Some States, such as California, have the lowest workers compensation benefits in the United States. These States have workers compensation laws that are very unfair to seriously injured workers and their families. Because of this, for most seriously injured workers, the only way they are going to receive fair compensation for their work injury case is by successfully bringing a third party work injury case. If you get injured at work, you can not sue your employer. Generally, the only recovery you have against your employer is workers compensation benefits. If someone else is legally responsible for your injuries you can bring a third party civil lawsuit. Also called a third party case. With a third party case you can recover lost wages, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life damages. You can not recover these damages in a workers compensation case. This is why if you are a seriously injured worker you must try and hire the right work injury attorney for your case.
A word to the wise. The great thing about the Internet is also the problem with the Internet. The Internet allows just about anybody to say just about anything. Anyone can call themselves a “Third Party Work Injury Attorney” or the like. They can do this whether they have been handling these cases for 20 years or they hope you’ll sign up with them so they can handle their first real third party work injury case. Fact is, it is difficult for the average client to tell the difference. 1. How many third party cases has the lawyer successfully handled? 2. Has the lawyer received favorable results at trial for third party work injury cases? 3. Does the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm handle workers compensation cases? 4. Has the attorney published articles in the area of third party work injuries? Have they published third party work injury articles in prestigious lawyer publications? 5. Has the lawyer been recognized by their peers? For example, have they been elected to office by the local Trial Lawyer / Consumer Lawyer organizations? Have they been elected to office by their state-wide Trial Lawyer / Consumer Lawyer organizations?
6. Has the lawyer been involved in important State Supreme Court cases? 7. Does the attorney have testimonials from other workers for their work injury cases? 8. Does the lawyer project confidence when you speak to them about your case? 9. What is the lawyers AVVO rating? 10. Does the lawyer have an informative website regarding work injuries? Be sure to take the time to research and evaluate the third party work injury attorney you hire. We understand that not every seriously injured worker will be able to hire the very best work injury lawyer for their third party case. But if you ask these questions, you will be in a much better position to evaluate the lawyers ability to successfully handle your work injury case. This article is not legal advice. I am simplistic in order to achieve clarity. The circumstances of your case may vary from those described herein. The foregoing legal discussion is based upon California work injury law. The law in your State may vary. If you are a seriously injured worker you should consult with a third party work injury lawyer. About The Author Bill Turley is a California Third Party Work Injury Lawyer. He was elected President of the Consumer Attorneys of San Diego and was elected to the Board of Governors of the Consumer Attorneys of California.
But all the attorney did in Bordyn was attempt to file his notice of appeal and proof of service of that notice as a single document. Further, these 2014 “standards” generally refer to the voluntary efiling regime that the Illinois Supreme Court was then trying to encourage. These standards were referred to in the introductory paragraphs of the January 22, 2016 Order adopting a timetable for mandatory efiling across the state, but they were not adopted as rules. An e-filed document submitted to the Clerk for filing shall be deemed filed upon review and acceptance by the Clerk. Illinois Supreme Court Rules. Rather, the paragraph merely describes what consequences follow for a document that fails to conform to these objective filing requirements that the court — not the clerk — has set forth. Now, I understand that one should not read too much into a Rule 23 Order like Bordyn. It will never be cited by any reviewing court addressing an efiling issue. But it will have been read.
Third in a series inspired by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s charges that “Illinois has one of the five worst legal climates in the nation.” Prior entries here and here. Certainly a lot of them are — and it’s nothing new. Go back and read the old Sun-Times series, “The Accident Swindlers” — a Pulitzer finalist in 1981 for Pam Zekman, Gene Mustain, Gilbert Jimenez, Norma Sosa, Larry Cose, Patricia Smith and John White. But flimsy soft-tissue cases still exist. I would argue that the biggest single reason for the discrepancy in damage awards is Supreme Court Rule 90: More often than not, the arbitrators hear difference evidence than the jurors. In the same case. But Rule 90 does not apply at trial: Medical records and bills that are automatically admitted at arbitration may never see the light of day at trial. It’s pretty easy to see why a proceeding where the bills are in evidence will result in a bigger award than a proceeding where the bills are not. In December 2003, Rule 90 was amended to require a plaintiffs to specify whether their medical bills are paid or unpaid.
In general, when evidence is admitted in a personal injury suit, by testimony or otherwise, that a medical bill was for treatment rendered and that the bill has been paid, the bill is deemed prima facie reasonable. The idea is simple: People don’t pay for what they don’t need. Enforcement of the rule would surely hold down awards in many “soft tissue” cases — the bills are seldom paid. The point of this lengthy example is to show that rules matter. It’s not that arbitrators are “liberal” and Cook County juries are not, it’s that the two groups often reach different results in the same case because they consider different evidence, not because of some partisan approach. Different rules apply; different results obtain. When the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the American Tort Reform Foundation decries “liberal” judges, they do both the judges and the public a disservice. What these groups are really exercised about are, more often than not, rules or statutes. That should be the focus of their efforts.
Silence can be golden. It can be a powerful courtroom weapon. ASA John Kastrenakis sitting silently in court for several minutes during closing argument in the Joyce Cohen murder trial. Kastrenakis was showing to the jury the impact of how long the defendant waited to call the police after her husband was killed-by hit men she had arranged. Go to West Palm and ask Judge K about it. Which brings us to Merchant v. State, where one Dwayne Merchant was on trial for first degree murder. As his fate was in the hands of the jury, the bailiff brought to the court’s attention that the alternate was the brother of one of the jurors deliberating. The court had a bit of a meltdown. It confronted the two jurors and chastised them for not mentioning they were related when the court inquired at the beginning of voire dire if any jurors knew anyone else. Ask the defendant if he consented to the mistrial.
As the scene unfolded, the defense attorney wisely remained silent. The court declared a mistrial. The defense then moved to dismiss the case for double jeopardy. Judge Tinkler-Mendez denied the motion. Au contraire said our 3rd DCA and Judge Emas: the motion should have been granted. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded with instructions that Mr. Merchant be discharged. A Rumpole “Well done. Well done indeed.” goes out to appellate ace Andy Kawel for the resounding victory. Thereafter, the case was reset for trial. As noted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. Doubt about the appropriateness of a mistrial is resolved in favor of the defendant, and the State “must demonstrate ‘manifest necessity’ for the mistrial, a requirement that has been part of this country’s jurisprudence since 1824.” Thomason, 620 So. 2d at 1237 (internal citations omitted). Manifest necessity requires that there be a “manifestly urgent and absolute necessity” for declaring a mistrial. Id. at 1239 (quoting State v. Grayson, 90 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla.
Moreover, manifest necessity requires that the trial court evaluate and discuss available alternatives prior to declaring a mistrial where the defendant does not consent to such an action. “Manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial without the defendant’s concurrence may be demonstrated only if the trial court has considered and rejected all possible alternatives.” Torres v. State, 808 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. See also Thomason, 620 So. And now we get to the power of silence. In the face of Judge Tinkler-Mendez declaring a mistrial, the defense remained silent. The State contended below, and on appeal, that Merchant should be deemed to have “consented” to the mistrial because neither he nor his counsel voiced an objection, thus waiving his right to later assert a double jeopardy bar to retrial. However, this position is without merit, as the law on this point is well-established: a defendant’s mere failure to object to a declaration of mistrial is not tantamount to consent. See State v. Grayson, 90 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla.
Thus, absent the defendant’s consent to the declaration of a mistrial, retrial is barred by double jeopardy unless the State meets its “heavy burden to show that the mistrial was justified by manifest necessity.” Spaziano, 429 So. 2d at 1346. The record in the instant case reveals no manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial and further reveals that the trial court failed to evaluate, discuss or consider available alternatives before declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury. The trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial, without the consent of the defendant, appears to have resulted from a series of assumptions and inferences, rather than from competent record evidence. Even if we were to accept the assumption that Kira and Kevin are brother and sister, this surely did not—without more—necessitate a mistrial. The court did not ask the defense for its suggestions or inquire whether the defendant agreed to a mistrial.
The court did not solicit or receive any input from the State or defense regarding any possible alternatives to a mistrial. The court’s conclusions were based almost entirely on assumption, inference and speculation. Nowhere are these conclusions confirmed on the record, particularly the central assumptions that Kira and Kevin are siblings and that they discussed the evidence or testimony during the course of the trial. The trial court erred in failing to conduct any inquiry and, by relying instead on assumption, inference and speculation, abused its discretion in concluding that a mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. At some point enough should be enough. The trial court was chastised repeatedly throughout this opinion. The trial court’s failure to make an inquiry, develop a proper record, and consider alternatives before declaring a mistrial forecloses a conclusion that a mistrial was even warranted, let alone one supported by manifest necessity. All because the defense attorney kept his mouth shut when the court declared a mistrial.
The Income Tax Department of the Indian government has allegedly dived in nine Bitcoin exchanges to appear into suspected tax evasion. The coordinated operation saw multiple teams visit nine anonymous exchanges in a number of cities including Bangalore, Delhi, Kochi and Hyderabad, according to the report. The leap is seen as the first important operation by Income Tax Department authorities beside Bitcoin exchanges, coming at a time when Bitcoin prices continue to smash record highs – up over 1,700% ever since the turn of the year. Before this year, important Indian Bitcoin exchanges launched a self-regulatory body to homogenize AML and KYC rules for clients and adopters as authorities and watchdog carry on to stay ambiguous over apparent guidelines or a regulatory potential for the industry. In November, India’s Supreme Court called on authorities and other ministries to plan legislation to legalize the flow of Bitcoin in India’s emerging but surging bitcoin ecosystem. Author’s Bio: Ricky Makan is a venture capitalist and Crypto Enthusiast best known for pioneering the market for Digital Marketing. He is a Co-founder of Unkrypted, a platform which provides the latest news and information that helps understand everything about the ever-evolving world of digital currencies. Please Register or Login to post new comment. Is Singapore Stocks Market on Bull Trend – Time to Invest ? How to Choose Best Investment? Can Tata Equity PE Fund Fulfil the Goal of Daughter’s Marriage After 7 Years? How To Buy Stocks? What is a Forex Broker? Breaking News: Five Winds Asset Management – no funds withdrawal.
Many readers are no doubt aware of the 2013 decision of the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in a case in which Huawei accused InterDigital of violating its obligation to license certain patents on FRAND terms. The court concluded that a FRAND royalty would be no more than 0.019% of the value of each Huawei product. To determine the reasonableness of the licensing terms offered by InterDigital to Huawei, the court examined publicly available information, including information on InterDigital’s licensing revenues, to estimate the fees that InterDigital charged or proposed to charge Apple and Samsung. The court needed to reverse engineer these numbers because InterDigital refused to disclose them, fearing that they would be provided to non-parties to the case. The court then compared those estimates to the fees that InterDigital had demanded from Huawei and found the latter to be much higher. In this respect, the unpublished decisions mirror the analysis in the judges’ articles. Some factors mentioned in both the judges’ articles and the unpublished decision look different from factors that would be relevant in a U.S. The InterDigital judges in their articles mentioned jobs-related factors. Huawei employs 51,000 R&D staff with over 49,000 patent applications and 17,765 patents granted worldwide. In contrast, InterDigital has 260 R&D personnel with only 19,500 patents and patent applications. Two more recent papers discussing this case are Fei Deng & Su Sun, Determining the FRAND Rate: U.S. Perspectives on Huawei v. InterDigital, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Feb. 2014(1), available here, and David S. Evans, Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, & Xinhua Zhang, Assessing Unfair Pricing under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law for Innovation-Intensive Industries, available on ssrn here. The Deng/Sun paper focuses on the Chinese court’s use of assertedly comparable licenses to determine the FRAND rate, and provides a translation of a portion of one of the Chinese judges’ articles on this issue. The second paper is somewhat broader in scope, but discusses the Huawei v. InterDigital case towards the very end (pp.
JUDGE PANDO AND SARI ADDICOTT. Judge Pando is challenged by attorney Sari Addicott. Ms. Addicott is not known to us, but that is not a qualification or disqualification for our endorsement. 25,000.00 loan to her campaign, she should be removed from the bench. The Herald also noted that Ms.Addicott has practiced law for 26 years and has the experience and qualifications to be a Judge. We did not follow the story surrounding Judge Pando’s loan, but in reviewing the public documents, we agree her conduct merits strong consideration for her opponent. We did have the occasion to see and appear before Judge Pando when she was in the REGJB. We found her to be a good judge, although we had strong negative opinions about her inability to appear in court on time. We strongly objected to the possibility that Judge Pando was asked to leave the Justice Building because of complaints from the State Attorneys Office. We cannot imagine any more chilling effect on an independent Judiciary than the ability of some pretentious prosecutor pontificating about a Judge’s ruling being able to get the Judge re-assigned. Therefore, for those reasons alone, our sympathies lie with Judge Pando. Indeed we may even vote for her. But there is considerable strong negative language in the opinion from the Florida Supreme Court about Judge Pando’s conduct during the previous election. Combined with her inability to promptly arrive for court on a regular basis, we feel we are prevented from endorsing her. Three attorneys vie for an open circuit court seat.
The Special Master hearings in the Moro et al consolidated cases (SB 822 and SB 861) are due to conclude today, if they haven’t already. The arguments over the income tax subsidies for out of state retirees is all new. The crux of the argument revolves around the Hughes case (1991), the adoption of HB 3349, and what the legislative intent of SB 651 (1991) was. This could be a trickier legal battle than I thought it might have been in the past. The Special Master will digest all this material and present his report to the Oregon Supreme Court on or before April 30, 2014. Once the report is available, I will provide a link to it from here. Do recall that the Special Master report is simply another piece of evidence used by the Supreme Court in formulating its rulings. The justices are not obligated to use any or all of the report; they may reject some findings, accept others, and completely ignore still others.
Ten days after he was sworn in, Judge Christ was dead. At first, the death of the 49-year old, married father of six was attributed to natural causes. That’s what Marlon A. Walker reported in the March 12 editions of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Walker wrote that Christ died on a duck-hunting trip with friends. More specifically, he died in a Pike County hunting lodge owned by fellow Judge Michael N. Cook. And then, as Robert Patrick reported for the Post-Dispatch, the Pike County Sheriff (who doubles as Pike County Coroner) found cocaine underneath Judge Christ’s body. Toxicology reports suggested the presence of both cocaine and alcohol and authorities are now convinced that Christ died of a drug overdoes. Judge Cook was only other person in the hunting lodge when Christ died and Cook was arrested on federal drug charges on May 22. But these charges are not related to the death of Judge Christ. On May 28 the Springfield State Journal-Register carried an AP story claiming that a St. Clair County probation worker, James Fogarty, admitted to an FBI informant that he’d provided cocaine to both Judges Cook and Christ. Paul Hampel writes in the May 29 Post-Dispatch that Cook has resigned from the bench — or tried to. St. Louis television station KSDK reports that Judge Cook handled 90 percent of the circuit’s drug court cases.
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