B. Venkataramana vs State Of Tamil Nadu and Anr

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petition (civil) 318 of 1950

Decision Date: 09/04/1951

Coram: H.L. Kania, S. Fazal Ali, M.P. Sastri, M.C. Mahajan, S.R. Das, B.K. Mukherjee, V. Bose

In the matter titled B. Venkataramana versus State of Tamil Nadu and another, decided on 9 April 1951, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court of India. The petition, identified as Writ Petition (civil) 318 of 1950, named B. Venkataramana as the petitioner and the State of Tamil Nadu together with an additional respondent as the respondents. The judgment was recorded in the official law reports as AIR 1951 SC 229. The bench hearing the case comprised Chief Justice H. L. Kania, along with Justices S. Fazal Ali, M. P. Sastri, M. C. Mahajan, S. R. Das, B. K. Mukherjee and V. Bose. The opinion for the Court was delivered by Justice S. R. Das.

Justice Das explained that the petitioner had invoked the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 32 of the Constitution of India, asserting that his right to obtain employment in the state service of the respondents had been violated. The dispute arose from a notice dated 16 December 1949, which was published in the Fort St. George Gazette on 20 December 1949. That notice announced that the Madras Public Services Commission would invite applications for eighty-three vacancies for the post of District Munsif within the Madras Subordinate Civil Judicial Service. The notice further clarified that twelve of those posts were to be filled by direct recruitment of persons already serving in the Madras Civil Judicial Department, while the remaining seventy-one positions were to be filled from among Official Receivers, Assistant Public Prosecutors and practising members of the Bar.

Crucially, the notice stipulated that the selection process would be conducted according to a communal rotation scheme, commonly referred to as communal general orders. According to those orders, the allocation of posts was to be made on the basis of caste, religion and community, with specific numbers assigned as follows: nineteen for Harijans, six for Muslims, six for Christians, ten for Backward Hindus, thirty-two for Non-Brahmin Hindus and eleven for Brahmins. In addition to the communal quotas, the notice prescribed different age limits for candidates belonging to the various categories, and it prescribed no age limit for candidates classified as Harijan or Backward Hindu.

The petitioner, B. Venkataramana, was a graduate who had obtained a first-class degree in Mathematics and had also passed the Bachelor of Law examination with second-class honors. He had been practising as an advocate in Nellore for more than seven years, thereby satisfying the statutory qualifications required for appointment as a District Munsif. It was acknowledged that, if the communal general orders were set aside, the petitioner’s academic marks would have placed him among the candidates eligible for selection.

In April and May of 1950, the Madras Public Services Commission conducted a viva-voce examination of the applicants. The petitioner contended that he performed satisfactorily in this oral examination, which was attended by a judge of the Madras High Court acting as a representative of that court. After the viva-voce, the commission selected twelve candidates from the existing Madras Judicial Department. The final list of selected candidates, published in the supplement to Part I-B of the Fort St. George Gazette on 6 June 1950, reflected the communal distribution: one Harijan, seven Muslims, four Christians, thirteen Backward Hindus, thirty-two Non-Brahmin Hindus and four Brahmins. The petitioner’s name did not appear on that list, prompting him to file the present writ petition seeking a declaration that the communal rotation rule employed for the District Munsif appointments was inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore void, and that the selections already made should be cancelled. He also requested that the state be directed not to fill the posts using the contested list, and that his own application be considered on its merits without the application of the communal rotation principle.

On 21-10-1950 the petitioner respectfully prayed that the Court issue an order declaring that the rule of communal rotation, which had been applied to select candidates for the posts of District Munsifs in the Madras Subordinate Civil Judicial Service, was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and consequently void. The petitioner further requested that the Madras Public Services Commission be directed to cancel the selections that had already been made, that the State of Madras be prohibited from filling the vacancies using the candidates chosen under the notification dated 16-12-1949, and that the petitioner's application for the said post be taken up on its merits without the application of the communal rotation rule.

Article 16 of the Constitution expressly guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. The relevant provisions read as follows: “(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of any employment or office under the State. (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.” Clause (4) therefore authorises the State to make reservations for appointments in favour of any backward class that it believes is under-represented, and such reservations cannot be regarded as unconstitutional.

The Communal Government Order itself expressly reserves seats for Harijans and for Backward Hindus. The remaining categories—Muslims, Christians, Non-Brahmin Hindus and Brahmins—must be treated as groups distinct from Harijans and Backward Hindus. Reference was made to the Schedule of Backward Classes contained in Schedule III to Part I of the Madras Provincial and Subordinate Service Rules, and it was argued that the term “Backward Hindus” should be understood to encompass all Hindu communities listed in that Schedule. In the present circumstances it is impossible to accept that any class of people other than Harijans and Backward Hindus can be designated as Backward Classes.

Concerning the posts reserved for Harijans and Backward Hindus, it may be observed that the petitioner, who does not belong to either of those two groups, is considered ineligible for those reserved posts not on the basis of religion, race, caste or similar factors, but because the reservation is intended to benefit a backward class of citizens. However, the petitioner’s ineligibility for any of the posts that are reserved for the other communities—Muslims, Christians, Non-Brahmin Hindus and Brahmins—can be said to arise solely on the ground of his own caste, namely that he is a Brahmin. This caste-based exclusion is not justified by clause (4) of Article 16 and therefore infringes the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner as an individual citizen under Articles 16(1) and 16(2). Consequently, the Communal Government Order, to the extent that it imposes such exclusions, is repugnant to the provisions of Article 16.

In this case the Court observed that the petitioner’s disqualification arose solely because he belonged to the Brahmin community. The Court illustrated that the petitioner might be far more qualified than a Muslim, a Christian or a candidate who is not a Brahmin, and that, if the posts reserved for those communities were opened to him, he would be eligible for appointment, as acknowledged by the Advocate General of Madras. Nevertheless, the Court held that the petitioner could not expect to obtain any of the posts reserved for those other categories merely because he is a Brahmin. The Court explained that his inability to be appointed to the reserved posts, even though his qualifications could exceed those of the members of the respective categories, resulted exclusively from his Brahmin status and his non-membership in those categories. The Court further found that the ineligibility created by the Communal G. O. was not authorised by cl. (4) of Arts, 16 and constituted an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner as an individual citizen under Art, 16 (1)& (2). Accordingly, the Court declared the Communal G. O. to be repugnant to the provisions of Art. 16 and therefore void and illegal. The Court considered this finding sufficient to dispose of the application and held that it was unnecessary to examine the impact of Arts. 14 or 15 of the Constitution on the respondents. The Court was informed that the petition was filed after most of the candidates selected under the reservation had taken charge of their posts. Consequently, the Court did not order the Madras Public Services Commission to cancel those appointments that had already been assumed. The Court noted, however, that not all posts had been filled and that there would be no difficulty in assessing the petitioner’s application on its merits without reference to the Communal G. O., which violated Part III of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court directed the respondents to place the petitioner’s application on file, to consider it on its merits, and to do so without applying the rule of communal rotation. Finally, the Court ordered that the petitioner be awarded the costs of this application.