Narhari and Others v. Shankar and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Appeal Nos. 22 and 23 of 1950

Decision Date: 13 October 1950

Coram: J. Naik

In this case, the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment on 13 October 1950 concerning the dispute between Narhari and others (petitioners) and Shankar and others (respondents). The bench consisted of Justices Naik R.S., Mehr Chand Mahajan, Siddiqui, and Khaliluzzaman J. The judgment was recorded under citations 1953 AIR 419 and 1950 SCR 754, and it also appeared in several later reporters. The petitioner, referred to as “A,” had instituted a suit seeking possession of a two-thirds share in an estate, while the respondents, “B” and “C,” claimed one-third shares each. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents. Both B and C filed separate appeals, which were heard together and disposed of by a single judgment, yet two distinct decrees were prepared. The petitioner filed an appeal against one of those decrees within the prescribed period, paying the full court fee. After the limitation period expired, the petitioner filed a second appeal against the other decree, paying only a nominal fee of Re. 1. The High Court held that the petitioner should have lodged two separate appeals within the limitation period, and because one appeal was time-barred, the earlier appeal should have been barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court examined this view and held that, since the appeals arose from a single suit and were decided by the same judgment, filing two separate appeals was not required. Moreover, the fact that one appeal was filed out of time did not affect the maintainability of the other appeal, and the question of res judicata did not arise. The Court further observed that the High Court erred in denying the petitioner the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, given the conflicting decisions on this point. The Court referred to the authorities Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli (A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 289) and Appa v. Kachai Bayyan Kutty (A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 689) in support of its reasoning.

The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed under article 374(4) of the Constitution, bearing appeal numbers 22 and 23 of 1950. Counsel for the appellants represented the petitioners, while the respondents were unrepresented. The Court’s judgment was delivered by Justice Naik. The suit from which the appeals originated concerned possession of two-thirds of the land described in Survey No. 214, together with an award of mesne profits. The petitioners asserted that Survey No. 214 constituted inam land and, according to a long-standing family custom, belonged exclusively to members of the senior line of the family. The respondents, who belonged to the junior lines, contested this claim. The factual backdrop involved the plaintiffs’ reliance on the custom of exclusive possession by the senior branch, a point that the Court examined in relation to the evidentiary and legal standards applicable to the dispute.

The case involved two sets of defendants, numbers 1 to 4 constituting one branch of the family and numbers 5 to 8 another branch, each claiming they possessed one-third of the disputed land and asserting that this portion represented their share of the family property, while denying the senior line’s alleged exclusive right. The trial court had decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. From that decree, each set of defendants filed a separate appeal before the Sadar Adalat, Gulbarga, paying court fees proportionate to their claimed share. The Sadar Adalat allowed both appeals and, by a judgment dated 30 Bahman 1338 F, dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit, directing that a copy of that judgment be placed on the file of the other connected appeal. Consequently, the first appellate court issued two separate decrees. The plaintiffs then lodged two appeals to the High Court. The first appeal, filed on 23 Aban 1345 F, was accompanied by the decree relating to the appeal of defendants 1-4. A second appeal was filed on 17 Azur 1346 F, attached to the decree concerning defendants 5-8, but this filing occurred twenty-nine days after the statutory limitation period. The later appeal was presented on a one-rupee stamp paper with a note indicating that the full court fee had already been paid in the earlier appeal, which had been recorded as Appeal No. 331 of 1346 F. During the hearing, the defendants raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the second appeal (No. 332 of 1346 F) was time-barred and therefore could not proceed, and that, if dismissed, the principle of res judicata would bar the first appeal (No. 331 of 1346) as well. The High Court ruled that the plaintiffs should have filed two distinct appeals within the limitation period; because the second appeal was admittedly out of time, the court held that res judicata applied to the first appeal, leading to the dismissal of both appeals. The plaintiffs subsequently appealed to the Judicial Committee of the State under article 374(4) of the Constitution, and the High Court’s decision relied on the earlier judgment in Jethmal v. Ranglal, a money suit in which both parties had appealed, the plaintiff’s claim being partially dismissed and the defendant’s claim partially upheld, with the first appellate court having dismissed the plaintiff’s portion.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in entirety, allowed the defendant’s appeal, and issued two separate decrees. The plaintiff filed an appeal against only the decree that operated against him, and the court applied the principle of res judicata. The High Court cited Nand-lal v. Mohiuddin Ali Khan (1), Nizamuddin v. Chatur Bhuj (2), Gayajee Pant v. Habibuddin (3) and Jagannath v. Sonajee (4). It held that where one suit produced two appeals, the parties were not obliged to file two separate appeals. In its judgment, the High Court merely noted that the appellant relied on those authorities without offering substantive commentary. The judges appeared to consider the Hyderabad Judicial Committee decision in Jethmal v. Ranglal sufficient, and therefore they omitted any further discussion of the cited cases. A later Judicial Committee decision, Bansilal v. Mohanlal (6), adopted the comprehensive authority of the Lahore High Court in Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli (7). The cited authorities included 22 D.L.R. 400, 28 D.L.R. 1094, 17 D.L.R. 322, 93 D.L.R. 457, 29 D.L.R. 108, 33 D.L.R. 603, and A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 289. Legal precedent established that when a single trial yields one finding and one decision, the presence of two decrees does not compel the filing of two distinct appeals.

In the Lahore High Court decision, two cross-suits concerning the same subject matter were filed simultaneously between the same parties. By contrast, the present case involved only one suit and a single judgment from the trial court. The first appeal to the Sadar Adalat also produced a single judgment, even though two sets of defendants filed separate appeals. In their appeal to the High Court, the plaintiffs impleaded all defendants as respondents, sought relief covering both appeals, and paid a consolidated court fee for the entire suit. It was well settled that where a single trial produced one finding and one decision, the existence of two decrees did not necessitate filing two separate appeals. Tek Chand J., in his judgment in Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli (7), observed that the decisive factor was the matter in controversy, not the decree itself. He further explained that estoppel arose from a judgment, not from a decree, and therefore could not be invoked on the basis of the latter. According to his reasoning, res judicata applied only when two distinct suits existed; a simultaneous decision in two suits could not constitute a judgment in the former suit. Because the present matter involved a single suit, the principle of res judicata did not arise, and both decrees derived from the same judgment that addressed the entire suit.

In the matter, the Court found that no issue arose for the operation of the principle of res judicata. It held that a judgment could not continue to operate merely because it had been challenged in a separate appeal bearing a different number or because a copy of the judgment had been annexed to another appeal. Accordingly, the two decrees were regarded as a single decree. The Court further observed that the High Court had erred in refusing to accord the appellants the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act, since a conflict of decisions on that point existed not only in the State High Court but also among various High Courts across the country. Counsel for the appellants relied upon the authority in Appa v. Kachai Bayyan Kutti (2), which was found to be on all fours with the present facts. On that basis, the Court concluded that both appeals ought to be allowed and that the matter should be remanded to the High Court for adjudication on its merits. It directed that the costs of the appeals would follow the ultimate result of the proceedings. Consequently, the appeals were allowed. (1) A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 289. (2) A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 689.