I Chose The Photo Of The Supreme Court

Israel’s Supreme Court ruled on Thursday that buses for ultra-Orthodox Jews that force women to sit separately from men are illegal, but also added that they could not halt voluntary segregation. Ultra-Orthodox women and their supporters launched a legal battle three and a half years ago leading up to this point. They challenged the rules on “kosher” bus line that caters to Israel’s ultra-Orthodox Jewish community. Several years ago, the Israel Religious Action Centre (IRAC) filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of Transportation and two privately owned bus companies, accusing them of discriminating against women by operating these buses. The bus lines in question required that female passengers wore modest clothing and must board and sit at the back of the vehicle. The lawsuit was filed immediately after five women came forward saying they were both verbally and/or physically attacked, and in some instances, denied permission to board the bus because they failed to observe the modesty and boarding regulations. Anat Hoffman, the centre’s executive director, called yesterday’s Supreme Court ruling “a tremendous victory”.

Regarding legal issues, the Counties and the State of Florida should prepare themselves for the spate of lawsuits sure to come due to the mistreatment of children by untrained child care staff in county jails. Florida’s reputation will suffer along with its children who are subjected to these bad practices. This bill was not vetted in public hearings. It was conceived and moved along during the frantic budget process and then agreed to by only two lawmakers in conference committee. The community has been denied the opportunity to speak directly to problems with its theory and implementation. The framers of the legislation have not taken into account the havoc to be wrought when some counties “opt in” and others “opt out”. The implications for the operations of the Offices of the State Attorneys, Public Defenders and the Department of Juvenile Justice are profound. Children will be detained long distances away from legal counsel and their families, and, in some cases, even hundreds of miles as a result of the real-life operating scenarios to unfold if this bill is implemented. The extent of problems in disproportionate access, transportation, medical care and parental and family involvement have not yet fully come to light because the bill did not receive a proper airing during the legislative session. With this bill the detention system for children in Florida will be neither state nor county. It will hover somewhere in between and children will experience the worst of both worlds. SB 2112 should not go forward. It will make the lives of children worse, not better.

Nowadays, it’s easy to upload your digital photographs to the internet, and it’s even easier for someone else to take those images and use them on their own web sites. This can be both good and bad. It’s great if you want your photos to gain a larger audience, and the site using them has given proper credit for the images. It’s bad if you’ve specified that the photos are not for general public use, and someone else has “borrowed” them anyways. How can you tell if someone else is using your photos? Since most internet search engines look for matching text, they’re not very helpful in this regard. However, there is a relatively new image search engine called TinEye that specializes in finding photos using image identification technology. That is, TinEye looks for images on the web that match some initial image that you specify. How Does TinEye Work? To use TinEye, you do have to create an account and confirm your email address, but the account is free and doesn’t take very long to set up at all.

Once you’ve created an account, you can either upload the image you want to search for or supply the URL for the web page where the photo is currently housed. As an example, I entered the URL for The White House Government home page in TinEye. TinEye took a few moments to scan that page and first returned all the images it found as shown in the screenshot below. From here, you can select any of the images that you want to search the web for. I chose the photo of the Supreme Court. There were three matches returned. As you can see from the matches returned, TinEye doesn’t just look for exact duplicates of the photo. The image search engine also takes into account that the photo may have been cropped, resized, or had other modifications made to it, and it returns these types of images in the search as well. It’s very possible that the images found by TinEye as possible matches for your photo really aren’t your photo at all. You’ll have to manually review the results and determine if you think it is a match.

For instance, in the example we used, the Supreme Court is a fairly common subject for photos taken by tourists, and many photographs of the building will appear very similar to one another. So, it’s quite possible that these photos did not come from the same original source even though they all look very much alike. The major limitation of TinEye is the number of images that it has already indexed that can be compared to your photo. If a copy of your photo exists on the web, and TinEye has not indexed it yet, it will not appear in the search results. As of today, TinEye has over 1 billion images indexed, and that number continues to rise. Just to use as a reference, about a month ago when I was checking something out on TinEye, the web site only had about 9 million images indexed. So, the search engine is definitely expanding its information base! TinEye is still in beta, so other improvements are being made on a continual basis as well. The image search engine still has quite a bit work to do to index a larger portion of the internet, but it’s definitely a site to keep your eye on.

Donya Tyree Hooks and her brother, Donald Hooks, owned an apartment building on Green Street in Chicago. Donald lived in the building; Donya did not. The property was insured with State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. The building was damaged in a fire on March 4, 2001 and a building tenant, Sharon Conner Hooks, was injured. Sharon was married to Donald at the time of the fire. Donya tendered Sharon’s suit to State Farm. State Farm contended that Sharon was an insured under Donya’s policy and, in general, an insurer has no obligation to defend a suit by one insured against another. Specifically, State Farm relied on the policy definitions to establish who was supposed to be insured under the contract: “‘You’ and ‘your’ mean the ‘named insured’ shown in the Declarations. Your spouse is included if a resident of your household. ‘We’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ mean the Company shown in the Declarations.” Donya and Donald were named insureds under the policy – and Donald’s spouse, Sharon, the plaintiff in the underlying case, would also be included within this definition.

The liability coverage of the policy contained an exclusion purporting to excuse State Farm from defending against any claim for “bodily injury to you or any insured within the meaning of part a. The Appellate Court’s decision is grounded in the severability provision of the State Farm policy. That provision read, “This insurance applies separately to each insured. State Farm argued that this conclusion would be inconsistent with State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Guccione, 171 Ill.App.3d 404, 525 N.E.2d 595 (2nd Dist. In Guccione, a named insured, Anthony Guccione, was accused of negligently discharging a firearm in the direction of his stepson, Gus Kazas, causing injury to Gus. Prior to the shooting, at least, Anthony, Gus, and Gus’ mother had all lived under the same roof (presumably, although the opinion does not discuss this, not as an entirely happy family). Discussing the severability clause in Guccione, the Appellate Court stated (525 N.E.2d at 597), “even if we view Anthony Guccione as a separately insured party, the exclusionary clause still applies.

5): “Under both policies, in order for someone to qualify as an ‘insured,’ that person must be both a relative of the named insured and reside in the same domicile as the named insured. State Farm was the plaintiff in Guccione as well; one can hardly have expected State Farm to raise this argument. On the other hand, the Guccione court did not address the absence of any blood tie between Anthony and Gus. The point that the Hooks court stressed, however, was that, unlike Anthony and Gus, Sharon and Donya never lived under the same roof. ”) Sharon was not an insured under Donya’s ‘separate’ coverage: They were not residents of the same household. Under Hooks it is clear that and insurer can refuse to defend its insured against a suit brought by related persons living with the insured. Left unresolved by the Hooks case is whether it is the ‘living together’ or the familial relationship that justifies the exclusion.

Other insurance companies have crafted an exclusion to attempt to prevent persons from suing a named insured with whom they reside, whether or not the person suing has any familial relationship with the insured. For example, in Peters v. Farmers Ins. 2003), an unpublished opinion, Daniel Peters rented an “upstairs bedroom” from David Wearn, a colleague of his from work. Peters sued Wearn after falling down the stairs leading to his rented bedroom. Similarly, in Illinois Farmers Ins. 1999), the underlying tort claimant, Barbara Brenny, was a ‘sublessee’ of the apartment rented by Farmers’ insured, Katina Neumann. Brenny argued, unsuccessfully, that the absence of any “social relationship” between with Ms. Neumann should have been taken into account concerning the applicability of the exclusion pertinent in that case. But the tort claimant and the defendant insured did reside in the same apartment. Certainly, insurers are entitled to be protected against collusive claims. However, family or resident exclusions, like other “provisions that limit or exclude coverage are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and ‘most strongly against the insurer.’” See, National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Glenview Park District, 158 Ill.2d 116, 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (1994); see also, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

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Applications closed last week for the next class of Cook County associate judges. If history is any guide, it’s safe to say that somewhere between 250 and 300 lawyers (including some former judges and perhaps even some currently-sitting judges) applied. The Circuit Court will shortly announce all of the persons who applied this time around (the Circuit Court solicits public comment about those applying) and I’ll put the list up here on FWIW when it is released. I was one of those filing an application last week and, when I turned in the application, I mentioned it on my Facebook page. I received a number of encouraging comments in response (not all of them from immediate family!), but the comments, nice as they were, exposed a degree of confusion about how associate judges are selected. I thought it might be useful to explain that in a post here. All judges in Illinois are elected — but not all judges are elected by the people.

In Cook County, the winners of the Democratic Primary are usually assured of victory in November. There are a few exceptions. Cook County’s 13th Judicial Subcircuit is heavily Republican. Some subcircuits have elected both Democrats and Republicans — but, mostly, the winners of the Democratic Primary are also the winners in November. The Republican Party seldom bothers to field candidates for most countywide vacancies in Cook County. But these are not the only judges elected in Illinois. The process is fairly automatic and all provided for in the rule. In Cook County, “notice is given to the bar of the circuit” via publication of an announcement in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin. We could — theoretically — fill each Cook County associate vacancy as soon as one occurs. That’s how they do things in DuPage County, for example, where Anne T. Hayes, a DuPage County Assistant State’s Attorney, was recently selected to become an associate judge. But we have more judges in Cook County than in other Illinois counties — a lot more. Back in 2011, the Tribune reported that we have 418 judges in Cook County — 275 elected circuit and subcircuit judges and 143 associate judges. A Cook County nominating committee trying to fill each associate judge vacancy as it occurred would be in almost constant session. Therefore, here in Cook County, we don’t start the process until the five vacancy mark is reached — the maximum amount that can be reached before a selection process must be started. Now that it has begun the process, the Circuit Court of Cook County will move just as fast as personnel and budgetary requirements dictate, and no faster. Other than the manner of their selection, there is not much difference between circuit judges and associate judges. There is a small salary difference (full circuit judges make a little more). Pursuant to Article VI, Sec.

Patrick Day of the Coalition for Responsible Regulation argued that the finding “erroneously decided to completely divorce” the risk assessment from the agency’s regulatory decisions. Judge David Tatel, who was particularly aggressive in questioning both sides, sharply dismissed Day’s logic. “I do not understand your argument,” he said. “Why don’t you try again? Tatel and Sentelle both seemed concerned that the petitioners were asking the court to overturn the scientific basis for EPA’s endangerment finding or the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts. Both judges indicated that was not their job. U.S. Circuit Judge David Tatel pointing out the agency had found the science certain enough. Against this backdrop, today’s Petitioners forwarded non-scientific reasons that they claimed would permit EPA to avoid finding that greenhouse gases are harmful to human health. Sometimes in reading Petitioners’ briefs, I got the feeling that Massachusetts hadn’t been decided. Among these non-scientific factors: Petitioners urged that EPA must consider humans’ ability to adapt to a changing climate in determining whether greenhouse gases endanger human health.

The second is a bit of serious merriment, as the folks at the Canadian Committee for the Advancement of Scientific Skepticism (CASS) fisk Tom Harris’ version of a climate change course. Tom, a public relations guy, took over a Carleton University course from Tim Patterson, a noted rock head and denialist there. Evidently lectures at CU are (partially) available as videos to those taking the class and to staff, so a staff member asked for and got access. The Ottawa Skeptics had a field day and dug out 142 issues for the bunnies delectation. Eli, being a backwards bunny will start at the back. CASS makes the excellent point that climate science is undergoing refinement reinforcing basic ideas rather than rebuilding from scratch but Eli asks why not, we bunnies are changing the climate at lightening (for geology) speed, which is the problem. One of the principles of engineering is if you want to understand how a system works, give it a kick and observe. Unfortunately, if you are in the box, this can be annoying.

Often referred to as the Year 10K problem. Eli would suggest that it would be a good thing to hang around for. Oh hell, its the usual spinach. Go read the CASS report, Skeptical Science or Coby Beck and the other blogs. Eli admires how CASS anticipates the spittle headed its way. Academic freedom carries with it the duty to use that freedom in a manner consistent with the scholarly obligation to base research and teaching on an honest search for truth. There was no free exchange of ideas, but the one-sided presentation of a biased viewpoint that contradicts much established research. Indeed, not only were alternative views not given time, but students were actively encouraged to ridicule those individuals who espoused views considered “alarmist” by the instructor (see our comment concerning “blooper of the week” above). Finally, as we demonstrate extensively in our analysis, the material presented was not an adequate representation of the current state of the field of climate science. The teaching of critical thinking and skepticism is healthy in a university setting where students are expected to move beyond the confines of rote learning. The major responsibility of the faculty at any university or college is to evaluate itself. Not so well known is that the faculty also evaluates adjuncts, instructors, whatever you call em. There is no way that the Carleton University Department of Earth Sciences met its responsibilities in this case. Harris is simply not qualified to teach a course on climate change.

Alan S. Reid, Senior Lecturer in Law, Sheffield Hallam University. As the Brexit clock ticks down, and the diametrically opposed objectives of Theresa May’s negotiating imperatives become ever more exposed, the clamour to clarify the processes and procedures surrounding Brexit intensifies. The group is headed by Andy Wightman MSP, and the other pursuers are Ross Greer MSP, Alyn Smith MEP, David Martin MEP, Catherine Stihler MEP and Joanna Cherry QC MP. English MPs Tom Brake and Chris Leslie were joined in the case in May 2018. The case was crowdfunded through the Good Law Project, headed by Jolyon Maugham, who is also a petitioner. The pursuers are keen to know the answer to this question since they believe that the route to Brexit is not unidirectional and binary. For the pursuers, representing constituents in a nation of the United Kingdom which voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU referendum, Brexit does not have to result in ‘Deal or No Deal’.

Rather, there may be a third way: A People’s Vote that includes the option to Remain in the European Union. In February 2018, the pursuer’s application for judicial review (subject, in Scotland, to the Court of Session Act 1988, s. ] UKHL 44, at paras. 39, 46, 52 and 65. See also Lord Rodger’s dicta at para. As is well known, the European Court of Justice does not entertain national courts submitting hypothetical questions concerning EU law (see, for instance, Foglia v Novello). The petitioners, in their case, also objected to the stated position of UK Ministers that outlines that Article 50 TEU is not unilaterally revocable. Indeed, in the earlier seminal constitutional case of Miller, the question of unilateral revocability of Article 50 TEU was assumed by both parties to be answered in the negative (para 10 of that judgment). The pursuers then immediately appealed to the Inner House of the Court of Session, where their reclaiming motion was successful.

The judgment of the Inner House was delivered on the 21st of September 2018. The Inner House found for the Reclaimers on a number of grounds. Lord Carloway, the Lord President, dismissed the UK Government’s claim that the judicial review action was not competent because the order sought was not practical. On the contrary, Lord Carloway considered that the issue was justiciable precisely because there was such controversy as to the appropriate way forward within the parliamentary process (paras 22-23 of the judgment). In all of these scenarios, there is a presupposition that both the Brexit clock inexorably continues to countdown to the 29th of March 2019 and that the choice for the UK Parliament is stark: Deal or No Deal. In the reclaiming motion, the Scottish judges approved the text of the question that they wished to send to the CJEU (see the Appendix to the judgment). Given that time is of the utmost essence in this case, the Scottish court expressly requested use of the expedited procedure (see Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU) before the Luxembourg court.

At present, the average time taken for the CJEU to deliver a ruling under the Article 267 TFEU procedure is 15.7 months (page 114 of the 2017 Annual Report of the CJEU) . Such a timeframe would, ironically, render the judgment academic since the UK is heading towards Brexit in just over four months. However, even with the expedited procedure, the Court will in all likelihood take between 3 and 5 months to render a judgment. The window of opportunity for the CJEU is exceedingly tight. It received the Scottish reference on the 3rd of October 2018. Sixteen days later, the President of the CJEU confirmed that, given the constitutional seriousness of the case, the case would be expedited. The UK Government has formally objected to this preliminary ruling request on a number of fronts. Firstly, the UK Government has published a policy paper to the effect that the question from the Scottish court is still a hypothetical one and that the CJEU has overstepped its judicial role in effectively acquiescing in this subterfuge.

These arguments can be dealt with cursorily. As a cooperative horizontal judicial process between national courts and the CJEU, it is for the national court alone to determine the appropriateness of sending an EU law question to the CJEU for adjudication. The UK Government’s second approach to taking exception to this Scottish court reference was to challenge the process of requesting assistance from the CJEU itself. Regardless of the relative merits or demerits of such an approach by the UK Government, these legal actions evidence a worryingly poor grasp of EU law principles. CJEU itself issues guidelines on how to refer EU law questions to it, however, these guidelines cannot fetter the wide discretion afforded to national courts to make their own decision on the appropriateness of an Article 267 TFEU reference. The lack of knowledge of basic underpinnings of EU law at the heart of the UK Government is either negligence writ large or an unashamed attempt to circumvent well established judicial lines of communication between national courts and the CJEU. Either way, it diminishes the reputation of UK Plc.