WASHINGTON — The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to toss out a lower court ruling that allowed a 17-year-old woman from Mexico to seek an abortion at an outside medical clinic while she was held in federal custody at a detention facility in Texas. The Trump administration urged the justices to vacate the ruling, an action that wipes out any value as legal precedent for other pregnant women in custody. The Justice Department also claimed that lawyers for the woman misled the government about when she would get the procedure. The woman crossed the southern border on her own in September 2017, unaccompanied by relatives, and was taken into custody. After a medical examination revealed that she was pregnant, she sought an abortion. Texas authorities gave her permission, but the Department of Health and Human Services, which runs the detention facility, refused. With the help of the ACLU and her legal guardian, she sued, and a federal judge in Washington said immigrant women in federal custody have the same right of access to an abortion as U.S. The judge ordered the government to present her to a clinic for treatment. Texas law requires a woman to attend a counseling session with her abortion doctor at least 24 hours before the procedure. The woman in the case, identified in court documents only as Jane Doe, attended such a briefing Oct. 19. But the doctor who counseled her did not appear to be available to perform the abortion. Based on that development, according to the Justice Department, the ACLU told government lawyers the abortion would be performed by a different doctor on Oct. 26, after another counseling session. The government said it planned to ask the Supreme Court early on the 26th to block the abortion.
As the Legislature’s regular 90-day session winds to an end, state lawmakers are girding for Gov. Rick Perry to call a special session that could start as early as Tuesday on congressional and legislative election maps. Texas Republicans already are coming off a court-issued setback revolving around their 2011 voting maps. A D.C. federal court last August threw out the state GOP’s redistricting plans on the basis that they discriminated against minority voters. It’s up to the judges, who had to draw temporary maps as a last-ditch effort to ensure Texans could vote in 2012 primaries, to resolve the fate of Texas’ redistricting skirmish. Before the federal court potentially pens new maps that chip away at a GOP stronghold, Republicans are expected to cement as permanent those provisional maps drawn up in San Antonio during a special session. And not just redistricting, either; the pet projects of the TeaBags are likely on the docket. Dewhurst told the Star-Telegram’s Dave Montgomery last week that he had asked Gov.
Rick Perry to call lawmakers back for another round before they could skip town once the 83rd regular session ends Monday night. Redistricting is a favor of a kind to Greg Abbott. The rest is a favor to Dewhurst, which the governor may not be willing to grant. Sen. Wendy Davis (D-Fort Worth) told KVUE. Dewhurst has at least one and maybe two downballot TeaBaggers drooling for a shot at him. Dewhurst, who’s held his current office for a decade, is expected to announce re-election plans shortly after the regular session ends. But he’s almost certain to face challenges from Land Commissioner Jerry Patterson and Agriculture Commissioner Todd Staples, both Republicans with solid conservative credentials. Uh huh. Back to that “do-me-a-solid” business. So much for the greater public good. Much more of interest in that Statesman link. And Paul Burka piles on the lieutenant governor. Update: It’s worth mentioning that 64 House representatives sent a letter to the governor asking for four anti-choice pieces of legislation to be added to any special session call. And Eye on Williamson has some good links as well.
Lawyers in Bristol are highly experienced and also have the combination of substantive information that makes legal representatives unbeatable in the industry. The Bristol dispute lawyers have the combination of substantive information that makes them unbeatable representatives in the law industry. Such kind of combination and their vast experience always offer high motivation and confidence to the lawyers to take up any case. The dispute lawyers are the pillars who made the litigation law firms in the country. There are many cases that are handled by the legal representatives. There are many reasons that many cases have been handled by the law firm because many clients easily find the right justice quickly. The lawyers in Bristol are one of the best lawyers found in the Cheltenham and their law industry. The strategic proceedings and the proper brief are the most important part of court. Every resource and contact is used to verify the importance of the evidence and the paper work.
Therefore, lawyers in Bristol are found to have highly aggressive attitude and make exceptional strategies for industry, businesses and other firms. Till the time, right decision or justice is not provided to the clients, the lawyers never relax. This helps the lawyers to make the best preparations before filling the plea to the courts. Lawyers in Bristol are highly skilled and talented and fight for the cases for their clients. The lawyers are also well versed and eligible enough to opt for the Supreme Court. Their unlimited experience and law knowledge make them eligible to handle all types of cases. Till the date, the dispute lawyers remain one of the most efficient and unbeatable legal representatives in the country. For better assistance, you can access the site named as “Fleet law.” They mainly work with their clients to bring disputes to a conclusion in the most effective manner. It also includes the analysis of the situation at the early stage of the case so that they can easily identify the strength and weakness of the case. Their main focus is on one area of law give us, we believe an edge over many of their competitors. As a law firm they are totally committed to the Southwest region. However, they regularly work with the clients beyond that region nationally and internationally. Their team deals with the cases in the country court, high court across the country. Their large numbers of cases are concluded by meditation, that is cost-effective and time efficient method also.
Clause 10 and Clause 10 uses the word relevant declaration and, therefore, only relevant declarations are to be made. On May 26, 1958, the appellants moved the High Supreme Court of India at Calcutta under art. That in fact is the position even under the provisions of the Code. It was said that s 2(b) of the Act in so far as it allowed the Government to declare an area in which ” there was ” dis- turbance in the past, to be a disturbed area, offends art. In this backdrop, submission of Mr. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. In our opinion, therefore, the challenge to the proviso in question cannot succeed. Supreme Court of India detention has been made. All that is done is to provide for the reservation of seats for the members of the said tribes or castes in the manner already indicated. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the appellant has violated clauses 3, 7, 8, 19, 27, 28 and 29 of the policy.
It will be clear from the above contentions of the parties that the first and foremost question in this case is the interpretation of s. It is necessary therefore to consider the scheme of Chapter IV in order to interpret s. But does this amount to an infringement of Art. The next argument is that the proviso to s. I propose to deal in this judgment with one of these grounds only. Referring to Clause 8(a), it is contended by him that the words used therein i. In regard to double-member constituencies like Parvatipuram the Constitution has not even adopted the course of providing for a special constituency 55 434 confined to the members of the scheduled tribe. As far as the reduction of the debts from 90 days to 60 days, it has been canvassed that it is within the outer limit and no exception can be taken to the same.
227 of the Constitution and s. That section appears in Chapter IV of the Act which deals with Control, of Transport Vehicles in which term is included ” a stage carriage ” with which we are concerned here. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant is that policy does not cover the two shipments and hence, there was no obligation on the part of the appellant to declare the same to the respondent-Corporation. The constituency is one and election is held to the said constituency from one joint electoral roll prepared on the basis of qualifications which are of general and uniform application. It is significant that the proviso leaves it to the discretion of the tribunal whether or not any other offence should be tried under the Act along with the scheduled offence charged against the accused in a given case. Criticizing the reliance on Clause 30 by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is highlighted by Mr. Even for the reserved seat all voters in the constituency are entitled to vote. We do not think that here is any substance in this argument. Relying on the authorities which we have referred to hereinbefore, if clauses 2 and 10 are read together, it becomes quite clear that the premium is payable only in respect of the shipments to which the policy applies. What the proviso does is to enable the tribunal to try any offence other than the scheduled offence with which the accused may be 84 658 charged and which would be ordinarily triable under the provisions of the Code. 7, would, thus, constitute the grounds, and not the matters contained in one or more of the clauses and sub-clauses under s. The statement of facts contemplated by s. If the trial of the major scheduled offence under the Act is justified and valid the impugned proviso does nothing more than enable the tribunal to decide whether the accused is guilty of any minor or allied offence.
On 13 January 2016, a woman phoned Naushad Ahmad Khan in the morning, demanding to know why he had filed a petition against the ban on women entering Kerala’s Sabarimala temple. She wouldn’t say who she was or where she was calling from, but she was convinced that Khan had orchestrated the filing of the petition and that he was deliberately trying to hurt people’s religious feelings. Khan tried to reason with her but she would have none of it. The call ended with the woman telling Khan that he didn’t do the right thing. Khan didn’t worry too much about the conversation until a video clip from the same number arrived in his WhatsApp inbox. The seconds-long clip had his photo, phone number and location. Khan told HuffPost India. Khan was taken aback momentarily, but couldn’t really understand what it meant. The petition in question had been filed in 2006 by the women’s cell of his organisation Indian Young Lawyers’ Association, who were being represented by advocate Ravi Prakash Gupta. Ten years later, the court had listed it for hearing the day before the woman called.
Khan wasn’t even present at the hearing. A few minutes after the video clip landed, Khan’s phone started ringing. He picked up the first call. It was a man, asking rudely why he had filed the petition and telling him what a big mistake he had made. Khan’s associate, who was present in his Delhi High Court chambers where HuffPost India met him on Friday, chipped in. Get our top news delivered to your inbox every morning, Monday to Friday. Newsletters may offer personalized content or advertisements. That was the beginning of a saga of stalking, cyber-attacks and death threats that went on for two years, said Khan. The calls didn’t stop. The Indian Young Lawyers’ Association was set up in 2003, and initially comprised 26 lawyers from across the country. Khan is the president of the organisation. In 2006, Bhakti Pasrija, the general secretary of the organisation and a Supreme Court lawyer, discussed the need to initiate a debate on the constitutionality of the Sabarimala diktat with other women in the organisation.
Together, they moved court. Pasrija told HuffPost India. After the women lawyers came to an agreement, they enlisted a lawyer and filed the petition. Khan’s organisation works for the welfare of lawyers and general public and often files public interest litigations on issues. Pasrija said she also couldn’t understand the hate being directed at Khan. Khan, his peers, or colleagues couldn’t fathom what was happening. Khan has lost count of the number of hate calls he has received over the past two years, but said that the last time he checked, months ago, he had received 1,500 calls from at least 500 different numbers. Some of those calls were made through proxy servers. HuffPost India. A majority of them were death threats. His phones wouldn’t stop buzzing all day, despite filing a complaint with the Delhi Police and the Supreme Court having directed the police to provide him protection. A few dozen messages also revealed the exact location of his house and threatened to blow it up.
Some of the men who kept calling, Khan said, revealed their identities and challenged Khan to spar with them. Khan won’t reveal who they were or if there were politicians, but he said a lot of “important people” called up to chastise him. His email was hacked, his phone cloned and his social media accounts compromised. Soon, his friends pointed out posts with his picture and phone number that were making the rounds of Facebook, with hundreds of faceless handles sharing them. The messages would detail what he was wearing, who he was with and the exact location of the places he was at. Besides messages, he also received emails and letters with threats. Khan, however, doesn’t say that he was victimised for being a Muslim man. Khan continues to receive police protection as well as threats even now, though the frequency has diminished. However, he isn’t pressing charges yet. Both Pasrija and Khan hail the Supreme Court’s decision. While Pasrija felt it is revolutionary, Khan said that it was important to respect Justice Indu Malhotra’s dissenting opinion as well.
Failure to schedule causes of action appears to be an endemic problem as shown by the fact that the Fifth Circuit has been asked to apply judicial estoppel to a bankruptcy case once again. However, the latest decision, Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 10-60106 (5th Cir. Judges Carolyn King and Catarina Haynes disagreed on how the doctrine should apply to a chapter 13 debtor’s untimely disclosure. The Court, with Judge King writing the opinion, held that the debtor failed to meet his burden of proof to show a non-disclosure was inadvertent. Willie Love was dismissed from Tyson Foods after he failed a drug test. When the company refused to re-test him based on his contention that an antibiotic caused him to erroneously positive, he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Along the way, he filed chapter 13 and did not list the claim The defendant successfully moved for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel based on the non-disclosure. While this synopsis is accurate, the following time line gives a more complete understanding of what occurred. He filed chapter 13 on May 1, 2008 and did not list a potential cause of action.
On September 22, 2008, the Debtor confirmed a chapter 13 plan which did not provide for a distribution to unsecured creditors. On July 16, 2009, Tyson moved for summary judgment. On July 22, 2009, the Debtor amended his schedules to disclose the claim and moved to employ special counsel to pursue the claim. On January 7, 2010, the District Court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge Carolyn King, writing for herself and Judge Jacques Weiner, upheld the summary judgment, finding that the debtor had failed to raise a fact issue as to whether the failure to disclose the asset was inadvertent. The opinion noted that the debtor’s brief discussed only two of the elements of judicial estoppel and did not address inadvertence. Opinion, p. 4, citing Reed v. City of Arlington. Critically, Love’s arguments before the district court did nothing to refute Tyson’s allegations or explain why Love did not disclose his claims when his disclosure obligations first arose.
His first two arguments clearly do not speak to his motive to conceal his claims against Tyson. ] to the bankruptcy court was ‘inadvertent.’” Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying judicial estoppel to Love’s claims. Opinion, pp. 6-7. Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court. The majority opinion included a thoughtful rejoinder to the dissent. In a spirited fifteen-page dissent, Judge Catarina Haynes offered both procedural and substantive reasons why she believed the majority was wrong. First, she argued that judicial estoppel is an affirmative defense. As a result, the Defendant had the burden of proof to show that there was no factual dispute as to any of the three elements. As the party invoking judicial estoppel on summary judgment, Tyson thus bore the burden of proof and had to prove, not just hypothesize, that Love had knowledge and a motive for concealment. Tyson failed to do so. Judge Haynes went on to state that even if Tyson had met its burden of proof that the debtor’s response was sufficient to raise a fact issue.
We should stop here, as I have shown that no summary judgment burden “shifted” to Love. However, even if it did, I disagree that Love failed to respond in kind, creating a material factual dispute on whether he had motive to conceal. Love’s summary judgment response set forth the Supreme Court’s judicial estoppel standard from New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 751 (2001). See also Hall v. GE Plastic Pac., 327 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. There, he disclaimed the third prong of that standard. Indeed, he expressly responded to Tyson’s claim that his “motive” was to gain money “free and clear” by arguing in response that any recovery would not be paid to him but to the estate. Judge Haynes went further and stated that under Reed v. City of Arlington and Kane v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., that the bankruptcy estate should not have been estopped.
This case, though different in kind, is controlled by our decisions in Reed and Kane. Both concerned whether a Chapter 7 trustee is estopped from pursuing unscheduled claims on behalf of the estate where the debtor had wrongly concealed claims during the bankruptcy proceeding. It makes no difference under the circumstances of this case that Love is not a trustee as were the parties seeking to avoid estoppel in Reed and Kane. For our purposes, his role as essentially a debtor in possession puts him in an analogous position to a trustee. It follows that because the claim is the property of the estate, and the estate has not been administered, judicial estoppel should not apply to bar relief that would benefit creditors. The debtors in Kane were virtually indistinguishable from Love in his position as debtor. While the Kanes’ lawsuit was pending in state court, they filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
That bankruptcy resulted in a no-asset discharge. It was not until a summary judgment motion was offered, arguing that judicial estoppel should apply, that the Kanes filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy so the Trustee could administer the previously undisclosed lawsuit. We reversed the district court’s summary judgment application of judicial estoppel, holding that equity did not compel barring the trustee from acting on behalf of the estate. Indeed, we even highlighted the possibility that the debtors may recover in the event of surplus. Unlike the litigants in our prior decisions concerning judicial estoppel, Love gains no potential legal advantage from his failure to disclose the claim against Tyson to the bankruptcy court. As Love explained to the district court—albeit somewhat ineloquently—the recovery sought against Tyson would aid his creditors, not defraud them. In this vein, Tyson has not established Love’s motive to conceal. Our precedent counsels against judicial estoppel in these circumstances.