Lawyer Supreme Court Of India

If you were wronged, you deserve compensation. But in many cases the laws are unclear on what constitutes a personal injury claim. Sometimes you lose your case. These deserve some form of compensation, but often it can be hard to get it. Sometimes you do in fact lose the personal injury case. You’re out of options, right? No, you can argue the court decision in appeals court for most state and federal cases, especially those involving accidents and injuries. First off, you need to see if you have a capable lawyer. Just because you were denied your personal injury claim does not mean your lawyer is inept. Sometimes, he or she may have made a clear case for you. In others, they were poor communicators, spent little if any time on your case, and overcharged you. There are a variety of other reasons for firing your lawyer and getting a new one.

You may have to pay somewhat more, but in appeals court, you need experience, time, and knowledge. A good personal injury lawyer can give each of these and help you reverse a decision. Appeals court is different from the regular trial. There are some similarities too, but it’s clearly a different process. You do not present evidence, witnesses, and there is no jury. Also, there is more than one judge – unlike the initial trial with one judge, you have several. In appeals court, you are trying to prove the law was not followed. If you can prove the original trial was in the wrong, you have a clear appeal. This is not a second chance to show all your witnesses, experts, and evidence. The one similarity is the involvement of your lawyer. He or she will likely help you with the brief (more on this soon), and will argue how the laws were not followed. How do you show mistakes? This is where your lawyer can earn his or her money. The main point of emphasis is the appellate brief. You will have to prove to the judges the mistakes made; they have full control of the court room and make the final decision. Lawyers earn their money with the appellate brief, submitted by both defendant and plaintiff before the appeal court hearing. The plaintiff, that’s you, will be arguing how the laws were not correctly interpreted. The defense, the one you want damages from, will be arguing the laws were correct and that the final decision was correct. You might still lose, but if your lawyer makes a good case, you have a very good chance of winning. If you do lose, you have the option of going to to the supreme court, which can be much more daunting to win. If in fact you win, this case can lead to your deserved compensation.

Every complaint under Section 498A received by the police or the Magistrate be referred to and looked into by such committee. Such committee may have interaction with the parties personally or by means of telephone or any other mode of communication including electronic communication. Report of such committee be given to the Authority by whom the complaint is referred to it latest within one month from the date of receipt of complaint. The committee may give its brief report about the factual aspects and its opinion in the matter. Till report of the committee is received, no arrest should normally be effected. The report may be then considered by the Investigating Officer or the Magistrate on its own merit. Members of the committee may be given such basic minimum training as may be considered necessary by the Legal Services Authority from time to time. The Members of the committee may be given such honorarium as may be considered viable.

It will be open to the District and Sessions Judge to utilize the cost fund wherever considered necessary and proper. Complaints under Section 498A and other connected offences may be investigated only by a designated Investigating Officer of the area. Such designations may be made within one month from today. Such designated officer may be required to undergo training for such duration (not less than one week) as may be considered appropriate. If a bail application is filed with at least one clear day’s notice to the Public Prosecutor/complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial. These directions will not apply to the offences involving tangible physical injuries or death. 20. After seeing the working of the above arrangement for six months but latest by March 31, 2018, National Legal Services 20 Authority may give a report about need for any change in above directions or for any further directions.

The Supreme Court of India is the highest Court of the country established under Part V, Chapter 4 of the Constitution of India. Primarily it is an appellate court and thus the highest court of appeal and takes up matters from the judgments of the High Courts across the country. However article 32 of the Constitution of the country vests in it original jurisdiction as well to decide matters dealing with the violation of fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens/persons under Part II of the Constitution of the country. Under article 32 of the Constitution of India the Supreme Court is empowered to issue directions, orders and writs in the nature of writ of mandamus, habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto to meet the ends of justice. Besides being an appellate court it also has advisory jurisdiction on matters referred to it by the President of India under article 143 of the Constitution of India. Since its inaugural sitting on 28th January, 1950 it has delivered thousands of reported judgments. The proceedings of the Supreme Court are conducted in English language only. The Supreme Court of India is now also providing an e-filing facility to all the litigants and the details of which have been provided at the official website of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Taneja Law office is presently headed by a second generation lawyer. Fully equipped office of the firm is located in the Supreme Court of India and is functional five days in a week Monday to Friday.

Plaintiff seeks phantom damages 6 times greater than actual costs”, citing to an article on the Colorado Civil Justice League blog. It seems the CCJL is critical of a recent decision by that state’s Supreme Court, Volunteers of America Colorado Branch v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080 (Colo. The discrepancy stems from the difference between the amount billed for medical treatment and the amount that the treater accepts in settlement of the bill. The rule has been described as an “established exception to the general rule that damages in negligence actions must be compensatory.” 25 C.J.S. Damages § 172 (2002). Although the rule appears to allow a double recovery, the appellate court correctly noted that, typically, the collateral source will have a lien or subrogation right that prevents such a double recovery. It is the lien or subrogation rights of third parties — that vary widely from state to state — that make sweeping generalities about the collateral source rule difficult to formulate.

In a rational world, the collateral source rule would be easy to understand and apply. Consider: Dan Driver is cruising down Main Street with one hand on the wheel and the other on his smart phone, texting his strong views about boycotting Donald Trump to NPR. Thus distracted, he fails to see (1) the light turn red on Main Street and (2) Peter Pedestrian entering the crosswalk, with the Walk light, attempting to cross the street directly in Driver’s path. Happily, Pedestrian survives the collision. 50,000 to fix Pedestrian up. Pedestrian writes a check. When Pedestrian sues Driver for negligence, what part of his medical bills, if any, may he hope to recover against Driver? 50,000 outlay. There’s no “collateral” source in that example at all; Peter can recover what Peter paid. But what if Pedestrian had armed himself with health insurance? 50,000 hospital bill is now paid by the insurance company. 50,000. Why should he be penalized for having the foresight to procure health insurance? Why should Driver obtain a windfall because he had the good luck to hit an insured person?

It’s when we leave the rational world and rejoin the real one that things get complicated. With the hospital bill a moving target, the collateral source rule becomes a little harder. In trying to figure out what amount plaintiffs like Peter Pedestrian get to present in damages cases, courts in various states have come up with three distinct approaches. The Wills court, citing Bozeman v. State, 879 So.2d 692, 701 (La.2004), identified these as (229 Ill.2d at 404): (1) actual amount paid; (2) benefit of the bargain; and (3) reasonable value. Courts using the the benefit of the bargain approach distinguish between plaintiffs who have paid some consideration for the benefit received from the collateral source (e.g., insurance premiums) and those who have not (e.g., Medicaid recipients). But, in Wills, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that this state follows the “reasonable value” approach. Most states follow this approach, the Wills court stated, although even here there is a majority and minority position. Tort reformers, like the Colorado group in today’s Overlawyered post, have serious problems with the collateral source rule. But the problems in the application of the collateral source rule are at least as much the fault of irrational medical billing practices as anything.

On Tuesday, voters requesting a Republican primary ballot in Cook County will discover that they have largely forfeited their right to vote for judges. Murnane and the ICJL want reform of the election process. In Cook County, most discussions of “reform” of the judicial election process involve elimination of elections altogether. The untrustworthy decisions of an ignorant electorate should be replaced by a system of “merit selection.” The Sun-Times editorialized in favor of merit selection just this week (my response, and a link to the newspaper’s editorial, may be found here). I attended (and wrote about) a joint seminar put on by the CBA, ISBA, WBAI and CCBA in October 2010 concerning reform of the judicial election process. The ICJL’s reform proposal this week also envisions a nonpartisan primary and several restrictions on which lawyers may qualify for the new ballot. From the ICJL Newsletter (numbering eliminated):- A mandatory standard for service as an attorney must be a qualification. That can be decided.

Candidates for the judiciary should be screened by a bi-partisan review commission before they have their names included on the ballot. The bi-partisan commission should include eight members in each of the legal jurisdictions in Illinois. That would include five Supreme/Appellate Court districts and the 22 Circuit Court districts. Cook County, because of its size, could be treated in a similar fashion but perhaps with multiple commissions. The eight members would include two each appointed by the four legislative leaders (Senate President, House Speaker, Senate Minority Leader, House Minority Leader). One of the two members appointed to the commission by each legislative leader must be an attorney, the other would not. That would assure an eight-member commission with four attorneys and four non attorneys; and four Republicans and four Democrats. In order to be recommended by the commission, a prospective candidate must win approval of six of the eight members.

That means Republicans and Democrats, lawyers and non-lawyers, would approve the candidate. Candidates for commission support would be interviewed by the commission, in addition to meeting other requirements to be determined by the commission. As many as four candidates for each position could be approved by the commission. Those four would run in a non-partisan primary election and the two highest vote getters would run in the general election. Candidates who were selected by the commission would be designated as such on a non-partisan judicial ballot, in much the same way as local referenda appear on primary and general election ballots. Murnane told FWIW in an email that he saw the commission as a way of making the proposal more politically viable. But there are a number of questions that arise from empowering legislative leaders, or their designates, to decide who is — or who is not — “backed” for the judicial ballot. Would these positions be paid?

If paid, might they then be pension eligible? And paid or not, how does one avoid the appearance of unfairness when Commission Member Smith subsequently appears in front of a judge that he or she has stamped with his or her seal of approval? Should we expect — or require — a judge to recuse him- or herself from any case brought by a commission member for a period of time — 3 years perhaps? Murnane acknowledged that recusal rules would have to be adopted, although he sees the particulars of this as a matter for the General Assembly to address. The ICJL proposal suggests that the General Assembly should determine how long any commission member might serve. The ICJL proposal also includes a significant public financing component:- Limits would be placed on expenditures by candidates in judicial elections. Public funding would be provided to candidates approved by the commissions and they could spend no more. Candidates who were not approved by the commission, but chose to run, would be limited to receive and spend no more than commission-backed candidates. In his email to FWIW, Murnane suggested that, ideally, no candidate who chose not to appear before the commission would be allowed on the ballot. Under the ICJL proposal, judges elected pursuant to this new system would face retention elections, just as judges do now. Perhaps the real significance of the ICJL’s proposal is that it is further evidence of a growing consensus, along the entire political spectrum, that significant reform of the judicial election process is necessary. What do you think of the ICJL proposal? What reforms would you propose?

In the plea agreement, the Government promised to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range, which the Government anticipated to be 188-235 months. Because the Government had miscalculated the defendant’s criminal history, however, the correct range was actually 135-168 months—even applying certain offense level enhancements that the defense contested. Although the Government acknowledged at sentencing that the properly calculated guideline range was 135-168 months, it asked the Court to impose a 235-month sentence. The defendant did not object, but asked the court to reject certain offense level enhancements and impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months. The district court applied the contested offense level enhancements and found the guidelines range to be 135-168 months, ultimately imposing a sentence of 168 months. On appeal, the parties agreed that the Government had breached the plea agreement and that the defendant could establish the first and second prongs of the plain error test. But the Government maintained that because the defendant received a sentence consistent with what the Government had promised to recommend, he could not establish that the error affected his substantial rights. The court agreed, because in Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. The court further refused to consider the merits of the defendant’s sentencing guidelines argument on the ground that he had waived his right to appeal. ] to follow those courts,” apparently creating a circuit split on the issue. Posted by Bradley R. Hall, E.D.

The Illinois Supreme Court announced yesterday it has (finally) adopted a new set of rules mostly based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Condcut. The text of the new rules is available online here and in pdf format here. A summary of the changes is available here. In 2008, while the rules were still being considered by the Supreme Court, I published an article discussing them in detail. The article is available here. In it, I praised the work of drafting committees for the most part, but I also criticized some aspects of the new rules. Unlike the current rules, the new rules include comments (usually the same text of the comments to the ABA Model Rules). The new rules abandon the old notion that the duty of confidentiality is based on a distinction between confidences and secrets which results in a rule that protects a much broader range of information.

The new rule on confidentiality also significantly changes the circumstances where disclosure of confidential information is permitted and expands the circumstances where it is mandated. The new rules fix an important discrepancy between the title of rule 4.2 and its text. The new rules change the approach to the issue of whether an attorney can represent a client if the attorney has to testify in the client’s case. The new Rule 3.8 on special responsibilities of prosecutors adds a duty to protect the defendant’s right to counsel.. It also adds a controversial statement regarding the authority of a prosecutor to subpoena other lawyers. Unlike the ABA Model Rules, the new Illinois rules do not require consent to conflicts of interest to be in writing. Sadly, the new rules eliminate the current rule urging lawyers to provide pro-bono services. The approach to the duty to report another lawyer’s misconduct seems to mandate disclosure of more information and under more circumstances than the ABA Model Rule. The new Rule 4.4(b) states that a lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of a client that the lawyer knows was inadvertently sent should promptly notify the sender. The rule, however, does not impose a duty to return the document or to refrain from reading it.

India’s Supreme Court is today hosting the final hearings of the ongoing case between cryptocurrency exchanges and the central bank concerning the latter’s blanket banking ban introduced in April. India’s crypto exchange operators have predictably challenged the central bank’s notice across the country’s courts, arguing the RBI’s chokehold is “arbitrary, unfair and unconstitutional”. In June, a Right to Information (RTI) request from a domestic lawyer seeking answers for the central bank’s policy went through, forcing the central bank to admit that it had conducted no research or consultation before introducing its crippling policy. ON July 20, the Supreme Court saw ‘limited arguments’ from lawyers on behalf of the Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI) – a body that domestic exchanges are part of, and the central bank. ],” a lawyer representing the central bank argued. The advocate for the exchange industry suggested that Indian cryptocurrency adopters and the wider blockchain industry are losing ground compared to global counterparts due to the restrictive policy.

This copy is for your personal non-commercial use only. VANCOUVER—British Columbia’s court case over the flow of heavy oil through the province could be damaged by the NDP government’s previous positions against the expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline, says a legal expert. The provincial government filed a reference case Thursday in the B.C. The province is also asking the court whether the amendments are over-riden by federal law. Nigel Bankes, chair of natural resources law at the University of Calgary, said he believes the province will lose on the validity question because it is targeting a federally approved project, even though the legislation covers broad environmental concerns. “All rhetoric, all the public announcements, all the announcements from the premier and the relevant ministers make it clear that this legislation is actually directed at Trans Mountain,” he said. Bankes said a precedent was set in 1984 when the courts ruled the government of Newfoundland and Labrador acted outside its authority by introducing legislation that disrupted Quebec’s right to access hydroelectric power from Churchill Falls. But Bruce Ryder of York University’s Osgoode Hall Law School said that case differs from B.C. Decisions made the B.C.

Supreme Court in favour of lower levels of government having the authority to create environmental protections in relation to the Northern Gateway pipeline could also support the province’s case, Ryder said. Ryder said he thinks the court will approve the validity question. The court could either refuse to answer the question due to a lack of information or, more likely, provide guidelines on how permitting could work that operates within the constriction, he said. Carissima Mathen, vice dean of the University of Ottawa’s law faculty, said there is a clear conflict between the B.C. “I haven’t seen any argument as to why the federal government doesn’t have authority to regulate this interprovincial pipeline the way they have authority over all kinds of other interprovincial undertakings,” she said. Ryder said if the province’s legislation is found to only add conditions to the shipment of heavy oils, the court could determine it does not conflict with federal law. But if the federal government introduces new legislation to “fortify” its authority over Trans Mountain, it could crush B.C.’s attempt to have some legal jurisdiction, he added. All the experts expect the case to be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. “It would be good for Canada and the global environment if we had more disputes over environmental jurisdiction,” she said, adding negotiations and compromise often result in “watering down” policies. Copyright owned or licensed by Toronto Star Newspapers Limited. All rights reserved. Republication or distribution of this content is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Toronto Star Newspapers Limited and/or its licensors.

When it comes to interests on bank accounts, there are some basic guidelines and regulations set by the Reserve Bank of India to make the banking operations smooth and effective. Every government, semi-government and private banks have to follow these basic regulations in their banking practices. Some of the regulations are described below. 1. Any bank, private or nationalized cannot accept interest free deposits from customers unless in current accounts. A bank will have to offer a uniform interest rate on saving bank deposits up to INR 1 lakh, irrespective of the amount in the account within this limit. A bank can offer different interest rates for saving bank deposits over INR 1 lakh. However, there is a condition. A bank will not discriminate between one deposit and another of similar amount, accepted on the same date, irrespective of bank locations. Apart from that, banks need to take authorisation of the Board/ Asset Liability Management Committee while setting interest rates on such deposits.

3. On saving bank accounts, bank can pay interest at quarterly or longer rests, depending upon the particular banking strategies and procedures. 4. Payment of interest on savings bank accounts would be calculated on a daily product basis by scheduled banks. 5. When it comes to term deposits repayable in less than 3 months or where the terminal quarter is unfinished, interest should be remunerated on a daily basis, taking into consideration a particular year of 365 days. However, some banks are implementing the method of considering the year at 366 days in a Leap year and 365 days in other years. Banks are free to use any methodology. However, they need to inform their customers prior about the method of calculation of interest while accepting the deposits. 6. Banks cannot pay interest on term deposit on a monthly basis; it should be paid for quarterly or longer intervals. 7. In case of a single term deposit of INR 15 lakh and above, a bank can offer different rates of interest. However, a bank cannot offer different rates of interest on the aggregative of individual deposits where the sum exceeds INR 15 lakh.