The Mississippi Supreme Court overturned Hinds County Circuit Court Judge Winston Kidd’s injunction against House Bill 2 today. HB 2 defined what constituted concealed for the purposes of concealed carry. By defining concealed, the bill clarified that open carry is permitted under the Mississippi State Constitution. Judge Kidd had found HB 2 to be “unconstitutionally vague” back in July and had issued a permanent injunction against the law. The parties seeking the injunction included Hinds County DA Robert Shuler Smith, Hinds County Sheriff Tyrone Lewis, and St. Senator John Horhn (D-Jackson). Backers of the the lawsuit included the Southern Poverty Law Center who helped draft the briefs. In their 9-0 decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that Judge Kidd had erred as a matter of law. This Court now finds that the Circuit Judge erred as a matter of law when he found House Bill 2 to be vague and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Court also assessed the cost of the appeal to the Appellees. Mississippi politicians were quick to praise the Supreme Court’s decision on open carry.
JACKSON—The Mississippi Supreme Court today ruled 9-0 that House Bill 2, which clarifies the definition of “concealed” for purposes of Mississippi laws regarding the concealed carrying of firearms, is valid and constitutional. The court also vacated the injunction that a Hinds County judge had issued against the bill. As a result, it is now clear that House Bill 2 can take effect statewide. “House Bill 2 is an important clarification of citizens’ right to keep and bear arms under the state and federal Constitutions. “I’m proud the Supreme Court confirmed our goal of protecting our right to bear arms. Rep. Andy Gipson (R-Braxton), author of HB 2, said he knew his bill was constitutional and was happy that the Court agreed. “When the lawsuit was first filed, I said I never seen a lawsuit filed over the constitutionality of a law in the Constitution,” Gipson said. Of course, the plaintiffs who brought the case were none too happy. St. Sen. John Horhn (D-Jackson) plans to introduce legislation to require permits for both open and concealed carry. He has also called on Jackson and Hinds County leaders to ban open carry. It should be noted that Sen.
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A Swiss Army knife should be considered a dirk (or dagger) under the law so sayeth California Attorney General Kamala Harris. She is appealing a California Court of Appeals ruling that a Swiss Army knife, even if carried with the blade open, cannot be considered a dirk or dagger. The case is California v. Castillolopez. I first heard about the case from Brandon Combs of the Firearms Policy Coalition over lunch at the NRA Annual Firearms Law Seminar. He was telling those of us at the table about the case and that the Second Amendment Foundation was joining with Knife Rights on an amicus brief. As to Kamala Harris and the state of California, it is as if they have something against the Scots-Swiss carrying a Swiss Army knife in their sporran. The joint release from SAF and Knife Rights on their amicus brief is below. A legal brief urging the California Supreme Court to rule that common, non-locking Swiss Army Knives and similar pocketknives are not illegal ‘dirks’ or ‘daggers’ was filed on Monday. Knife Rights would like to thank our good friends at the Second Amendment Foundation, Cal Guns and the Firearms Policy Coalition for their support of this brief. Castillolopez was convicted in 2012 by a San Diego County jury for illegally carrying a concealed dirk or dagger after law enforcement found a Swiss Army Knife with the blade open in his pocket following a traffic stop. The Fourth Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal later overturned his conviction, holding that Castillolopez’ pocketknife didn’t meet the statutory definition of an illegally-carried ‘dirk’ or ‘dagger’ because it didn’t have a locking mechanism.
This is why we celebrated the Trump win. The spectre of constitutional crises every day. The constitutional crisis in the Nixon administration started with the Saturday night massacre, and ended six months later when the Supreme Court upheld the district court judge’s order requiring the white house to produce the tapes. In May, 1861, two months into office, President Lincoln suspended the great writ of habeas corpus and then defied the US Supreme Court. As Judge Hirsch has probably recounted dozens of times to dazed young PDs and ASAs, John Merryman, a State Legislator from Maryland was arrested for hindering the movement of Union Troops. Merryman was held at Fort McHenry. His lawyer (not Sy Gaer) filed a for a writ of habeas corpus to bring the body of the defendant to a district court. Lincoln issued an executive order (well before Trump ever did) that suspended the right for the great writ of habeas corpus on military bases.
The commander of the fort followed the order of his commander in chief and refused to deliver Merryman. US Supreme Court Chief Judge Roger Taney paused briefly in his penning the Dred Scott decision to rule that Lincoln did not have the authority to issue an order suspending habeas corpus. Lincoln sat tight. He didn’t respond. He didn’t reply. And he didn’t order Merryman released, and we had our first constitutional crises. We are a blogger of the people. We don’t mingle with hoi polloi, but we sometimes visit and observe. And Thursday night was an exercise in the people’s version of constitutional law. We wrote- what seems like an eternity ago- that Article III judges were all that stood between our president and a dictatorship. While we disagree with the 9th circuit’s analysis, we are proud to live in a country where a Judge can tell a president “NO” and No means No -Lincoln and Taney not withstanding. Lincoln refused Taney’s order two months into his presidency while struggling to deal with a rebellious Maryland border state. Not to be outdone, 45 has provoked a crisis less than thirty days into office while struggling to deal with a rebellious white house staff.
India’s Supreme Court ruled on Wednesday that the country’s sweeping biometric database does not violate privacy rights. But the panel of five judges did decide to place restrictions on the program, according to the Times of India. Under the Aadhaar system, all citizens, residents, and visiting workers of India—an estimated 1.2 billion people—are virtually required to provide iris scans and fingerprints to the government so they can receive a unique 12-digit identity code. As Aadhaar has grown more ubiquitous, many corporations have started demanding people’s Aadhaar data. Over the years, the program has proven to be flawed. A reported series of leaks left as many as 130 million at risk of fraud, and technical errors have prevented Indians from receiving welfare benefits. But proponents of the system argue that providing Indians with Aadhaar numbers grants them easier access to critical services without requiring them to fill out paperwork and go through processes that could hinder marginalized or rural citizens. The court’s majority opinion touched on this viewpoint, claiming that the system empowered disenfranchised Indians, including those with literacy issues, according to the New York Times. The Indian government will still be able to ask for Aadhaar data for tax purposes. But now, corporations are not allowed to request Aadhaar data. Specifically, Aadhaar information won’t be required to open bank accounts, enroll children in classes, or request phone SIM cards. The panel also ruled that citizens can’t be denied welfare benefits if they don’t have an Aadhaar ID. The court has requested that the government enable stronger security measures and limit the time that personal data can be stored.
Title VI banned discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in any program receiving federal financial assistance. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in favor of the plaintiffs. The ruling did not specify any specific remedy because no specific remedy had been requested by the plaintiffs. The court noted that “no remedy is urged upon us.” As a result of the Lau v. Nichols decision, Congress took various actions. They passed the Equal Educational Opportunity Act (EEOA) in 1974, which prohibits denial of equal access and deliberate segregation and requires districts to take actions to remedy language barriers. By codifying the language of the Lau decision into law, Congress ensured that the ruling of the court would endure. In addition, the legislators passed amendments to the Bilingual Education Act, which provided federal funding for bilingual programs at a higher level than before. The Lau Remedies were used for several years by the OCR of the U.S. Department of Education in conducting Lau compliance reviews. But the remedies were an administrative solution that needed more power behind them.
In a temporary victory for opponents of the 396-home Hasidic development in this eastern Sullivan County village, a Sullivan County Supreme Court judge on Thursday ordered a day-long halt to its construction. The defendants include Lamm, the ruling boards of Bloomingburg and Mamakating and other town officials and developers connected with the 400-acre property and its 2006 annexation from Mamakating into Bloomingburg. They’re ordered to appear in Sullivan County Supreme Court Friday afternoon to explain why the stop-work order should or should not be lifted. Opponents, including Holly Roche and the Rural Community Coalition, claim that the annexation of the land for the development was done illegally, since residents of that land did not have the opportunity to vote on it. Lamm said he was sure the judge would allow the project to proceed and reject the Rural Community Coalition’s argument. He noted that a state Supreme Court judge in 2012 dismissed an RCC lawsuit challenging the approvals process for the development, saying they had waited too long to file it, and the village had followed the rules of the process. The lawyer who researched and requested the stop-work order, Kurt Johnson of Bloomingburg, claims the annexation violated the state Constitution, which, he says, requires that the people who live in the area to be annexed must vote on the annexation. This is the second temporary setback for the developers of Chestnut Ridge, which opponents fear will overwhelm this village of 400 residents. In December, the Bloomingburg Planning Board rejected developers’ plans for a girls’ private school that would be fed by the development.
I am also not keen on “emergency legislation” It tends to be, as you say, sticking plaster which never gets revisited and only adds to an already excessively over-complicated piece of legislation. PACE, in its current form, is incredibly over-amended by the use of the usual parliamentary “cut and paste” technique. As things are, the legislation does no credit whatsoever to English law. This is even more so when the subject-matter is the detention without charge of individuals. It is interesting to look back to the origins of PACE. Few people do so however. I doubt that Parliament will give this issue more than minimal time. They really ought to revisit the whole edifice of PACE and the Codes. No easy or quick task however. Such an exercise should probably be preceded by an independent examination of police practice – including compliance with PACE as it is and whether practice differs and, if so, why. Furthermore, Parliament would need to consider what rules should apply in the light of present day circumstances. Above all, the balance should not be allowed to tip too far against the citizen. The case is going to the Supreme Court – probably in an attempt to overturn the decision and thereby obviate any compensation claims. This is necessary since judicial decisions are normally retrospective in effect.
Four Hasidic henchmen pleaded guilty to a bone-breaking assault yesterday, in the latest chapter of a holy war over control of one of New York’s largest Hasidic congregations. But the four walked out of court sentenced only to 50 hours of community service after a prosecutor conceded his case was shaky because one of the brawl victims was a convicted felon who had escaped from federal prison. The court appearance was the latest in a battle of biblical proportions between two brothers over control of the 40,000-member Yatev Lev D’Satmar congregation. Last year, two supporters of insurgent older brother Aaron Teitelbaum sneaked into the synagogue before Simchat Torah holiday services and planted themselves in Chief Rabbi Zalman Teitelbaum’s chair. They then locked Zalman in a small apartment connected to the synagogue. About 50 of Zalman’s followers broke down a door to free the rabbi and attacked the two Aaron supporters and their three bodyguards.
Can the Parliament pass a resolution condemning a former judge of the Supreme Court? Can the Parliament condemn a person without offering an opportunity to such a person to defend its views for which he is condemned? Can the Parliament discuss the conduct of a ‘stranger’ which is not relevant for its functioning and pass a resolution on such conduct? These and many other interesting questions touching various aspects of Parliamentary functioning came up for determination before the Supreme Court recently. ] answered all the above questions in the affirmative. “2. On 10.03.2015, the petitioner, a former Judge of this Court published a post on his Facebook Page in respect of Mahatma Gandhi, Father of the Nation. The post was entitled “Gandhi – A British Agent” and stated that Mahatma Gandhi did great harm to India. … there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament…….” occurring in first clause of Article 105, is general in nature; not confined to individual members and is applicable to all discussions and debates in Parliament.
“32. The submission of the petitioner however is, when Parliament is claiming a privilege what is to be considered is whether the act in respect of which privilege is claimed, is fundamental to the functioning to the Parliament. 36. We now deal with the concerned Rules and the Resolutions in question. Rule 156 of Rajya Sabha Rules quoted hereinabove shows that a resolution could relate to a matter of general public interest and under Rule 155 a resolution could be in the form of a declaration of opinion by Rajya Sabha. Under Rule 157 certain conditions are specified, inter alia that the resolution shall not refer to the conduct or character of persons except in their official or public capacity. Rules 171, 172 and 173 of Lok Sabha Rules are also on similar lines. Resolution dated 11th March, 2015 passed by Rajya Sabha expressed “unequivocal condemnation of the recent remarks” of the petitioner against Mahatma Gandhi and Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose.
Similarly resolution dated 12th March, 2015 passed by Lok Sabha condemns the statement of the petitioner relating to Mahatma Gandhi and Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. The condemnation by both the Houses was of the opinion and remarks and did not refer to the conduct or character of the petitioner. These resolutions were purely in the form of declaration of opinion. 37. It is not as if any action was deliberately undertaken or sanction was issued against the petitioner. The petitioner in exercise of his right under Article 19(a) made certain statements concerning two famous personalities. We are not for a moment suggesting that he could not or sought not to have made those statements. He is entitled to his views and put those views in public domain for consumption of public in general. The response by both Houses of Parliament was also natural in that the Resolutions in question dealt with his statements in public domain. All that the resolutions did was to condemn his remarks and did not refer to the conduct or character of the petitioner.
As stated earlier, the remarks made by the petitioner regarding Mahatama Gandhi and Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, which were in public domain, were touching subject of general public interest and as such could well be discussed in the Houses. The learned Attorney General is right in submitting that the resolutions had no civil consequences in so far as the conduct and character of the petitioner is concerned. Unlike all the cases referred to herein above which visited upon the concerned individual certain civil consequences, the present resolutions do not inflict any penalty or visit the petitioner with any civil consequences. 39. According to the petitioner, a stranger who makes a speech outside the House, not connected with the functioning of the Parliament and not derogatory to Parliament, could not be taken notice of by Parliament to punish him. The power to punish a stranger, if his acts in any way impede or interfere with functioning of Parliament, will certainly entitle Parliament to initiate action for breach of privilege or in contempt.
Such limitation is definitely read into the exercise of power for breach of privilege or contempt. However, such limitation or restriction cannot be read in every debate. A pure and simple discussion or debate may touch upon or deal with a stranger. As stated above, freedom of speech in Parliament is subject only to such of the provisions of the Constitution which relate to regulation of procedure in Parliament. No separate law is required to confer jurisdiction to deal with the opinions expressed by individuals and citizens during debates. If the nature of opinions expressed by such citizens or individuals pertain to matters of general public interest, it would certainly be within the powers of the House to have a discussion or debate concerning such opinions. So long as the debate or discussion is within the confines of the Rules, it will be expressly within the powers of the House to disapprove such opinions. No restriction is placed by the Constitution or the Rules of Procedure and none can be read in any of the provisions. It is true that a citizen or an individual may find himself in a situation where he has no way to reply to the discussion or a resolution passed by the concerned House. The concerned individual or citizen may also find himself in a position where the resolution is passed without giving him any opportunity of hearing.
Religion has been a quiet presence in a Queens courtroom during the five-week murder trial of Mazoltuv Borukhova and Mikhail Mallayev, but only rarely has their Jewish faith been the subject of contention. On Thursday, Dr. Borukhova was forced to admit that she had violated the Sabbath to inquire about buying a spy camera camouflaged inside a button. But the real trouble started shortly afterward, when the defendants’ insistence on observing the Jewish day of rest conflicted with another inviolate period of repose — namely, the judge’s vacation. The Talmudic details of the dispute will be explained shortly. The allegations — that Dr. Borukhova hired Mr. Mallayev, her cousin by marriage, to kill her husband, Daniel Malakov, during a bitter custody dispute over their daughter — have scandalized the small community of Bukharian Jews. All three families belong to the ethnic group, which immigrated, almost in its entirety, to the United States from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bukharian Jews preserved their religion for nearly 3,000 years under the Persian Empire, Muslim khanates and Communist rule.
They have settled mainly in the Forest Hills section of Queens, clustered around synagogues that are traditional if not ultra-Orthodox — and now find themselves riven by the family feud. Both Dr. Borukhova and Mr. Mallayev told the police that they would never be involved in anything illegal because of their religious beliefs. Dr. Borukhova’s relatives sit every day in the second row of State Supreme Court, murmuring prayers from books printed in Russian and Hebrew. Dr. Malakov’s relatives occasionally hiss at them across the aisle. Covering their hair in accordance with religious rules for married women, Dr. Borukhova’s sisters wear bouffant wigs that became an issue when prosecutors claimed that an eyewitness saw one sister at the murder scene. Their mother, who, depending on which side is to be believed, either threatened Dr. Malakov that he would soon “go to God” or merely said the almighty would punish him, opts for a fuzzy cloche hat.
Since 2015, there has been a lot of discussion on whether non lawyers should be allowed to provide some legal services. Back then, Washington created a program to certify “Limited Licensed Legal Technicians” (or “LLLTs”) who, after completing a course of study, would be allowed to represent clients without the supervision of a lawyer in limited circumstances. You can read my original posts on this topic here, here, here, here, here, and here. For many months, there was a debate as to whether this was a good idea, and whether other states would follow Washington’s lead. Some states did appear to be ready to do so, but in the end only Utah followed through. Interview clients to understand their objectives and obtain facts relevant to achieving that objective. Review and explain documents of another party. Inform, counsel, assist and advocate for a client in mediated negotiations. Fill in, sign, file and complete service of a written settlement agreement form in conformity with the negotiated agreement. Communicate with another party or the party’s representative regarding the relevant form and matters reasonably related thereto. Explain a court order that affects the client’s rights and obligations. Although the Supreme Court has approved the program, it has not yet published the final regulations. Those are due to be published by the end of September.
Through an email communication from Luisa’s daugther I was informed that they have set up an official site to help find Luisa and Nilo where people following up on the developments can check for updates. While people are frantic looking for Luisa and Nilo “witnesses account” on the abduction of Jonas Burgos is now being muddled with different versions and liepapers are having a field day confusing the people. Forget about that conflicting “witnesses” account and let’s focus on more important and relevant information as opposed to what these liepapers dissed out. Now what exactly are armed men riding in tandem in motorcycles doing keeping a close watch on the residence of the family of the late Jose Burgos, Jr.? If they are the police or military people I don’t think they will find the missing Jonas there and what’s the deal with these burly men on board motorcycles tailing close friends of Jonas Burgos since Monday, April 30? Maybe if they start looking elsewhere instead of the residence of the father of the missing person they may turn out with positive results.
61 million from the contingency reserve into the accounts of the 8 employers responsible for the City of Eugene case. The last decade’s worth of litigation has been extremely costly to all parties and PERS has played both sides of the street for too long now. The time has come for this gamesmanship to cease and desist. PERS must decide NOW whether it is a trust for the benefit of its members, or a slush fund that benefits employers. We may all be stakeholders in the system, but the legislative mandate for PERS is clear. It exists solely and exclusively for the benefit of members of the system. The moment it ceases to exist for that purpose alone, it makes a mockery of trust law, and makes the notion of a fiduciary responsibility to the members a joke. Finally, it is absolutely clear that PERS has become so heavily influenced by politics that it is impossible to get any sort of a fair hearing in Oregon.
From the very beginning of the decade, starting with the City of Eugene case, it has been clear that politics and economics would take priority over statutory duties. The courts have been influenced by the ravings of the media, the media has pounced on any small or large PERS story with the gusto of a ravenous coyote. This is my last post for 2011. While I wish I could have ended the year with cheerier news, I guess the “good” news is that 11 years of litigation have finally come to an end. Now, let’s hope the Legislature has the good sense to leave the PERS system alone for awhile and let it recover from these debacles. I wish for all to have a safe, happy, and prosperous New Years. I say that without irony. I hope that the financial markets stabilize and people can get back to enjoying their retirements. Some of us have wasted nearly 11 years hoping to get some closure on the crap of the past decade. At last we have it; it is time to enjoy what time we have left.