that the tenure was held under the zamindar, because otherwise it would not have been necessary for the zamindar to grant a patta and the ghatwal to execute a kabuliyat in his favour. The Court also placed before it a document labelled exhibit 1, which is a report of Khadim Muhammad Ataullah, an employee of the East India Company, incorporating statements made by the then zamindars of Gidhaur indicating that they had been in possession of the zamindary for nearly 700

The evidence included a record stating that “the milkiat zamindari, Chaudhri and Kanungoi of the pargana … had all along been in their possession.” This passage demonstrated that the Gidhaur estate was an ancient zamindari and that its zamindar also exercised the functions of chaudhri and kanungoi. The importance of this observation lay in the fact that the sanad issued by Captain Browne was addressed to chaudhri-s, kanungo-s, and similar officials. The judgment then referred to an extract from the Bengal District Gazetteer, volume XVII, page 168, which read: “About 1774 the lawless state of this tract led the British to place it in charge of Captain James Browne, who settled the estates with the ghatwals with two exceptions. These two exceptions were Dumri and Mahesri which were settled directly with the proprietors, the story being that the ghatwal tenure holders fled at the approach of Captain Browne, their reputation as dacoits and brigands being too strong for them to face a Government officer without fear of the consequences. In the case of Dumri however, the ghatwals finding that in their absence a settlement had been made of their tenure, returned and obtained a sanad settling it with them under the Raja of Gidhaur. Of the estates settled with ghatwals only two are now held by their descendants, viz. Tilwa and Kewal. The others have passed into the hands of the Maharaja of Gidhaur, Chetru Rai, Akleswar Prasad and others of Rohini.” While the Gazetteer was not conclusive, it was regarded as an official document prepared with care by experienced officials who derived facts from official records. The Court noted that Dawson Miller C.J., in the Fulbati case, had pointed out certain inaccuracies in the latter part of the quoted passage, yet affirmed that the earlier portion received considerable support from the documents previously cited.

The counsel for the appellant relied heavily on the assertion that Dumri ghatwali was mentioned in Captain Browne’s “India Tracts” as one of the ghatwalis placed under the Collector of Jungle Terrai districts. The Court observed that this argument had not been raised before any of the lower courts, and that Captain Browne’s treatise had not been produced to them. Consequently, the respondent’s objection—that he had not been given sufficient opportunity to examine the material and to present relevant documents for the Court’s consideration—carried considerable weight. Nonetheless, the Court held that, based on the evidence presently before it, the inference sought from Captain Browne’s statement was not fully justified. The Court explained that merely showing that a ghatwali was listed under the Collector could not change the intrinsic nature of the ghatwali; the character of a zamindary ghatwali would not become a government ghatwali solely because of such a designation. This formed the first reason for rejecting the appellant’s claim, and the Court indicated that further reasons would follow.

The Court observed that the mere fact that a ghatwali was shown to be under the Collector did not change its character; for example, a zamindary ghatwali could not become a Government ghatwali solely because it was described as being under the Collector. The Court cited the decision reported in A I.R. 1923 Patna 453 to support this proposition. The Court also noted that, as Collector of the Jungle Terrai districts, Captain Browne appeared to exercise authority not only over the ghatwals but also over the zamindars who lived in the area administered by him. Moreover, the Court found that the statements made by Captain Browne concerning the Jungle Terrai ghatwals and their relationship to the zamindar did not bolster the position advanced on behalf of the appellant. In support of this view, the Court reproduced passages from Captain Browne’s treatise. Captain Browne wrote that the Jungle Terrai ghatwals had formerly been subject to various Rajahs, paid a modest tribute as a token of feudal obedience, and were obligated to oppose invasions, especially from the south, by mustering their armed followers to support their Rajahs. He further described that the chiefs possessed absolute authority over their vassals, and that even the fear of death in war would not compel the vassals to reveal any secrets concerning their chief, his family, or his property. The treatise also characterised the Raja of Gidhaur as a former ruler of considerable territory whose power had been diminished by conquests of the Rajah of Bierboom and Comgar Cawn, leaving the present Rajahs Gopal Singh and Durrup Singh with only marginal political influence. On the whole, the Court concluded that the Dumri ghatwals were hardly men of sufficient stature to separate themselves from the zamindar and establish themselves as independent chiefs.

The Court turned to two further pieces of evidence that it considered highly relevant. First, the appellant’s tenure was recorded as part of the Gidhaur zamindary in the Permanent Settlement. Second, the Record of Rights listed the tenure as istemrari mokrari tenure under the zamindar of Gidhaur. The Court referred to the decision in Raja Lelanund Singh Bahadoor v. The Bengal Government, in which the Privy Council rejected the Government’s claim to resume a ghatwali in the zamindary of Khuruckpore for revenue-assessment purposes. The Privy Council based its ruling on the fact that the ghatwali lands formed part of the zamindary, were included in the Permanent Settlement of the zamindar, and were subject to the jama assessed on that zamindary. The Court indicated that, on a preliminary basis, the inclusion of the tenure within the Permanent Settlement and its subordination to the zamindar generated a presumption that the ghatwali was connected with the zamindar. The Court emphasized that, although the Permanent Settlement did not alter the nature of the tenancy or transform public services into private services under the zamindar, the consistent inclusion of the tenure within a zamindary and its coverage by the jama supported the view that the ghatwali was dependent upon the zamindary.

In this case, the Court observed that the fact that the land was listed in the Permanent Settlement of the zamindar and that, under that settlement, the ghatwal was required to pay rent to the zamindar created a presumption that the ghatwali was somehow connected with the zamindar. However, the Court stressed that the Permanent Settlement of the land could not alter the fundamental nature of the tenancy on which the land was held, nor could it transform public services into private services under the zamindar, as was stated in the decision of Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Bakranath Singh(2). The Court noted that several reported cases show instances where the properties of persons who were Government ghatwals were included in the zamindary of other individuals, but where there was no clear evidence about the true character of the ghatwali, the inclusion of the tenure within a zamindary and its coverage by the jama assessed upon it should tip the balance in favour of the party who asserts that the tenure depends upon the zamindary. In the present matter, the presumption arising from the Permanent Settlement was reinforced by the entry in the Record of Rights, which identified the tenure in question as “istemrari mokrari” held under the zamindar. The Court therefore concluded that, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption of dependency on the zamindary remained strong.

The Court then turned to the evidence presented by the appellant. The appellant relied on exhibits N and N-1 together with certain rent receipts that had been granted by the zamindar in an attempt to establish an independent title. The Court found that these documents were of little assistance. Exhibit N was a notice dated 1859 issued to an ancestor of the appellant by an official whose signature was illegible. The notice referred to a report by the sub-inspector of the Chakai thana stating that “the sautars (bad characters) are in their places of residence and no riots or disturbances are taking place,” and it instructed the ghatwal to prepare a list of the sautars in his ilaqa and to file it before the officer-in-charge of the thana. Exhibit N-1 was a similar notice, but it was incomplete and did not indicate who had issued it. It reproduced a police sub-inspector’s report that, because of crop failure, burglaries and thefts had occurred, and it recommended that the zamindars of the ilaqa should be directed to “look after the occurrences and keep eyes over the bad characters and mischief makers so that occurrences may be stopped.” The Court held that these notices did not necessarily demonstrate that the appellant was a Government ghatwal; such notices were commonly addressed to zamindars in that era, and the mere description of the recipient as a ghatwal did not show that he was acting in the capacity of a Government ghatwal rather than as a zamindari ghatwal. The appellant also produced rent receipts and road-cess receipts, but these too failed to aid his case because they contained statements indicating that the tenure to which the receipts related belonged to the proprietary zamindary of Gidhaur. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellant had not succeeded in rebutting the presumption created by the Record of Rights and the Permanent Settlement, and he had not established that the tenure in question was a Government ghatwali.

In reviewing the rent receipts and road-cess receipts, the Court observed that those documents, among other things, expressly stated that the tenure to which the receipts related belonged to the proprietary zamindary of Gidhaur. That brief examination of the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the appellant had not been able to present clear and conclusive proof to overturn the presumption created by the Record of Rights and the record of the Permanent Settlement. Consequently, the appellant failed to establish his claim that the tenure in question was a Government ghatwali. The Court noted, in passing, that in the earlier mortgage suit which preceded the present litigation, the appellant made no defence that the ghatwali was non-alienable. Although the issue was later raised in the execution proceedings, the court of first instance decided against the appellant and the matter was abandoned on appeal. In view of these circumstances, the Court saw no justification for disturbing the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had examined the matter with great care.

The Court then turned to the second point raised in the appeal, namely the plea of adverse possession. Both lower courts had reached concurrent findings against the defendants on that plea, having fully discussed the evidence and provided cogent reasons for their conclusions. The Supreme Court reiterated its general reluctance to reopen issues that have been thoroughly investigated by the lower tribunals and on which there is a consensus of findings. In this case, the appellant did not demonstrate any exceptional circumstance that would warrant a departure from the established practice, and therefore the findings of the lower courts were to be accepted. The appellant also argued that the plaintiff’s suit was barred under article 142 of the Limitation Act because the plaintiff was required to prove possession of the disputed lands—especially those listed in Schedule II of the plaint—within twelve years of the filing of the suit, and that this proof was absent. The Court rejected this contention, holding that the plea must be negatived. The trial judge had unequivocally found, “The story of possession and dispossession as put forth in the plaint must be believed, because, as I have already said, there is overwhelming evidence in this case to prove the possession of the plaintiff over the surface as well as the subsoil.” That finding was not challenged before the High Court. Although the appellant’s statement of case set out sixteen reasons, none asserted the absence of any evidence showing that the plaintiff had been in possession of the disputed lands or the lands mentioned in Schedule II within the twelve-year period. Accordingly, both grounds advanced in the appeal failed.

In this case the Court stated that there was no doubt that the entire estate had passed to the plaintiff through the sale, establishing that the plaintiff now held legal title to the surface land. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that a separate and well-settled rule of law governs the ownership of underground rights in tenancies that were created by a zamindar. According to that rule, a zamindar is presumed to remain the owner of the subterranean or mineral rights in any tenancy he established, unless the party asserting a contrary claim can produce evidence showing that the zamindar voluntarily gave up those rights. The Court cited the earlier decisions Hari Narayan Singh v. Sriram Chakravarthi (1) and Durga Prasad Singh v. Braja Nath Bose (2) as authority for this presumption. Applying this principle to the present facts, the Court observed that the appellant had not adduced any evidence demonstrating that the zamindar had ever relinquished the underground rights associated with the land in question. Because the presumption in favour of the zamindar remained unrebutted, the Court concluded that the appellant’s reliance on the alleged ownership of such rights could not succeed. Accordingly, the Court held that the appeal failed and ordered that it be dismissed with costs payable by the appellant. The final order recorded that the appellant was represented by an agent named R.R. Biswas, while the respondent’s agent was identified as R.C. Prasad.