The U.S. Supreme Court

The Delhi High Court has ruled that a wife, though separated, is entitled to maintenance depending on her husband’s financial position. Chief Justice AK Sikri and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw said. It rejected the argument that if a husband provided food and shelter after a separation, he owed nothing more to his wife. Hath Kharch” (pin money),” the bench observed. The couple, with two children, got married in 1981 and was subsequently separated, but was living in the same house. In 2002, the husband had agreed to pay Rs 1,50,000 per month to his wife. However, he stopped the payments after four months and his wife approached the family court. Declining to give further maintenance the husband, a well-qualified doctor and businessman, had contended that he was looking after all the financial needs of his wife and as such she did not require any maintenance. He further contended that he had deposited Rs 2 crore in the court for his wife in a dispute relating to the partnership of hotel Marina, in which she had an 8 per cent share. He also alleged that his wife also owned a 1,000 sq. yards plot in Faridabad. The wife had predicated her claim at Rs 1,50,000 per month on the basis of the 2002 agreement, that she was not working and had no other source of income. The bench cited a Supreme Court judgment reiterating that the test to be applied is to place the wife in the same position as she would have been if the relationship had continued.

Well, really only refugees. Curiously, he and his political allies do not talk about the majority of other immigrants and their needs in the City of Cleveland. We don’t hear him talk about the THOUSANDS of undocumented immigrants that live in Cleveland (many married to U.S. The city declined to follow the lead of 70 other cities and counties in filing an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court in support of President Obama’s DAPA program (Deferred Action for Parental Accountability, intended to provide temporary relief from deportation to 5 million undocumented folks without criminal records, who have U.S. Cleveland can relax, for now. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a tie vote on June 23, 2016, blocked Obama’s DAPA program, leaving the lower court’s order in place. The real-life issues consequences of a broken immigration system, especially when Congress has long abdicated its responsibility to pass immigration law reform, fall to the cities.

At least to those cities that care enough to try and address them. Immigration is an urban challenge and opportunity. In the past few weeks, after years of civic dialogue, mayors and city councils in Cincinnati and Detroit passed Municipal ID programs to integrate the undocumented in their community (as well as homeless and other marginalized groups). Jackson and his team remain stone silent. And his silence and inaction on so many immigration-related issues is glaring. We don’t hear about the creation of an Office of Immigrant Affairs in City Hall — which many cities in the rust belt have launched in recent years to help drive and coordinate their region’s immigrant inclusion efforts. We don’t hear about translating city hall website and materials to OPEN up the city hall for all people — as part of a language equity policy. We don’t hear about doing outreach to existing immigrant communities, with law enforcement, libraries, and others, to build community, groom civic leaders, educate on naturalization and visas for victims of crime and human trafficking.

Instead, we hear about some inchoate plans to create an Orwellian “Dream Neighborhood” to segregate new refugees in rehabbed homes. The plan appears to be driven by private interests/developers, not city hall. Also, refugee resettlement itself is managed by nonprofit resettlement agencies, like Catholic Charities, not city hall. So, it’s hard to understand why the city is talking like it’s THEIR program. It’s still not clear what the program is, despite being talked about for years. Could it be that Global Cleveland or its new pet project the Dream Neighborhood, might merely be a public relations move to distract the community and mask the Mayor’s nativism — making Cleveland APPEAR a bit, well, immigrant-friendly? Jackson and his team know that refugee flow is dictated by the federal government. A small number of refugees enter the U.S. 65,000 to 85,000. A trickle will make it to Cleveland. Small enough not to change Frank’s agenda. Jackson’s allies in local politics, business and philanthropy, must know, certainly, that Cleveland is an outlier in the rust belt in the immigration game. They don’t want to look too bad, so voila, the Dream Neighborhood.

In any event, refugee resettlement, as important as it is, and the Dream Neighborhood, whatever it is, are not a substitute for a comprehensive immigration integration strategy. Joe Cimperman, the longtime downtown Cleveland City Councilman and new head of Global Cleveland, knows this. During his 18 years on City Council, and despite being a child of an immigrant, Cimperman has largely avoided immigration issues, and certainly has ignored the opportunity to revitalize the city by welcoming and integrating a new wave of immigrants. Joe Roman, the President of the Greater Cleveland Partnership (GCP), the city’s chamber of commerce, equally avoids the issue like the plague, not wanting to fall out of Jackson’s favor. Roman declined a request to do a Cleveland event around immigration reform a few years ago with the Partnership for a New American Economy (a coalition of CEOs and mayors around the country, convened by Michael Bloomberg and Rupert Murdoch).

While other city chambers of commerce around the country lobby aggressively for creative immigration reform to boost their local economies, GCP sits quietly on the sidelines. Years ago, Columbus surpassed Cleveland as Ohio’s immigrant and global city. Progressive political, business and university leadership have paved the way for immigrant talent and entrepreneurship flows into Columbus. Have you ever wondered why there are 40,000 African immigrants in Columbus, and only a handful in Cleveland? The answer: enlightened leadership and local policy. Ironically, with politics at City Hall driven by African American leadership, immigrants of color do not often feel welcome. Real change is not drip, drip. Real change is not deceptive and manipulative. Real change does not divide. It is inclusive of EVERYONE. The problem is that Cleveland leaders do not really want change that meaningfully includes immigrants. Numerous journalists have told me that Jackson declines media requests to talk about his immigration strategy. There are reason for this.

One, he has no immigration strategy. Two, he doesn’t want anyone to know he doesn’t have one. And three, he doesn’t want one — he believes that immigrants will hurt Cleveland by competing for jobs, changing the race-political game, and changing the definition of diversity from a black/white paradigm. Since Frank does not grant media requests to discuss this issue, it is up to citizens to ask Jackson, publicly, when the cameras are rolling, why he feels this way. While Trump at least speaks his mind on immigration, Jackson stays largely mum. Other than saying that he seeks to “take care of our own,” he offers no insight as to “who” are “our own.” Does this include the thousands of undocumented immigrants living now in Cleveland? Further, he declines to specifically address why he feels that the economists’ research on immigrant contributions is wrong, and why so many other cities in the rust belt are misguided to work hard to integrate and attract immigrants. When Jackson is asked publicly about immigration, which is rare, but usually initiated by Attorney Joseph Meissner, a Green Beret and co-founder of the Harvard Law School Civil Rights Law Journal, Jackson is almost indecipherable.

Here is a recent example of Jackson’s incomprehensible jabberwocky in answering a citizen question on immigration. Isn’t the “Dream Neighborhood” his program? What about the hundreds of programs currently under his management at city hall? For a peek at a real immigrant integration and attraction strategy, check out Chicago’s Plan for New Americans, outlining Mayor Rahm Emmanuel’s vision of creating the most immigrant-friendly city in the world. 5 million (some of it funded by Governor Kasich), wasting 6 years and running through 4 executive directors, Global Cleveland has accomplished precious little. Perhaps that was the intent all along? In light of such entrenched parochialism and insularity, one has to ask the questions: Why even bother launching organizations like Global Cleveland, or engage in prolonged civic dialogue about empty projects like the “Dream Neighborhood” or “La Villa Hispana”? Because it creates the appearance that the necessary and important work of immigrant inclusion is actually being done. On July 18, 2016, Trump will be in Cleveland for the GOP Convention. He will find many friends here who understand that immigration is a powerful wedge issue that can be played for political advantage, much to the detriment of the American people. Well, in many ways, Cleveland’s leaders have already built a wall. To make Cleveland great again, it’s time for the people to tear it down.

The court first overruled the finding of the lower court that Mesivtah did not benefit a substantial and indefinite class of persons that are the legitimate subjects of charity. The Commonwealth Court stated that Mesivtah demonstrated that the cost of the camp was generally subsidized and that extra subsidies benefited those of little or no means. Quoting other case law, the court held that a charity need not benefit exclusively persons of little means; the benefits can extend to all persons generally. However, the court held that Mesivtah did not meet the case law criterion that it relieve the government of some of its burden. The court stated that there was little use by the general public of the facilities. The court did not disagree that Mesivtah met the requirements of section 5(f ) of the Charity Act regarding government service. 10 P.S. § 375(f ). The Commonwealth Court ignored a lengthy and detailed discussion directly on point in Alliance Home. There, the Supreme Court found that there was no conflict between case law and the Charity Act, but proceeded to discuss at length the considerations that must be addressed if such a conflict were at issue. The court repeated the obvious point that the judiciary, not the General Assembly, are the final interpreters of the Constitution.

Back in 2010 I posted a comment criticizing the practice of appointing attorneys for juveniles in delinquency proceedings to serve simultaneously as guardians ad litem and urging the Illinois Supreme Court to grant review in a case that challenged it. The Court did not grant the appeal in the case I wrote about in 2010, but some time later, it did grant the appeal in another case – In Re Austin M. – which raised the same issue. I was glad the Court would be addressing the question, but I was not too optimistic about the possible result. I thought the Court would continue to repeat the erroneous analysis that courts in Illinois had followed for many years. The opinion is available here. For more on the case go to the Juvenile Law Center blog and here. Austin’s initial claim on appeal is that the legal representation he received at his delinquency trial amounted to a denial of his right to counsel . Austin contends that a GAL, unlike a defense attorney, owes a duty to the court and to society and may disregard a minor client’s wishes if the GAL believes it is in the minor’s best interests.

Further, Austin contends that his attorney’s “hybrid representation” deprived him of his statutory and constitutional right to counsel and constitutes a per se conflict of interest requiring reversal of his adjudication. The State asks us to reject this claim. Austin’s claim requires us to decide . “hybrid representation” is inconsistent with the statutorily and constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel afforded minors in delinquency proceedings . ] minor in a delinquency proceeding has a non-waivable right to be represented by a defense attorney. There is no statutory exception which would permit representation by a GAL—even one who is also an attorney at law. Minors in delinquency proceedings also have a constitutional right to counsel. It is clear to us that a juvenile’s right to counsel in a delinquency proceeding is firmly anchored in both due process and our statutory scheme. In a delinquency proceeding, when counsel attempts to perform the role of GAL as well as defense attorney, the risk that counsel will render ineffective assistance or that an actual conflict of interest will arise is substantial.

]hen a guardian ad litem is appointed in a delinquency case, it is generally because there is no interested parent or legal guardian to represent the child’s best interests. In these situations, the GAL must act in the role of a concerned parent, which is often in opposition to the position of defense counsel. Further, a GAL—unlike a defense attorney—owes a duty to the court and to society. A guardian ad litem need not zealously pursue acquittal if he does not believe acquittal would be in the best interests of the minor or society. When counsel attempts to fulfill the role of GAL as well as defense counsel, the risk that the minor’s constitutional and statutory right to counsel will be diluted, if not denied altogether, is too great. We conclude, therefore, that the interests of justice are best served by finding a per se conflict when minor’s counsel in a delinquency proceeding simultaneously functions as both defense counsel and guardian ad litem. UPDATE: I later wrote a law review article reviewing the opinion. It is available here.

At present there are six vacancies in the Supreme Court, which has a total strength of 31 judges. New Delhi: For the first time in the Supreme Court’s history, senior woman lawyer Indu Malhotra has been elevated directly from the Bar as a judge of the court. In the last two years, senior advocates Rohinton Nariman, Uday Lalit and L. Nageswara Rao were directly appointed as Supreme Court judges, without serving as high court judges. However, Ms Malhotra, 61, is the first woman lawyer to make it to the Supreme Court without having served in a high court. In 2007, Ms Malhotra, a senior counsel who has been practising law in the Supreme Court for 30 years, became the second woman to be designated as senior advocate by the Supreme Court. On Wednesday, the collegium comprising Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justices J. Chelameswar, Ranjan Gogoi, Madan B. Lokur and Kurian Joseph, at its meeting, recommended the elevation of Ms Malhotra and Uttarakhand high court chief justice K.M.

Joseph as apex court judges. The law ministry is expected to process this and the two are likely to be appointed within a fortnight. Since the Supreme Court’s inception in 1950, six woman judges have been appointed. They are Justices M. Fathima Beevi, Sujata Manohar, Ruma Pal, Ranjana De-sai, Gyan Sudha Misra and R. Banumathi. Ms Malhotra will be the seventh woman to be a Supreme Court judge. Born in Bengaluru, Ms Malhotra was inspired by her lawyer father O.P. Malhotra to take up the profession. She did her schooling from Carmel Convent School in New Delhi and went on to do BA (Honours) in political science from Lady Shri Ram College. She later completed her masters in political science from Delhi University, and after a brief stint in teaching, completed her LL.B. At present there are six vacancies in the Supreme Court, which has a total strength of 31 judges. This year seven more judges will retire. They are CJI Dipak Misra and Justices Chelameswar, Lokur and Joseph, besides Justices Amitava Roy, R.K.

A Houston lawyer recently discovered that the passage of time was not sufficient to protect him from the consequences of actions taken in a brief representation nearly six years earlier. In re Cochener, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 460 (Bankr. S.D. “In 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) to rectify perceived fraud and abuse in the bankruptcy system. That a federal bankruptcy judge would acknowledge that BAPCPA might have been a legitimate response to a problem is extraordinary enough that this case bears some scrutiny. The Debtor filed her chapter 7 petition on May 1, 2001, some six months after being divorced. 111,000.00 in debts. The Debtor’s ex-husband informed the Trustee that the Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs were far from accurate. As a result, the Trustee asked some searching questions and requested additional documents at the first meeting of creditors. The Debtor’s initial lawyer agreed that the documents would be produced and that the Debtor would appear for a continued creditors’ meeting. Based on the conduct of the first meeting, the Debtor’s attorney had enough sense to realize that he was in over his head.

He referred the Debtor to an attorney who was Board Certified in Consumer Bankruptcy Law and had been practicing for fifteen years. He also told the new attorney that there were allegations of concealed assets. The new attorney apparently decided that the Debtor had made a horrible mistake in filing for bankruptcy. Even before he was formally substituted into the case, he prepared and filed a Motion to Dismiss the chapter 7 case. The motion represented that the interests of creditors would be better served by permitting dismissal and that no creditor would be prejudiced by dismissal. However, the motion did not make any factual allegations. At the same time, counsel blithely informed the trustee that based on the motion to dismiss, the Debtor would not be attending the continued meeting. The Trustee objected to the dismissal and informed the Debtor’s new counsel that attendance at the creditor’s meeting was not optional.

Nevertheless, the Debtor and her new counsel failed to attend the creditors’ meeting, which the Trustee continued yet again. The Debtor’s substitute counsel informed the Trustee that they would not be attending once again, based on the pending Motion to Dismiss. The Debtor also failed to produce any of the documents requested. At the hearing upon the Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court apparently continued the hearing and instructed the Trustee to conduct discovery. When the Trustee requested dates for a Rule 2004 exam, Debtor’s counsel did not respond. When the Trustee noticed the exam anyway, Debtor’s counsel objected to the production requests on the basis that they went back more than one year. The Debtor failed to appear for the scheduled Rule 2004 exam and counsel contended that he had not heard from her in several weeks. Shortly thereafter, the Debtor’s second lawyer filed a motion to withdraw. At this point, he had been representing the Debtor for just over five months. The Court allowed Debtor’s second attorney to withdraw, but noted that “This order is without prejudice to any claims, ethical or otherwise, held by the Ch.

The Trustee’s counsel informed Debtor’s second attorney that he should reimburse the Trustee for the cost of responding to the Motion to Dismiss. Counsel never accepted the Trustee’s offer to make amends. This would prove to be a poor choice. The Motion to Dismiss was eventually denied, some eleven months after it was filed. 90,000 in assets. The Trustee obtained a default judgment in the adversary proceeding he brought to recover these assets. Finally, several years later and after filing a forcible detainer action, the Trustee recovered two pieces of real property. The properties had been thoroughly trashed and the words “Thou Shalt Not Steal or Covet” and other similar phrases had been written on the walls. The Debtor and her son blamed this vandalism upon day laborers who did not otherwise speak English but were apparently able to quote the Bible in a foreign language. On May 9, 2006, the Trustee’s counsel sent Debtor’s substitute counsel the first of several letters stating that the Trustee intended to seek sanctions.

The third letter provided Debtor’s counsel with a proposed motion for sanctions and informed him that the motion would be filed the next day if a settlement offer was not forthcoming. Debtor’s counsel did not make a settlement offer and so the Motion for Sanctions was filed some five years after the substitute counsel had first been retained. The Court subsequently issued its own show cause order requiring the Debtor, her son and the initial attorney to show cause why they should not be sanctioned as well. At the hearing on sanctions, it was brought out that Debtor’s second attorney was the same attorney who had been sanctioned by Judge Steen in the case of In re Thomas, 337 B.R. 879 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. One of the more interesting aspects of this case was the passage of time. Although not explicitly stated by the court, claims for sanctions are apparently not subject to traditional limitations periods.

Thus, with apologies to Neil Young, sanctions, like rust, never sleep. Having disposed of the timeliness issue, the Court concluded that Rule 9011 did not apply. Because the Trustee did not send a sanctions demand letter until May 9, 2006, some four years after the court ruled upon the motion to dismiss, counsel was never given the opportunity to withdraw the offending pleading. As a result, sanctions under this rule were not available. However, that was not the end of the inquiry. Instead, the Court found that it could use its inherent powers under §105 to impose sanctions. On the surface, this appears to be an end run around the text of the rule. However, it is one endorsed by the Supreme Court. In Chambers v. Masco, 501 U.S. The Court also found that where the relief requested does not include disbarment or suspension, that proof by a preponderance of the evidence will suffice. The Court also found that sanctions could be imposed under 28 U.S.C. 1,064.92 incurred in prosecuting the Motion for Sanctions. 50,000 for damage to the real properties.