Again, here is a link to the opinion (majority opinion by Justice Thomas; dissent filed by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Breyer). Under the Patent Act, a company can be liable for patent infringement if it ships components of a patented invention overseas to be assembled there. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). A patent owner who proves infringement under this provision is entitled to recover damages. § 284.The question in this case is whether these statutes allow the patent owner to recover for lost foreign profits. We hold that they do (p.1). The majority opinion centers on the Supreme Court’s extraterritoriality analysis, although it does also reiterate, as past decisions have done, that § 284 is intended to provide “full compensation” for the infringement. The Court expressly decides not to “address the extent to which other doctrines, such as proximate cause, could limit or preclude damages in particular cases” (p.9 n.3). Basically, the Court concludes that the conduct that § 271(f)(2) addresses is domestic, and thus that § 284 should be read as providing full compensation for that act of domestic infringement. This Court has established a two-step framework for deciding questions of extraterritoriality.
It can be rebutted only if the text provides a “clear indication of an extraterritorial application.” Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. Courts make this determination by identifying “the statute’s ‘focus’” and asking whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in United States territory. Ibid. If it did, then the case involves a permissible domestic application of the statute. We resolve this case at step two. 5 (slip op., at 10, n.5) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ]’” or vindicate. Morrison, supra, at 267 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. But if the relevant conduct occurred in another country, “then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S.territory.” Ibid. Applying these principles here, we conclude that the conduct relevant to the statutory focus in this case is domestic. We begin with § 284. It provides a general damages remedy for the various types of patent infringement identified in the Patent Act.
The portion of § 284 at issue here states that “the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement.” We conclude that “the infringement” is the focus of this statute. ] patent owners complete compensation” for infringements. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. ] the Patent Holder. ’” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. But that observation does not fully resolve this case, as the Patent Act identifies several ways that a patent can be infringed. See § 271. To determine the focus of § 284 in a given case, we must look to the type of infringement that occurred. We thus turn to § 271(f)(2), which was the basis for WesternGeco’s infringement claim and the lost-profits damages that it received. Section 271(f)(2) focuses on domestic conduct. ] in or from the United States.” . In sum, the focus of § 284, in a case involving infringement under § 271(f)(2), is on the act of exporting components from the United States.
] of the statute’s solicitude” in this context. Morrison, 561 U. S., at 267. The conduct in this case that is relevant to that focus clearly occurred in the United States, as it was ION’s domestic act of supplying the components that infringed WesternGeco’s patents. Thus, the lost-profits damages that were awarded to WesternGeco were a domestic application of § 284 (pp. So, suppose we have a replay of Power Integrations or Carnegie-Mellon. The infringing conduct at issue is a manufacture, use, or sale that occurs in the United States, in violation of § 271(a), but which triggers a chain of events resulting in (1) the U.S. As I’ve noted previously, I’ve come around to the view that the answer is yes, and I’m inclined to read Justice Thomas’s statements as quoted above as supporting that result. But I think Justice Thomas has the better of the argument here, when he states in the majority opinion that this “position wrongly conflates legal injury with the damages arising from that injury” (majority opinion p.9).
Suppose a company develops a prototype microchip in a U.S. Suppose too that the chip infringes a U.S. Under the terms of the Patent Act, the developer commits an act of infringement by creating the prototype here, but the additional chips it makes and sells outside the United States do not qualify as infringement. Under WesternGeco’s approach, however, the patent owner could recover any profits it lost to that foreign competition—or even three times as much, see § 284—effectively giving the patent owner a monopoly over foreign markets through its U.S. That’s a very odd role for U.S. “foreign law alone, not United States law,” is supposed to govern the manufacture, use, and sale “of patented inventions in foreign countries.” Microsoft, supra, at 456 (dissent pp. I have a hard time imagining the initial act of manufacturing the infringing prototype in the U.S. And what about the noninfringing alternative of manufacturing the prototype in a country where it isn’t patented (a point the Solicitor General made in his brief, as I recall)? That would seem to eliminate most of the damages resulting from the foreign sales, I should think. Worse yet, the tables easily could be turned. If our courts award compensation to U.S. ’t run, what happens when foreign courts return the favor? Suppose our hypothetical microchip developer infringed a foreign patent in the course of developing its new chip abroad, but then mass produced and sold the chip in the United States. A foreign court might reasonably hold the U.S. But if it followed WesternGeco’s theory, the court might then award monopoly rent damages reflecting a right to control the market for the chip in this country—even though the foreign patent lacks any legal force here (dissent p.8). I suppose that’s a risk–but for that matter, other countries could interpret their patents as having extraterritorial force altogether, if they wanted to.
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The facts in brief are as follows. Plaintiff and defendant are competitors in the market for respirator filters, and at some point both independently developed methods for imparting something called an “electret” characteristic to their filters. At an exhibition in 1997, TransWeb’s founder Ogale handed out samples of a filter material his firm had developed. 3M filed a patent application more than a year after this exhibition, eventually obtained two patents, and filed an infringement action against TransWeb. In Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), the U.S. After Therasense,the showing required for proving inequitable conduct and the showing required for proving the fraud component of Walker Process liability may be nearly identical. See, e.g., Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct and Walker Process Claims AfterTherasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. Pa. While 3M points to evidence supporting a conclusion that fluorinated material does not form a distinct market, this does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s conclusion to the contrary.
The court also finds no error in the jury’s determination of the relevant geographic market. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . ’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). The jury concluded that TransWeb was entitled to its lost profits and attorney fees in recompense for 3M’s antitrust violation. 7.7 million defending the infringement suit. 3.2 million on a one-for-one basis as “cost of suit” fees. 23 million as damages. 3M does not appeal the lost profits or cost of suit fees. 23 million of attorney-fees damages, because TransWeb failed to show any link between those attorney fees and an impact on competition. 3M argues that those attorney fees had no effect on competition because they did not force TransWeb out of the market or otherwise affect prices in the market.
On this basis, 3M argues that those attorney fees are not an antitrust injury and thus cannot be a proper basis for antitrust damages. Section 4 of the Clayton Act does not provide recompense for any injury causally linked to a violation of the antitrust laws, but rather only for antitrust injury. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990); Brunswick Corp. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 7.7 million must be “attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny” in order to qualify as an antitrust injury. Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. ] from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior,” not from competition-increasing or competition-neutral aspects. 3M’s argument focuses on the fact that the harmful effect on competition proven by TransWeb at trial never actually came about. TransWeb proved at trial that increased prices for fluorinated filter media and respirators would have resulted had 3M succeeded in its suit. However, because TransWeb prevailed, these effects never materialized. We do not read the antitrust injury requirement from Atlantic Richfield, Brunswick, and similar cases to so narrowly define the scope of antitrust injury.
Those cases dealt with situations where the antitrust-defendants’ actions, though unlawful, would not have actually reduced competition. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. 337-38 (rejecting attempt to recover profits lost due to an increase in competition and reduction in prices caused by vertical, maximum-price-fixing arrangement); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 487-88 (rejecting attempt to recover lost marginal profits that were not achieved because an acquiring company purchased a failing company, thus maintaining competition with the antitrust plaintiff). In this case, however, 3M’s unlawful act was in fact aimed at reducing competition and would have done so had the suit been successful. 3M’s unlawful act was the bringing of suit based on a patent known to be fraudulently obtained. What made this act unlawful under the antitrust laws was its attempt to gain a monopoly based on this fraudulently-obtained patent. TransWeb’s attorney fees flow directly from this unlawful aspect of 3M’s act. ] acts unlawful,” Brunswick, 429 U.S. ] anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny,” Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 334. The “competition-reducing aspect,” id. 344, of 3M’s behavior was its attempt at achieving a monopoly by bringing the subject lawsuit. Therefore, TransWeb’s attorney fees are both injury-in-fact and antitrust injury. The court finds further support for awarding attorneys’ fees spent in defending the patent infringement claim in precedent from other circuits involving sham litigation antitrust claims, and from the policy of encouraging parties to file meritorious antitrust suits. To be honest, I’ve never given much thought to the question of what appropriate antitrust damages should be for attempted (but unsuccessful) monopolization. As 3M points out, when (as here) the attempt is unsuccessful there may be no exclusion of competitors or higher prices. 8 million in fees. As a matter of policy, enhanced damages conceivably make sense for antitrust violations that are hard to detect or that cause harm to a wider population–the optimal deterrence point–but it’s never been clear to me why U.S.
Indira Jaising is a woman who anyone would think more than twice before messing with. She has a reputation for being formidable—as a lawyer and also as a legal activist. She is India’s first woman additional solicitor-general and the first-ever woman to become senior advocate in the 154-year-old Bombay High Court. Yet, she was sexually harassed—that, too, in the precincts of the Supreme Court. Sexual harassment, Jaising says in an interview with THE WEEK, is the “hidden dirty secret” of the legal profession in India, faced not just by women lawyers but even women judges. Are the Indian judiciary and the bar patriarchal? Highly patriarchal, in many ways. There is no enabling environment in the courts for a woman lawyer. This is driving out women from the profession. There is another very important issue—of sexual harassment of women, both lawyers and judges. I am fighting a case of a woman judge who had to resign after she complained against another judge for having sexually harassed her. This is the hidden dirty secret of the legal profession.
Women lawyers and even judges are sexually harassed. ] sexually harassed by judges in the Supreme Court. If this is the position of two interns working with Supreme Court judges, I cannot imagine the real extent of the problem. How rampant is this malaise? Even now, I experience abuse from male colleagues. Sexual harassment is not related to age. I have experienced it at my age. I have been subjected to sexual harassment in the corridors of the Supreme Court. It happened a couple of years ago. It is a busy place and it is normal for people to bump into you. But, you know when it is accidental and when it is deliberate. It was another senior male lawyer. I did not make any complaint, but I stopped him then and there and confronted him about it. I feel it is an adequate way of dealing with it. So, I had to experience it, despite my seniority in the profession and despite my age. Women lawyers and judicial officers who are junior are definitely more vulnerable. Don’t these problems exist in other professions, too? Yes, but there is a difference.
If a woman government employee is sexually exploited, the government is under obligation to redress her complaint. A woman lawyer is self-employed. It is like being in the unorganised sector. And junior women lawyers are dependent on seniors. So, in the legal profession, you are on your own. You do not have the protective umbrella of the employer. Did you have to face problems as a woman lawyer? People say to me that now that I have made it, I do not have to face these problems. But, even after ‘I have made it’, my word is often treated as less valuable than the word of a male lawyer. If there is a male lawyer with me, the judge asks the male lawyer to speak. I lose the precious initial minutes to make my point. This mindset flows from the top to the bottom. The judges, too, come from our society, and how they behave in court is determined by their upbringing.
They display an inability to accept that women are equal. Isn’t there any change in the higher judiciary? Women lawyers talk about being patronised by the men in the profession. It is unfortunate—this tendency to patronise women in the profession. What the male judges and lawyers do not like is women not willing to be patronised. If you do not have a godfather, it is not accepted. If you are your own person in the legal profession, it is not accepted. If you are okay with being patronised, you are accepted in the inner circle; you are accepted into the old boys’ club. I insisted on not becoming part of the old boys’ club. Coming from a non-legal family, I worked hard and persevered despite odds. I make it a point to hire women lawyers in my office. They have a safe working environment in my office. Why are there so few women judges? The main reason for this is the inability of the women to lobby. Many women lawyers could become judges if they are given the opportunity at the right age, taking their merit into consideration. Can reservation for women in the higher judiciary help? I would like to call it affirmative action and not reservation. It should be done. Definitely, it will lead to appointment of more women judges. This way, we can have a critical mass of women judges. That would make a difference. If you have two people of equal merit, one is a man and the other a woman, the woman should be preferred. The work space will become more democratic if you have more women judges. In the work environment, being a woman would be more acceptable and not be seen as an exception to the rule.
For those lawyers who become judges, a high court may beckon. Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court or a state Supreme Court weigh constitutional issues and make decisions that affect all citizens. The president appoints justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, while state Supreme Court justices are either appointed by governors or elected by popular vote. Justices who land one of these jobs earn more on average than other lawyers. The Chief Justice of the U.S. 267,000 according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. 109,940 for all judges according to the United States Department of Labor. The median salary means half the judges make less than this amount and half make more. Federal salaries also best pay among state Supreme Courts. Pay for justices who serve on state high courts varies. Justices in some locations earn much more than other places. 244,179 a year, for the highest state-court pay in the nation. Supreme Court justices receive compensation-boosting perks.
Federal high-court justices with at least 10 years’ experience on federal benches can retire at full salary if their years of service and age equal 80 or more. To keep judges with severe physical or mental decline from staying on the bench for financial reasons. U.S. Supreme Court justices also qualify for health insurance through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. Benefits, which justices can tap into after retirement, include national networks of doctors with no waiting period for care. States also offer benefits to justices. For example, Texas provides longevity pay, or bonuses that grow the longer justices serve. In Minnesota and most other states, Supreme Court justices are eligible for state-employee insurance benefits, as well as pension plans that both states and judges contribute to. For U.S. Supreme Court justices, a lifetime appointment is another advantage. Justices must work as lawyers before they’re appointed or elected to a high court. Earning a law degree requires four years of undergraduate study and three years of law school. More than half of states also require justices to take continuing-education classes. In addition to education, justices need critical-reasoning skills and the ability to set aside personal beliefs and base decisions on rules of law. They must be able to weigh many facts and make fair decisions quickly. Listening skills are key, because justices have to pay close attention to each side’s arguments. Justices have to sift through large numbers of documents to filter facts. Also, justices must be able to write clearly so that both sides understand and accept the reasoning behind a decision.
It has been nearly two months since I posted the last entry. Truthfully, nothing much of substance has happened, although the various newspapers around the state, the various anti-public employee organizations (e.g. OSBA, OBA, PBA) are still running around with their hair on fire about the “PERS Problem”. Even national columnists and investment advisors are writing about the impending doom from a public pension debacle. 41 billion?), the solutions vary from state to state and from public entity to public entity. One certain thing is that States, by the constitution, cannot go bankrupt. As an extension, a public retirement system run by the State cannot go bankrupt. 100,000 cap (not indexed for inflation) has multiple problems because of the accrued benefit matter. As long as individuals have access to the 3 year average, it will trump any 5-year average or salary cap for individuals close to retirement. Ditto for sick leave. You can stop further accrual, but you can’t take away what is already accrued.