Chintaman Rao vs State of Madhya Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petitions Nos. 78 and 79 of 1950

Decision Date: 8 November 1950

Coram: Mehr Chand Mahajan, Hiralal J. Kania, B.K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar

In this case the Supreme Court of India decided a dispute between Chintaman Rao, who was the petitioner, and the State of Madhya Pradesh, which was the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 8 November 1950. The bench that heard the matter was composed of Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Chief Justice Hiralal J. Kania, Justice B. K. Mukherjea and Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar. The official citation of the decision is 1951 AIR 118 and 1950 SCR 759, and the case has been referred to in many subsequent reports, including E & D 1951 SC 318, D 1952 SC 75, F 1954 SC 224, R 1956 SC 559 and several others up to RF 1974 SC 366.

The matter concerned the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, LXIV of 1948, specifically sections 3 and 4 of that Act. The statute prohibited the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season and imposed restrictions on the right to carry on trade or business protected by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950, subject to the reasonableness test in Article 19(6). The Act authorised the Deputy Commissioner to fix, by notification, a period that would be deemed an agricultural season for specified villages, and to issue a general order extending to those villages that prohibited bidi manufacture during that season. Further, the Act required that no person residing in a village covered by such an order should engage in bidi manufacture during the agricultural season, and no manufacturer should employ any person for bidi manufacture in that period.

Under the provisions of the Act the Deputy Commissioner issued an order that forbade all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis during a particular agricultural season. Two individuals—a bidi manufacturer and an employee of a bidi factory—both residing in one of the affected villages, filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus. They contended that the Act, by preventing them from exercising their fundamental right to carry on their trade or business guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g), was void.

The Supreme Court examined the constitutional challenge and rendered its holding. The Court said that, in the first point of its decision, the object of the statute …

In this case the Court observed that the purpose of the statute was to secure enough agricultural labour for the farming season in areas where bidis were manufactured. The Court noted that the same objective could have been achieved by a law that merely restricted the employment of agricultural workers in bidi factories during the agricultural season, without banning the whole bidi manufacturing activity. Because the provisions of the Act bore no reasonable connection to that purpose, the Court held that the Act did not impose a “reasonable restriction” as required by clause (6) of Article 19 and was therefore void. The Court further explained that even to the extent that the Act might be seen as authorising restrictions on agricultural labour, it could not be sustained. The language of the Act was so broad that it could cover restrictions both within and beyond the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action. Since the possibility could not be eliminated that the law might be applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution, the Court declared the Act wholly void.

The Court defined the phrase “reasonable restriction” to mean that any limitation on the enjoyment of a constitutional right must not be arbitrary or excessive, and must be no more than is necessary for the public interest. “Reasonable” was described as implying careful, intelligent deliberation, a choice guided by reason. Legislation that arbitrarily or excessively infringes a right lacks the quality of reasonableness and, unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g) and the social control allowed by clause (6) of Article 19, it fails the reasonableness test. The Court also held that the legislature’s determination of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is not final; the Supreme Court retains the power to examine whether legislative restrictions meet the constitutional standard and to declare a law void if it finds the restrictions unreasonable. The judgment proceeded to note the original jurisdiction of the petitions numbered 78 and 79 of 1950, filed under Article 32 for a writ of mandamus. Counsel for the petitioners and counsel for the respondent were named. The applications were made by a proprietor and an employee of a bidi manufacturing concern in District Sagar, Madhya Pradesh, who claimed that the State law prohibiting bidi manufacture in certain villages, including the one where they lived, conflicted with Part III of the Constitution and was consequently void. The Court identified the applicable legislation as the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, LXIV of 1948, which had been enacted on 19 October 1948.

In this matter, the Court observed that the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, dated 19 October 1948, was the statute governing the State at the time the Constitution came into force. The Court reproduced Sections 3 and 4 of that Act, which read as follows: “3. The Deputy Commissioner may by notification fix a period to be an agricultural season with respect to such villages as may be specified therein. 4. (1) The Deputy Commissioner may, by general order which shall extend to such villages as he may specify, prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season. (2) No person residing in a village specified in such order shall during the agricultural season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis, and no manufacturer shall during the said season employ any person for the manufacture of bidis.” Accordingly, on 13 June 1950 the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar issued an order under the authority of the Act that barred all residents of certain villages from engaging in bidi manufacturing. Two days later, on 19 June 1950, the petitioners filed two applications under article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of that order on the ground that it infringed their constitutional right to freedom of occupation and business. While the petitions were pending, the agricultural season covered by the 13 June order expired. A new order, covering the next agricultural season from 8 October to 18 November 1950, was promulgated on 29 September 1950 in the same terms, and the petitioners raised a supplementary challenge to this fresh order. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution declares, “All citizens shall have the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business,” thereby guaranteeing freedom of occupation and business. However, the Court noted that such freedom is subject to the restrictions enumerated in clause (6) of article 19, which states: “Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business.” The central issue before the Court was whether the 1948 Act fell within the protective ambit of this saving clause or whether it exceeded the permissible limits of legislative power. Counsel for the petitioners argued that the impugned Act did not merely impose reasonable restrictions aimed at the public interest but completely negated the constitutional right. To assess the merit of that contention, the Court indicated that a detailed examination of the Act and its operative provisions was required.

In this case, the Court examined the impugned Act and several of its provisions. The preamble of the Act declared that its purpose was to provide measures for supplying adequate labour for agricultural purposes in areas where bidis were manufactured. Sections three and four, as cited, authorised the Deputy Commissioner to prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season. Any violation of those provisions was made punishable under section seven of the Act, with a penalty that could include imprisonment for a term of up to six months, a fine, or both. The legislation was said to have been enacted to support the “grow more food” campaign and to bring under the plough large tracts of fallow land. The principal question that required determination was whether, while claiming to protect public interests, the statute arbitrarily interfered with private business and imposed unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions on a lawful occupation. In other words, the Court needed to decide whether the total prohibition of bidi manufacture during the agricultural season constituted a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Court stressed that unless it could be shown that the provisions of the Act bore a reasonable relation to the intended purpose, the freedom of occupation and the right to practice a business could not be curtailed. The expression “reasonable restriction” was interpreted to mean that any limitation on the enjoyment of the right must not be arbitrary or excessive, and must be no more than what is required in the public interest. The term “reasonable” was understood to imply intelligent care and deliberation, that is, a choice of course that reason dictates. Legislation that arbitrarily or excessively invades the right, therefore, could not be said to possess the quality of reasonableness, and unless it achieved a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed by article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by clause six of article 19, it would be deemed lacking in that quality. Clause six, in the concluding paragraph of article 19, enumerates certain categories of restrictions that the Constitution-makers considered reasonable. Those categories serve as a guide to interpreting the clause and illustrate the extent and nature of restrictions that, according to the statute, could be imposed on the freedom guaranteed in clause (g). The Court observed that, in substance and effect, the Act suspended the right mentioned in article 19(1)(g) for the whole duration of the agricultural seasons, and such a suspension could cause such dislocation of the bidi industry that it might lead to its ultimate ruin. While the object of the statute was to ensure adequate agricultural labour in bidi-manufacturing areas of the Province, the Court noted that the same objective could have been achieved by legislation that merely restrained the employment of agricultural labour in bidi manufacture during the season, rather than imposing a complete prohibition. Even at that point in time, a restriction might have been reasonable if it had amounted to a

In this case the Court observed that a law regulating the hours of work in the bidi manufacturing business, although it would limit the pool of workers and set limits on working hours, would not amount to a total shutdown of the industry and could therefore be regarded as falling within the scope of clause (6). However, the Court found that the actual effect of the provisions of the Act bore no reasonable connection to the object sought to be achieved and that the provisions were so sweeping that they went far beyond that object. The language of the statute, the Court said, prohibited a bidi manufacturer from employing any person in his enterprise, irrespective of where that person might reside. Consequently a manufacturer situated in the area could not bring in labour from neighbouring parts of the district, from other parts of the province, or from outside the province. Such a prohibition, the Court held, was arbitrary because it had no relation whatsoever to the purpose of the legislation and therefore could not be characterized as a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the constitutional right. The statute further barred every person residing in the notified villages during the agricultural season from engaging in bidi manufacturing. The Court noted that among the residents of those villages there were many infirm and disabled persons, children, elderly women and petty shopkeepers who were incapable of performing agricultural labour. All of those persons were thereby denied the opportunity to earn their livelihood. It is common knowledge, the Court said, that each village contains classes of people who do not take part in agricultural work; they and their wives and children often supplement their income by working in the bidi trade during their leisure hours. No reason existed, in the Court’s view, to prohibit them from pursuing that occupation. The statute, as it stood, not only forced those who could be employed in agricultural work to abandon other avocations, but also prohibited persons who had no connection with agricultural labour from engaging in bidi manufacturing and thus from earning a living. These provisions, the Court concluded, could not be regarded as reasonable restrictions on the right of the applicants and, being so, the statute was not in conformity with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Even to the extent that the law might be said to authorize restrictions concerning agricultural labour, it could not be sustained because its language was sufficiently broad to cover restrictions both within and beyond the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the right. Since there remained a possibility that the law could be applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution, the Court held that it must be declared wholly void.

In this case, the Court observed that any application of the statute for purposes not authorized by the Constitution must be held to be completely void. Counsel for the Government of Madhya Pradesh argued that the state legislature was the proper authority to assess the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the law. The counsel asserted that the legislature alone was familiar with the conditions prevailing in the state and therefore alone could determine what legislation would effectively further the goal of increasing food production, bring fallow land under cultivation, and support the grow-more-food campaign. The counsel further maintained that the Court, being geographically distant, could not evaluate the reasonableness of the restrictions using its own standards. The Court rejected this contention, noting that it conflicts with the clear provisions of the Constitution. The Court explained that a legislative determination of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is not final or conclusive; it remains subject to judicial supervision. In matters involving fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has the duty to protect the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and possesses the power to strike down any legislative enactment that infringes those freedoms. The Court emphasized that the Constitution sets a ceiling on legislative power, and any provision that permits application beyond that ceiling cannot be sustained. It also noted that the language of the impugned statute was sufficiently wide to allow restrictions that were not within the permissible limits of legislative action. Accordingly, the Court held that the impugned statute fails the test of reasonableness and is therefore void. Consequently, the orders issued by the Deputy Commissioner on 13 June 1950 and on 26 September 1950 were declared void, inoperative, and ineffective, meaning that they have no legal effect from the date of this judgment. The Court directed the respondents not to enforce the provisions of section 4 of the Act against the petitioners in any manner, including any administrative or penal measures. The petitioners were awarded costs of these proceedings in both petitions, reflecting the Court’s finding that the proceedings were unjustified. The petitions were allowed. An agent for the petitioners in Nos. 78 and 79 was appointed, and an agent for the respondent in Nos. 78 and 79 was appointed to appear for the respective parties in the proceedings.