An Advocate And Indian Law In Light Of Supreme Court Judgements

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Just what you might expect from an attorney whose Civil Court campaign motto was “Elect a Mensch To the Bench! Every time we pointed out to a colleague that Justice Schmidt would seek re-election in this September’s primary the response was a collective “Are you kidding! He should be appointed for life! Justice Schmidt has been praised for his knowledge of the law, and his innate ability to size up a case as well as the competing attorneys and put a “real number” on a case. Defendant and plaintiff attorneys agree. Typical is legendary defense counsel Mark Longo, who regards Justice Schmidt as ‘one of the most hard-working, sincere and competent jurists I have come across in my more than 27 years of practicing law. Attorney Longo cites Justice Schmidt’s “ability to bring parties together to resolve cases under difficult circumstances, for example where there is no (bodily injury) insurance.

The lawyers have called it a “discriminatory” decision. The Indian Express had reported on March 26 that the SC collegium has recommended to the Centre that lawyers who are to be considered for the post of HC judges should be between 45 and 55 years. For elevation of district and sessions judges to the HC bench, the collegium has recommended a maximum age of 58-and-half years. “(The) bar association has received representations from many senior advocates and other members of the Bar, raising concern about Supreme Court’s decision of fixing a maximum age limit of 55 years. It is arbitrary,” bar association president Harpreet Singh Brar said. The association wrote that Articles 124 and 217 of Constitution regarding appointment of judges do not provide any age bar. “Secondly, the discrimination of age bar between lawyers vis-a-vis judicial officers is unfair and discriminatory,” it stated. The association also stated that discrimination in fixing an upper age limit for advocates “puts lawyers at lower pedestal, and less deserving and (less) meritorious”. It argued that elevation to the HC bench is not done every year, and at times for years together, which scuttles opportunities for lawyers for consideration to be elevated to the bench. “In case the elevation is not held every year, some lawyers would surpass the age of 55,” it contended.

Michael Cordts was a Tribune employee who made a short term diability claim. The newspaper used Medeval Corporation to evaluate the merits of such claims. Medeval employee disclosed that treatment to Cordts’ ex-wife. Cordts hadn’t mentioned this treatment to his ex-wife and he had no intention of doing so. His Complaint against the Tribune and Medeval had four counts. Counts I and III alleged defamation. According to the Defendants, Counts II and IV attempted to state a claim under the common law invasion of privacy. The Defendants filed a §2-615 motion to dismiss the defamation counts. Their motion to dismiss Counts II and IV was brought solely under §2-619. And that’s where the Defendants went fatally off course. The trial court dismissed the entired case, but Cordts elected to appeal the dismissal of only Counts II and IV. In Storm & Associates, Ltd. Cuculich, 298 Ill.App.3d 1040, 700 N.E.2d 202, 206 (1st Dist.

A motion brought under §2-619 is different. For one thing, a court can consider affidavits or other material competent under Supreme Court Rule 191 in deciding such a motion. Most importantly, however, a §2-619 motion, like a summary judgment motion, “admits the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Joseph v. Collis, 272 Ill.App.3d 200, 649 N.E.2d 964, 969 (1st Dist. In the Cordts case, the Defendants had a strategic reason to bring their motion under §2-619: They wanted to use matter outside the four corners of the pleading. Justice Joseph Gordon, writing for a unanimous panel, explained (slip op. Even the Defendants were obliged to concede that the plaintiff’s ex-wife was a person with whom the plaintiff had a “special relationship.” Getting back to Justice Gordon’s opinion (slip op. ]efendants contend by way of affirmative defense that the disclosure was, nevertheless, excusable because Kathleen had a “natural and proper interest” in the information.

The Appellate Court concluded (slip op. ]e would have to agree with defendants that an ex-wife would have a natural and proper interest in learning about any debilitating condition suffered by her ex-husband that could impact his ability to maintain support of the their children. In this case, no one disputes that Cordts was liable to provide support to his daughter and that if he ceased to be able to support her, that obligation would fall solely to Kathleen, the child’s mother. Cordts, by his claim, tacitly concedes that his mental condition was such that a disability claim was appropriate. And if the Appellate Court had agreed with the Defendants that this was all Plaintiff was attempting to plead in Counts II and IV, it would have affirmed the trial court. But the Appellate Court did not agree. The court quoted this allegation from Cordt’s complaint (slip op. ] under 740 ILCS 110/3, commonly known as the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act and also under the Defendant Tribune’s own privacy policies. The Appellate Court found (slip op. Defendants on notice of a claim — founded on the Confidentiality Act. In support of this conclusion, the Appellate Court cited §§2-612(a) & (c)of the Code of Civil Procedure (slip op.

Advocates in India constitute a privileged class that enjoys the exclusive right to practice law. As officers of the Court as well as agents of the client, the advocate has to adhere to a standard of conduct which is befitting of his status and responsibility. It may be noted that under the Advocates Act, the concerned State Bar Council can take disciplinary action against any advocate who is found to be guilty of professional or other misconduct. The use of the word ‘other’ clearly indicates that misconduct does not merely refer to professional misconduct – it could refer to any misconduct, whether in the professional capacity or otherwise. To understand the scope and implication of the term ‘misconduct’, the context of the role and responsibility of an advocate should be kept in mind. Misconduct is a sufficiently wide expression, and need not necessarily imply the involvement of moral turpitude. The Supreme Court has, in some of its decisions, elucidated on the concept of ‘misconduct’, and its application.

] the Supreme Court explored the amplitude and extent of the words “professional misconduct” in Section 35 of the Advocates Act. It may be noted that in arriving at the decision in the case, the Supreme Court carried out an over-view of the jurisprudence of the courts in the area of misconduct of advocates. It reiterated that the term “misconduct” is incapable of a precise definition. Broadly speaking, it envisages any instance of breach of discipline. It means improper behavior, intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of standard of behavior. The term may also include wrongful intention, which is not a mere error of judgment. Therefore, “misconduct”, though incapable of a precise definition, acquires its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of duty. To sum up, it must be improper or wrong behavior which is willful in character. It may involve moral turpitude, but is not a mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of duty. The advocate, as an officer of the Court, also has the responsibility to render services of sound quality. Likewise, in the case of N.G. Ultimately, as it has been upheld and reiterated that “misconduct” would cover any activity or conduct which his professional brethren of good repute and competency would reasonably regard as disgraceful or dishonourable. It may be noted that the scope of “misconduct” is not restricted by technical interpretations of rules of conduct. This was proven conclusively in the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. ]The facts under consideration involved advocates positioning themselves at the entrance to the Magistrate’s courts and rushing towards potential litigants, often leading to an ugly scrimmage to snatch briefs and undercutting of fees.

An Oak Park synagogue’s bid to double its occupancy limit was denied for a second time Thursday when a panel ruled the county had not violated a federal law protecting religious exercise. The decision by the county Planning Commission returns the matter to the Board of Supervisors, although representatives of Chabad of Oak Park expect a court fight may be necessary. Rabbi Shlomo Bistritzky said after the 4-1 decision. Leaders of Chabad of Oak Park want the commission to raise the occupancy allowed by its county permit from 70 to 145. The ceiling would apply to Sabbath and Jewish holiday services at the converted house in a residential area. Commissioners rejected the expansion over customary land use issues in July, then took it up again Thursday to weigh whether it’s required under the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. In a six-hour hearing in Ventura, rabbis and worshipers said their rights to practice their faith had been compromised. Worshipers cannot easily get to another service if 70 people are already inside the chabad because their beliefs prohibit driving on the Sabbath, Bistritzky said.

Although they sympathized, four of the five commissioners said the denial did not violate the federal law. Commissioners Leo Molitor, W. Stephen Onstot, Michael Wesner and Richard Rodriguez found no violation. Commissioner Nora Aidukas dissented. Commissioners said that even though they did not find in favor of the chabad, they hoped the Board of Supervisors would consider raising the ceiling over 70 for the growing congregation. But Bistritzky said in an interview that he was not interested in compromising. Commissioners ruled after Assistant County Counsel Robert Kwong said a variety of technical grounds had to be met. He cited other court decisions involving the law to commissioners, who were skittish about handling issues that are often left to federal judges. Molitor told the chabad’s followers. To make the finding, the commissioners first had to decide whether the chabad had made a “prima facie” case, or one true at first sight that the county had “substantially burdened” the exercise of religion. None but Aidukas agreed that the county had done so. The panel decided unanimously that the government had a compelling interest in the matter. All but Aidukas said the county had acted in the least restrictive manner. About 50 people attended the hearing, some the orthodox Jews who attend the chabad and others neighbors opposing expansion. Jeri Fox, a 27-year resident of Oak Park. A fire inspection last year showed that at least 168 people could safely occupy the structure. An environmental review also cleared the proposed expansion, officials said. Planning Director Kim Prillhart, though, said zoning rules require compatibility between the chabad and the homes in the surrounding area. Chabad leaders agreed to the limitation of 70 when terms were negotiated for the permit in 1994, she said.

There are few things more dramatic than a television show or film that shows ordinary people joining together in a class action lawsuit to bring down corporations. Like what every class action lawyer will tell you, it is not as simple as that. It takes more than a group of people complaining about the same thing to gain the benefits of a class suit. Class actions as done in America have their origins in the legal traditions of the English chancery court. In the 17th century, English courts set up the “bill of peace.” This allowed a group to be represented in court by a single person. To be eligible for the bill, there were three requirements. They first looked at whether there were many interested persons for the lawsuit. The second was determining if all members had an interest in the issues. The third required a representative who can protect the interests of all members, especially those who were absent.

The US adopted class representation on a case-to-case basis until the US Supreme Court said in 1853 that courts should allow it for the sake of justice and convenience. Any class action attorney will tell you that class suit helps deal with cases that involve large numbers of people. Instead of several individual cases, there is just a consolidated suit. Class suits also give litigants strength and unity, preventing defendants from taking apart a case by going after litigants piecemeal. In most cases, there are three important factors for a court to determine if a class suit is possible. One of the most important is the certification of the “class” that will file the suit as one. A class could be composed of a group of factory workers or customers who were affected by the same brand. Another is that there must be enough members of a class that even joint filings will be cumbersome. Your class action lawyer will point out, though, that numbers alone do not make a class. Federal courts have been known to recognize a group over a dozen members as a class and reject those with a membership in the hundreds. Another requirement is that the litigants must have issues in common. This means that all the members of the class should have at least one issue of law or fact. The representative is an important part. He or she is required to be a member of the class, as defined by the court. Additionally, the representative must be capable of fighting for the rights of their class. Federal Rule 23 also insists that there be no family or financial relationship with the class action attorney pushing for the case.

Slow. Glacially slow. Maddeningly, dangerously slow. That is so far my experience with the new Cook County efiling system. And, from what I’ve heard from colleagues and from what I’ve been seeing online, specifically from the Civil Practice and Procedure Section on ISBA Central, I am not alone. But, first, the good news: Free filing online is once again free. 3.95. (I’m still waiting for word of the class action suit on this one. I have heard from one colleague who said that she signed up with an EFSP (I believe that’s the appropriate jumble of letters) that charges a fee for free filing. But what my colleague did was analogous to paying someone else to file her documents for her. There have always been services willing to take your money and wait in line to file your documents, right? But this is no longer required. I can access the virtual file counter through Odyssey File & Serve. In the past, I had efiled in DuPage or Will Counties using I2File — but I2File is not yet accepting Cook County filings. The new Cook County efiling system went into effect at the beginning of the month.

At the end of that week I had to file a rather involved motion — one with hundreds of pages of exhibits. But, as I’d learned from efiling in DuPage, even competently run systems will have limitations on file sizes for documents to be filed. So I knew I had to break this mammoth motion into more manageable parts. Who in the world came up with that name? The way it’s used here conjures images of Greylord — I got what you need in this envelope right here. I think the Cook County efiling interface must have been designed by someone who saw a file-stamped pleading once. The file stamp winds up on the page in the place you’d expect. But the designer could not possibly have had any experience actually filing documents. 1. Create the document, and print it out. 2. Sign the document. 4. Prepare a Notice of Filing for the document — and sign that — and make the requisite number of copies. 5. Go the Daley Center. 6. Get in the appropriate line on the 6th or 8th floors thereof.