TALLAHASSEE, Fla. – The Florida Supreme Court on Thursday rejected appeals by three Death Row inmates in decades-old cases, including the 1991 murder of a Fort Pierce police officer. The rulings were part of a long line of similar decisions in cases rooted in a 2016 U.S. In one of Thursday’s cases, justices turned down an appeal by Death Row inmate Billy Leon Kearse, who was convicted in the murder of Fort Pierce police officer Danny Parrish during a traffic stop, according to court records. In another case, justices rejected an appeal by Death Row inmate Stephen Todd Booker, who was convicted in the 1977 murder of 94-year-old Lorine Demoss Harmon in Alachua County. In the third case, justices denied an appeal by Ian Deco Lightbourne, who was convicted in the 1981 sexual battery and murder of Nancy O’Farrell in Marion County. Each of the appeals related to a 2016 U.S.
“It is dangerous and reckless for the NRA to claim that teenagers should be allowed to carry loaded semiautomatic weapons on our streets and playgrounds. The Second Amendment allows for commonsense gun laws, it doesn’t require that we legally allow armed teens in our communities,” said Brady Center President Paul Helmke. The lawsuit, filed by the National Rifle Association, claims that the Second Amendment requires that states allow teens and young persons ages 18-20 to carry loaded firearms in public. According to the Brady Center brief, the U.S. The Brady Center amicus brief was filed today in the case D’Cruz v. McCraw by attorneys with the Brady Center, the law firm Hogan Lovells and Texas attorney Scott Medlock. The Brady Center was joined on the brief by Texas organizations Mothers Against Teen Violence and the Texas Chapters of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence. Today, in that same court, they filed a motion to withdraw their application of amici curiae. This move was not opposed by either the NRA or the Texas Attorney General’s Office. Perhaps to make up for their premature filing of their brief, the Brady Campaign then filed an application to file an amicus brief in the Westchester County (NY) pistol permit case, Kachalsky et al v. Cacace et al. They attached as an exhibit the proposed amicus brief. However, as I noted in a post describing the first endorsed letters in this case, Judge Cathy Seibel’s Individual Practices 2.A. requires a pre-motion conference arranged by letter before a motion is allowed to be entered into the record. She makes no mention of amici curiae filings. One must wonder if the Brady Campaign is quite aware of just how tightly Judge Seibel runs her courtroom. If not, they well could be in for a surprise and may have to say “never mind” again.
For Part 1 of this series, click here. There seems to be a misunderstanding among lawyers generally and courts in particular that, unless forced to do so, a lawyer in a civil case will never disclose a single scrap of information. And yet we know that we don’t behave that way. Judges didn’t behave that way when they were in practice either (just ask one). And we also know that most—the overwhelming majority of—civil cases are disposed of without trial. And, finally, we also know that this happens even though a great many cases are settled without suit ever being filed. Cases settle without suit because lots of information is voluntarily disclosed. Plaintiffs’ attorneys carefully gather together their clients’ medical records and lost-time records and helpful scene photographs and bundle them together in a ‘package’ designed to make the adjuster requisition adequate authority. The damning documents are carefully arranged and an explanatory letter is sent in an effort to make the other party to the contract realize the consequence of his or her breach.
It doesn’t take a 213(f)(3) disclosure schedule to get the property owner to share the engineering report that clearly shows that the concrete was improperly mixed and that this caused the damage to the structure. These disclosures are willingly made in order to resolve cases at the earliest possible opportunity. ’s just information that might hurt our cause that we try to keep hidden. Even if some damaging stuff sometimes remains buried during pre-suit investigation, cases don’t typically arrive in court without both sides already knowing quite a bit, good and bad, about the controversy. Why does it automatically make sense to recreate all the information obtained or exchanged pre-suit? In a great many cases—especially in our hyper-connected, over-sharing world—a lot of information damaging to our opponent is already known by third parties. Military Strategy 101 teaches that a good flanking maneuver is less costly than a frontal assault on a fortified position.
Why do lawyers spend so much time, and so much client money, making frontal assaults on their opponents, demanding that they reveal damaging stuff that could be far more easily obtained from others? The concept of “complete” or “full” discovery may sound appealing to law school professors, but the costs attendant thereto has made our civil court system too expensive a forum for too many – and, yet, there’s no viable alternative available. Don’t get me started: Discovery is corrupting arbitration practice, too, and where one side is purchasing the arbitrator, as is now the case in mega-company vs. What we should do instead is abandon the idea of automatic discovery and move to a zero-based discovery system. This is not as inconsistent with our existing rules as you might initially think. Rules 218(a)(4), (5), and (10) specifically invite a trial court’s early and direct involvement in discovery issues. With zero-based discovery the burden would be imposed on any party who wants it to persuade the court as to what discovery is necessary, and why. The new assumption would be that, without a court-specified and court-monitored discovery schedule, carefully tailored to meet the specific needs of each case, a case would be ready for trial just as soon as issue was joined. But, without unfettered, automatic discovery, the cost of litigation would be reduced, perhaps drastically, bringing the court system—and the services of lawyers—once again within the reach of middle class people and small businesses. That alone might curb the surge in pro se litigation. Meanwhile, equally well-funded parties could still try and discover each other to death (if equally well-financed parties are determined to wage a discovery war of attrition, the wise trial judge will gladly let them). But the civil court system can still be preserved as a viable dispute resolution forum for the rest of us.
The term “Joint Enterprise” could usefully be confined to cases such as this garage example of X and Y and it is on this, that our focus lies. I will therefore, for present purposes, use the term joint enterprise in this limited sense. Making Y criminally liable for the killing is sometimes described as “parasitic accessory liability”. ] EWCA Crim 1622 at paras. The Guardian 1st April 2014, drew attention to statistics obtained by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. The statistics may be seen at Joint Enterprise in numbers. Between 2005 and 2013, 1,853 people were prosecuted by the CPS for homicides that involved four or more defendants. This is the closest approximation that can be made to the use of joint enterprise. Most academics agree these prosecutions almost certainly relied on the joint enterprise doctrine. In the same eight years 4,590 people were prosecuted for homicides involving two or more defendants – a definition the CPS suggests is a clear indication of the use of joint enterprise.
It tends to be homicide cases that come to greater public notice and joint enterprise frequently plays a part in such cases. It is also far from uncommon for joint enterprise cases to arise from events involving numbers of young people (loosely referred to as “gangs”). There are certainly some instances where convictions for murder have been obtained against individuals whose degree of participation in the offending can be said to be quite minimal or peripheral. Joint enterprise is NOT confined to homicide cases and could, in principle, be applied to other types of offending (e.g. theft or public order offences etc). Joint enterprise is frequently defended as a necessary tool in the criminal law’s armoury to deal with “gangs”. The campaign group JENGBA (Joint Enterprise Not Guilt by Association) seeks changes to the substantive law. I am not connected to JENGBA but, as we shall see, they have a strong case for reform.
Before getting into the case law and applicable examples that highlight age discrimination, wrongful termination and associated workplace problems, it is crucial to understand the applicability of ADEA. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)(1) outlines that only workers over the age of 40 are protected against age-based employment discrimination. It applies to employers with 20 or more workers. Areas of potential discrimination are identified as including hiring and firing decisions, pay and benefits packages, training and apprenticing as well as the assignment of tasks and jobs. In Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.(2), an employee was relieved of his duties and subsequently filed an age discrimination suit. Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc.(3) was decided by the D.C. Court of Appeals in 1995. It extends age discrimination protection to employees of American corporations that operate branches in foreign countries. The only exception to an EEOC claim is the potential for violating a foreign country’s law by not discriminating based upon age.
Freedom of Speech vs. In Crawford v. Medina General Hospital(4), the court found that comments pertaining to a worker’s age can indeed constitute age discrimination. This is true even if the “old age remarks” are not made to the over-40 worker but to coworkers. The court held that ADEA makes a firing unlawful in the same way as it does make illegal pay, conditions and privilege discrimination based on age. It is noteworthy that this case is one of the first instances in which a hostile work environment claim was directly tied to an age discrimination action. There is, of course, a lot of subjectivity in this finding; however, it does go on to show that disparaging age-related remarks created workplace conflicts that adversely affected the worker’s performance and the court-finding was therefore justified. Even though the case law is encouraging in that it clearly defines the relationship between age discrimination, wrongful termination and actions the employer may take to prevent the problem from occurring, it should be viewed with extreme caution. The experts at the Public Law Research Institute(5) explain that only about three percent of wrongful termination cases ever make it to a jury trial; approximately 96 percent are settled before getting to court. This points to a huge shadow area where negotiations and internal deals may still trump case law.
In a new order released today, Federal District Court Judge Anthony W. Ishii rejected two requests made by California Attorney General Kamala Harris in the dispute, captioned Silvester, et al. Harris, that was filed in Fresno nearly three years ago. ] made various arguments to justify the waiting period, but the evidence did not actually support a 10-day waiting period,” today’s order noted. ] arguments were more in line with rational basis scrutiny”- a weak form of judicial review that was expressly rejected in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark District of Columbia v. Heller decision – “than with intermediate scrutiny,” which forces governments to prove how a law impinging on a constitutional right serves an important purpose. In the case of the waiting period laws, Attorney General Harris couldn’t. “The Court notes that Defendant has not identified any error of law or any erroneous factual finding,” Judge Ishii explained in his denial of Harris’ requests. “The Court stands by its analysis and its findings that the waiting period laws violate the Second Amendment” as applied to the three classes of individuals that, plaintiffs successfully argued, shouldn’t be subject to the laws.
“A bench trial has concluded, and a law that is actively being enforced has been found to be unconstitutional. ] the Second Amendment as applied to three classes of individuals,” like those similarly situated to individual plaintiffs Jeff Silvester and Combs. Notably, the waiting period requirement was first passed in the same 1923 legislative act as California’s “may-issue” concealed carry laws and a ban on the public display of handguns by gun dealers. Both of those regulations are currently being challenged in federal lawsuits backed by The Calguns Foundation and the Second Amendment Foundation, who are institutional plaintiffs in the Silvester case. The Ninth Circuit is currently considering Yolo County Sheriff Ed Prieto’s request for rehearing of a decision that found his carry license policies violate the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Meanwhile, four gun dealers seeking to strike down the ban on commercial speech filed a motion for preliminary injunction in Sacramento’s federal district court on Monday, arguing the handgun display ban violates the First Amendment.
Before retirement, I had noted that the number of regulators working at the state and federal level were constantly being hired away and going to work for private law firms. At that point they would often work for corporations in dealing with the regulations in the regulatory government offices. One could ask why corporations and all the companies had to hire armies of lawyers to combat all the insane rules. These lawyers coming from the government in the never ending revolving door made at least five times the money in private practice. Still, I don’t like the revolving door much because it seems as if it is unethical. It’s funny that lawyers claim to be the epitome of ethics, and yet engage in this bizarre gray area. It no longer reigns supreme when it’s been manipulated in this way, even if it’s only happening procedurally. Indeed, I hope you will please consider all this, and all the ramifications of this type of revolving door behavior between government lawyers, clerks, the Supreme Court, and law firms.
The age of big data is upon us. Data in law is ubiquitous, informative of past decisions and helpful in prognosticating future results. How we make use of this data is often a topic of debate. One view holds that large amounts of processed information can inform legal decision-making (Here are examples of how this looks in practice.). Lawyers taking this approach try to maximize the use of this abundant information. A particular area of Supreme Court practice in which big data can improve lawyers’ decisions is in the case-selection stage. There are several signals that lawyers can send the justices and clerks to enhance their chances of a cert grant. One factor that plays a large role and is beyond a lawyer’s control in any given instance is a lawyer’s experience before the Supreme Court. Expert Supreme Court counsel are much more successful in persuading the justices to hear their cases than lawyers with less experience. There are multiple explanations for these results, some of which have been better analyzed than others.
Using unconstitutional excuses of ‘best interest of the child’ and ‘abuse of women’, family courts, and at mother’s whim, civilly rapes fit father of their rights, their children, and their property, daily. Here’s the ‘what and why’ of it unobscured by propaganda. For doing nothing wrong, the state virtually kidnaps a fit father’s children from his care and strips him of meaningful parental control and the benefits of care, happiness and companionship that parenting brings. Then, the court enslaves him to both the state and the mother who, together, extort from him impoverishing weekly payments euphemistically called child support but used for whatever the mother wants for up to 23 years. It claims it’s his obligation to support his children despite robbing him of the benefits associated with any such obligation – a clear violation of the maxims of law but consistent with what constitutes slavery. These extortions leave most fathers close to or in destitution with little to directly spend on his children.
Most mothers then alienate children from their fathers. Fathers see their future and their family destroyed with the full support of the mothers, family courts, and the state’s power to enforce it all. For being behind or unable to pay child-support, a father endures state administrators denying him a license to drive, any state license needed to work or his passport to leave the country. If he doesn’t pay it all he goes to jail for contempt of court under a phony due process without a jury and often irrespective of his financial straits. If he dies, his estate goes to the mother for ‘child support’ until all past and future child support is paid. That’s what a fit and good father faces today for being unable to comply with the court’s orders that financially rape him. Those are the operational facts devoid of the phony embellishments this state tyranny uses to cover up its denial of fathers’ fundamental rights. This tyranny has destroyed thousands upon thousands of fathers. It has forced them to go underground, leave the country, commit suicide, or end up on skid row alienated from their children and lost to their family.
No matter how much a father fights in court for his rights including directly caring for his children, the courts refuses to acknowledge his rights but only his obligation to pay money to the mother. Family courts unconstitutionally invoke the ‘best interest of the child’ excuse to ignore the parental right and other fundamental rights of fit fathers. They claim authority over his children and award them overwhelmingly to the mothers. This most sexist and rights-denying injustice fathers face is palpable and obvious to all except those brainwashed on feminist privileges and empowerment of women at any expense. No one wants to be in a father’s position in family court; it’s the mother’s position that’s assured of the parental rights and its benefits – including state enforcement of the father’s extortion payments to her. Very few within this judicial system have the guts to speak out against the injustice occurring in family courts.
Most will speak only under their breath, away from the ears of authority. The women’s abuse excuse is ever ready to be invoked to backup court judgments made under the best interest of the child excuse. Again, everyone knows how phony the abuse excuse is with its phony due process. But very few within the system will speak out about it. Such criticisms are heavily suppressed. Exposing the sexist outcomes and injustice that family courts impose on fathers is certainly not part of the state-imposed feminist agenda that initiated and supports the state-based divorce and domestic violence industry. Doing so would undermine the power and strangle-hold it has on constitutional redress. What you will hear is that fathers who don’t comply with the horrendously unfair, burdensome and malicious family court orders are just deadbeats and irresponsible. Objecting to being denied their rights and their children is a form abusive behavior.
That’s the propaganda. The state-based divorce and domestic violence industry lives off the unjust orders that the family courts impose on fit fathers. It’s part of the tyranny that fathers face. It includes the judicial and executive branches and promotes its tactics, policies, and accomplishments for the money, power, and agenda it provides. 1. First, the judiciary has slowly usurped justice by negating both accountability of judicial and prosecution personnel who violate constitutional procedures and constitutional protections for litigants in family court. 2. Secondly, feminist propaganda has pushed for ‘greater good’ laws that privilege women at the direct denial of fathers rights and protections – infusing such feminist jurisprudence into our legal system and into the public mindset. 3. Lastly, the enormous benefits such perfidy and perversion of justice against a targeted class – fathers – has created the divorce and domestic violence industry that feeds off this targeted injustice and promotes more of the same.