Joylal Agarwala vs The State

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1950

Decision Date: 4 October, 1951

Coram: Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Harilal Kania

The case titled Joylal Agarwala versus The State was decided on 4 October 1951, and the judgment was recorded by Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar, who also served as the author of the opinion. The bench that heard the matter comprised Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Justice Harilal Kania of the Supreme Court of India. The docket consisted of two separate criminal appeals that originated from convictions pronounced by the High Court at Calcutta. In the first appeal, the High Court itself granted permission to proceed to this Court under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. In the second appeal, the Supreme Court exercised its own authority to grant special leave to appeal under article 136(1) of the Constitution. Although both appeals were considered together during the hearing, the parties involved were distinct and the factual circumstances differed; consequently, the Court deemed it appropriate to render two separate judgments to address each case on its own merits.

Criminal Appeal No 7 of 1950 concerned the appellant, Joylal Agarwala, who was employed as a salesman in a retail establishment located in Pulbazar, Darjeeling district, in the State of West Bengal. He was charged with selling a piece of textile cloth at a price that exceeded the price fixed by the control regulations. The specific violation was alleged under clause 24(1) of the Cotton Textiles Control Order, 1948. Following a trial before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Darjeeling, the appellant was convicted under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946—hereinafter referred to as the Essential Supplies Act—and sentenced to six months of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant subsequently challenged the conviction before the Sessions Judge, who set aside the finding on two grounds: first, that no prior sanction had been obtained as required by clause 36 of the Cotton Textiles Control Order, and second, that the Essential Supplies Act was not in force in the Darjeeling district on the date the alleged offence occurred. The State of West Bengal appealed the acquittal to the High Court. During the appellate proceedings, the appellant abandoned the argument concerning the lack of sanction, contending that the necessity for such sanction had been removed by a later notification issued by the Central Government. The High Court, however, examined the second point and concluded that the Essential Supplies Act had been validly extended to the Darjeeling district and was operative there on the date of the occurrence, which was 14 October 1949. Accordingly, the High Court reversed the Sessions Judge’s acquittal, reinstated the conviction recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and imposed a sentence of four months’ rigorous imprisonment upon the appellant.

To appreciate the principal legal issue regarding whether the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, was in effect at the time the alleged offence was committed, it is necessary to set out the relevant statutory provisions and their dates of operation. The Essential Supplies Act came into force on 19 November 1946. Section 92(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, stipulates that no legislation enacted by either the Federal Legislature or a Provincial Legislature shall apply to an excluded area—or to a partially excluded area—unless the Governor, by means of a public notification, directs otherwise, and unless the Governor, in issuing such direction, may specify any exceptions or modifications that he deems appropriate. In exercise of the authority conferred by this provision, the Governor of Bengal issued a notification on 14 December 1946, declaring that the Essential Supplies Act would apply to the district of Darjeeling, which at that time qualified as an excluded area. Section 1(3) of the Essential Supplies Act further provides that the Act shall cease to have effect upon the expiry of the period specified in section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. VI, Chapter 39). Section 4 of that Act defines the applicable period as a duration of one year beginning with the date on which the proclamation of emergency, in force at the time the Act was passed, ceases, or, if the Governor-General directs by public notification, a period of two years commencing from that date, subject to any conditions expressly provided therein.

In the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor was empowered to issue a direction concerning any statute, stating that the statute would, as applied to a particular area, “have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as he thinks fit.” Exercising this power, the Governor of Bengal issued a notification on 14 December 1946 declaring that the Essential Supplies Act would apply to the district of Darjeeling, an area that had previously been excluded. Section 1(3) of the Essential Supplies Act thereafter provided that the Act would cease to have effect when the period specified in Section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, Ch. 39) expired. Section 4 of that 1946 Act set out the following period: “The period mentioned… is the period of one year beginning with the date on which the Proclamation of Emergency in force at the passing of this Act ceases to operate or, if the Governor-General by public notification so directs, the period of two years beginning with that date: Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the extension of the said period is passed by both Houses of Parliament, the said period shall be extended for a further period of twelve months from the date on which it would otherwise expire so, however, that it does not in any case continue for more than five years from the date on which proclamation of Emergency ceases to operate.” The Proclamation of Emergency referred to in that provision terminated on 31 March 1946. Consequently, in the absence of any Governor-General notification under the second alternative, the Essential Supplies Act would have remained in force only until 31 March 1947, that is, for the one-year period prescribed by the first alternative. However, on 3 March 1947 the Governor-General issued a public notification directing that the Act be continued for a period of two years from the date the emergency ceased, thereby extending the operation of the Essential Supplies Act to 31 March 1948. Subsequent constitutional developments altered the legislative framework: the Indian Independence Act was enacted on 18 July 1947, and India became a Dominion on 15 August 1947. Under section 9 read with section 19(4) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General issued an order on 14 August 1947 that replaced the words “both Houses of Parliament” with “Dominion Legislature” in the proviso to Section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, and also inserted a new Section 4A, thereby assigning the legislative powers of the Dominion Legislature to the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly thereafter exercised those powers, passing its first resolution on 25 February 1948 which extended the life of the Essential Supplies Act by one year, moving the expiry date to 31 March 1949. A second resolution was adopted on 23 March 1949, further extending the Act’s operation by another year to 31 March 1950. In light of these statutes, notifications, and resolutions, the appellant raised three questions before the Court. The first question sought to determine whether the Governor’s notification of 14 December 1946 continued the operation of the Essential Supplies Act in the Darjeeling district beyond the original period of one year following the cessation of the emergency.

In this appeal the petitioner raised three separate points. First, the petitioner asked whether the Essential Supplies Act could continue to operate in the district of Darjeeling beyond the statutory period that had been fixed for the Act, specifically beyond the one-year period measured from the date when the emergency declared under the Act ceased. Second, the petitioner contended that after the Governor-General had extended the life of the Essential Supplies Act by a notification dated 3 March 1947, a fresh notification by the Governor under section 92(1) of the Government of India Act was still required in order to keep the Act in force in Darjeeling. Third, the petitioner submitted that the two resolutions passed by the Constituent Assembly could themselves operate to extend the life of the Essential Supplies Act. The Court first examined the effect of section 1(3) of the Essential Supplies Act, which provides that the Act shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period described in section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946. That provision does not tie the duration of the Essential Supplies Act to a fixed one-year period after the termination of the emergency; instead it allows the Governor-General, by way of a notification, to fix a period of two years and to extend the operation of the Act in increments of one year for up to a maximum of five years. Consequently, the determination of the period for which the Essential Supplies Act remains operative is not left to any other statute; it is set out within the Act itself. The notification dated 14 December 1946 issued by the Governor applied the Essential Supplies Act to the district of Darjeeling, and the Governor-General’s subsequent notification extended the life of the Act in that district up to 31 March 1948. Because the later Government notification extended the Act to Darjeeling without naming a particular term of applicability, the Act would continue to operate in Darjeeling for as long as it remained in force in the rest of India. Only in a situation where the Act’s effect would have ceased before the Indian Independence Act came into force and where a re-enactment by the legislature sought to be applied to an excluded area would a fresh notification under section 92(1) of the Government of India Act be required. In the present case no such circumstance arose, and therefore the question of a fresh notification did not arise.

Section 19(4) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, states: “In this Act, except so far as the context otherwise requires – references to the Government of India Act, 1935, include references to any enactment amending or supplementing that Act, and, in particular, references to the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 ….” The adaptations made by the Governor-General under sections 9 and 10 of the Indian Independence Act replaced the words “Constituent Assembly” for “both Houses of Parliament” in section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act. By means of two separate resolutions passed on different dates, the Constituent Assembly exercised the powers that had previously belonged to both Houses of Parliament and extended the life of the Essential Supplies Act until 31 March 1950. As soon as those adaptations came into force by order of the Governor-General, the Constituent Assembly’s resolutions became effective in prolonging the operation of the Essential Supplies Act.

In this matter, the Court observed that the adaptations introduced by the Governor-General had been brought into operation by his order and that the Constituent Assembly had thus acquired the powers that had previously been vested in both Houses of Parliament under section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act. The Court stated that there was no doubt about the validity of those adaptations. The Court then turned to the precedent cited in the earlier proceedings, namely the decision in Jalindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar and others ([1949] F.C.R. 596), and held that that case was not applicable to the present facts. The Court explained that the legislature itself had considered the question and had fixed the period for which the Act would remain in force, while leaving the method for attaining the maximum period to be carried out in stages according to a specific scheme. Consequently, the Court found that there was no delegation of legislative authority, and certainly no delegation of any legislative power, in the arrangement. On that basis, the Court concluded that the appeal was bound to fail and ordered its dismissal.

The Court then addressed Criminal Appeal No 25 of 1951. In that appeal, the appellant, Bichan Chand Molla, had been charged with loading twenty-eight bags of mill-made cloth from a truck onto a specially chartered aircraft at Dum Dum airport on behalf of his employers, Messrs Amarchand Pannalal, without possessing the permit required by clause 4(2) of the West Bengal Cotton Cloth and Yarn Movement Control Order, 1947. He had been convicted under section 7(1) read with section 8 of the Essential Supplies Act, sentenced to nine months of rigorous imprisonment and fined one thousand rupees by the First Class Magistrate of Barrackpore. The Sessions Judge of 24-Parganas had dismissed the appellant’s appeal, and a revision petition filed in the High Court had met the same result.

The Court noted that the legal argument raised in this appeal was identical to that presented in the earlier appeal and therefore had to be rejected as untenable for the reasons already explained. A special point raised by the appellant concerned the alleged absence of mens rea. The High Court had examined this issue and held that two factual circumstances allowed an inference of mens rea. The appellant had testified that he was loading hand-loom bales rather than mill-made cloth and that he possessed no permit and could not produce one even from his employers. The Court agreed that, in view of these facts, a criminal intent could be properly inferred. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal of this appeal as well.