Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 93 of 1951

Decision Date: 23 November 1951

Coram: Vivian Bose, Saiyid Fazal Ali, Mehr Chand Mahajan

In the matter titled Commissioner of Police, Bombay versus Gordhandas Bhanji, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 23 November 1951. The bench comprised Justices Vivian Bose, Saiyid Fazal Ali and Mehr Chand Mahajan. The petitioner was the Commissioner of Police, Bombay and the respondent was Gordhandas Bhanji. The reported citation of the decision is 1952 AIR 16 and 1952 SCR 135, with subsequent citations appearing in various law reports. The factual background involved the City of Bombay Police Act of 1902, specifically section 22(1), together with the Rules framed thereunder, namely rules 8, 238 to 257 and 263 to 283, as well as section 45 of the Specific Relief Act of 1877. The respondent had applied for a licence to construct a cinema on a site within the City of Bombay. The Commissioner initially rejected the application, but after the respondent sought reconsideration, the Commissioner, acting on the advice of the Cinema Advisory Committee, granted permission by means of an office letter dated 16 July 1947. The Commissioner later filed an affidavit stating that, but for the Committee’s advice, he would have refused the application again. Subsequent to this, the Government instructed the Commissioner to send a communication to the respondent stating that the permission granted on 16 July 1947 was cancelled. The respondent then applied to the High Court of Bombay for a decree under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act directing the Commissioner to withdraw the cancellation and to uphold the permission for the cinema. The High Court ordered the Commissioner to withdraw the cancellation. The Commissioner appealed this order to the Supreme Court. The Court held first that the letter of 16 July 1947 reflected a decision made by the Commissioner himself in the honest exercise of the discretion vested in him; the decision was not invalid merely because it relied on the Committee’s advice, even though the Commissioner admitted he might not have granted the licence without such advice. Second, the Court found that the cancellation of the licence was not valid because the communication of cancellation was issued by the Government of Bombay and not by the Commissioner exercising his own authority; the Commissioner acted only as a conduit for the Government’s instruction. The Court further concluded that the respondent’s request for an injunction directing the Commissioner to grant the licence could not be granted, as the licence had already been validly granted and there was no lawful cancellation. Likewise, an injunction directing the Commissioner to withdraw the cancellation could not be granted because Rule 250 confers upon the Commissioner an absolute discretion in this matter. Finally, the Court noted that although no specific statutory provision compels the Commissioner to exercise the discretion under Rule 250, the enabling power granted by that rule is vested solely in the Commissioner.

The Court observed that the rules framed under section 136, paragraph (f), (g) and (n) of the City of Bombay Police Act of 1902 established that the Government of Bombay possessed no authority to cancel a licence once it had been issued. The Court further clarified that the sole individual vested with the power to grant or refuse a licence for constructing a building intended for public amusement was the Commissioner of Police. Because the Commissioner had already granted permission for the erection of the cinema and because there was no valid order of cancellation, the Court held that the respondent’s request for an injunction directing the Commissioner to grant such permission could not be granted. Likewise, the Court found that an injunction directing the Commissioner to withdraw the alleged cancellation could not be granted, since Rule 250 conferred upon the Commissioner an absolute discretion in this matter. Although no specific provision of law compelled the Commissioner to exercise the discretion granted by Rule 250, the Court noted that the enabling power was intended for the welfare of the public at large and therefore carried with it a duty to be exercised when circumstances demanded. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Commissioner could be ordered, under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, to exercise his discretion and determine whether the licence should be cancelled.

The Court explained that the expression “any law” in section 45 did not refer solely to statutory law but encompassed all forms of law, whether statutory or otherwise, and therefore the performance of duties imposed by the rules could be compelled under the provisions of that section. The Court further held that no other specific and adequate legal remedy was available to the respondent within the meaning of section 45; although the respondent might have chosen to ignore the purported cancellation, doing so would have placed him at his own risk because the order appeared to emanate from the State Government and had been served by a public officer. Accordingly, an injunction was not a proper and adequate remedy in the circumstances of the case. The petition was not deemed incompetent under section 46 of the Specific Relief Act, since the facts gave rise to a demand for justice and a denial of that justice within the meaning of the provision. Finally, the Court stated that public orders made under statutory authority must be interpreted objectively according to the language used in the order itself, and not by reference to any subsequent explanations offered by the officer who made the order. In support of this principle, the Court cited Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford and Alcock, Ashdown & Co v. Chief Revenue Authority.

In this appeal, the Court addressed Civil Appeal No. 93 of 1951, which was filed against the judgment and decree of the Bombay High Court rendered by Chief Justice Chagla and Justice Bhagwati on 6 September 1949 in Appeal No. 16 of 1949. The appeal arose from a judgment dated 2 February 1949 issued by a single judge of the same High Court, Justice Tendolkar, in Miscellaneous Application No. 223 of 1948. The facts of the case and the arguments of counsel were set out in full in the lower-court judgment. The solicitor-general for the appellant, C. K. Daphtary, was assisted by G. N. Joshi, while the respondent was represented by N. C. Chatterjee, who was assisted by R. M. Hajarnavis. The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered on 23 November 1951 by Justice Bose.

The central issue was whether an order should be made under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act against the appellant, who held the office of Commissioner of Police, Bombay. The respondent, Gordhandas Bhanji, sought to construct a cinema house on a plot of land situated in Andheri in the year 1945. At that time Andheri lay outside the municipal limits of Bombay, and the prevailing regulations required that a person obtain a No-Objection Certificate from the District Magistrate of the relevant area. Accordingly, the respondent filed an application for such a certificate on 12 September 1945. The District Magistrate refused the application on 30 September 1945, citing opposition from the local public and noting that an existing cinema theatre already operated in Andheri, rendering another unnecessary “for the present.” On 1 October 1945, Andheri was incorporated into Greater Bombay, and the authority to grant or refuse a cinema licence transferred to the Commissioner of Police, Bombay. The respondent then submitted a second application addressed to the Commissioner on 21 November 1945. After a period of correspondence, the Commissioner rejected this application on 19 March 1946, again on the ground of public opposition.

Undeterred, the respondent made a further application on 1 April 1946, requesting a “reopening” of his case. In that application he argued that the Government of Bombay was giving careful attention to the development of Greater Bombay as a model city and that a modern cinema of the type he proposed was indispensable to that development. The Commissioner, after consulting the Government of Bombay, wrote to the respondent on 25 April 1946 indicating that the matter of selecting and approving sites for cinemas was presently under the consideration of the Government, and he assured the respondent that the application would be examined once a decision was reached. Around that time a Cinema Advisory Committee was formed by the Government. While the precise scope and extent of the Committee’s powers were not explained, the Committee’s title suggested that its functions were advisory in nature.

According to the record, five members of the Committee inspected the site on 12 May 1947, and after extended discussion they concluded that, because four schools were located near the site, the location was unsuitable for a cinema and therefore the application should be rejected. A note reflecting that conclusion was prepared, and the matter was placed on the agenda of the Committee’s next meeting for a final decision. The final decision itself does not appear in the record. However, the Commissioner’s affidavit states that within a month the Committee advised that the application should be granted. Acting on that advice, the Commissioner issued the necessary permission by letter dated 14 July 1947 (or 16 July 1947, as the letter bears both dates). The letter contains no reference to the Committee’s recommendations, and although the Committee may have influenced the Commissioner, the face of the letter shows that the ultimate decision was that of the Commissioner of Police.

The Court observed that the Cinema Advisory Committee was created solely to give advice and possessed no decision-making power. Five members of that Committee visited the proposed site on 12 May 1947 and, after an extended discussion, concluded that the proximity of four schools rendered the location unsuitable for a cinema and therefore recommended its rejection. The Committee prepared a note stating this conclusion and placed the matter on the agenda of its next meeting for a final decision. Although the final decision was never entered into the record, the Commissioner of Police, relying on his affidavit, testified that within a month the Committee had advised that the application should be granted. Acting on that advice, the Commissioner issued a letter dated 14-16 July 1947 granting the necessary permission. The Court noted that the letter contained no reference to the Committee’s recommendations, yet there was nothing on its face to show that the Commissioner’s decision was anything other than his own exercised in good faith. The Commissioner later affirmed in his affidavit that he had originally been satisfied to refuse the petitioner's application but, at the Committee’s urging, granted the permission on 14 July 1947. The Court held that this statement did not invalidate the order. No allegation was made that the Commissioner’s will had been overborne, nor that there was any dishonesty or fraud in his actions. Accordingly, the Court found that the Commissioner was duly entitled to consider the advice offered by a public body established for that purpose and, in the bona-fide exercise of his discretion, could accept that advice and act upon it even though he might have reached a different conclusion in the absence of that factor. The sanction issued on 16 July 1947 was therefore deemed a proper and valid sanction.

The Court further noted that the sanction prompted representations to the Government, apparently by members of the public who opposed the scheme. In response, the Commissioner wrote to the respondent on 19-20 September 1947 directing him not to proceed with construction of the cinema pending Government orders. Shortly thereafter, on 27-30 September 1947, the Commissioner sent another communication stating, “I am directed by Government to inform you that the permission to erect a cinema at the above site granted to you under this office letter dated 16 July 1947 is hereby cancelled.” The Court considered whether this cancellation represented an act by the Commissioner exercising a power vested in him, or whether the Commissioner was merely conveying an order issued by another authority, namely the Government of Bombay. The determination of this point was essential to decide if the cancellation was an independent order of the Commissioner or simply an intimation of a cancellation made by a higher authority.

The Court concluded that the communication sent by the Commissioner was not an independent order of cancellation but merely a notice that an order had been issued by another authority, namely the Government of Bombay. The Court observed that the party attempting to rely on the Commissioner’s affidavit sought to portray the notice as a cancellation made by the Commissioner himself, insisting that the order originated from him and not from the Government. The Court emphasized that public orders made under statutory authority must be interpreted objectively based on the language of the order, and not on subsequent explanations or the personal intentions of the officer who issued them. The Court examined the wording of the notice and determined that it could not be read as a declaration in which the Commissioner stated, “I, by virtue of the authority vested in me, do hereby order and direct….” The Court held that if the Commissioner possessed the power to cancel the licence and was the proper authority to do so, he would have expressed that power in clear and explicit terms. Public officials are required to use precise language so that persons affected by an order understand exactly what is required of them and which authority is responsible. The surrounding circumstances confirmed this interpretation: the licence had initially been refused, then granted, subsequently suspended, and the respondent had been told to await directions from the Government, not from the Commissioner. The letter dated 30 September conveyed the Government’s orders, and the Commissioner’s later actions were consistent with that role.

Further, the Court noted that the respondent’s counsel, on 18 November 1947, queried how the Government could interfere with a permission that had been granted by the Commissioner, asserting that the authority to grant permission lay with the Commissioner acting in consultation with the Advisory Board. The Commissioner’s reply on 3–4 December 1947 clearly stated that the permission had been cancelled under the orders of the Government, and that the Government could be approached for further clarification. The Court found that the language used in this reply would not have been employed had the cancellation been a direct order of the Commissioner. While the Court did not suggest that the Commissioner could not consider the Government’s views, it held that the cancellation order itself originated from the Government, with the Commissioner acting merely as a conduit for that order. Consequently, the Court determined that the next issue to resolve was whether the Government of Bombay possessed the statutory power to cancel a licence once it had been issued, a question that required an examination of the relevant Rules framed under Section 22(1)(f)(i)(g) and (h) of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902, which regulate licensing and control of places of public amusement, including cinemas.

The Court noted that the indirect or round-about wording of the order could be explained only by the fact that the cancellation did not originate from the Commissioner himself. The Court clarified that it was not suggesting that the Commissioner would have acted improperly if he had taken into account the views and wishes of the Government, provided that he retained his own independent judgment and issued the order in his own capacity. However, based on the material before it, the Court found that the actual authority for the cancellation came from the Government of Bombay and that the Commissioner merely acted as a conduit for that governmental decision.

The next issue for determination was whether the Government of Bombay possessed the statutory power to revoke a licence after it had been granted. The Court explained that this question required an examination of the relevant Rules, which were framed under section 22(1)(f)(i)(g) and (h) of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902. Those Rules regulate the “licensing, controlling, keeping and regulation” of places of public amusement within the City of Bombay. In particular, Rule 8 applies to any person who wishes to erect a cinema or similar building.

The Court observed that, in its view, a clear distinction of principle exists between the erection and use of buildings intended solely for private or residential purposes and those intended to serve as places of public amusement. For the latter category, additional considerations arise that are not applicable to private residences, including the power to withdraw or modify a licence after it has been issued. The Court explained that, ordinarily, a person may deal with his own property as he wishes, subject only to specific statutes that regulate such use. Accordingly, in the case of a private dwelling, a person who complies with all applicable rules, regulations and restrictions would generally have a right to build, and if permission were withheld despite fulfillment of all conditions, he would normally be entitled to demand that the necessary permission be granted.

However, the Court stressed that this line of reasoning does not extend to premises intended for public performances. In such cases, matters of safety, convenience, morality and public welfare must take precedence. It is therefore usual, on grounds of public interest, to vest a public authority with discretionary power to grant or refuse licences and to modify or cancel licences that have already been granted. The Court emphasized that this distinction must be kept in mind when construing the present Rules.

Consequently, when Rule 8 refers to “erecting” such premises, the Court held that the rule is not a simple building regulation applicable to any structure in the abstract. Instead, it applies to a building that is intended to be used for a specific purpose affecting the public at large and the residents of the locality. The licence sought under Rule 8 is therefore not merely permission to construct a building; it also authorises the use of the structure, once erected, for a particular public purpose.

The Court further noted that Rule 8 is situated within Part II of the Rules, which is headed “Preliminaries to obtaining licence for premises.” The preliminaries prescribed in Part II include, among other requirements, the making of a written application to the Commissioner of Police.

The regulations require that before an application for a licence is made, a preliminary notice must be published. This notice must be prepared in the form prescribed in Schedule A and must be displayed on a board and kept there until the Commissioner of Police has dealt with the application. The rule further provides that no application may be considered until a period of one fortnight has elapsed after the Commissioner receives a copy of the notice. Schedule A explains that the purpose of the notice is to enable the Commissioner to receive any objections that may be raised to the proposed erection of the premises. The remaining rules in Part II set out the particulars that the application must contain, together with the documents that must accompany it, such as the plans and specifications of the proposed building.

Part III lays down detailed structural requirements that the building must satisfy. These requirements include the use of fire-resistant material for the roof, the construction of staircases and dressing rooms of a specified type, appropriate seating arrangements, corridors, exits and other similar features. The provisions of Part III apply both to a building that already exists but has not yet obtained a licence for public performance and to a building that has not yet been erected. Part IV deals with the “Use of cinematograph apparatus and other optical lanterns” and the rules in that part are mainly concerned with health and safety matters. Parts V and VI are not relevant to the present case; they prescribe special rules for circuses and for exhibitions of boxing and wrestling. Part VII is the portion that is material for the present purposes and it is headed “Licences”. Rule 237 provides that the owner, tenant or occupier of such premises and the person who proposes to give any public performance, entertainment or exhibition on those premises must each obtain a licence under these rules. Under the sub-heading “Licences for Premises”, Rules 238 to 257 are listed. Rule 237 further states that no such premises shall be opened or kept open for use as a place of public amusement unless the owner, tenant or occupier has obtained the necessary licence from the Commissioner. Rule 248 invests the Commissioner with absolute discretion to refuse any licence if, in his opinion, the place is likely to cause obstruction, inconvenience, annoyance, risk, danger or damage to residents or passers-by in the vicinity. Rule 250, which is crucial, declares that the Commissioner shall have power, in his absolute discretion, at any time to cancel or suspend any licence granted under these rules. After Rule 257 a second sub-heading, “Performance Licence”, appears, and Rules 258 to 283 set out the requirements relating to the holding of performances, which are distinct from the requirements relating to the building or premises on which the performances are to be held. The remaining rules are not relevant. From a careful reading of these rules it is clear that the only person vested with the authority to grant or refuse a licence for the erection of a building intended for public amusement is the Commissioner of Police.

In this case the Court observed that the sole authority empowered to grant or refuse a licence for the erection of a building intended for public amusement was the Commissioner of Police. The Court further noted that Rule 250 conferred upon the Commissioner an absolute discretion to cancel or suspend any licence that had been granted under the Rules, and that this power was vested exclusively in him rather than in the State Government; consequently only the Commissioner could exercise it and no other person or authority possessed that power. The Court rejected the submission that Rule 250 applied solely to matters such as the maintenance of premises or the type of performances to be given therein and not to licences for erecting buildings. It pointed out that the pre-amble to the Rules expressly described them as relating to “licensing, controlling, keeping and regulation” of places of public amusement in the City of Bombay. Although Part II, which deals with the erection of cinema houses, did not itself authorise the issue of a licence, it nevertheless indicated that a licence was required. For example, the heading of Part II described the ensuing Rules as “preliminaries to obtaining licence for premises,” and Rule 21 stipulated that before a licence could be granted certain certificates had to be produced, thereby confirming the necessity of a licence. The Court further explained that the only provisions actually dealing with the issuance of a licence were found in Part VII, where Rules 237 and 238 required the owner, tenant or occupier of premises intended for a cinema house for public amusement, as well as the person proposing to give a public performance on such premises, to obtain a licence. Accordingly, the Court held that Rule 250 did authorise the cancellation of a licence already issued, but that such cancellation could be effected only by the Commissioner of Police. A contention was raised that the power to cancel a licence could cause great hardship, especially where money had already been expended on the building, and that an estoppel might arise. The Court noted that no question of estoppel had been raised before it, and therefore it would not consider whether an estoppel might arise in the face of a law enacted for the public good or whether a person who builds knowing the risk of cancellation under Rule 250 could rely on estoppel. The Court then turned to the next issue, namely whether an order in the nature of a mandamus could be issued under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. It emphasized that the present matter did not fall within article 32(2) or article 226(1) of the Constitution, and that the jurisdiction conferred by section 45 was of a very special and limited kind.

Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act confers a jurisdiction that is narrowly confined, although the range of powers that may be exercised within that narrow scope is broad. The statute imposes three principal limitations on any order that may be issued under it. First, the order must command the performance of a particular act or prohibit a particular act; it cannot be limited to a purely declaratory declaration as is permissible under section 42. Second, the proviso to the section requires that the act to be performed or refrained from must be clearly mandated by the authority concerned under some law that is currently in force. Third, the applicant must demonstrate that no other specific and adequate legal remedy exists to address his grievance.

Applying these requirements to the instant matter, the petitioner is required to identify the precise act he seeks to be performed or restrained, a matter that must be extracted from the prayer in his petition. The petition specifically asks for two forms of relief: (1) an order directing the Commissioner of Police to withdraw the cancellation of a licence, and (2) an order directing the Commissioner to grant permission for the erection of a cinema. Regarding the second request, the law does not obligate the Commissioner to issue a licence merely because the petitioner satisfies certain conditions; instead, the Commissioner possesses a discretionary authority to grant or deny a licence, and the only legal duty imposed upon him is to exercise that discretion in good faith. The Commissioner exercised his discretion by granting the licence, and, in the view of this Court, no valid order of cancellation has occurred; consequently, the licence remains in force and the relief of granting permission for the cinema cannot be awarded.

Turning to the first relief, the petition seeks an order requiring the Commissioner to withdraw an already-issued cancellation. The rules vest the Commissioner with an absolute discretion to cancel a licence at any time after it has been granted, and there is no statutory provision that compels him to refrain from exercising that discretion or to retract a cancellation that has already been effected. Such a requirement would unduly restrict the absolute discretion granted to him by Rule 250. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the relief in the precise form pleaded. Nevertheless, the Court retains the authority to fashion a modified form of relief that is consistent with the statute. It is noteworthy that the petitioner also requested “such further and other relief as the nature and circumstances of the case may require.” The Court has found that the Commissioner did not actually exercise his discretion to cancel the licence; rather, he merely forwarded to the respondent an order of cancellation that had been purportedly issued by another authority. The facts demonstrate that the Commissioner was presented with objections that demanded the exercise of the discretion concerning cancellation specifically vested in him by Rule 250.

In this case the Court observed that the Commissioner of Police, by virtue of Rule 250, was obliged to exercise the discretion conferred on him and to apply his own independent and unrestricted judgment to decide whether to cancel the licence or to reject the objections raised. The Court held that this duty could now be compelled under section 45. An objection was raised that no specific law required the Commissioner to exercise the discretion, on the ground that Rule 250 merely granted a discretion without imposing an enforceable duty. The Court rejected this objection, relying on the observations of Earl Cairns, L.C., in the House of Lords decision Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, which the Court endorsed in full. The cited passage explained that the nature of the power, its purpose, the conditions of its exercise, and the identity of the persons benefitted may combine the power with a duty, thereby obligating the holder of the power to act when called upon. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the discretion vested in the Commissioner under Rule 250 was granted for public reasons, encompassing the convenience, safety, morality and welfare of the public at large, and that such a public-oriented power is inherently coupled with a duty to be exercised whenever circumstances demand. The Court emphasized that this duty could not be neglected, avoided or set aside, and that its performance could be enforced through section 45. A further objection argued that section 45 was limited to duties imposed by “any law for the time being in force,” and therefore applied only to statutory duties. Although the Court acknowledged that authority supported this view, it found no justification for restricting the plain language of the provision or for importing meaning that was not present. The Court described section 45 as a benevolent provision intended to compel public officers to fulfil their public duties and to provide a swift, summary remedy against misuse, excess, laziness, incompetence, inertia or inaction on the part of such officers. It saw no reason to place statutory duties on a different footing from duties imposed by other kinds of law, especially since some statutory duties are minor compared with non-statutory obligations. Consequently, the Court held that the expression “any law” in section 45 was sufficiently broad to encompass all forms of law, and thus the Commissioner’s duty to exercise his discretion could be mandated under that section.

The Court observed that the phrase “any law” was intended to cover every kind of law and that this interpretation was to be adopted. The remaining question before the Court was whether the applicant was left without any other specific and adequate legal remedy. Counsel for the appellant argued that the respondent could simply disregard the so-called order of cancellation if he believed it to have no effect, and that alternatively the respondent could obtain an injunction, which would provide adequate relief. The Court held that the first alternative did not constitute a specific or adequate remedy. The order in question was an order that appeared to emanate from the State Government itself and had been served on the respondent by a responsible public officer. Whether the order was that officer’s personal order or an order of the State Government, it was clearly an instruction that required obedience as a matter of prudence and precaution. Although, as the facts showed, the order ultimately proved ineffective in this case, the Court stressed that it would be unreasonable to expect a person to ignore an order that has been properly served, even if that person might later argue that he was legally entitled to disregard it. Moreover, the fact that the order was served, particularly after the Commissioner’s letter dated 19-20 September 1947, indicated that serious objections—matters that the Commissioner was duty-bound to consider—had been raised. Consequently, the respondent was entitled to expect the Commissioner to reach a definite decision; without such a decision the respondent was left in a state of uncertainty. If the respondent were to begin construction, the Commissioner would have the authority under Rule 250 to intervene and order a halt to the work, which would likely draw the respondent into a prolonged and costly litigation that he might or might not win. The Court therefore concluded that the respondent had a right to be told, by the proper legal authority, exactly what he may or may not do so that he could arrange his affairs accordingly. The Court further held that the dangerous practice of ignoring an official order at one’s own peril was not the sort of specific and adequate legal remedy envisioned by section 45.

Turning to the question of whether an injunction could serve as an adequate remedy, the Court noted that it did not say that an injunction could never be appropriate; each case must be decided on its own facts and no rigid rule was being laid down. However, in the present circumstances an injunction was not deemed sufficient. The Court observed that filing a suit for an injunction would require compliance with section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code because the suit would be against a public officer in his official capacity. This requirement would inevitably cause delay, and the civil litigation process, including any appeals, would be lengthy. In a commercial undertaking such as the one before the Court, such inordinate delay could jeopardise the project, potentially leading to its ruin. Large sums of money would necessarily have to remain tied up while the matter was in abeyance, land and material prices would continue to rise, and a rival theater nearby would keep gaining reputation and goodwill—both factors being critical in commercial enterprises. Therefore, the Court concluded that the injunction, given the procedural delays it would entail, would not meet the urgent needs of the case, and that the applicant indeed had no other specific and adequate remedy available under section 45.

Because the money required for the project was tied up while the matter remained unresolved, the costs continued to increase as land and material prices rose. In addition, a rival theater nearby was constantly building its reputation and goodwill, factors that, although difficult to quantify, are crucial in commercial enterprises. The Court therefore considered it essential that the issues raised in this case be resolved at the earliest possible opportunity. While any single factor might not alone satisfy the requirement of section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, the Court held that the combination of the financial stakes, the escalating costs, and the competitive pressure collectively demonstrated that the applicant possessed no other adequate remedy. The Court further observed that numerous cases of a similar nature have successfully invoked section 45 even though an injunction could have been pursued. To illustrate this point, the Court referred to the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Alickcock, Ashdown and Co. v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay (50 I.A. 227 at 233). In that decision, Lord Phillimore remarked that it would be erroneous to claim that a public officer who refuses, without cause, to obey a legislative directive could escape the reach of the Specific Relief Act, thereby denying the aggrieved party any judicial remedy. Following that reasoning, the Privy Council ordered relief under section 45. The present Court therefore concluded that the applicant’s request was not barred by the absence of an injunction and that section 45 was the appropriate mechanism to provide a timely and effective remedy.

The petitioners also argued that the petition was infirm because the requirements of section 46 of the Specific Relief Act had not been satisfied, specifically that they had not shown a demand for justice followed by a denial. The Court clarified that the demand and denial contemplated by section 46 are matters of substance rather than formalities. In this case, a substantive demand was made and a corresponding denial was evident. After the order of cancellation was communicated to the petitioner, he instructed his counsel to write to the Commissioner on 18 November 1947 seeking an explanation for the apparently arbitrary cancellation of the permission. The Commissioner’s reply, dated 3 or 4 December 1947, indicated that the cancellation had been ordered by the Government and directed the petitioner to approach the Government for further clarification. The petitioner's counsel then wrote to the Home Minister on 9 December 1947, stating that the client had received no reasons for the cancellation, had not been afforded a hearing, and wished to present his case before the Minister. The Secretary to the Home Department responded on 12 January 1948, informing that the Commissioner had been instructed to cancel the permission in view of numerous protests received by the Government. Subsequent correspondence on 16 February 1948 from the petitioner's counsel expressed that the client felt he had not been treated fairly and that justice had been denied to him. The only reply received was that the Government did not wish to add anything further to the earlier response. Although the initial demand had not been addressed directly to the Commissioner, his letter of 3/4 December 1947 effectively referred the matter to the Government, whose subsequent denial served as a denial by the Commissioner in substance. The Court therefore held that an evasion or shelving of a demand for justice satisfies the denial requirement of section 46, and that the petition met the substantive criteria prescribed by the statute.

On 16 February 1948 the petitioner's solicitors wrote that their client felt he had not been treated fairly and that justice had been denied to him. The only reply to this communication was that the Government was directed to inform the petitioners that it did not wish to add anything to the reply already given. Taken together, the correspondence exhibited a clear demand for justice and a corresponding denial. Although the demand was not addressed directly to the Commissioner and the denial was not issued by him, the Commissioner had earlier, by his letter of 3-4 December 1947, referred the petitioner to the Government and stated that he was acting under Government orders. Consequently, the demand made to the Government and the denial by the Government were, in substance, a demand made to the Commissioner and a denial by him. The Court observed that an evasion or shelving of a demand for justice suffices to constitute a denial within the meaning of section 46. It noted that English law does not require the refusal to be expressed in exact words, only that the party complained of has unmistakably decided not to comply with the demand (see Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham edition, page 772). Likewise, United States jurisprudence holds that a demand is unnecessary where it would be a mere idle ceremony (see Ferris on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, page 281). Indian law follows the same principle, requiring only a substantive demand and denial, not the precise wording. Accordingly, the requirements of section 46 were satisfied. The result, therefore, was that the appeal failed, although a modification of the High Court's order was required. The High Court had directed the Commissioner of Police to withdraw the order of cancellation that he had passed. The Court held that the Commissioner had not made the order and, even if he had, a direction to withdraw it could not be issued because the Commissioner possessed discretion under Rule 250. The Court substituted the following order in place of the High Court's directive: the Commissioner of Police was to consider the requests made to him for cancellation of the licence sanctioned by his letter dated 14-16 July 1947, to weigh all aspects of the matter, to apply his own judgment, and to issue a clear and unambiguous order either cancelling or refusing to cancel the licence, exercising the absolute discretion vested in him by Rule 250 of the Rules for Licensing and Controlling Theaters and Other Places of Public Amusement in Bombay City, 1914. As the appeal failed except for this slight modification, the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The decree was therefore modified. Agent for the appellant: P.A. Mehta. Agent for the

The party identified as the respondent was Rajinder Narain.