Most Americans probably do not know that the US is driving the surrogacy industry globally, on both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, the US is second worldwide only to India in the supply of surrogates, many of whom are military wives. Among those who study the issue, it is estimated that between 40 and 50 percent of surrogate pregnancies in the US are commissioned by foreign buyers. There is a good reason for this: of the top commercial surrogacy markets in the world, only the US and Ukraine have not passed prohibitory legislation on it. On the demand side, many American buyers go to India, Nepal, Mexico, Vietnam, Kenya, or Cambodia because surrogacy is far cheaper there than it is in the US. 25,000. In fact, the US government via the State Department, in conjunction with the fertility industry, has been trying to get an international treaty passed at The Hague that would facilitate the global surrogacy industry. In such a bustling global marketplace, it becomes easy to dehumanize the women and babies involved. It’s all too tempting to ignore the very real effects surrogacy has on the lives of the women who sell their bodies and the children who are bought and sold. The case petitioners have asked the Supreme Court to hear reveals the inherently exploitative nature of surrogacy, which clearly violates both constitutional and human rights.
The trustees had a “power” to defer the sale indefinitely. An example might be a conveyance of land to T1 and T2 in fee simple absolute in possession on trust for sale for B for life and then to C in fee simple absolute. Co-ownership – It frequently arises that two or more persons wish to own land together. The most common situations are husband and wife or civil partners or cohabitees purchasing a home together and arrangements relating to property acquired for business purposes. Two methods are available to achieve co-ownership: the Joint Tenancy and the Tenancy in Common. Where there is a joint tenancy, each joint tenant can be said to own the entire estate. He or she does not own any distinct share. If one joint tenant dies, his or her interest does not pass under the will (or intestacy) but accrues to the remaining joint tenants (sometimes still referred to as the “jus accrescendi”)..
Where there is a tenancy in common, each tenant in common will own a particular share – e.g. equal shares or 75% to 25% etc. Here, each tenant in common is free to deal with his or her share. For example, if one tenant in common dies then his or her share will pass to others under the will (or intestacy). The choice between joint tenancy and tenant-in-common requires considerable thought. It can have significant consequences and appropriate legal advice should always be obtained. Before 1926, a legal estate could be held either under joint tenancy or tenancy in common. Joint tenancy of a legal estate continues to be possible. However, after 1925, tenancy in common of a legal estate is not permitted. Therefore, in co-ownership arrangements, the legal estate in the land must be held as joint tenants on trust for, as the case may be, the beneficiaries either as joint tenants or as tenants in common (in whatever shares are specified). Since the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 the appropriate trust is a “trust of land” and not a trust for sale.
Meaning of “trust of land”. “trustees of land” means trustees of a trust of land. There are various ways in which a joint tenancy can be converted into a tenancy in common and these include a “notice of severance” served upon the other joint tenants. Note: In recent times, there has been considerable litigation and, in particular, in connection with shares in a home. In relation to unamarried cohabitees, the Law Commission made recommendations but these have not been implemented. ] EWCA Civ 578 but judgment remains to be handed down. Kernott v Jones is a cautionary tale for cohabitees and emphasizes the need for sound legal advice. Conveyancing- the imposition of a trust for sale (pre 1997) and now a trust of land (after 1996) is essentially conveyancing machinery enabling a purchaser to obtain the land free of any beneficial interests in the land. Obsolete forms of co-ownership: For completeness, we may note coparcenary and tenancy by entireties. Coparcenary could arise on an intestacy before 1926 where, instead of a male heir, the surviving issue were daughters. They took jointly as coparceners. This is not possible since the 1925 legislation altered the way in which property devolves on an intestacy. A tenancy by entirety arose where, before the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, land was transferred to a husband and wife. The law effectively regarded them as a single person who, it may be added, was the husband ! After 1882, such tenancies were converted into joint tenancies and the Law of Property Act 1925 completed that process for any remaining tenancies by entirety. Note: This post does not constitute legal advice.
Attorney generals summarize each ballot initiative for voters in 100 words or less. The summary appears on the initiative petition circulated among voters. If a minimum number of voters sign the initiative petition, the initiative appears on the ballot. The summary gives voters a sense of the measure’s purpose without creating prejudice for or against the proposed measure. Attorney General Kamala D. Harris wrote the title and summary for Reed’s Pension Reform Act. First, Reed claimed the word “eliminates” was misleading because the initiative does not repeal or replace any provision of the state Constitution. The Court agreed the initiative does not eliminate any provision of the state Constitution. But the summary does not state the initiative eliminates constitutional provisions – the summary states the initiative eliminates constitutional protections. The Court found the Attorney General’s characterization was accurate. Second, Reed argued the phrase “constitutional protections” is false and misleading because the California Rule granting public employees vested pension rights in retirement benefits is not constitutionally based. Next, Reed ignored California Supreme Court precedent a second time, arguing the word “vested” is false and misleading. Reed claimed the word “vested” only describes benefits that have already been earned through past service, not benefits earned through future service. Again, the California Supreme Court has used the term extensively to describe benefits earned through future service. Finally, Reed challenged the Attorney General identifying “teachers, nurses, and peace officers” as affected public employees. Reed claimed the Attorney General cherry-picked three very popular job classifications of public employees to discourage voter support. In fact, those three job classifications make up close to half of all public employees. The Court found the Attorney General accurately and concisely identified the affected employees for voters.
Tonight, Governor Scott, announced the appointment of three new Judges in Miami-Dade County. Scott leaves office on January 7, 2019; (maybe even earlier if he is confirmed to have won the Senate race), and he clearly wants to leave his final and lasting impressions on trial court benches throughout the State. He moved quickly to name replacements for Circuit Court Judges Stephen Millan and Ariana Farjardo Orshan and County Court Judge Wendell Graham. Judge Bokor, age 40, has been a member of The Florida Bar for 13 years. Bokor was an Assistant County Attorney, when, in October of 2016, Scott named him to the County Court bench. Two years later and Bokor is now a Circuit Court Judge replacing Stephen Millan. Bokor had applied to open seats on the Circuit Court, 3rd DCA, and Florida Supreme Court all within the past two months. Judge Guzman, age 48, has been a member of The Florida Bar for 21 years.
Guzman was an ASA for two years, then worked for the FBI for six years as a legal advisor, followed by two years in private practice before working as a Chief Assistant Statewide Prosecutor for five years. He was named a County Court Judge by Governor Scott in 2012. Six years later he becomes a Circuit Court judge replacing Judge Farjardo Orshan. Lody Jean, age 40, has been a member of The Florida Bar for 14 years. Jean was born in Haiti of Lebanese decent. For the first eight years of her legal career she was employed as an ASA in Miami-Dade County. She has been in private practice for the past six years handling immigration and criminal defense matters. She is the Immediate Past President of the Haitian Lawyers Association. She replaces Judge Wendell Graham. Congrats to Miami-Dade ASA Frank Ledee. Governor Scott named Ledee a Circuit Court Judge today in Broward County replacing Judge John Contini. Governor Scott still has ten names on his desk for two open seats on the 3rd DCA. We expect he will name those replacements sometime in the next 30 days.
In Ohio, a person can always represent himself in court. This is called appearing “pro se” and is a common (though unwise) practice where very little is at stake, such as in small claims courts around the state. Why is it unwise? The two main reasons are that attorneys who regularly perform evictions will be a great deal more familiar with the ins and outs of the law than the lay person. Secondly, an attorney will see the case objectively, and a dispassionate eye is a more effective observer of events than the landlord who may see things subjectively, having his vision clouded by emotions. ], as well as for the recovery of past due rents. Picklo was not licensed to practice law in the state of Ohio, but she nevertheless filed these claims and appeared in court on behalf of the property owner since she was the rental manager. Ms. Picklo argued that R.C. She also cited R.C. There are several places. You can contact your local bar association and ask to be referred to an attorney who regularly performs evictions. If you call any large apartment complex, the rental managers there will more than likely refer you to the attorney they use. If you know an attorney personally, even if he or she does not conduct evictions, he or she will very likely know someone who does.
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court in a landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education (Topeka) declared that state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white students was unconstitutional. This case overturned Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) which allowed state sponsored segregation. In 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus called out his states’ National Guard to block black students’ entry to Little Rock Central High School. President Eisenhower responded by deploying elements of the 101st Airborne Division and federalized Faubus’ National Guard. Over 40 years later, I met one of the Little Rock Seven, Ernest Green, who had become an executive in the securities industry. In 1963, I watched on live TV as Alabama Governor George Wallace personally blocked the door at the University of Alabama to prevent the enrollment of 2 black students. Wallace, an ardent segregationist, had been known to repeat his mantra “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” several times for the TV audience. Wallace moved aside when confronted by General Graham and Nicholas Katzenbach, Asst. Attorney General. General Graham of the Alabama National Guard was ordered by President Kennedy to intervene and moved Governor Wallace to make history. All Southern States required segregation by law and it would be many years before the fighting over the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 1954 was fully implemented. Now we have many of the governors of these same states fighting the implementation of the health care act as it relates to Medicaid. They are going to opt out of that part which would help the poorest citizens of their state. The south is still fighting the federal government, and I wonder how much of this fight is also tied to race?
The Connecticut Supreme Court was asked Friday to reconsider its recent decision that the state provides students from impoverished communities the minimally adequate education the state Constitution requires. The coalition also asks the court to reconsider its conclusion that the state is not constitutionally responsible for paying to help students overcome societal deficiencies such as poverty and other issues at home. With no court mandate, what’s next for school funding? The plaintiffs argued that there might not be a statewide deficiency in overall education spending, but there are major deficiencies in the most impoverished districts, which struggle to raise revenue locally. “The question is not merely whether Connecticut residents, in the aggregate, receive adequate school,” the plaintiffs’ attorneys wrote. “Those are forceful and unequivocal findings of ultimate facts,” the plaintiffs said. The state attorney general’s office has until Wednesday to respond to the plaintiffs’ request for a rehearing. There is no deadline for a Supreme Court decision.
For Appeals under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 from an order made by the National Commission, entertaining complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any claimed exceeds Rupees One Crore. For Appeal under Section 19(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts of Act, 1971, from any order or decision of Division Bench of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. For Appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 from an order made by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India under Section 36 and 37 of the Advocates Act. For Appeal under Section 116 A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 on any question, whether of law or fact, from every order passed by a High Court under Section 98 or Section 99 of the said Act. For Appeal under Section 10 of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 from any judgment, sentence or order not being an interlocutory order, of the special court, both on fact and on law. For Appeals under Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 from certain orders passed by the Central Government or by the MRTP Commission.
News from the PERS front is pitiful right now. There are three lawsuits awaiting action from Judge Henry Kantor of the Multnomah County Circuit Court. Despite promising a “quick” ruling, both the Arken and Robinson cases have been awaiting Judge Kantor’s decision since September 28, 2006 – 8 full months now. Both of these are high stakes cases that could affect the way PERS is currently handling the invoicing and collection from “window” retirees (Arken) as well as a broader segment of PERS retirees (Robinson). Judge Kantor has had several high profile cases on his calendar since he made the prediction of a relatively quick decision, but those cases have come, gone, and are in various stages of appeal. Resolution of the Arken and Robinson cases would hardly be definitive at this legal level. Parties on both sides of both cases have promised to appeal any adverse ruling, so both cases are ultimately heading for the Oregon Supreme Court. However, to get to the OSC, both cases would have to go through the Oregon Court of Appeals first, leaving final resolution in limbo until at least 2011 by current estimates. Justice moves very slowly.
This will probably be my last post until after June 16th. I will be on the East Coast visiting friends and family (and catching a few plays) for the next several weeks. As always, I will monitor email and try to respond to urgent issues. I will also keep watching for any significant events that are “of the moment” and will attempt to update this blog from a distance via Internet Cafes. I can get email on my phone, but I can’t do blogging from it and I’m not taking a notebook computer with me this time. Enjoy the great weather while it lasts. Since the Rose Festival has started, it is a given that crappy weather will soon be upon us. Note added at 5:30 p.m. In my haste to write this, I omitted a couple of other significant issues that remain to be resolved. The “White” case challenges the settlement agreement itself. Should this case finally get a hearing and a ruling, it has the potential of overshadowing any of the other extant cases as it would invalidate the settlement and make both Arken and Robinson unnecessary. Similarly, the Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to take up the matter of attorney fees in the Strunk case. To apportion attorney fees, the court has to decide who are the “winners” and who are the “losers”. Strunk decision. This is one of those few legal decisions I await with some glee. I like watching the SC twist slowly in the wind.
So says Michael Mann. Although that link is only to someone else reposting something Mann said, and annoying only “said” in the form of an image1. Aanyway, the relevant case is I believe Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA. And since I took the trouble to find that out, and read some of the decision, I shall blog about it. You’ll be unsurprised to learn that while MM’s soundbite is mostly true, it elides a great deal of important detail. For example, just like the recent Alsup case, K was entirely happy to take all the GW science at it’s word. The actual judgement is here (or here). The argument, as in so many of these cases, is arcane and complex, hinging (sort of) on the meaning of the word “replace”. It’s worth pausing for a moment to think about this point: the higher courts don’t hear simple cases where the answer is obvious to the lower courts; or indeed so obvious that it never comes to court.
This kinda returns us to a point I was trying to make before: that if the legislature wanted to make these points beyond doubt it could. It could either explicitly give the EPA authority, or withhold it. Quite some time ago, in 1990, section 612 of the Clean Air Act was passed, and requires manufacturers to replace ozone-depleting substances with safe substitutes. So what does that leave as a problem? The problem was that the EPA wanted to use that authority to oblige people using HFCs to replace them with something that doesn’t deplete ozone, and doesn’t cause GW; or at least not so much. However, the act appears to only give the EPA authority to force people to replace ozone-depleting substances; and HFCs aren’t. Is this a bit Jesuitical? Yes, but that’s the law for you. Is it a reasonable reading of the law? I think so; and of course on of the other two judges on the case concurred. Could one make a reasonable case for the opposite? Yeees, probably. Indeed the dissent (Wilkins) does so (page 26). Is this an example of K clearly being unreasonable?