Pritam Singh vs The State

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. II of 1950

Decision Date: 05/05/1950

Coram: Saiyid Fazal Ali, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea

In the matter titled Pritam Singh versus The State, a judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court of India on the fifth day of May, 1950. The decision was recorded by the author Saiyid Fazal Ali and the bench that heard the case comprised Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, and Justice B.K. Mukherjea. The petitioner was identified as Pritam Singh and the respondent as The State. The official date of judgment is noted as 05/05/1950. The case citation appears in the All India Reporter as 1950 AIR 169 and in the Supreme Court Reporter as 1950 SCR 453. Additional citator references include D 1953 SC 415 (10), RF 1954 SC 20 (5), F 1954 SC 23 (13), R 1954 SC 271 (11), R 1956 SC 217 (31, 35, 44), R 1958 SC 61 (8, 9), R 1959 SC 633 (5), F 1961 SC 100 (2), RF 1961 SC 1708 (9), R 1964 SC 1645 (9), R 1970 SC 668 (2), RF 1976 SC 758 (8), F 1977 SC 472 (5), R 1986 SC 702 (12), R 1988 SC 1883 (245), D 1992 SC 1277 (39, 101). The constitutional provision relevant to the appeal is Article 136(1) of the Constitution of India, which deals with the grant of special leave to appeal. The headnote of the report summarized the principle that the Supreme Court will not entertain a petition for special leave under Article 136(1) unless the applicant demonstrates the existence of exceptional and special circumstances, a substantial and grave injustice, and a case of sufficient gravity to merit a review of the decision appealed against. The headnote further clarified that once special leave is granted, the appellant is not permitted to raise anew all factual findings and arguments that could have been raised before the High Court; only those points that could have been raised at the preliminary stage of seeking leave may be urged at the final hearing, citing Ibrahim v. Rex ([1914] A.C. 615).

The judgment itself began as an appeal by special leave from the High Court of Judicature at East Punjab, identified as Criminal Appeal No. II of 1950. The appeal challenged a judgment and order dated 23 November 1949, pronounced by the High Court of the Province of East Punjab at Simla, wherein Justices Falshaw and Soni had upheld the conviction of the appellant on a charge of murder and confirmed a death sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. The appellant was represented by counsel Jai Gopal Sethi, assisted by H. J. Umrigar, while the respondent was represented by Basant Kishan Khanna, the Advocate-General of East Punjab, assisted by S. M. Sikri. The judgment was delivered on 5 May 1950 by Justice Fazal Ali. In his pronouncement, the Court noted that this appeal concerned the conviction of Pritam Singh for the murder of an individual named Buta Singh and the affirmation of a capital sentence by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. Both the trial judge and the High Court had found the prosecution case to be substantially true, a finding that the Supreme Court was prepared to examine further in the course of its reasoning.

In the incident recounted, on 28 December 1948 the accused, Pritam Singh, made an indecent overture toward a woman named Punni, who was the wife of Kakarra Chamar and had been brought into the village by the deceased, Buta Singh, some ten or twelve years earlier. After learning of this overture, Buta Singh confronted Pritam Singh, but finding the accused’s attitude unyielding, he advised Kakarra to report the matter to the police station. The following day, while Kakarra was on his way to the police station, Mal Singh, who was the first prosecution witness, intercepted him and informed him that Pritam Singh had apologized and that the matter should not be pursued. On 30 December, at approximately five o’clock in the evening, as Buta Singh emerged from his house, Pritam Singh approached him brandishing a double-barrelled twelve-bore gun and discharged a shot into the victim’s abdomen, causing Buta Singh’s death a short time later. Shortly after the shooting, two men named Punjab Singh and Nal Singh, both of whom had observed the occurrence, travelled the thirteen-mile distance to the police station at Abohar and filed the first information report concerning the murder. In that report Punjab Singh reiterated the facts already described and additionally asserted that the accused was intoxicated at the time he fired the gun and that his younger brother, Hakim Singh, also drunken, stood nearby shouting “Kill, don’t care.” None of the other witnesses corroborated Punjab Singh’s assertions regarding Hakim Singh’s involvement or the alleged drunken condition of either brother, and after a thorough police investigation the authorities issued a charge sheet solely against Pritam Singh. The accused was then tried before the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. After hearing the prosecution, which presented five eyewitnesses—Punjab Singh, his brother Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (the brother of a witness), and Mst. Phoolan, the mother of the deceased—the Sessions Judge, together with the four assessors present, concluded that the prosecution’s version of events was substantially true. In reaching that conclusion the Judge relied, among other matters, on the prompt lodging of the information report, the identification of at least four of the alleged eyewitnesses within that report, and the absence of any satisfactory explanation as to why the prosecution witnesses would have conspired to falsely incriminate the accused if he were innocent. On appeal, the High Court affirmed the Sessions Judge’s findings, and the learned High Court judge, in the concluding portion of his judgment, observed that after giving the case every consideration he was of the opinion that the Sessions Judge had correctly held that the case against the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court had held that the case against the appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. After that finding, the appellant obtained special leave to appeal to this Court. The learned counsel for the appellant, identified as Mr Sethi, then presented to the Court a very elaborate set of arguments seeking to demonstrate that the conclusion reached by the lower Courts was erroneous. He contended that the alleged eye-witnesses were closely connected with one another and also with the deceased, and that the witnesses and the accused belonged to two mutually hostile factions. He further asserted that these witnesses had given inconsistent statements concerning the various places from which they claimed to have observed the incident. Some of them, he said, had also made contradictory statements about their own position before the police officer who prepared the plan of the scene, as well as before the trial Court, and they had likewise varied in their descriptions of the positions of the other witnesses. In his view, such inconsistencies meant that the witnesses could not be regarded as truthful, especially because they had denied certain earlier statements that they had made either to the police or before the Committing Magistrate. Mr Sethi also advanced a theory—one that had been rejected by both the trial Judge and the High Court on grounds that, prima facie, did not appear unreasonable. He argued that the occurrence must have taken place late at night, that there were probably no eye-witnesses who could identify the actual assailant, and that the appellant had been falsely implicated because of an existing enmity.

The obvious response to all of the appellant’s contentions is that this Court is not an ordinary criminal appellate court and does not generally reopen factual questions, particularly when two Courts have agreed on the facts and when the disputed conclusions depend on the credibility of witnesses whom the trial Court had the advantage of seeing and hearing. In the present matter, the prosecution’s version of events—neither incredible nor improbable—was supported by no fewer than five witnesses, including the mother of the deceased. Although the testimony had certain infirmities, it impressed the four assessors and the two Courts below, who, in assessing its reliability, gave due weight to several broad aspects of the case that, in their view, negated any theory of conspiracy or collusion. Under these circumstances, it would be contrary to established principles and precedents for this Court to transform itself into a third fact-finding tribunal and, after re-weighing the evidence, arrive at a conclusion different from that reached by the trial Judge and the High Court. Nonetheless, Mr Sethi argued on the assumption that, once special leave to appeal had been granted, the entire case was open for reconsideration and that the appellant could challenge every finding of fact and raise every possible point that might have been raised in the High Court or the trial Court. That assumption, the Court held, was entirely unwarranted.

In this appeal the Court observed that the argument that, once special leave to appeal had been granted, the appellant could freely contest every finding of fact and raise any point that could have been raised before the High Court or the trial Court was wholly unwarranted. The Court noted that this mistaken view was not a new misconception and that it had already been rejected by the Privy Council in England in the case of Ibrahim v. Rex (1), quoting the Privy Council’s statement that “the Board has repeatedly treated applications for leave to appeal and the hearing of criminal appeals as being upon the same footing… The Board cannot give leave to appeal where the grounds suggested could not sustain the appeal itself; and, conversely, it cannot allow an appeal on grounds that would not have sufficed for the grant of permission to bring it.” The Court emphasized that the rule articulated by the Privy Council rested on sound principle and, in its view, only those points that are appropriate to raise at the preliminary stage of seeking leave to appeal should be urged at the final hearing of the appeal. To permit a different set of standards at the two stages of the same proceeding would be illogical. The Court further indicated that it was necessary to make several general observations about the power of this Court to grant special leave to appeal in criminal matters. It explained that the constitutional provisions governing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are contained in Articles 132 to 136. Article 132 covers both civil and criminal cases and provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. Article 133 deals exclusively with the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in civil matters and is modeled on sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Article 134 establishes the Supreme Court as a court of criminal appeal, but only for a limited class of cases, thereby implying that no appeal lies to the Court as a matter of right except in the cases expressly specified therein. Article 135 provides that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction and powers over any matter to which the provisions of Articles 133 or 134 do not apply, if such jurisdiction and powers were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the Constitution commenced under any existing law. Finally, the Court turned to Article 136, which it reproduced in part: “136. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India…” The Court pointed out that the first observation concerning this article is its wide-ranging and general character, indicating that it is not limited to criminal cases.

In this case the Court noted that article 136 is not limited to criminal matters, as the phrase “appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order” clearly embraces a broad spectrum of matters. The Court further observed that the language of article 136 refers to “any cause or matter,” whereas articles 132 to 134 speak of “civil, criminal or other proceeding,” thereby indicating a wider reach. Moreover, while articles 132 to 134 restrict appeals to those from the High Courts, article 136 provides that an appeal may arise from any court or tribunal situated within the territory of India. Upon a careful examination of article 136 together with the preceding article, the Court concluded that the extensive discretionary power conferred on it must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases, and that a relatively uniform standard should guide the granting of special leave across the many types of matters that may be presented under this provision. By virtue of article 136, the Court is empowered to grant special leave in civil cases, criminal cases, income-tax matters, disputes before various tribunals, and a host of other proceedings. The Court articulated that the only consistent standard it could lay down is that special leave should be granted solely where special circumstances are demonstrated. The Court referred to principles occasionally laid down by the Privy Council for granting special leave in criminal cases, which were examined by the Federal Court in Kapildeo v. The King, and stated that although those principles are not binding, they often provide a sound basis for exercising discretion. Generally the Court will not grant special leave unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been suffered, and that the case presents sufficient gravity to merit a review of the decision appealed against. Applying this test, the Court found that the present appeal did not satisfy any of these conditions, and therefore it could not interfere with the High Court’s decision. Consequently the appeal was dismissed. Agent for the appellant was S.P. Varma and agent for the respondent was P.A. Mehta.