Ravula Hariprasada Rao vs The State
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: supreme-court
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1950
Decision Date: 19 March, 1951
Coram: Saiyid Fazal Ali, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar
In the matter titled Ravula Hariprasada Rao versus The State, the decision was pronounced on the nineteenth day of March, 1951. The judgment was authored by Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali and was delivered by a bench consisting of Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B. K. Mukherjea, and Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar. The petitioner in the proceeding was Ravula Hariprasada Rao and the respondent was the State. The citation of the judgment appears as 1951 AIR 204 and 1951 SCR 322. The case is also referenced in several citator reports, including RF 1964 SC1140, R 1965 SC 722, R 1966 SC 43, R 1966 SC 128, and F 1971 SC 866. The substantive legal context concerned criminal law, specifically the element of mens rea, in relation to the Motor Spirit Rationing Order of 1941, particularly clauses 22, 25, and 27, and the Defence of India Rules of 1939, rule 81(4). The issues examined included the supply of petrol without the use of coupons, the failure to record required entries on coupons, the liability of an employer for the acts of employees, and the proper interpretation of the statutes involved.
The headnote of the judgment explained that, unless a statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes mens rea as a component of an offence, a person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offence without a guilty mind. The Court held that clauses 22 and 25 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, when read together with the Defence of India Rules, did not eliminate the requirement of mens rea. Consequently, where employees of a licensed petrol filling station supplied petrol to a motorist without obtaining the required coupons and thereby contravened those clauses, the licensee, who was absent at the time of the wrongdoing and lacked knowledge of it, could not be convicted under rule 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules. However, clause 27 of the Order was worded differently, imposing a duty on the supplier to endorse the vehicle’s registration or other identifying mark on the petrol coupons. The Court therefore ruled that if the supplier’s employees failed to endorse these particulars on the coupons, the supplier would be liable even without knowledge of the employees’ misconduct. The Court referred to the decisions in Srinivas Mall Bairolia v. King Emperor and Isak Solomon Macmull v. Emperor as supportive authority. The judgment was rendered under the criminal appellate jurisdiction as Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1950, arising from a judgment and order of the High Court of Madras dated the nineteenth of August, 1947, which had rejected an application to set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under clauses 22 and 27 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941. Special leave to appeal had been granted by the Privy Council, and the appeal was originally registered as Privy Council Appeal No. 14 of 1949 before being transferred to the Supreme Court. Counsel for the appellant was K. Bhimasankaran and counsel for the respondent was R. Ganapathi Iyer. The judgment was pronounced on March nineteenth, 1951.
The judgment was delivered by Justice Fazl Ali. The appeal, which was brought after the Privy Council granted special leave, was limited to the sole question of whether a guilty mind is required to constitute an offence under section 81 of the Defence of India Rules. The factual background is as follows. The appellant held the licence for two petrol filling stations, numbers 552 and 276, located at Guntur, although his residence was in Chirala, a distance of about forty miles. In addition to residing at Chirala, he served as a Presidency First Class Bench Magistrate there and was described as managing an extensive business that operated at several places. The stations were operated by two employees, Ch Venkatarayudu and Dadda Pichayya, who were respectively in charge of the two filling stations. In 1946 the appellant together with his two employees were tried before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Guntur for offences alleged under the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, and each was convicted on 18 July 1946. In the first case the charges alleged that on 27 June 1945 at Guntur the appellant and the employee who was in charge of the pump supplied petrol to cars without obtaining the requisite coupons, thereby contravening clause 22 read with clause 5 of the Order, which had been promulgated under rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules. The same day and at the same place they were also accused of accepting coupons for two other cars in advance without actually supplying petrol, an act alleged to be in violation of clause 27 of the Order. The second case alleged that during the twenty-four-hour period commencing at 6 a.m. on 28 June 1945 the appellant and the employee at the second pump supplied petrol to four motor vehicles without taking coupons, again breaching clause 22 read with clause 5. They were further alleged to have accepted coupons for three other vehicles in advance without dispensing petrol, thereby violating clause 27, and to have supplied petrol to two additional vehicles against coupons but without making the required endorsements and particulars on the reverse of the coupons, an infringement of clause 27A of the Order. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate found both the appellant and the respective employee guilty in each case. The appellant, whose case is the subject of this appeal, was sentenced to a fine of rupees 30 on the first count and rupees 20 on the second count in the first case, with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for one week, and to a fine of rupees 20 on each of the three counts in the second case, also with a default imprisonment of one week. Before the Magistrate the appellant pleaded that he was the presiding First Class Bench Magistrate at Chirala, that he conducted his petrol business at various centres through servants, that he had issued strict instructions to those servants not to deviate from the rules under any circumstances, and that he could not be
In the proceedings below the appellant argued that he should not be held liable for breaches of the regulations that were committed by his employees, insisting that he was merely the presiding First Class Bench Magistrate at Chirala and that he could not be made responsible for acts of his servants. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, however, rejected that contention and entered a conviction against the appellant on both counts, imposing a fine of thirty rupees on the first count and twenty rupees on the second, with a default imprisonment of one week. Unwilling to accept this outcome, the appellant appealed to the Sessions Judge at Guntur. On 9 September 1946 the Sessions Judge set aside the conviction on the second count in each of the two cases but affirmed the conviction and the associated sentence on the remaining charges. The High Court at Madras subsequently affirmed the Sessions Judge’s decision on 19 August 1947. Following these judgments the appellant sought special leave to appeal to the Privy Council. Leave was granted on 9 July 1948, but the leave was limited to a single issue: whether the element of mens rea is required to constitute an offence under rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules. The matter before the Privy Council therefore depended on the plea taken by the appellant and on the assumptions adopted by the lower courts. The appellant’s plea that he was not present in Guntur when the alleged violations occurred was not rejected by the lower courts; nevertheless they held that liability attached to him irrespective of his personal knowledge, reasoning that the question of mens rea did not affect the conviction for the offences with which he was charged. The trial Magistrate’s judgment expressed this view explicitly: “It is argued on behalf of accused 1 that he is not a resident of Guntur and that he has no knowledge of any infringement committed by accused 2. If any breach of the rules is committed by either proprietor or his servant, both are guilty whether they had the knowledge of the breach or not. The question of mens rea will, of course, affect the measure of punishment but it cannot affect the conviction (vide 1943, M.L.J. 38).” Before addressing the relevance of mens rea to conviction, the Court examined the applicable statutory framework. Rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules authorises the Central or Provincial Government, by order, to regulate the distribution, disposal, use or consumption of articles and to require that articles kept for sale be sold either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons under specified conditions. Under this authority the Central Government issued the Motor Spirit Rationing Order 1941, stating that its purpose was “securing the defence of British India, the efficient prosecution of the war and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.” Clause 2(d) of that Order defines a “dealer” as a person who carries on the business of supplying motor spirit at retail, and it includes a person who has charge of a government-controlled supply of motor spirit for private use.
The judgment set out that the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, defined a “dealer” as a person having charge of a supply of motor spirit controlled by Government from which any person is furnished with motor spirit for private use. The Order further defined a “supplier” in sub-clause (m) as a person carrying on the business of supplying motor spirit. Clause 5 of the Order provided that motor spirit required for any vehicle not covered by clause 3 or clause 4 shall be furnished or acquired only against the surrender to a supplier at the time of supply of valid ordinary coupons or of a valid supplementary coupon and only in accordance with any conditions or instructions appearing on or attached to the coupons. Clause 22 laid down that no person shall furnish or acquire a supply of motor spirit otherwise than in accordance with the provisions contained in this order. Clause 27 stated that no person shall surrender to a supplier and no supplier shall accept special receipts or coupons at a time other than the time at which the supply of motor spirit authorised by the special receipts or coupons or acknowledged by the receipts is furnished. Clause 27A required that when motor spirit is furnished against the surrender of one or more coupons, the supplier shall immediately endorse, or cause to be endorsed, on each coupon so surrendered the registration or other identifying mark of the vehicle to which the motor spirit is furnished. Rule 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules, which provides for the imposition of a penalty, declares that if any person contravenes any order made under this rule, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or both. The respondent contended that, although ordinarily a person should not be held liable for the criminal acts of another and no one can be charged with the commission of an offence unless a particular intent or knowledge is found to be present, mens rea is not of the essence of the offences in this case and therefore the appellant must be held liable for the acts of his employees. The appeal raised the question previously considered by the Privy Council in Srinivas Mall Bairolia v. King Emperor. In that case the appellants before the Privy Council were convicted under the Defence of India Rules relating to the control of prices and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The first appellant acted as Salt Agent for part of the district of Darbhanga, having been appointed to that office by the District Magistrate, and his duty was to sell to licensed retail dealers the supplies of salt allocated by the Central Government to his part of the district. The second appellant was employed by the first appellant and had been entrusted with the duty of allotting the appropriate quantity of salt to each retail dealer and noting on the buyer’s licence the quantity which he had bought and received.
The record showed that the buyer’s licence noted the quantity of salt that the buyer had purchased and actually received. Under rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules, the provincial governments were given authority to issue orders for controlling the prices at which any articles or things of any description might be sold. The Defence of India Act, 1939, which provided the basis for those rules, allowed the provincial governments to delegate the exercise of those powers to designated officers. Accordingly, the power to make price-control orders for various articles, including salt, was delegated to the district magistrates. Rule 81(4) of the same Rules prescribed punishment for any person who contravened such orders.
Both appellants were jointly charged with the sale of salt on three separate days in July 1943 to three identified traders, each sale being at a price that exceeded the maximum price fixed by the district magistrate’s order. In addition, the first appellant faced a separate charge, relating to the same transactions, alleging that he had abetted the second appellant’s violation of the price-control order. The trial magistrate acquitted the first appellant of the substantive offences but found him guilty on the three counts of abetment. Both the Sessions Judge and the High Court, on revision, affirmed those convictions.
The Privy Council ultimately upheld the appellants’ convictions on the merits. However, the Council took exception to the High Court’s view that, even if the first appellant could not be shown to have known of the second appellant’s unlawful acts, he could still be held liable on the basis that “where there is an absolute prohibition and no question of mens rea arises, the master is criminally liable for the acts of the servant.” The Privy Council’s Lords expressed respectful dissent, stating that they found no justification for classifying the offences under the Defence of India Rules as belonging to the narrow and exceptional class of offences that can be committed without a guilty mind. They cited the judgment of Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen (1) as authority. The Council noted that offences in that limited class are usually of a comparatively minor character, and it would be a surprising consequence of the delegated legislation if a person who was morally innocent could be held vicariously liable for a servant’s crime and subjected to imprisonment of up to three years. Their Lords further agreed with a recent observation by the Lord Chief Justice of England, who emphasized that, for the protection of individual liberty, a court must always remember that unless a statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, excludes mens rea as an essential element of the offence, a defendant should not be found guilty of a criminal offence.
In the discussion, the Court observed that, as a general principle of criminal law, a person should not be convicted of an offence unless the legislation expressly eliminates the requirement of a guilty mind, or the requirement is implied by the statute. The Court referred to the authority in Brend v. Wood (1946) 110 J.P. 317, 318, which states that a defendant cannot be found guilty of a crime unless he possesses a guilty mind, unless the statute itself removes mens rea as an element of the offence. Applying that principle, the Court found it difficult to sustain a conviction against the appellant under clause 22 read with clause 5 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941. The wording of clause 22 does not support the proposition that an innocent master may be held criminally liable for the acts of his servant. The clause, which has been quoted earlier, merely provides that no person shall furnish motor spirit in a manner contrary to the provisions contained in the Order. The provision is not limited exclusively to a supplier; it is framed in general terms and therefore can affect any individual who violates its terms, whether that person is a supplier or not. Moreover, the language indicates that liability attaches only to the person who actually furnishes motor spirit in breach of the Order.
During the arguments, counsel for the appellant referred to the Bombay High Court decision in Isak Solomon Macmull v. Emperor (1948) A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 64, a case that also involved an alleged breach of clause 22 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order. In that judgment, the learned Chief Justice reiterated the well-settled rule that, unless a statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes mens rea, a defendant cannot be held guilty of a criminal offence without a guilty mind. Relying on that rule, the Chief Justice held that when a servant sold petrol to a bogus customer without the required coupons, and the master was neither present nor aware of the transaction, the master could not be held vicariously liable for the servant’s act. The Court agreed with that reasoning and considered the decision directly applicable to the present facts, concluding that the appellant could not be held liable for the servant’s conduct under clause 22.
The Court then turned to the third charge in the second set of proceedings, which concerned a breach of clause 27A of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order. Clause 27A, as previously described, imposes on the supplier the duty to endorse, or to cause to be endorsed, the registration or any other identifying mark of the vehicle to which motor spirit is supplied. The charge against the appellant alleged that the required particulars had not been endorsed on several coupons against which petrol had been dispensed. The appellant’s argument in this regard was that the omission was caused by his servants and not by him personally. The Court examined the language of clause 27A and found that it clearly places the responsibility for making the necessary endorsements on the supplier himself. The definition of “supplier” contained in the Act had already been quoted, and there was no doubt that any person falling within that definition who contravenes clause 27A must be held guilty of the violation. The object of the clause was to require the petrol supplier to establish a complete system ensuring that all required endorsements are made on the coupons accompanying each supply of petrol. Consequently, even if the default was committed by the supplier’s servants, that fact alone would not absolve the supplier from liability under clause 27A.
In this case, the appellant argued that he could not be found guilty because the alleged default had been committed by his servants rather than by him personally. The Court examined the language of clause 27A and concluded that the appellant’s contention could not be accepted. Clause 27A, as previously discussed, expressly places the responsibility for making the required endorsements on the supplier of petrol. The definition of “supplier” contained in the Act had already been quoted, and the Court held that there was no doubt that any person who falls within that definition must be held guilty if clause 27A is violated. The purpose of the clause, the Court observed, was to require the petrol supplier to establish a complete system that ensures the necessary endorsements are placed on the coupons against which petrol is supplied. The Court acknowledged that in many situations the default may be committed by the supplier’s servants who operate the petrol pump, but it emphasized that this fact alone does not exonerate the supplier from liability. To illustrate this principle, the Court referred to Mousell Brothers v. London and North-Western Railway(‘), where Viscount Reading C.J. observed that, “Prima facie, then, a master is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servant to which the master is not a party. But it may be the intention of the Legislature, in order to guard against the happening of the forbidden thing, to impose a liability upon a principal even though he does not know of, and is not party to, the forbidden act done by his servant. Many statutes are passed with this object. Acts done by the servant of the licensed holder of licensed premises render the licensed holder in some instances liable, even though the act was done by his servant without the knowledge of the master. Under the Food and Drugs Acts there are again instances well known in these Courts where the master is made responsible, even though he knows nothing of the act done by his servant, and he may be fined or rendered amenable to the penalty enjoined by the law. In those [1) [1917] 2 K.B.D. 836 at 844. cases the Legislature absolutely forbids the act and makes the principal liable without a mens rea.” The Court also quoted Atkin J., who stated, “I think that the authorities cited by my Lord make it plain that while prima facie a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the prohibition or the duty absolute; in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants. To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not regard must be …” This reasoning led the Court to reject the appellant’s claim of non-liability based solely on the conduct of his servants.
The Court explained that when construing a statutory provision, the matters to be examined include the object of the statute, the specific words used, the nature of the duty prescribed, the person on whom the duty is imposed, the individual who would ordinarily perform the act, and the person against whom any penalty is directed. The Court noted that where authority for this approach is required, it may be found in the judgment of Bowen L.J. in Reg. v. Tylor (1).
In the case of Mullins v. Collins (2), the servant of a licensed victualler had knowingly supplied liquor to a constable on duty without the authority of the servant’s superior officer. The Court held that the licensed victualler was liable to be convicted even though he lacked knowledge of the servant’s conduct. Blackburn J. observed that “if we hold that there must be a personal knowledge in the licensed person, we should make the enactment of no effect.” The Court further observed that many other English decisions express the same principle, and several of those decisions have been compiled and classified by Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen (3). The principle articulated in those cases has also been adopted in a number of decisions in this country.
Applying this principle, the Court allowed the appeal in part. Specifically, the convictions and sentences imposed on the appellant on the first charge in both cases were set aside, while the conviction and sentence on the third charge in the second case were upheld. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed in part. Counsel for the appellants represented the appellant, and counsel for the respondent represented the State.