Divorce Appeal In Supreme Court Of India

Ms. Prieto talked to Henares and BIR Regional Director (now Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue) Nestor Valeroso, on different occasion, who both gave leniency to GDI. The aforesaid deficiency tax assessment obtained finality because GDI failed to file a VALID PROTEST against the Formal Letter of Demand and Assessment Notice (FAN). However, Henares intentionally did not collect it, purportedly because representatives of GDI complained to her that Dalanon’s assessment was faulty. Thus, she ordered two (2) re-investigations. There is no LAW that authorizes the commissioner to order two (2) re-investigations of a FINAL, EXECUTORY and DEMANDABLE assessment. She also claims that the authority to decide and declare finality of a certain assessment is a function vested by law upon the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Her assertion does not find basis in LAW. Her claim that Dalanon’s assessment was faulty is WRONG. In fact, she was not able to dispute Dalanon’s assessment.

2.34 per mmbtu. The Bombay High Court decided in RNRL’s favour, but RIL moved the Supreme Court on July 4 challenging this decision. For last many years, Anil Ambani has indulged in many a malicious campaign against RIL and its chairman. These campaigns reached their nadir in recent months through a vicious series of advertisements, unprecedented in India’s corporate history. This was followed by Anil Ambani’s endeavor to rope in NTPC in Reliance’s gas dispute. Over the last few months many in the government, including the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister, have said the brothers must put an end to such acrimony. 4.20 per million British thermal unit (mBtu) for the next 5 years. 4.20 per mBtu soon also agreed to pay the disputed marketing margin to Reliance Industries under protest and sought natural gas to its power plant when it resumes operations after a maintenance shutdown. Despite these past events, RIL in its statement to the press said that, it welcomes Anil Ambani’s statement of reconciliation, and hopes that it is a positive change in the negative, calumnious and malafide campaign launched by R-ADAG against RIL. Mukesh Ambani said that this issue can be easily resolved, provided the proposal for reconciliation is anchored in good and honest intentions. According to RIL’s statement, the dispute under litigation is not merely a family matter, as Anil Ambani’s statement tries to make out to be. Another point that evokes a question is that, Anil Ambani, has yet again sought to communicate to RIL and its Chairman through the public domain, whereas he could have easily contacted his elder brother directly.

On January 11, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that one unlucky law school graduate is carrying too much student loan debt to be allowed to hold a license to practice law in the state. On January 11, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that one unlucky law school graduate is carrying too much student loan debt to be allowed to hold a license to practice law in the state. Hassan Jonathan Griffin, the subject of the ruling, graduated from Ohio State Universitys Moritz School of Law in 2008 after working as a stockbroker in Arizona for five years. 150,000 in debt from student loans. 16,500 in credit card debt. Griffin applied in November 2009 to take the Ohio bar exam in February 2010, but his student loan debt disclosure on the exam application triggered an investigation by the State Bar Associations Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness. Following the boards report, the Ohio Supreme Court denied Griffins application to take the Ohio bar exam on the grounds that he had no feasible plan to satisfy his financial obligations and repay his school loans.

Griffin is far from the only would-be attorney to run afoul of state licensure laws due to unpaid school loans. In the last two years, Texas and New York have both denied law licenses to applicants who defaulted on large debts from college and graduate loans. This emerging trend of denying a professional license to an applicant on the basis of excessive student loan debt hasnt been limited to the legal profession. In October, the state of Tennessee revoked the licenses of 42 nurses who had defaulted on their college loans. Tennessee officials say that their move to revoke the nurses licenses came only after 18 months of attempts to get the nurses into a repayment plan of some type for their defaulted loans. Some of these nurses, state officials noted, had been in default for as many as eight years. The Tennessee Department of Health reports that since it relieved the 42 nurses of their credentials to work, about half of them have entered a student loan repayment plan, and their licenses have been reinstated. In addition, states and the federal government can also garnish borrowers take-home pay by as much as 15 percent, reduce Social Security benefits, and intercept tax refunds as a means of recovering unpaid student loan debt. A defaulted education loan can remain on ones credit report indefinitely, as long as the loan remains in default, and for up to seven years following repayment, once the defaulted debt has been paid off.

Northern Trust Bank to stop handling IOLTA accounts: Beginning of a trend or isolated incident? The letter I got from the Northern Trust was confusing. My office checking account is there. My personal checking account is there, too, and my savings account, and my IRA and a couple of Northern Trust Funds accounts besides. This must be a mistake, I thought, so I called the man who wrote the letter. He’s out of town. I called a more general number. 2 million on deposit. As the nice lady from the bank and I were talking, I pulled up the list of eligible institutions maintained by The Lawyers Trust Fund of Illinois to see where else I might go. Still, James J. Grogan, ARDC Deputy Administrator and Chief Counsel, was not surprised when I told him what the Northern Trust had told me. Grogan said. He suggested I talk with David T. Holtermann, General Counsel of the Lawyers Trust Fund of Illinois. Holtermann wasn’t surprised either; LTF has also received a number of phone calls from concerned lawyers. LTF was “blindsided” by the Northern Trust’s announcement, Holtermann told me.

But, he added, LTF has put a link on its website just this week, providing an update for lawyers concerned about their Northern Trust IOLTA accounts. This page will be updated, Holtermann said, as new information becomes available. IOLTA accounts are different from the typical, modern bank account in several ways. Account holders pay no monthly maintenance fee for IOLTA accounts, but most other checking accounts come with at least a monthly maintenance fee that the customer must pay. I asked Holtermann whether IOLTA accounts have become so different that banks are becoming unwilling to deal with them. Is Northern Trust the harbinger of a trend, or just an instance of a bank changing directions about the kind of clientele it wants? Holtermann told me in response, adding that, despite some initial concerns from LTF’s banking partners, there have been no real issues about reporting. We can’t predict the future, Holtermann said, but there’s no reason to see this action by Northern Trust as the beginning of a trend. There certainly is reason to believe that other banks will not follow the Northern Trust’s lead. With roughly 400 participating banks (even after the Northern Trust’s defection) it seems pretty obvious that a lot of banks value IOLTA accounts because they value lawyer business. Presumably, these many banks find that any administrative inconveniences in managing IOLTA accounts are more than made up for in good will and other business that lawyers can bring. LTF was established by the Chicago and Illinois State Bar Associations in 1983. The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently designated LTF to administer the IOLTA program and make grants to support the provision of legal aid throughout Illinois. Today LTF uses proceeds from the IOLTA program and funds generated by the annual Legal Aid Fee assessed on active Illinois lawyers at the direction of the Supreme Court in order to make grants. 6.47 million was generated by the Legal Aid Fee. 2.27 million was realized from IOLTA.

Albert J. Klumpp, PhD, a Research Analyst with the Chicago firm of McDermott Will & Emery LLP, has provided FWIW with his take on the recent Supreme Court primary. He agreed with my suggestion that Justice Mary Jane Theis’s victory had a lot to do with her fundraising and TV ad campaign. Klumpp noted that there have been only seven Supreme Court contests in Cook County during the past 38 years; these events provide insufficient data for serious number-crunching. But, he suggests, an analogy may be made between the Supreme Court races and other countywide judicial races. Therefore, Klumpp concludes, simply raising and spending lots of money is not enough. The ads purchased, he says, must have an impact. In the case of Justice Theis, Klumpp felt there were three identifiable reasons why her commercials were effective. I mentioned the pro- and anti-Romney ads, but Klumpp felt these were relatively few, at least compared with other election cycles. Cunningham was a strong candidate, Klumpp said. And, Klumpp added, Pucinski beat Theis in only four of the 50 wards, winning by double digits in only one. It was Justice Theis’s success in all ethnic communities in the City that suggested to Klumpp how important was Emanuel’s endorsement. I asked Dr. Klumpp if he might be exaggerating the mayor’s influence. Certainly, his endorsement of Justice Theis was decisive in getting her a head-start on fundraising, and certainly when elected Mayor Emanuel polled well in areas across the city. But controversy descends upon anyone on the 5th Floor. Dr. Klumpp’s 2005 Ph.D. I’ve asked Dr. Klumpp to share more of his observations concerning the recent primary race with FWIW readers and I’m hoping he will find time to do so.

Arising out of S.L.P. 2. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized on the 30th of April, 1979 as per the Hindu rites at Akola. In the wedlock, two sons, namely, Vishal and Rahul, were born on 23.9.1982 and 1.11.1984 respectively. As the appellant-husband felt that there was total discord in their marital life and compatibility looked like a mirage, he filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) (ia) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for brevity ‘the Act’). 3. It was the case of the appellant before the court of first instance that the respondent-wife did not know how to conduct herself as a wife and daughter-in-law and despite persuasion, her behavioural pattern remained unchanged. The birth of the children had no impact on her conduct and everything worsened with the efflux of time. 5. The asseverations made in the petition were controverted by the respondent stating that she was always respectful and cordial to her in- laws, relatives and the guests as was expected from a cultured daughter-in- law.

They led a happy married life for 16 years and at no point of time she showed any arrogance or any behaviour which could remotely suggest any kind of cruelty. She attended to her mother-in-law all the time with a sense of committed service and at no point of time there was any dissatisfaction on her part. She disputed the allegation that she had hidden the keys of the motorcycle or closed the gate or repeatedly called the appellant on phone at the office to abuse him or to disturb him in his work. It is her stand that the appellant owns an oil mill, ginning factory and a petrol pump at Chopda and had sold certain non-agricultural land by demarcating it into small plots. 7. The learned trial Judge framed as many as four issues. The two vital issues were whether the appellant had been able to prove the alleged cruelty and whether he was entitled to take disadvantage of his own wrong. The appellant, in order to prove the allegation of cruelty, examined ten witnesses and on behalf of the respondent, eight witnesses were examined.

10. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Judge, the husband preferred Second Appeal No. 683 of 2006 before the High Court. The learned single Judge of the High Court came to hold that there were concurrent findings of fact and no substantial question of law was involved. 11. We have heard Mr. Arvind V. Sawant, learned senior counsel for the appellant-husband, and Mr. Vivek C. Solshe, learned counsel for the respondent-wife. 13. At this juncture, we may note with profit that the learned senior counsel for the appellant exclusively rested his case on the foundation of mental cruelty. 17. The expression ‘cruelty’ has an inseparable nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status.

], a two-Judge Bench approved the concept of legal cruelty as expounded in Sm. “Conception of legal cruelty undergoes changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living. With the advancement of our social conceptions, this feature has obtained legislative recognition that a second marriage is a sufficient ground for separate residence and separate maintenance. Moreover, to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. ], while dealing with ‘cruelty’ under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, this Court observed that the said provision does not define ‘cruelty’ and the same could not be defined. The ‘cruelty’ may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulty. “First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second, the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse.

Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. 19. After so stating, this Court observed about the marked change in life in modern times and the sea change in matrimonial duties and responsibilities. It has been observed that when a spouse makes a complaint about treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions.

It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. ] wherein Lord Denning stated, “the categories of cruelty are not closed”. “Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty. These preliminary observations are intended to emphasise that the court in matrimonial cases is not concerned with ideals in family life. The court has only to understand the spouses concerned as nature made them, and consider their particular grievance. ], it has been held that mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to behaviour or behavioural pattern by the other.

Mental cruelty cannot be established by direct evidence and it is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment, and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. ], it has been opined that a conscious and deliberate statement levelled with pungency and that too placed on record, through the written statement, cannot be so lightly ignored or brushed aside. ] and Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of U.P. 32. Presently, to the core issue, viz, whether the appellant-husband had made out a case for mental cruelty to entitle him to get a decree for divorce. 33. The appellant-husband, examining himself as PW-1, has categorically stated that the wife used to hide the pressed clothes while he was getting ready to go to the factory.

Sometimes she used to crumple the ironed clothes and hide the keys of the motorcycle or close the main gate. In the cross-examination, it is clearly stated that the wife was crumpling the ironed clothes, hiding the keys of the motorcycle and locking the gate to trouble him and the said incidents were taking place for a long time. This being the evidence on record, we are at a loss to find that the courts below could record a finding that the appellant used to enjoy the childish and fanciful behaviour of the wife pertaining to the aforesaid aspect. This finding is definitely based on no evidence. Such a conclusion cannot be reached even by inference. If we allow ourselves to say so, even surmises and conjectures would not permit such a finding to be recorded. It is apt to note here that it does not require Solomon’s wisdom to understand the embarrassment and harassment that might have been felt by the husband.

The level of disappointment on his part can be well visualised like a moon in a cloudless sky. 34. Now we shall advert to the allegation made in the written statement. The respondent-wife had made the allegation that the husband had an illicit relationship with Neeta Gujarathi. The learned trial Judge has opined that the said allegation having been proved cannot be treated to have caused mental cruelty. He has referred to various authorities of many High Courts. The heart of the matter is whether such an allegation has actually been proven by adducing acceptable evidence. It is worth noting that the respondent had filed a complaint, RCC No. 91/95, under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code against the husband. He was discharged in the said case. The said order has gone unassailed. 35. Another aspect needs to be taken note of. She had made allegation about the demand of dowry. RCC No. 133/95 was instituted under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the husband, father-in-law and other relatives.