Udhaw Singh v. Enforcement Directorate · 2025 INSC 247

The unfinished trial behind the request for release

The appellant had been detained for an offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 for one year and two months, while only one of the 225 cited witnesses had been examined. The Supreme Court had to decide whether continued custody could be justified when that record showed that the trial was unlikely to finish within a few years, notwithstanding the restrictive conditions governing bail under the PMLA.

Why the progress of the trial mattered to the constitutional assessment

The Court relied on the contrast between the appellant's completed period of detention and the very limited examination of the witnesses cited for trial, which supplied a concrete basis for concluding that completion was not likely within a reasonable period. It applied the reasoning adopted in V. Senthil Balaji, in which the constitutional protection of liberty and a speedy trial prevented statutory restrictions from becoming a means of prolonged incarceration without a realistic prospect of timely adjudication.

The adopted reasoning explained that Section 45(1)(ii) does not authorise the State to detain an accused for an unreasonably long time, especially where the trial has no prospect of finishing within a reasonable period. Its relevance in the appellant's case followed from the actual state of the prosecution, rather than from a fixed rule that a particular number of months in custody must always result in bail.

Why a stringent statute did not extinguish constitutional jurisdiction

In the reasoning which the Court applied, the assessment of reasonable time required attention to the punishment attached to the alleged offence, the strictness of the bail threshold and any statutory outer limit for completion of the trial. These considerations explained why a court had to evaluate the practical consequences of continued detention within the particular statutory and procedural setting, while keeping the constitutional rights of the undertrial in view.

The adopted passage recognised the power of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on the ground that further detention would violate Part III of the Constitution, notwithstanding the statutory restriction, where the record established no possibility of trial concluding within a reasonable time. That constitutional intervention was described as discretionary, with delay substantially attributable to the accused and a real threat to society arising from the accused's antecedents identified as circumstances which could justify declining relief.

The significance of Article 21 was therefore that it required meaningful protection when a pending trial could not reasonably reach its conclusion, rather than permitting detention to continue through mechanical reliance on Section 45. The Court did not invalidate the PMLA bail provision or dispense with its operation in every case, but applied the constitutional reasoning to a record which disclosed continuing custody and a remote prospect of trial completion.

Why Kanhaiya Prasad did not require a different result

The Court examined the decision in Union of India through the Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad after it was brought to its attention, finding that the constitutional delay decisions had not been applicable on the facts of that matter. The accused there had been in custody for less than seven months when the High Court granted bail, while no finding had been recorded that the trial could not finish within a reasonable time.

Those differences explained why cancellation of bail in that case did not amount to a departure from the law in K.A. Najeeb and V. Senthil Balaji. In Udhaw Singh, the number of witnesses still to be examined and the detention already undergone supplied the factual basis for applying that law, while the contrasting decision lacked the finding concerning prolonged trial which made constitutional intervention relevant here.

Why the order preserved the appellant's participation in the trial

Having concluded that the appellant deserved release pending trial, the Court required his production before the Special Court within a maximum of one week so that appropriate bail terms could be imposed. It specified regular and punctual attendance, cooperation with early disposal and surrender of any passport, preserving the ongoing prosecution while ending the detention which the record could no longer justify.

The appeal was accordingly allowed on those terms, without a determination that the appellant was innocent of the money-laundering allegation. The reason for release remained the constitutional effect of custody in a case whose trial could not reasonably conclude soon, while the conditions maintained the appellant's availability for the adjudication that still had to occur.

Source: Udhaw Singh v. Enforcement Directorate · 2025 INSC 247