Santosh Kumar Jain vs The State (Union of India)

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1950

Decision Date: 5 March 1951

Coram: Hiralal J. Kania, Patanjali Sastri, Das, Sudhi Ranjan

Santosh Kumar Jain was the petitioner in an appeal against the State, Union of India, with an intervenor entered on 5 March 1951. The matter was heard before the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice Hiralal J. Kania, and the bench consisted of Justice Hiralal J. Kania, Justice M. Sastri, and Justice Patanjali. The judgment was delivered on 5 March 1951. The case is reported in the 1951 volume of the All India Reporter at page 201 and also in the Supreme Court Reporter at page 303. Subsequent citations include references in the 1964, 1985, and 1990 Supreme Court law reports.

The dispute centered on the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946, specifically section 3, which grants the Central Government the authority to “provide for regulating or prohibiting production, supply and distribution” of essential goods. The issues presented for determination were whether this statutory power extended to the issuance of directions and orders to particular individuals to perform specific acts, whether an order directing the search and seizure of goods held by a specific company was valid, the scope of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 3, and whether the generality of powers conferred by sub-section (1) encompassed such specific directives. Additional questions concerned the legal consequences of obstructing officials carrying out a seizure order and the applicability of section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which defines the offence of obstruction.

The headnote summarised the relevant statutory provision: section 3(1) empowers the Central Government, when it deems necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of an essential commodity, to issue a notified order regulating or prohibiting the production, supply, distribution, trade and commerce of that commodity. The provision expressly states that, without limiting the generality of the powers in sub-section (1), an order may also address any incidental and supplementary matters, including the entry into and search of premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft, and the seizure by an authorised person of any articles about which there is reason to believe a contravention has been, is being, or is about to be committed.

Applying this statutory framework, the Governor of Bihar, exercising powers delegated to the Provincial Government for foodstuffs, issued an order authorising the District Magistrate of Patna and the Special Officer in charge of rationing, also in Patna, to search the sugar stock of a company whose General Manager was the appellant. The order directed the seizure of five thousand maunds of sugar on the basis that the company was about to contravene an order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies issued under the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947. The appellant obstructed the officials conducting the search and seizure, and consequently was convicted under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Court held that the power “to provide for regulating or prohibiting production, supply and distribution” granted by the Act to the Central Government includes the authority to regulate or prohibit by issuing specific directions to particular persons. Accordingly, the Governor’s order was not invalid merely because it targeted a single company rather than a general rule, and the obstruction constituted an offence under the applicable penal provision.

The Court explained that the power granted by the Act to “provide for regulating or prohibiting production, supply and distribution” includes the authority to direct a particular producer or dealer to perform or refrain from a specific act concerning production, and therefore the order issued by the Governor was not invalid merely because it applied to a single company rather than constituting a general rule or regulation. The Court further held that sub-section (2) of section 3 does not confer any additional or separate powers beyond those already given by sub-section (1); the matters enumerated in sub-section (2) are merely illustrative and are stated to be “without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1).” Consequently, because the seizure of an article falls within the scope of sub-section (1) of section 3, the Central Government, and its delegate the Provincial Government, were competent to issue an order for seizure under sub-section (1) irrespective of any anticipated breach of another order contemplated in clause (j) of sub-section (2). Moreover, even assuming that the order of the Chief Controller of Prices under the Sugar Control Order was incomplete or inoperative, the reference to that order in the Governor’s order would be merely redundant and would not affect the validity of the Governor’s order; thus the appellant’s conviction under section 186 of the Penal Code was upheld. The Court then posed the question whether, for an offence under section 186, the act that was obstructed must be duly authorised and otherwise lawful, and applied the principle laid down in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee (1945) F.C.R. 195. The judgment concerned a criminal appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1950) from the High Court of Judicature at Patna, which had dismissed a revision petition against the conviction of the appellant for an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant, at all material times, was the General Manager of the Jagdishpur Zamindary Company, the lessee of the Bhita Sugar Factory, and he was prosecuted for obstructing the District Magistrate and the Special Officer in charge of Rationing, Patna, when they went to the factory on 6 December 1947 to remove 5,000 maunds of sugar that had been seized from the company’s stock pursuant to an order of the Government of Bihar dated 5 December 1947. The judgment was delivered on 5 March 1951 by Justice Patanjali Sastri, with counsel for the appellant, counsel for the respondent, and an intervener appearing before the Court.

According to the prosecution, the Jagdishpur Zamindary Company deliberately ignored repeated directives to supply sugar that had been issued under the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947. Those directives were issued by government officers who were properly authorised to enforce the order. Because the company failed to comply, the Government issued an order on 5 December 1947 exercising the powers granted to the Central Government by clause (1) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. Those powers had been delegated to the Provincial Government for matters relating to foodstuffs in the notification of the Government of India, Department of Food, No PY 603 (2)-1 dated 21 October 1946. The Governor of Bihar, by the signature of T. P. Singh, Secretary to Government, authorised the District Magistrate of Patna and/or the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, to search the sugar stock held by Messrs. Jagdishpur Zamindary Company at Bhita, Patna District. The order stated that the company’s stock was about to contravene an order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies, Bihar, made under clause 7(1)(ii) of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947 and issued in Order No. 1613-P.C.R. dated 27 September 1947. The Governor’s order further directed that 5,000 maunds of sugar held by the company be seized.

When the authorised officers arrived at the Bhita Sugar Factory on 6 December 1947 to enforce the order, the appellant, who was then the General Manager of the company, informed them that he would do everything possible to prevent the removal of the sugar. The officers discovered that the sugar godowns had been locked and that the access road had been blocked by piles of coal, firewood and tins, making vehicular traffic impossible. In addition, a railway siding leading to the godowns had been rendered unusable by the removal of several rails and fishplates. Because of these obstructions, the officers were compelled to call upon armed police to break the locks, repair the railway line and clear the road blockade before the sugar could be taken away.

The appellant’s principal defence was that, when section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, was properly construed, the Government did not have the competence to issue the order of 5 December 1947; consequently, the order was illegal and void. He further argued that any obstruction to the execution of an illegal order could not constitute an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The court rejected this contention, found the appellant guilty, and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for three weeks. On appeal, the Sessions Judge of Patna affirmed both the conviction and the sentence, agreeing with the findings of the trial court, and a

The appellant filed a revision petition which the High Court rejected; however, the High Court issued a certificate under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, finding that the matter was suitable for appeal to this Court because it raised a question of sufficient public importance concerning the interpretation of section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. Section 3, as it is relevant to the present case, reads as follows: “3. (1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, may, by notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof, and trade and commerce therein. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), an order made thereunder may provide- (j) for any incidental and supplementary matters, including in particular the entering, and search of premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft, the seizure by a person authorised to make such search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to believe that a contravention of the order has been, is being, or is about to be committed, the grant or issue of licences, permits or other documents, and the charging of fees therefor.”

The appellant contended that an order issued under sub-section (1) must be a rule or regulation of general application, similar to the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, which was issued by the Central Government on 4 August 1947. The appellant argued that the wording of sub-section (1) only empowers the Central Government to “provide for regulating or prohibiting” the production, supply, and distribution of essential commodities and does not authorize the making of ad hoc or special orders directed at a particular person or thing. The Court found no basis for imposing such a restrictive construction on the scope of the power conferred on the Central Government. The term “notified order,” defined as an order notified in the official Gazette, is sufficiently broad to encompass both special and general orders relating to the matters specified in section 3. The power to provide for regulating or prohibiting production, distribution, and supply, when vested in an executive body, may logically include the authority to issue directions to a specific producer or dealer, or to require a particular act to be performed or refrained from in relation to production, and section 4 supports this interpretation. Section 4 authorises the Central Government to delegate its power to make orders under section 3, subject to conditions, to any officer or subordinate authority of either the Central or a Provincial Government. It would be unreasonable, as the appellant suggested, to allow a subordinate officer responsible for a small area, by delegation, to exercise powers of a legislative character in relation to the matters specified in section 3, yet be denied the power to issue special orders concerning specific individuals or things.

In this case, the Court observed that the power delegated under section 4 cannot be limited to a purely legislative function concerning the matters listed in section 3, nor can it be restricted to the issuance of general orders. The Court held that the delegate should not be permitted to issue special orders directed at particular individuals or specific items, because such a situation was not envisaged by the statute. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the authority conferred by section 4 must necessarily include the power to give directions to any producer or dealer with respect to the production, distribution or supply of any essential commodity that is specified. For the delegate to possess such authority, the authority that makes the delegation under section 4 must itself have that power under section 3. The Court illustrated this principle by referring to section 7 of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, which was made by the Central Government. That section authorises the Controller to issue directions to any producer or dealer to supply sugar or sugar products to particular areas, persons or organisations. The delegation in that provision is expressed to be made “in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 3 and 4” of the Act. The Court reasoned that unless the Central Government had the power to issue such directions under section 3, it could not validly delegate that power to the Controller under section 4. This reasoning is reinforced by the wording of section 15, which contemplates an order under section 3 being made against a particular person, stating that “an order made under section 3 which prohibits him … from doing any act or being in possession of a thing without lawful authority…”. The Court found that the narrow construction of section 3 advanced by the appellant’s counsel would make the whole scheme of the Act impracticable, and therefore rejected that construction without hesitation. The Court further noted that, even assuming a narrow view, an order for seizure could be issued only if the conditions and limitations of clause (j) of sub-section (2) of section 3 were satisfied, namely that the authorised person “has reason to believe that a contravention of the order… has been, is being, or is about to be committed”. In the present matter, the order dated 5 December 1947 directed the seizure of 5,000 maunds of the company’s sugar. That order stated that the company was “about to commit a contravention of the order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies, Bihar, made under cl. 7(1)(ii) of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, and issued in order No. 1613 P.C.R. dated 27 September 1947, insofar as the said order relates to the said company.” The latter order required the company, among others, “to supply sugar at the prices fixed to the approved dealers of certain districts”, but left it to the District or Sub-divisional Officer to determine the quotas for the approved dealers from the district or sub-divisional allotment and to inform the company of the time and place of supply.

It was found by the courts below that the total quantity of sugar which the order required to be supplied was varied from time to time, and that no quotas for approved dealers were ever fixed nor any information sent to the company indicating when and where supplies were to be made. The order dated 27 September 1947 therefore remained inchoate and incomplete, and it could not be carried out or contravened until the later order of 5 December 1947. On that basis it was submitted that a seizure and removal could not be lawfully ordered on the ground of an anticipated contravention of an order that was not yet operative, and that the officers who carried out the illegal and unauthorised removal of the sugar were not acting in the discharge of their public functions. Reference was made to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Lilla Singh v. Queen Empress (1) and Queen Empress v. Jogendra Nath Mukerjee (2), where it was held that the public function being obstructed must be a legal or legitimately authorised function for the obstruction to constitute an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. Counsel for the respondent, however, maintained that for an offence under that section it was not necessary that the act which was obstructed be duly authorised and lawful, provided that the public servant performed or attempted to perform the act honestly and in good faith, believing it to be part of his public functions. The respondent relied on the decisions of the Madras High Court in Queen Empress v. Poomalai Udayan (3), Public Prosecutor v. Madava Bhonjo Santos (4) and Peer Masthan Rowther v. Emperor (5) to support this view. The Court considered that it was unnecessary for the purpose of the appeal to pronounce on the precise scope of section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, because the appellant’s argument was bound to fail on another ground. It was evident that sub-section (2) of section 3 did not confer any further or additional powers on the Central Government beyond those conferred by sub-section (1), since an “order made thereunder” could only provide for matters specifically enumerated in sub-section (2) in an illustrative manner and without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1). Because seizure of an article fell within the scope of sub-section (1), it was competent for the Central Government or its delegate, the Provincial Government, to issue an order for seizure under that provision, independent of any anticipated contravention of another order as contemplated in clause (j) of sub-section (2). The order of 5 December,

In the present case, the order dated 5 December 1947 was held to be a valid order despite its reference to the earlier order of 27 September 1947, which was described as being about to be contravened. The Court observed that even if the September order were incomplete and inoperative, as the appellant argued, the mention of it in the December order would constitute an immaterial redundancy and would not affect the legality of the later order.

Consequently, the seizure of the company’s sugar was regarded as duly authorised and lawful. The Court further concluded that by preventing the removal of the seized sugar, the appellant committed an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, even when the stricter interpretation of that provision formulated by the Calcutta High Court was applied.

The reasoning advanced by the Court was supported by the Privy Council decision in Sibnath Banerjee’s case(1). The Court then turned to the statutory framework provided by section 2(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, as amended by section 2 of the Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1940. These provisions empowered the Central Government to make rules for securing the defence of British India, public safety, maintenance of public order, and related matters. Section 2(2) stipulated that, “without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the rules may provide for all or any of the following matters …,” and listed among these matters the detention of any person “reasonably suspected” of acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety, identified as clause (x).

Rule 26, made under the said Act, authorized the Government to detain a person “if it is satisfied” that such detention was necessary to prevent the person from acting prejudicially. The Federal Court initially held that this rule was ultra vires because it extended beyond the scope of clause (x) by leaving the decision to the Government’s satisfaction (2). However, that decision was later reversed. Lord Thankerton, delivering the Board’s judgment, explained that subsection (2) serves only an illustrative function; the rule-making power resides in subsection (1), and the “rules” referred to in subsection (2) are those authorised by subsection (1). He emphasized that the phrase “without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)” confirms that subsection (2) does not restrict subsection (1). Lord Thankerton concluded that the general language of subsection (1) adequately justifies the terms of Rule 26 and counters the criticisms raised by the learned Judge regarding subsection (2). This interpretation aligns with the Court’s view on the effect of subsections (1) and (2) of section 3 of the Act.

The Court dismissed the appeal and consequently ordered the cancellation of the appellant’s bail bond. In addition, the Court directed that the appellant must surrender to the authorities as a result of the dismissal. The order reiterates that the appeal was dismissed and that the bail bond execution is set aside, thereby obligating the appellant to present himself for surrender. The appellant was represented in these proceedings by an agent identified as Rajinder Narain. The respondent, together with the intervenor, was represented by an agent identified as P.A. Mehta. The effect of this order is that the appellant’s liberty on the basis of the bail bond is terminated, and he is required to comply with the surrender directive issued by the Court.