Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs State Of Madhya Bharat

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 2 November, 1951

Coram: Bose

In this matter the Supreme Court considered the appeals of two brothers, Hate Singh and Bheru Singh, who had both been convicted of murdering Shiv Singh and had been sentenced to death, a judgment that the Madhya Bharat High Court affirmed. Both brothers sought relief from this Court, but the Court dismissed Bheru Singh’s appeal at the outset because he had openly admitted that he had fired the gun and had taken full responsibility for the killing from the beginning of the trial and had maintained that admission throughout the proceedings before the High Court. The trial record also contained the evidence of two eyewitnesses who testified against Bheru Singh, and given his admissions, the Court found that their testimony could be accepted as reliable regarding his conduct. In contrast, the Court noted that there existed some doubt concerning the case of Hate Singh, and consequently, his appeal was permitted to be heard, which forms the subject of the present decision. Hate Singh consistently denied any involvement in the crime. The prosecution’s case, as summarised by the Court, was that a sudden quarrel erupted between Shiv Singh and Bheru Singh after Shiv Singh had struck Hate Singh’s twelve-year-old brother-in-law. During the altercation Bheru Singh allegedly discharged a firearm at Shiv Singh, wounding him, after which Shiv Singh, though injured, rushed at Bheru Singh brandishing a lathi. The appellant, Hate Singh, who also possessed a gun, is said to have intervened, fired at Shiv Singh, and struck him, causing Shiv Singh to fall dead. The medical evidence established that Shiv Singh sustained three gunshot wounds located on the front left side of his body – two in the chest and one in the abdomen. One bullet penetrated the heart, a second entered about two and a half inches from the left nipple and damaged the spleen, and the third entered near the left side of the umbilicus. The examining physician, Dr Shukla, testified that each of these injuries alone would have been sufficient to cause death, and further opined that a single discharge from a gun could have produced all three wounds. No bullets or firearms were recovered at the scene, and consequently the Court could not directly determine whether the injuries resulted from one weapon or multiple firearms. The prosecution described one weapon as a breech-loading double-barrel gun with a hammer action, while the other two were described as older muzzle-loading guns, which would be expected to discharge different types of ammunition. The Court indicated that only the weapons identified as Arts D and E required consideration, since no argument had been raised linking a third weapon, identified as Art G, to the facts of the case. The Court then turned to the eyewitness testimony that implicated both Bheru Singh and Hate Singh, indicating that although such testimony would normally have been sufficient for affirmation, special circumstances in this case required a more careful scrutiny of the witnesses’ statements against Hate Singh.

In this case, the Court observed that Bheru Singh also implicated Hate Singh and that both of their testimonies had initially been accepted as credible. Ordinarily, such admissions would have left no room for the Court’s interference, but the Court identified special reasons for not taking these witnesses’ statements at face value against Hate Singh. The Court first set out certain facts that are either admitted by the parties or, in the Court’s opinion, established beyond doubt. Bheru Singh, from the very beginning, admitted his own guilt and assumed full responsibility for the offence. In contrast, Hate Singh has consistently denied any participation in the shooting, and his version of events has remained unchanged throughout the investigation. According to the testimony of Jugar Singh, who is identified as PW 14, the accused gave this account a few hours after the murder, well before the police arrived at the scene and before either of them was apprehended. While it is true that the witness had ample time to devise a defence and that he is the nephew of the accused, the learned Sessions Judge gave full credence to his statement and placed no doubt on his veracity. Consequently, the Court can accept as a fact that the accused conveyed that story to the witness on the very evening of the incident, and that the witness is not fabricating what he was told. This does not preclude the possibility that, at some earlier stage, the accused may have agreed to adopt a common line of defence so that one might be sentenced to death while the other escaped liability; nevertheless, the fact remains that they embraced this stance from the outset and did not devise it later, a circumstance the Court finds particularly striking. Moreover, Hate Singh has openly admitted his presence at the crime scene at the relevant time, a point he could have denied, and he has also admitted that he was carrying a firearm, another admission he could have avoided. If the two brothers had intended to construct a false narrative that would sacrifice one brother while freeing the other, they could not have chosen a more hazardous version of events; on their face, their statements therefore possess a degree of credibility. The Court further noted that statements recorded from an accused under Sections 208, 209 and 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code constitute some of the most important evidence to be considered at trial. It must be remembered that, in this jurisdiction, an accused person is not permitted to enter the witness box and testify on oath in his own defence; such statutory statements are intended to stand in for the kind of testimony that would be permissible in other legal systems. These statements must be admitted as evidence, treated like any other oral testimony, and accorded appropriate weight, with the presumption of innocence guiding the assessment of their reasonableness unless the prosecution can disprove them beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court observed that a statement recorded by a magistrate or a sessions judge can become a very strong defence tool for a person who is truly innocent. In India, the statements taken by the Committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are meant to substitute the testimony that an accused could give voluntarily in the witness box in England or the United States. Consequently, such statements must be admitted as evidence, considered under the provisions of Sections 287 and 342, and evaluated in the same manner as any other witness testimony. This requires that favourable material for the accused be given the same respect and weight as material that is adverse to him. Moreover, because the law presumes innocence, an accused’s version of events should be accepted if it is reasonable and consistent with the probabilities, unless the prosecution can prove beyond reasonable doubt that the version is false. The Court felt that this basic principle had not been applied correctly in the present case. The next point unanimously accepted by all parties was that two shots had been fired. Every witness concurred that two shots were heard, the accused Bheru Singh confessed to firing two shots, and Hate Singh, before the Committing Magistrate, testified that he heard two distinct shots. Therefore, the fact of two shots was established. The remaining issue was whether Bheru Singh fired both shots as he claimed, or whether one shot was fired by Bheru Singh and the other by Hate Singh. The medical evidence did not contradict the defence’s version. The examining doctor stated that a single bullet could have caused all three injuries, and consequently two bullets could also have caused the same injuries, even if both were discharged by the same shooter. The post-mortem report did not provide any evidence to the contrary, and the failure to retrieve the projectiles from the bodies left the Court without potentially decisive forensic proof. The Court then noted that the seizure of the firearms was beyond doubt. Article D was identified as a double-barrel breech-loading gun with a hammer action, which Bheru Singh said he used; this weapon was found buried about six inches deep near the front door of Hate Singh’s premises. Article E was described as an old-fashioned single-barrel muzzle-loading gun that was lying openly against a wall inside Hate Singh’s house. Both weapons were recovered after being pointed out by Hate Singh himself. Finally, the Court highlighted a crucial piece of evidence concerning the condition of the guns that had been overlooked. According to the defence, Bheru Singh possessed the double-barrel gun and fired two shots from it, while Hate Singh did not use his own single-barrel firearm in the incident.

According to the defence, the weapon assigned to him was the old-fashioned single-barrel muzzle-loader referred to as Art E, which was recovered from his premises. In the absence of any reloading, the double-barrel gun identified as Art D would have both barrels empty of live rounds and therefore would be found in an unloaded condition. Conversely, the muzzle-loader, unless it were already empty, would still be loaded at the time of seizure. It has been accepted throughout the trial that Art E, the muzzle-loader, was indeed found loaded, leaving the state of Art D as the remaining question. The seizure memorandum, exhibited as Ex P-8, records that the double-barrel gun had one barrel loaded and the other barrel empty, while the single-barrel muzzle-loader was loaded. This description was challenged by the accused, and one of the witnesses to the seizure, Vajeram (P.W. 13), was cross-examined on that point. During cross-examination, Vajeram admitted that only one of the two guns was found loaded but could not recall which specific gun it was. Another witness, Ramsingh (P.W. 12), testified that Art E was loaded but offered no information regarding the condition of the other firearm. Both witnesses gave their statements on 25-1-1950. Subsequently, Sub-Inspector Thakre (P.W. 17) was examined on 30-5-1950, having had ample opportunity to investigate the matter, yet he neither contradicted Vajeram’s account nor stated that Vajeram was erroneous, and he omitted any comment about the condition of the guns at the time of recovery. Because Vajeram’s statement aligns with a material aspect of the defence version and because he was not contradicted by the officer who would have been most likely to do so if his testimony were inaccurate, there was no justification for disregarding Vajeram’s evidence. The learned Sessions Judge addressed this issue by observing that Vajeram, a witness to the panchnama (P-6), “does not remember which of the two guns recovered was loaded” and suggested that “one barrel of the double-barrel gun was probably leaded at the time of the seizure,” a presumption deemed more probable in light of the eye-witness statements. The Court found this approach unsatisfactory, noting that the prosecution’s undisputed facts in the witness box matched the accused’s narrative, yet the Sessions Judge nonetheless led the accused to believe their version was correct and later reversed that inference in the judgment. The Court highlighted that the accused Hate Singh was asked, “Ramsingh … and Vajeram depose that out of the two guns (Arts D & E) recovered from your house ‘one’ was loaded. Ramsingh further says that the gun which was loaded is ‘Art E’. What have you to say about it?” to which Hate Singh replied, “I do not know whether the gun was loaded or not.”

The testimony of the second accused, Bheru Singh, was recorded in response to the same question posed to Hate Singh. He affirmed that one gun, identified as Article E, was found loaded. He asserted that this gun had been lying loaded inside the house prior to the incident. The examination of the accused did not contain any reference indicating that Article D was also loaded in one barrel. The High Court did not address this particular issue. A further, though comparatively minor, point emerges from the discovery of the weapons. Only a single gun was recovered from a buried position, namely the weapon that Bheru Singh conceded to have used. The other firearm was discovered lying openly. This circumstance tends to suggest that only the weapon implicated in the offence was concealed. The Court noted that a more thorough investigation could have included an examination of the barrels, which would have clarified whether both barrels of Article D were fouled, whether only one barrel was fouled, and whether the barrel of Article E showed any fouling at all. In the Court’s view, these observations constitute the salient features of the case and must be accepted as established beyond dispute. All of these facts are consistent with the defence’s version of events. Consequently, the Court indicated that the prosecution’s evidence must be scrutinised with greater than ordinary care.

The first eye-witness, identified as Deoji (PW 1), testified that he was present at the commencement of the quarrel and was close enough to seize the deceased Shiv Singh by the hand in an attempt to prevent the continuation of the dispute. Because of his proximity, Deoji claimed he could observe which accused possessed which firearm. He stated that Hate Singh was holding a single-barrel gun, while Bheru Singh carried the double-barrel gun, a narration that aligns with the defence’s account. Deoji further recounted that after moving approximately one-hundred and fifty paces away from him, the parties continued to quarrel, at which point Bheru Singh discharged the first shot, striking Shiv Singh and causing him to stagger backwards. Shiv Singh then recovered, seized a stick, and rushed toward Bheru Singh. At that moment, Hate Singh fired a second shot that killed Shiv Singh. The explanatory notes accompanying the Sketch Map (Exhibit P 2) indicated that Bheru Singh was twenty to twenty-one paces from the deceased when he fired, whereas Hate Singh was fourteen or fifteen paces away when he fired the second shot, standing behind Bheru Singh. This implies that after the first shot, Shiv Singh had sufficient time to move at least six paces before the second shot was discharged. The Court observed that at this juncture the witness appeared to become confused, and, in the Court’s opinion, attempted to rectify his inconsistency by attributing the double-barrel gun to Hate Singh and the other gun to Bheru Singh.

The witness testified that after Shiv Singh fell, both accused men rushed toward him and that the first accused, identified as Hate Singh, struck Shiv Singh on the forehead with the butt-end of his gun. The witness added that he observed the butt-end of Hate Singh’s gun to be broken. This description implied that Shiv Singh sustained a head injury and that the gun’s butt had broken, a fact the prosecution sought to corroborate by noting that two broken fragments of a gun butt had been recovered from the scene. In reality, no head injury was present on Shiv Singh, and the broken firearm was a double-barrel gun, designated as Art. D. In an attempt to conceal this discrepancy, the witness later claimed on cross-examination that Hate Singh possessed the double-barrel gun whose butt was later broken. The prosecution’s case in the Committal Court aligned with the witness’s original account, which coincidentally matched the defence’s version. Bheru Singh was questioned: “Thereafter you hit Shiv Singh, who was lying down, on his abdomen with the butt of your gun, causing it to break.” He answered affirmatively, stating he struck the dead body of Shiv Singh with the butt of his gun. The Sessions Judge appeared to accept this narrative, asking Hate Singh whether Deoji Anjana had also testified that Hate Singh hit Shiv Singh’s forehead with the gun butt and that Bheru Singh struck Shiv Singh’s abdomen with his gun’s butt, causing the butt to break. A similar query was posed to Bheru Singh.

The same inaccuracy might have been dismissed as insignificant had it not been reinforced by another eye-witness, Bhawanya (P.W. 5), who echoed the first witness regarding the sequence of firing – asserting that Bheru Singh fired first and Hate Singh followed – but, under cross-examination, claimed that Art. E was discharged first and Art. D second, and that Art. D was the gun habitually carried by Hate Singh. It was unlikely that two independent witnesses would deviate from the Committal Court record on the same point purely by accident. The defence’s version concerning the firearms appeared more plausible because Deoji (P.W. 1) admitted that after striking Shiv Singh on the stomach, Bheru Singh set his gun down and then attacked Shiv Singh with an axe. If the butt-end of the gun had indeed broken, it was understandable that Bheru Singh would put the weapon aside; however, it was improbable that he would abandon a functional weapon in the midst of an assault. The Court then considered the testimony of seven additional witnesses who had heard the two shots and observed the accused but did not witness the actual discharge. Two of these witnesses, Babru (P.W. 4) and Ramsingh (P.W. 15), had supported the accused’s account, yet their credibility was questioned. The remaining five witnesses did not observe the second shot, although at least four were positioned within viewing distance and two had seen Shiv Singh falling. This would be plausible if the shots were fired in quick succession, as might occur with a double-barrel gun, but not if the eye-witnesses’ version of a delayed second shot were accurate.

The Court observed that the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, identified as Babru (PW-4) and Ramsingh (PW-15), was rejected despite there being no apparent reason for disbelief. Regarding the remaining five eyewitnesses, the Court found it notable that none of them reported hearing or seeing the second shot, even though at least four were positioned within clear view of the scene and two actually witnessed Shiv Singh falling. The Court explained that such an omission would be plausible only if the two shots had been discharged in rapid succession, as could occur with a double-barrelled firearm, but it would be inconsistent with the witnesses’ own description of the sequence of events. According to the eyewitness accounts, Bheru Singh fired the first shot, after which Shiv Singh staggered backward and then lunged forward a distance measured on the map as six to seven paces before the second shot was delivered. The Court noted that the interval required for a person to move six or seven steps would be considerable, providing ample time for nearby observers to raise their heads and look toward the source of the gunfire. Moreover, a reasonable person hearing a shot fired close to his or her position would normally react by turning the head to locate the source of the noise. Because at least five of the eyewitnesses did not have the opportunity to perform such a reaction, the Court concluded that this circumstance strongly supports the accused’s version of events and casts serious doubt on the reliability of the eye-witnesses’ narrative.

The Court also remarked that both the Sessions Judge and the High Court had attached significance to the fact that the accused had absconded, yet no opportunity was ever given to the accused to explain this circumstance. The Court reiterated the established principle that every material fact intended to be used against an accused must be disclosed to him, together with a reasonable chance to respond. The Court expressed regret that this procedural safeguard is frequently overlooked in criminal proceedings. Although the Court ordinarily refrains from re-evaluating evidence on appeal, it chose to do so in this case because a departure from the usual rule was evident. The usual rule states that when an accused raises a reasonable defence that appears likely to be true and is corroborated by two prosecution witnesses, the burden of proving guilt shifts more heavily onto the prosecution. In such circumstances, a defence that is both plausible and probable, when contrasted with a weak and indecisive prosecution case, must create reasonable doubt that the accused is entitled to enjoy. The Court found that the prosecution’s evidence failed to eliminate the serious doubts that a careful comparison with the defence evidence revealed. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeal succeeded, set aside Hate Singh’s conviction and sentence, and ordered his immediate release.